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Abstract 
This thesis provides an examination of the key determinants of industrial company 
failure in the UK and Russia, for the 1990s. 
For the UK, some new empirical evidence, presented for the 1990s recession period, 
is based on binary logit analyses of a cross-section and unbalanced panel of large 
quoted companies, using accounting-based indicators. Conventional for cross- 
sectional studies empirical design of modelling the failure determinants separately 
for various risk-horizons, prior to the event of insolvency, is extended here by 
allowing for unanticipated changes in the nominal interest rate and in the real 
exchange rate, and also by controlling for the firm's age effect. We find that cross- 
sectional models, conditioned on changes in overall economic conditions, dominate 
simpler models, utilising financial inputs alone, for comparisons of ex ante, out-of- 
sample classificatory accuracy. Thus, the UK data suggest that for the years before 
and during the 1990s recession, shifts in the real exchange rate and rises in the 
nominal interest rate magnified dramatically the risk of failure of highly geared 
firms. The estimates from the fixed effects models indicate substantial unobserved 
heterogeneity across members of the panel and reveal that failing UK companies 
were less liquid, lacked profitability, and had declining net worth. 
For Russia, the evidence from binary logit is bootstrap-based and controlled by 
comparison with a similar random sample drawn for the UK over the recession years 
1990-91. The Russian data uncover that, unlike in the UK, gearing and liquidity did 
not appear to explain enterprise liquidation in the mid-1990s, while lower 
profitability and smaller size were the key determinants of failure risk. 
vi 
List of Tables 
Page 
2.1 Principal Components of Empirical Design Adopted by the Core Studies into 
Corporate Failure at the Firm-Level ...................................................... 62 2.2 The Forewarning Ability of Failure Models Based on MDA .................................... 108 2.3 The Forewarning Ability of Failure Models Based on Binomial Logit ..................... 109 3.1 Sectoral Composition of the UK Company Cross-section for the Reporting Years 146 
1988-94 .................................................................................................................... 3.2 Number of Company-years in Sets of Non-Failed Finns, Used for Random 
Selection of Non-Failed-Group Observations in Estimation Cross- 
sections .......................................................................................... 147 3.3 Financial Ratio-Based Models: Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK 
Companies, One and Two Years Prior to Failure ..................................................... 185 3.4 Financial Ratio-Based Models: Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK 
Companies, Three and Four Years Prior to Failure .................................................. 186 3.5 Classification and Predictive Ability of Financial Ratio-Based Models, One and 
Two Years Prior to Failure: Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies.. 187 
3.6 Classification and Predictive Ability of Financial Ratio-Based Models, Three and 
Four Years Prior to Failure: Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies.. 188 
3.7 Models Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables: Logit Results for the Cross- 
section of UK Companies, One and Two Years Prior to Failure ............................. 194 3.8 Models Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables: Logit Results for the Cross- 
section of UK Companies, Three and Four Years Prior to Failure ........................... 195 3.9 Classification and Predictive Ability of Models Incorporating Macroeconomic 
Variables, One and Two Years Prior to Failure: Logit Results for the Cross-section 196 
of UK Companies ................................................................................................... 3.10 Classification and Predictive Ability of Models Incorporating Macroeconomic 
Variables, Three and Four Years Prior to Failure: Logit Results for the Cross- 
section of UK Companies ........................................................................................ 197 3.11 Models Incorporating the Duration Term: Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK 
Companies, One and Two Years Prior to Failure .................................................. 205 3.12 Models Incorporating the Duration Term: Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK 206 
Companies, Three and Four Years Prior to Failure ............................................... 3.13 Classification and Predictive Ability of Models Incorporating the Duration Term, 
One and Two Years Prior to Failure: Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK 
Companies ................................................................................................................ 207 3.14 Classification and Predictive Ability of Models Incorporating the Duration T erm, 
Three and Four Years Prior to Failure: Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK 
Companies .............................................................................................................. 208 3.15 Models Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables and the Duration Term; Logit 
Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, One and Two Years Prior to 
Failure ...................................................................................................................... 212 3.16 Models Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables and the Duration Term: Logit 
- -Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, Three and Four Years Prior to 
Failure ...................................................................................................................... 213 3.17 Classification and Predictive Ability of Models Incorporating Macroeconomic 
Variables and the Duration Term: Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK 
Companies, One and Two Years Prior to Failure ..................................................... 214 3.18 Classification and Predictive Ability of Models Incorporating Macroeconomic 
Variables and the Duration Term: Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK 
Companies, Three and Four Years Prior to Failure ................................................... 215 4.1 Transition within the Panel of UK Industrial Companies for 1988-93 ....................... 228 4.2 Sectoral Composition of the UK Industrial Company Panel for 1988-93 .................. 229 
Vil 
4.3 Results from Fixed Effects Binary Logit for the Unbalanced Panel of UK Quoted 
Companies, the Panel Period 1988-93 ..................................................................... 2R; 
4.4 Sets of the Key Determinants of Failure Risk for UK Quoted Companies in the Late 
1980s and Early 1990s: A Comparison of Cross-sectional, Financial Ratio-based 
Logit Models and Fixed Effects Logit Models for the Unbalanced Panel .................. 242 
5.1 Sectoral Composition of the Russian Company Sample for 1995-96 ......................... 263 
5.2 Sectoral Composition of the Estimation Sample of UK Companies for 1990-91 ...... 263 
5.3 Logit Results for Russian Data, 1995 Estimation Period .......................................... 272 
5.4 Logit Results for UK Data, 1990-91 Estimation Period ........................................... 
273 
5.5 Logit Results for Russian Data, 1995-96 Estimation Period .................................... 
278 
ALI Company Insolvency in 1988-94, England and Wales .............................................. 
301 
A2.1 Means and t-statistics - Independent Variables for the Estimation Samples used in 
the Cross-sectional Analysis of UK Companies, Sample Period 1988-91; One and 
Two Years Prior to Failure ...................................................................................... 
302 
A2.2 Means and I-statistics - Independent Variables for the Estimation Samples used in 
the Cross-sectional Analysis of UK Companies, Sample Period 1988-91; Three and 
Four Years Prior to Failure .................................................................................... 
304 
A2.3 Pairwise Correlations for the Estimation Sample used in the Cross-sectional 
Analysis of UK Companies; One Year Prior to Failure ............................................ 
306 
A2.4 Pairwise Correlations for the Estimation Sample used in the Cross-sectional 
Analysis of UK Companies; Two Years Prior to Failure .......................................... 
309 
A2.5 Pairwise Correlations for the Estimation Sample used in the Cross-sectional 
Analysis of UK Companies; Three Years Prior to Failure ....................................... 312 
A2.6 Pairwise Correlations for the Estimation Sample used in the Cross-sectional 
Analysis of UK Companies; Four Years Prior to Failure ......................................... 315 
A3.1 Descriptive Statistics for UK Quoted Companies in the 1988-93 Panel .................. 318 
A4.1 Means and t-statistics - Independent Variables for the Analysis of the Russian Data: 
the Estimation Sample for 1995 and Pooled Estimation Sample for the Period 1995- 
96; One Year Prior to Failure ................................................................................ 
320 
A4.2 Pairwise Correlations for the E stimation. S ample of40 Russian Companies, 1995 
Sample Period; One Year Prior to Failure ............................................................... 321 
A4.3 Pairwise Correlations for the Pooled Estimation Sample of 48 Russian Companies, 
1995-96 Sample Period; One Year Prior to Failure ................................................ 322 
A4.4 Means and t-statistics - Independent Variables for the Analysis of the UK Data, The 
Estimation Sample for 1990-9 1; One Year Prior to Failure ................................... 323 
A4.5 Pairwise Correlations for the Estimation Sample of 40 UK Companies, 1990-91 
Sample Period; One Year Prior to Failure .............................................................. 324 
A5.1 Company Names and Years of Entering Insolvency Regime, of UK Failed Quoted 
Industrials Used in the Estimation Sample for the Cross-sectional Analysis ........... 325 
A5.2 Company Names and Years of Entering Insolvency Regime of UK Failed Quoted 
Industrials Used in the Holdout Sample for the Cross-sectional Analysis ................ 325 
A5.3 Company Names of UK Non-failed Quoted Industrials Used in the Estimation 
Sample for the Cross-sectional Analysis ................................................................. 326 A5.4 Company Names of UK Non-failed Quoted Industrials Used in the Holdout Sample 
for the Cross-sectional Analysis ......................................................................... 330 
A5.5 Company Names and Years of Entering Insolvency Regime of UK Failed Quoted 
Industrials Used in the Panel Analysis ..................................................................... 331 A5.6 Company Names of UK Non-failed Quoted Industrials Used in the Panel Study ..... 332 
A5.7 Company Names and Years of Entering Insolvency Regime of UK Failed Quoted 
Industrials Used in the Estimation Sample for the Comparative Study .................... 338 
A5.8 Company Names of UK Non-failed Quoted Industrials Used in the Estimation 
Sample for the Comparative Study .......................................................................... 338 A5.9 Names, Years of Insolvency, and Accounts Years of Failed Russian Industrial 
Companies ................................................................................................................ 339 A5.10 Names and Accounts Years of Non-failed Russian Industrial Companies ................ 340 
Vill 
List of Figures 
page 
1.1 Company insolvencies in 1979-95 .......................................................................... 42 
ix 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
A popular view held by many financial economists and accountants is that measures 
of traditional financial analysis play an important role in the determination of the 
risk of a company defaulting on its debt obligations and subsequently failing via 
insolvency. This thesis examines this substantive issue further by considering the 
determination of failure risk with company-level data for two countries, the UK 
between 1988 and 1993, and Russia in 1995 and 1996. 
The need for better understanding the causes of corporate financial distress and 
failure seems significant for the following reasons. 
At the microeconomic level, the key determinants of company failure are considered 
as an important ingredient for decisions concerned with the assessment of 
commercial and investment risks. Models that quantify the risk of default or detect 
factors, magnifying the risk of failure of an individual entity, are central to any 
firm's financial transactions, which involve significant credit exposures in the 
process of conducting business operations. Initial evaluation of default risk of an 
individual asset or company also lays the foundation for risk measurement systems 
supporting decisions in the context of corporate lending, issuing the fixed interest 
finance to businesses, credit derivatives pricing, and valuation and analysis of 
distressed firms. 
At the macro level, this issue has important implications of financial stability and 
economic growth. Given the potential severity of the economic and social 
consequences of sharp rises in company failures, the knowledge of factors that 
increase the corporate sector vulnerability to default and insolvency, can be of 
practical use to banks and public bodies, monitoring the national economic situation, 
in their design of policies preventing and ameliorating crises. 
The risk of failure via legal insolvency is the uncertainty surrounding a company's 
ability to service its debt and obligations. Failure risk can be broken down into three 
main components. The first component is associated with high gearing, the second 
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component relates to the firm's business risk, and the third component is aggregate 
economy risk that depends on the state of the business and credit cycles and changes 
in other background macroeconomic factors such as interest and exchange rates and 
factor prices. Because failure is a combination of different factors and mistakes, 
prior to the event, there is no way to unambiguously discriminate between firms that 
will fail and those that will not. Thus existing commercial applications for assessing 
the risk of default and failure as well as analytical tools, used in academic research 
into failing firms' characteristics, for the most part, have not been backed by an 
explicit theoretical model of the failure process! Conventional approaches to failure 
modelling are based on the assumption that financial statement-based measures, 
equity and debt market quotations, and credit ratings capture both the unique 
characteristics of the firm's financial profile and macroeconomic pressures on the 
corporate sector. That has a direct bearing on quantitative models developed for 
purposes of risk management or identifying failure causes. Given the problem of 
model uncertainty, to arrive at specifications that reflect as much of reality as 
possible, extant studies have heavily relied on empirical techniques that permit 
statistical search through a sufficiently large number of model inputs, describing the 
financial profile and other characteristics of the firm. However, such approaches 
inevitably depend on quality of data inputs and to be of practical value resultant 
models need to be validated and recalibrated on a continuous basis. 
Numerous studies have been devoted to empirically explain the event of UK 
company failure. Taffler and Tisshaw (1977), Marais (1979), Taffler (1982), 
Goudie (1987), Goudie and Meeks (1991) have modelled failure as the 
classification problem, where the binary response variable falls into one of two 
classes: failed firms and non-failed firms, and the risk of failure is then quantified 
using discriminant analysis combined with cross-sectional data and purely 
accounting ratios-based covariates. Alternative approach of using logit to model a 
causal relationship from firm's attributes to the probability of failure was utilised in 
studies by Peel, Peel, and Pope (1986), Keasey and McGuinness (1990), and 
* We should, however, point out to one exception. A well-known commercial application with a theoretical 
backing is KMV's default risk model CreditMonitoro, based on the option theoretic model due to Merton 
(1974). The model's implementation rests on an extensive database of historical default and bankruptcy 
frequencies needed to generate the measure of default risk for an individual debt issuer. 
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Morris (1997). The relevance of the empirically derived failure determinants was 
inferred from the statistical significance of individual explanatory variables and 
further validated by the classificatory accuracy of a model, evaluated on a out-of- 
sample basis. The appropriateness of detecting the important determinants of failure 
within the framework of traditional binary response statistical models is evidential 
from the true ex ante predictive ability of such proprietary applications for assessing 
quoted industrial companies as the UK-based Z-score model (Taffler, 1995) and the 
US-based ZETAO m odel (Altman, 2 000). M ore r ecent UK work by Alici (1995), 
Tyree and L ong (1995), and Wilson, Chong, and Peel (1995) has employed a 
newer analytical approach of neural networks to classify the data. These models 
reveal slightly improved within-sample and out-of-sample predictive accuracy when 
compared with conventional discriminant and logit models, however, it is worth 
noting that the neural network literature has not yet provided generally agreed 
procedures for model selection and testing (Fairclough, 2000). In this thesis, the 
apparent performance of company failure models is not the ultimate objective, but 
only a means for elucidating the underlying phenomena. It seems equally essential 
for our research to perform statistical tests of significance for modelled determinants 
of failure. Therefore in both parts of the thesis - in the analysis of the UK company 
failure d eterminants for 1988-93, and in a comparative study of UK and Russian 
firms in the 1990s - we follow the classical approach of previous UK and US work 
and employ logit as a methodology for statistical modelling of the relation between 
the risk of failure and changes in financial-ratio based explanatory variables. 
Compared to past studies into UK company failure, there are two distinguishing 
features of our empirical work. 
Firstly, in the analysis of the failure determinants using pooled cross-sectional data, 
we try and extend a common range of financial inputs by allowing for the non- 
financial factors that appeared to be important variables in the studies of the 
aggregate rate of business failure by Wadhwani (1986), Hudson (1987), Young 
(1995), in the macro-micro study by Goudie and Meeks (1991), and in the study of 
corporate growth and survival by Dunne and Hughes (1994). Specifically, we try to 
introduce into conventional cross-sectional analysis the "firm's age effect" and two 
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variables reflecting changes in the macroeconomic climate. Our contribution is to 
better investigate the relevance of traditional financial ratio-based determinants, 
when the probability of failure is conditioned on unanticipated changes in the 
nominal interest rate and in the real effective exchange rate. We examine a relatively 
large unbalanced and resembling the true population proportions, cross-sectional 
data set of UK quoted industrial companies, covering the 1990-92 recession. To 
briefly anticipate our results, we find the important independent explanatory role for 
unexpected changes in interest and exchange rates, which are overall positively 
linked to the probability of failure. However, the "firm's age effect" appeared to be 
less pronounced when its incremental impact upon the probability of failure is 
judged by an improvement in the models' out-of-sample classificatory accuracy. As 
for accounting-based measures, we find that gearing, liquidity, and profitability 
determine failure of the firms in our sample. 
Secondly, we explore the use of panel data and a fixed effects logit estimator, which 
allow ustoc apture b oth c ross-section and t ime-series v ariation in financial ratio- 
based inputs and formally model unobserved heterogeneity across firms by 
controlling for unobserved firm-specific fixed effects. We utilise an unbalanced 
panel of UK quoted industrial companies for six years, from 1988 to 1993. Estimates 
of the fixed effects specifications for the "financial profile-failure risk" relationship 
provide an interesting comparison with estimates from our cross-sectional analysis. 
A robust empirical result, consistent with the observation in Turner, Coutts, and 
Bowden (1992), is that the shortage of liquidity is the main factor that discriminates 
between failing and non-failed firms in our samples, which implies that over the 
1990s recession even some profitable, viable companies might have experienced 
difficulties with accessing short-term finance. 
The main emphasis in this thesis is on the identification of the key failure 
determinants for LJK quoted industrial companies, however our work also makes a 
contribution to the Russian transition literature by looking at the causes of industrial 
enterprise insolvency in the mid 1990s. It might seem u nusual toe xamine ino ne 
piece of research the phenomena of company failure for economic, institutional, and 
legal settings as different as those of the UK and Russia. The reason for doing so 
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relates to our aim to consistently apply the modelling methodology advocated in 
previous LJK research, to the Russian case, and to contrast the two different 
populations of firms. To date no benchmark empirical work on Russia exists, and 
historical data on company failure, especially in the time dimension, are scarce. 
Therefore it seems sensible to use a comparative study format to investigate the 
important, observable from enterprise statutory accounts determinants of failure. 
Moreover, this format allows us to control the small sample results for Russia by 
indirectly inferring the Russian model performance and the relevance of explanatory 
variables, from a similar in empirical design, small-scale study of UK firms. 
Although the small cross-sectional data set of Russian firms is still a valuable source 
of information about why enterprises failed via legal insolvency int he 1 990s, we 
have to deal with an additional issue of judging model accuracy in the absence of 
fresh holdout observations. We follow the UK studies, based on discrete-outcome 
models, by Fairclough and Hunter (1998) and Hunter and Komis (2000) and 
attempt to solve the problem by using bootstrap simulations to evaluate the 
relevance of the modelled determinants of failure. We set bootstrap confidence 
intervals for model parameters and assess model classificatory accuracy by using the 
resampling scheme due to Adkins (1990) and procedures due to Efron and 
Tibshirani (1993). 
We find that the dimensions of liquidity and financial indebtedness are not effective 
in explaining failure for Russian companies, whereas the measures of profitability 
and size appear potentially to be robust predictors. Companies of smaller size and 
lower profitability are more likely to become bankrupt. The Russian results are 
remarkably consistent with the views, expressed in Commander and Mumssen 
(1998) and Schaffer (1998), on the role of soft budget constraints and all-pervasive 
barter transactions in the Russian corporate sector. 
The plan of the present thesis is as follows. We start in chapter I with a discussion of 
the UK and US literature that deals with the definitional issues, outlines a wide 
range of factors, associated with the process of company failure, and provides the 
theoretical background for empirical modelling. A basis for the analysis of company 
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failure is given by a mix of finance, economics, law, and management literatures that 
offer various theoretical considerations as to the plausible causes of default and 
failure. Then there is a summary of the macroeconomic factors' influence uncovered 
by the studies of the aggregate rate of business failure. The goal of chapter I is to 
highlight the firm-level and macroeconomic characteristics driving corporate default 
and failure, which would seem to be desirable to capture in empirical models. 
Chapter 2 presents a survey of previous UK and US empirical research concerned 
with explaining the causes and predicting the event of failure of industrial 
companies. We consider evidence in relation to failure determinants obtained with 
data from financial statements and market valuation information. The survey also 
summarises existing approaches to failure modelling by discussing the main 
elements of their empirical design that include: adopted sampling procedures, 
statistical techniques chosen, identification and selection of relevant explanatory 
variables to be used as model inputs, and solutions used in model validation under 
the limited amount of data. Theoretical considerations and previous empirical 
findings on the determinants of company failure allow us to suggest three research 
questions. In particular, as an extension to the UK firm-level research into failure 
causes, we wish to examine more directly the apparently missing in extant cross- 
sectional models link between the changes in macroeconomic conditions and failure 
risk for the 1990-92 recession. Further, by taking account of company unobserved 
heterogeneity in a panel-data analysis, we aim to develop new insights about the 
features of the firm's financial profile that explain UK company insolvency in this 
period. In addition, highlighted in previous UK and US work the value of financial 
ratios, as effective predictors of distress and failure, has been the source of 
inspiration for suggesting to carry out an exploratory study of Russian firms. 
Chapter 3 deals with the cross-sectional analysis of UK quoted industrial company 
failure using the binomial logit estimator. In our empirical design we recognise and 
account for the methodological issues of non-stationarity in data and bias in the 
model parameter estimates, introduced by the samples non-representative of the true 
population proportions. The determinants of failure implied in four separate sets of 
models arc reported, each set representing a series of time-to-failure-specific models 
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for the four years before the event. These four sets of logit models include: (i) 
models based on financial inputs alone; (ii) models based on financial inputs and 
augmented with macroeconomic variables; (iii) models based on financial inputs and 
a control for firm's age; and (iv) models based on financial inputs, controlling for 
firm's age, and augmented with macroeconomic variables. More complete models 
that condition predictions on unanticipated changes in the nominal interest rate and 
in the real exchange rate, demonstrate the best out-of-sample classificatory accuracy 
over both short and long risk-horizons, indicating importance of the interrelationship 
between the key determinants. The contribution of this chapter is to reflect in 
modelling the multifactor basis of the failure process by the means of detecting 
financial characteristics of failing firms when the risk of failure is conditioned on the 
effects of changes in the macroeconomic envirom-nent, and firm's age is controlled 
for. 
The results from the cross-sectional analysis are followed in chapter 4 by a panel- 
data study that uses a less conventional and sophisticated methodology of the fixed 
effects logit estimator. To obtain unbiased estimates for the failure determinants, we 
allow for unobservable permanent individual company effects in the data while 
exploring the relationship between the firm's financial profile and the risk of failure. 
The contribution of this chapter relates to the use of panel data for modelling the 
causes of UK company insolvencies over the 1990-92 recession. 
Chapter 5 concentrates on the comparative study of failure determinants for Russian 
and UK firms. Based on data for enterprise insolvency in Russia for 1995-96, a 
model of failure risk is developed using the binomial logit estimator. The sample 
size is controlled by the bootstrap estimates of model statistics and by comparison 
with a similar random sample drawn for the UK over the recession years 1990-91. 
The contribution of this chapter is that we have uncovered an interesting feature in 
the Russian data set, specifically, we observe that profitability and size differences 
between failed and non-failed firms were the key discriminating variables, while, in 
contrast to the UK case, but not inconceivable, liquidity and financial indebtedness 
seemed irrelevant. 
xvi 
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Chapter 6 concludes with a brief summary of results and suggests policy issues and 
research questions for future work. 
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CHAPTER I 
CHAPTER1: BACKGROUND: DEFINITION AND CAUSES 
OF COMPANY FAILURE 
1.1 Introduction 
Our purpose in this chapter is to provide a selective overview of the literature concerned 
with the nature, definitional issues and theoretical arguments for a formal representation 
of such diverse and chaotic phenomena as company financial distress and failure. This 
overview sets the scene for the subject of this thesis - empirical analysis of failure 
determinants for an individual company in the UK and Russia, for the 1990s. The 
discussion of applicable fundamental propositions made in the areas of the theory of the 
firm, corporate finance and management studies will be presented. It covers the 
dominant effects of economic inefficiency implied in poor profitability, geared capital 
structure, liquid asset insufficiency, declines in market capitalisation, unfavorable 
changes in macroeconomic conditions, and poor managerial decisions. A summary of a 
range of more formal models specifying the conditions for company default and 
liquidation is provided. The chapter also briefly describes the institutional setting for 
company insolvency representing a legal mechanism for resolving financial distress. 
Interrelations between underlying company financial collapse fundamental causes, 
illustrated by the published across several areas and reviewed in this chapter studies on 
the subject of failure, will provide guidance for structuring our empirical analysis of a 
complex interplay between firm-specific characteristics, environmental factors and 
managerial mistakes, motivating an econometric investigation reported in the last four 
chapters. 
1.2 What is Company Failure 
A voluminous literature providing stylised facts on the determinants of the company 
failure outcome at the firin level dates back to Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968). 
Despite extensive empirical research, company failure remains a vague concept and 
suffers definitional ambiguity. The notion of failure can be set out in a number of ways 
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and therefore empirical investigations at the company level have explored a wide range 
of phenomena and provided insights into different aspects of economic and financial 
distress. The absence of a generic category of failure, however, complicates 
comparisons. 
Taken to the extreme, company or business failure can be defined as closure or 
discontinuation of a legal entity (Watson and Everett, 1966). At the other end of the 
spectrum represented by much of the industrial economics literature on entry and exit, 
the semantic content of the term "company failure" usually relates to firm's exit from 
the product market (see, e. g., Jovanovic, 1982; Mueller, 1991; Agarwal and Gort, 
1996; Caves, 1998). From this angle, failure is seen as a manifestation of the 
Schumpeterian "creative destruction! ' through which the market selects between 
efficient and inefficient firms (Schumpeter, 1942). According to neo-classical analysis, 
the probability of a firm's survival for a given interval of time is a function of a vector 
of in arket attributes s uch a s, for example, growth in demand, barriers to entry, scale 
economies, and a vector of attributes that relate to the individual firm. Insufficient 
profitability is the main factor that in the long run forces the firm to reduce its presence 
in the market and exit the industry. Poor operating performance is not tolerated for long. 
Firms that do not supply the product at the competitive price-cost margins face 
difficulties in generating profits and exit due to the inevitable discipline of factor and 
product markets. Obviously, failure in the economic sense need not be accompanied 
immediately by financial distress arising from debt finance, liquidity shortages and 
external financing constraints. Market exit can simply be viewed as a set of strategic 
decisions made by the firm regarding the use of its inherited configuration of capital. 
The market exit decisions are made by the firm in response to unanticipated changes in 
demand and competitive conditions. Through the selection process the assets of poor 
performers are being reallocated to presumably better uses while the assets of good 
performers are retained within the firms and kept in their most efficient use. Within this 
framework, company failure can be viewed as a welfare-enhancing device and way of 
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re-allocating industry-specific resources! It is noteworthy that the role of a geared 
financial structure that exposes the firm to financial risk is usually disregarded in the 
embodying the economic efficiency concept models of market exit. 
Financial and legal dimensions of the failure process are featured in approaches 
employed in the areas of financial economics, law, and the business studies. Financial 
distress is induced by the firm's financial structure. In high-geared firms, a small decline 
in operating performance will trigger financial distress. Classical research of company 
survivability in these areas emphasizes the importance of factoring in the capital 
structure considerations while the synonymous terms "corporate failure" or "company 
failure" is specified as the inability of a distressed company to meet debt obligations due 
to liquidity shortages. Under this perspective, the situation of failure subsequently 
involves losses incurred by the company's creditors and a need to resort to bankruptcy 
or insolvency mechanisms available within a legal system of the country in order to 
secure payment of the creditors' claims. Understanding financial failure is of great 
importance because firms that default on their debt affect the financial position of their 
creditors. That poses a threat to financial stability in the economy when an individual 
company failure is symptomatic of a more widespread corporate sector problem, leading 
to contagion, which could trigger further defaults. Since the inability to make debt 
payments may be resolved through liquidation and possibly acquisition of a distressed 
firm, financial failure is viewed as a selection mechanism leading to substantial asset 
reallocation away from financially distressed firms. Financial distress is often 
accompanied by organizational restructuring (Wruck, 1990; Sudarsanam and Lai, 
2001). Comprehensive organisational. changes in management, governance and structure 
can create value for the firm's claimholders by improving the use of resources. Financial 
distress frees resources to move to higher-value uses by forcing managers and directors 
to reduce capacity and rethink operating policy and strategy decisions. Financial distress 
will also create value when the firm value is the highest in liquidation and the 
1 It should be noted, however, that a firm might disappear from the industry as a result of a merger. Rivals possibly 
may acquire the successful firm's assets and expertise and apply it to the products of both firms. In this case exit 
comes from success. 
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management is reluctant to liquidate. However, there is little and contradictory evidence 
on the efficiency of financial distress and insolvency procedures while theoretical 
propositions on benefits of financial distress have not yet been validated and quantified 
in empirical studies. (see, e. g., White, 1989 and 1994; Kahl and School, 2001). 
In investigating the selection process triggered by financial distress, the concept of 
failure has a comparatively restricted meaning, corresponding with legal usage: it 
usually means that a company has become involved in certain legal consequences 
because it defaulted on its debt obligations. Defaults can be technical and/or legal and 
always involve the relationship between the debtor-company and creditors. Default 
proper involves a missed payment of either principal or interest, i. e. it means that a debt 
that is due remains unpaid. Technical default is the violation of a debt covenant other2 
then one specifying principal and interest payments. The consequences will depend on 
the contents of the debt contract. Although in reality technical defaults can be and are 
renegotiated, they still signal deteriorating financial performance of the firm (Altman, 
1993). Legal default or default proper is more serious than technical default, and may 
lead directly to a formal insolvency regime. If the company, unable to meet or 
renegotiate the cash claims upon it, exercises its right to default on payments, that 
usually follows by the firm's creditors instituting legal proceedings whereby all claims 
against the company are settled. The corporate finance literature links financial failure to 
the presence of long-term debt in capital structure noting however that even an all- 
equity-financed company may be pushed into insolvency if, for instance, it incurs a 
sequence of profits insufficient to meet its fixed commitments to workers and suppliers 
or fulfil obligations in relation to actual or potential damages from litigations. 
Financial distress is not synonymous with corporate death in terms of discontinuation of 
a legal vehicle of the business. However, the tractable legal event of entering an 
involuntary insolvency regime by a debtor-firm does manifest severe financial distress. 
In essence, in operationalising the complex concept of company failure, the finance 
Such covenants can place restrictions on dividends or additional borrowing. 
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literature, uses a discrete variable, recording the presence in a company's history of such 
easily observable events of financial distress resolution as involuntary insolvency or 
bankruptcy (see, e. g., Altman, 1968; and Taffler, 1982 and 1995). 
Although the occurrence of financial failure measured by involuntary insolvency is 
attributed to debt financing and the lack of liquidity, it ultimately depends on the limits 
of lenders' willingness to support the firm. The latter is linked to the tightness of the 
terms of finance. The creditors' right to liquidate can be easily exercised when lending 
is collateralised and concentrated in the hands of a single lender (Armour and Frisby, 
2001). A rational secured creditor will cease supporting the firm where the returns from 
enforcement are greater than the returns from negotiations. The failure of a firm to meet 
its financial obligations does not always lead to bankruptcy because creditors can take 
over the distressed company or extend the maturity of the debt upon default. Often 
creditors forgive small shortfalls in order not to bear bankruptcy costs or transfers to 
other creditors (Scott, 198 1). 
The evolution of financial distress invites attention to the resolution of financial distress 
via quick acquisitions of poor performing firms. A financially distressed firm may 
become an acquisition target when the creditors observing the performance of the 
company in distress favour taking voting equity stakes in the firm in exchange for 
(partial) debt forgiveness. Therefore the literature sometimes ascribes the "negative" 
meaning of failure to status of those firms that lost independence in acquisitions or 
mergers (e. g., Hoshi, 1998; Peel, 1990; Taffler, 1995). Taffler (1995) differentiates 
between the outright failure of a business, an equivalent of a legal insolvency state, such 
as administration, receivership, or creditors' voluntary liquidation, and certain 
alternative events which may range from acquisitions, capital reconstructions, involving 
loan write-downs and debt-equity swaps, to informal government support and 
guarantees. This line of thinking puts on a parity liquidation and acquisition, stressing 
the ultimate importance for businesses to continue trading as independent firms. It may 
be noted that there are grounds to remain cautious when interpreting acquired firms as 
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failures. Although financially distress cannot be excluded as a context for acquisition, 
corporate finance theory offers other interactive motives for acquisitions and mergers, 
not always associated with or explained by the causes of financial distress and debt 
default (see, e. g., excellent discussions in Copeland and Weston (1988) and Peel 
(1990)). For some insolvency-free, financially sound and fast-growing acquired 
companies, the acceptance of a merger or take-over invitation constitutes a strategic 
move and positive outcome to the owners. 
The questions of existence and evolution of economic organization are dealt with in the 
field of the theory of the firm. Although our reading of the literature reveals no an all- 
purpose analytically convenient theory of the firm, features of the existing theories of 
the firm are useful for better understanding of a complex multidimensional phenomenon 
of corporate financial failure. In the next section, we sketch out some of the ideas that 
can be adopted for explaining survivability of economic organization. 
1.3 An Overview of Theories of the Firm 
1.3.1 The Neo-classical Explanation: The Firm-as-Production-Function Model 
and Economic Inefficiency as a Failure Cause 
Neo-classical theory considers the firm mainly in technological terms, as a theoretical 
link to facilitate an explanation of the price system (see, e. g., Kreps, 1990; Keasey and 
Watson, 1993; Hart, 1995; Mas-Collet, Whinston and Green, 1995). The neo- 
classical model has been especially useful for analysing how the firm's optimal 
production choice varies with input and output prices, for understanding the aggregate 
behaviour of an industry, price-mediated market equilibrium and efficient social 
production and allocation of private goods. In the neo-classical world, the firm is run by 
a selfless owner-entrepreneur, who is motivated by a desire to maximise his own, 
exogenously determined, subjective preferences. The central concern of the neo- 
classical framework is that equilibrium market prices are determined by equating the 
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supply and demand of goods by utility maximising entrepreneurs. The further 
assumptions of perfectly competitive markets with many market participants, 
homogeneous commodities with respect to quality and costless information and trade 
are usually made for the determination of relative prices. This implies that all arbitrage 
opportunities will be instantly competed away and no practical problems associated with 
business transactions exist. 
Note that in the spirit of the neo-classical model of the firm and market structure, failure 
is defined as exit from the product market and serves as the means of removing 
inefficient firms from the industry3. The conditions for market exit can be established on 
the basis that the privately owned firm is an entity, which has an o bJ ective function, 
profit, which it maximizes, subject to constraints imposed by its set of technological 
capabilities, factor prices, and the demand curve faced by the firm. Note also that the 
underlying this conceptual structure economic definition of profit refers to rates of 
return in excess of the opportunity cost of capital employed and return to entrepreneur. 
An implication of the model of profit-maximising behaviour is that whatever level of 
output the firm chooses to produce it would do so at the minimum possible costs. 
According to the firm-as-production-function theory, exit of a competitive, profit- 
maximising firm, operating under conditions of certainty, is implicit in its cost curves in 
the short and long runs. The short-run restrictions are that levels of some of factor inputs 
are fixed and the firm minimises costs of the variable factors or short-run variable costs, 
which i mplicitly d epend ont he I evels off ixed c osts. Int he s hort r un, the firm must 
always pay its variable costs, regardless of the level of output. If, in the short run 
situation, the total variable cost curve lies above the total revenue curve at every level of 
output, that is the resulting economic profit is negative, then the profit maximising firm 
produces nothing and loses fixed costs only. In the long run, all costs are variable and 
should be covered, and if the long-run competitive equilibrium price fails to cover long- 
run average costs, the established firm will be induced to exit from the industry. One 
3 In a classical paper, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that " the form of organisation that survives in an activity is 
the one that delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs". 
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might expect that the firms that do not obtain best practice input-output combinations, 
would necessarily earn inferior profits and would, as a result of that, be forced out of the 
market. In this respect, in the long or medium run, failure reflects economic 
inefficiency. On average, the firm must earn normal profits in order to cover economic 
costs and any firm that fails to generate a return on capital employed comparable to that 
obtainable in other equally risky markets, eventually exits the market and its resources 
will be transferred to other uses. 4 Buchanan (1939; pp. 29-30; emphasis in original) put 
it best when he said that in the narrow economic sense the enterprise is a failure if there 
has been misdirected investment: 
... failure means simply that the returns to capital invested in the opportunity, which the promotion 
was designed to exploit, have in fact fallen short of those expected, that instead of the realized 
returns being greater than those elsewhere available, they have actually proven to be less. ... 
Otherwise expressed, we might say that, costs being computed on an alternative opportunity basis 
at the time the enterprise began, are in excess of returns. ... The enterprise is a failure in the sense 
that, had this state of affairs been anticipated, the corporation would not have been brought into 
being. 
The neo-classical. model of market exit indicates the importance of the market structure 
and implies that economic success can be gauged using the concepts of profitability and 
economic returns while economic distress is associated with inefficiency. 
Writers in the area of company failure draw a distinction between financial distress and 
economic distress. Economic distress, being associated with inefficiency, the firm's 
decisions on output, entry and exit, and the market structure, manifests itself in poor 
operating performance in terms of sales or operating profits hence the underlying 
business problems might make liquidation of the company a valuable option. Financial 
distress is the effect of geared capital structure, when the firm has trouble with meeting 
the interest and principal payments on its debt and with extending credit. A firm may be 
4 Ibis does not, of course, imply that all loss-making firms leave the industry and discontinue as legal entities, or that 
those that exit, will do it instantaneously. Ability to raise external finance influences the length of the failure process. 
Credit allows firms to smooth losses or profits over time, while financial markets pcm-dt to reduce the cost of capital. 
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in financial distress without being in economic distress, although the two may be linked 
to one another and often happen together (Wruck, 1990). On the other hand, a firm may 
experience economic distress without being in financial distress because of the absence 
or near absence of legally enforceable debt (Altman, 1983). An attempt to empirically 
investigate the connection and the direction of a causal relation between financial 
distress and economic distress has been made in Opler and Titman (1994), who 
examined corporate performance in distressed economic sectors of the US for the period 
of 1972-91. They implicitly assumed the exogeneity of ex-ante leverage ratios and 
measured economic distress by a decline in sales and negative stock returns. Their 
results seem indicative of the link from financial to economic distress since the findings 
show that companies with a high relative to the industry leverage ratio, tend to lose 
market share and experience lower operating profits during economic downturns than 
their more conservatively financed competitors. Opler and Titman conclude that firms in 
financial distress may tend to underperform. In contrast, for the UK context, Goudie 
and Meeks (1991) notice no necessary connection between legal failures and firms that 
are economically inefficient, because sudden changes in the macroeconomic 
environment such as interest and exchange rates variations or errors in government 
policies may eliminate economically viable enterprises. 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), who consider market structure and exit conditions in the 
monopolistically competitive industry constrained on the demand side, emphasize the 
role of product diversification in preventing economic distress. They show that, in a 
monopolistically competitive industry, the equilibrium will lead to a bias against the 
firms supplying products that are characterized by inelastic demand and have high fixed 
costs and low marginal costs, as compared with a constrained Pareto optimum, where 
each firm must have nonnegative profit. The Dixit and Stiglitz analysis with 
heterogeneous consumers and social indifference curves suggests that inelastically 
demanded commodities are specialised products desired by a few consumers. Profit 
maximising firms, dealing with those products, are especially vulnerable to economic 
Although profitability is clearly a crucial factor in the process of exit form the market, it must be considered in 
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distress and are likely to exit the industry. That results in less variety for consumers and 
entails distortion in allocation of resources from the social point of view. Multi-product 
firms might be able to stay in the industry if there would be a possibility to divest 
unprofitable product lines or absorb losses with cross-subsidies. The cross-subsidizing 
strategy would be selected if the product is in the early phase of its life-cycle and 
discounted expected returns over the period of production cover the costs associated 
with cross-subsidies. Otherwise firms who impose barriers to entry may not be forced to 
a part on the cost curve where losses become a significant burden. 
Traditional economic models of market exit make little statements about the existence 
or discontinuance of the legal entity. An inefficient firm might choose to close 
voluntarily. Normative decisions to shut down business operations are likely to be based 
on expected returns and the ability of the firm to cover its variable costs. The firm 
should liquidate unproductive capacity when the productivity of an individual asset (i. e. 
a plant) falls below the firm's marginal gain from operating it. There should be a critical 
value of the asset's marginal product, below which the asset should be liquidated, and 
above which it should be retained. Liquidation may take two different forms, closure 
when demand is low and selling out to more productive users when demand is high. 
Thus a firm's decision to liquidate a plant will depend on its productivity and also on 
industry and macroeconomic conditions, although inefficient transfers by bankrupt firms 
are likely to be severe in times of industry downturns. 
We note the failure of the neo-classical model to utilise the importance of the financing 
mix for explaining exit of an economic organisation due to financial distress. First, by 
assuming an ideal world of perfect and complete capital markets, neo-classical theory 
renders financing decisions irrelevant because the value of the firm can be solely 
determined by its ability to generate positive cash flows (Modigliani and Miller, 1958 
and 1963). Since the firm's ability to generate cash flows is independent of the 
financing decision, its value will be irrelevant to how the cash flows are split between 
combination with capitalisation variables. 
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different capital suppliers. Therefore, the choice of capital structure will not affect the 
value and thus survivability of the economic organisation. In reality, capital markets are 
imperfect and geared firms facing severe liquidity problems and externally imposed 
capital rationing may be unable to avoid negotiating their debt contracts with creditors 
in legal insolvency proceedings. Bankruptcy caused by debt default can be effective in 
forcing firms to scrap assets when demand is low. However, when demand is low, both 
the value of the assets and the difference in value between efficient and inefficient firms 
is also likely to be lower. Therefore the value of bankruptcy in weeding out inefficient 
firms might not be high. It is also obvious that failure in the economic meaning of an 
excess of average cost above average revenue need not to be accompanied at once by 
financial difficulties resulted from the geared capital structure and subsequent inability 
to meet debt obligations as they mature. 
Second, the neo-classical set-up ignores incentive problems within the firm and 
incomplete and costly contracts between agents. Neo-classical theory supposes that all 
transactions, including employment relations, ownership rights and financial structures, 
are contingent contracts that can be costlessly negotiated and perfectly enforced without 
legal disputes. The neo-classical model ignores the costs incurred by agents in solving a 
set of problems from initially making a contact with potential buyers and sellers through 
to obtaining restitution should one party default on an agreement. Even when the neo- 
classical theory incorporates some separation of ownership from control it supposes that 
managers will always make decisions that are in the best interest of owners (or 
shareholders) since information is symmetric. The once orthodox view that the firm is a 
production function has been re-thought in the new institutional economics literature, 
which preserves a role for financial instruments in explaining survivability of the firm. 
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1.3.2 The New Institutional Economics: The Role of Debt Finance in Financial 
Distress 
In relation to establishing the consistent relationships underlying the process of 
company failure, the contributions made by the studies in the new institutional 
economics suggested a new perspective on the implications of capital structure 
decisions and gearing levels for financial distress. We summarise below the relevant to 
our present concerns ideas grown out of the new institutional economics work. 
1.3.2.1 The Firm as a Nexus for Contracting Relationships 
Approaches, abandoning the concept of the entrepreneur-owner and the firm-as- 
production-function model, have been developed in the new institutional economics 
literature, in particular under the rubrics of "transaction cost theory" and "agency 
theory" which have many applications in corporate finance. This literature focuses on 
the effects of information and the structure of ownership and financial claims in 
controlling and rewarding conflicting agents. The main approach in investigating 
behavioural implications of individual property rights is to consider the firm as a set of 
contracts among factors of production, with each factor motivated by its self-interest. 
Transaction cost economics posits that due to uncertainty about the future states and 
information asymmetry, writing an internal or external contract, specifying an incentive 
scheme, is difficult and costly. Therefore contracts are not comprehensive, being revised 
and renegotiated as the future unfolds. The primary reason is that, under uncertainty, it 
is costly to plan for various contingencies, difficult to negotiate about these plans, and 
hard and costly to write these plan down in such a way that in the event of a dispute, an 
outside authority can simply enforce the contract. As a result, contracts contain gaps and 
missing provisions, which the parties can fill as they go along. It is important to note, 
that the re-negotiation process imposes expost costs, incurred at the re-negotiation stage 
itself, and others are ex ante costs, incurred in anticipation of re-negotiation. This theme 
of transaction costs lies at the heart of the large transaction cost literature, which started 
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in a classic work by Coase (1937) on the existence of the firm and firm-market 
boundaries. 
Coase's thinking about the firm suggests that the organisational forms that are able to 
deal effectively with transaction and agency costs are able to survive and prosper at the 
expense of others. Assuming that significant transaction costs are incurred in organising 
economic activities, Coase insists that the firm and the market are alternative modes for 
organising the very same transactions. The main reason why it is profitable to establish a 
firm is a cost of using the price mechanism of spot-markets. Thus, the firm is viewed as 
an institutional device whereby transaction costs can be reduced and factors can be hired 
on incomplete contracts. The property of an incomplete contact permits the subsequent 
direction of recourses to their most profitable uses as circumstances change. 
Incomplete contracts are inconsistent with neo-classical market equilibrium. In reality, 
in many markets, there is neither a clearly defined commodity nor a clear-cut price. On 
the contrary, the relationships between the parties may need to be renegotiated in ways 
not fully anticipated at the stage of the initial contract. Thus, administrative intervention 
is needed to complement or replace the operation of market forces, not merely to 
enforce contract terms. However, even if re-negotiation proceeds smoothly, the outcome 
may depend on the ex post bargaining strengths of the parties rather on economic 
efficiency. 
A radical contribution to understanding the economic nature and financial structure of 
the firm has been made by the writers in the agency tradition (see e. g., Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1986; A gnion and Bolton, 1992). 
Originated in financial economics, the "principal-agent problem" literature recognises 
that financial contracts - including debt contracts - are inherently and unavoidably 
incomplete but focuses upon the crucial role played by information and the structure of 
ownership and financial claims in controlling and rewarding conflicting and 
opportunistic agents in the environment of contractual incompleteness. Information is a 
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subject that has obvious connections to the incentives and opportunities that exist for 
moral hazard (contractual non-performance) and transactions. The age*ncy view suggests 
that agents do not give up their own self-interests just because they have entered into an 
economic relationship. As mentioned above, moral hazards and opportunism, 
particularly under the conditions of uncertainty and costly and asymmetrically 
distributed information, render fully state-contingent contracts impossible or excessively 
costly to draw-up, monitor and enforce. Having pointed out that the firm is not an 
individual and the personalisation of the firm seems a misleading approach, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) assert that firms are legalfictions, which serve as a nexusfor a set of 
contracting relationships among individuals. The value of debt arises from the 
contingent control allocation it induces. Most investment projects are sufficiently 
complex that it is difficult or very costly for the contracting parties - the entrepreneur 
and the financier - to make contracts contingent directly on the future states of nature 
and describe ex-ante precisely the most desired schedule of corresponding actions. Even 
if we abstract from the issue of bargaining under asymmetric information assuming that 
the contracting parties can perfectly identify which state of nature will occur, important 
future variables have to be left out of the contract as they are difficult to verify initially. 
However contracts can be made contingent on a publicly verifiable signal about the state 
of nature at some future date. Such signals may represent a variable of short-term 
performance (or profits) or a default-no-default event. 
Debt financing is a natural way of implementing contingent control allocations of a 
particular kind. If the signal represents a default-no-default event then the entrepreneur 
gets control as long as he does not default on debt obligations but the creditor gets 
control in the event of default. 
This view of the firm emphasises the important role the legal system plays in the 
organisation of economic activity. Law sets bounds on the kinds of contracts into which 
individuals and organisation can enter, while the powers of the state are used to enforce 
performance of contracts. Insolvency (bankruptcy) refers to the court-supervised process 
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for breaking and rewriting the contracts. Liquidation refers to the sale of the firm's 
assets and distribution of proceeds to claimants. In relation to the financial distress 
resolution, insolvency law works alongside the institutional framework for the market of 
corporate control, providing distressed firms with mechanisms for exit through 
insolvency or acquisition. 
It is necessary to note that these developments in the agency literature have been based 
on the assumption that the relevant unit of analysis of the enterprise behaviour is a large 
publicly traded quoted firm with dispersed power of many small shareholders who may 
find it difficult to exercise control. The firm has ready access to external capital markets 
for equity and debt finance. It is further assumed that the firm's equity shares are liquid, 
there are strong financial and regulatory incentives to obtain and process information on 
the firm, and that the capital market is efficient in processing this information. Fama and 
Jensen's model, which is now firmly established in the finance literature, emphasises 
the minimising of transaction and agency costs as the major motivation behind the 
choice of external market contracting (Farna and Jensen, 1983). According to Fama 
and Jensen, agency theory of the firm has several aspects. The most important 
contractual arrangement is the contracts that specify which agents have the right to any 
residual income (ordinary shareholders) and which agents are responsible for day-to-day 
control of the firm (managers). Control consists of two distinct decision processes, 
namely, the initiation and implementation of decisions, undertaken by professional 
managers, and the ratification and monitoring of decisions, overseen by the board of 
directors directly elected by the shareholder group. One type of agency problem arises 
from a potential conflict between control (managers) and ownership (equity holders), 
which leads to nontrivial monitoring costs the owners will incur in order to keep the 
agents (managers) in line. Furthermore, in a public company, dispersed power of 
shareholders creates a free-rider problem. An individual shareholder does not have an 
incentive to expend substantial resources to monitor the behaviour of managers since 
the gains from improved management are enjoyed by all shareholders, whereas the costs 
are bome only by those who are active. Because of the free-rider problem, the managers 
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of a public company may have a fairly free hand to pursue other than the shareholders' 
wealth maximisation goal, including empire-building or enjoyment of perquisites. 
Consequently the owners face a trade-off between monitoring costs and forms of 
compensation that will cause agents to act in the interests of the owners. If the 
managers' compensation were all in the form of shares in the firm, the monitoring costs 
will be zero. But this is practically impossible since the agents will always be able to 
receive some compensation in the form of non-pecuniary benefits. The owners therefore 
would have to incur inordinate agency costs in order to ensure that the agents always 
make the decisions the owners would prefer. Especially relevant to the question of 
financial failure is the power of agency theory to shed light on the choice made by a 
modem corporation with dispersed ownership as to a particular debt-to-equity mix. It is 
convenient at this juncture, if, before outlining the factors proposed in the agency theory 
literature in relation to financing strategies as a means to overcome the agency problem 
between the owners and top management of the firm, we detour slightly to discuss a 
basic model of capital structure determination which weighs up the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of long-term debt finance and has important implications for 
understanding company failure in the form of insolvency. 
1.3.2.2 The "Tax Shelter-Bankruptcy Cost" View on Debt 
The "standard" theories of capital structure conclude that as far as company survival is 
concerned, gearing and financial risk are the primary causes of default and bankruptcy 
but there are both advantages and disadvantages to the presence of debt in capital 
structure. Capital structures of companies can be separated into two types. Companies 
can have either a capital structure, which consists entirely of equity capital, or a mixed 
capital structure where capital with a fixed rate of return (such as loan capital and 
preference share capital) and equity capital are held in varying proportions. Viewed 
more broadly, apart from debt and equity securities, financing arrangements to fund 
operations also include other claims that also promise fixed payoffs, issued to 
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employees, managers, and suppliers. For the modem public corporation, the mixed 
capital structure is more common. 
Financial gearing levels, indicating the proportion of debt capital in the firm's overall 
capital structure, are choice variables, arising from the budget constraints, therefore the 
capitalization of a company is a risk and return trade-off. The firm takes on the risk of 
fixed financing costs, anticipating that h igher r eturns; w ill a ccrue toe quity h olders at 
higher levels of demand. The effect of financial gearing is that, for a financially geared 
company, any increase in profit before interest and tax will result in a more that 
proportionate increase in the return to the shareholders after taxes. Assume that the 
basic earning power of the firm is given by the return on assets (ROA) that compares 
earnings before interest and tax with total assets. The basic earning power, being 
invariant to capital structure and the way the firm is taxed, is a measure of profitability, 
which is of utmost importance from the operating point of view. The relation between 
the return on shareholders' equity (ROE) and the return on assets (ROA) is a function of 
the proportion of debt used for financing and the cost of that debt finance. Introducing 
(FC) as the average interest rate on debt and (t) as the effective tax rate on the firm, we 
can write ROE as: 
ROE = ROA + (ROA - FC(I - t)) 
Debt 
Equity 
As long as the basic earning power (ROA) is greater than the cost of debt (FC), debt 
financing will magnify the profitability contribution of the earning power. The 
magnification -factor is the capital gearing ratio. The higher the degree of gearing, the 
greater the profits, so long as trading income exceeds the costs of servicing the debt. 
The amount the earning power could fall before the shareholders will be hurt by 
financial gearing is given by the term (ROA - FC), which measures the excess returns 
on the firm's assets over the cost of debt. Relation (1.1) implies that higher returns may 
offset some of the negative effect of high gearing on the risk of debt default. 
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An efficient mix of debt and equity in the capital structure of a company reduces the 
price of long-term capital thus increasing net economic returns, which ultimately 
increases the firm's value. Fixed interest capital has an advantage of being cheaper to 
raise than equity while interest payments are allowable against profits for tax purposes 
by most tax systems. Equity is costlier to shareholders because, in liquidation, creditors 
are paid first. Preferences for having debt in the long-term capital structure may also 
stem from the shareholders' unwillingness to accept outside equity into the business, 
because of the dilution of control. 
The theory recognizes that financial risk is attached to debt finance. Increased corporate 
debt in relation to equity, assets, or cash flows, entails a possibility of non-repaying 
interest and principal as promised in the debt contract, and is likely to lead to a greater 
probability of financial distress and bankruptcy (Auerbach, 1985; Davis, 1995; Rees, 
1995; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; Crosbie, 1998). A number of factors directly 
influence the ability of a finn. to meet debt obligations. The key factors include: (i) profit 
stability determined in turn by the nature of the firm's product, the competitive structure 
of the industry, cyclical fluctuations and other aspects of the macroeconomic 
environment; (ii) the ability of the firm to generate cash flows; (iii) a level of fixed costs 
of production, which have to be paid irrespective of the level of sales and profits; and 
(iv) the market value of the firm's assets defining the relative burden of the firm's 
contractual obligations and default risk. 
As discussed above, one advantage to having debt in capital structure debt relates to the 
tax deductibility of interest payments. These benefits, existing for companies in tax 
paying positions, are counterbalanced by costs associated with financial distress and 
bankruptcy. The inclusion of bankruptcy costs alongside the tax deductibility of interest 
payments, extended the pioneering work by Modiglian! and Miller (1958) on capital 
structure irrelevancy by arguing that a value maximising firm may choose optimal 
capital structure consisting of both debt and equity (see, e. g., Baxter, 1967; Myers, 
1977; Brennan and Schwartz, 1978; Chen and Kim, 1979; Myers, 1993). Research 
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differentiates between the direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy to a distressed firm 
(see, e. g., Giammarino, 1989; Altman, 1993). Direct costs are out-of-pocket cash 
expenses directly related to bankruptcy filing and administration. Indirect bankruptcy 
costs of a firm in distress are expenses or economic losses that result from bankruptcy, 
but are not cash expenses on the process itself. These relate to the lost-profit component 
and include the diversion of management time while bankruptcy is underway, the 
impact on the firm's reputation, lost sales during and after bankruptcy, and the loss of 
key employees after a firm becomes bankrupt. White (1989 and 1994) adds to indirect 
costs those losses that are generated by inefficient decisions in relation to continuing, 
reorganising or liquidating; for instance, the value of forgone investment opportunities 
during bankruptcy procedure and the lost value of funds that are tied up during 
bankruptcy and incurred by the creditors and the economy. White considers bankruptcy 
costs as the "deadweight" economic costs of firms going bankrupt. Armour and Frisby 
(2001) present recent evidence from interviews conducted with UK insolvency 
practitioners that debtor goodwill would suffer through adverse publicity associated the 
commencement of insolvency proceedings. 
The link between the level of gearing and the probability of failure is implied in the "tax 
shelter-bankruptcy cost" (TS-BS) theory, discussed in Castanias (1983), where 
financial failure is defined as a revenue outcome which is insufficient to cover 
promised, the end of period payments to debt holders. The probability of failure is 
endogenously determined by the choice of the level of debt, and given by the following 
basic model: 
B 
F= fg(E, R)dE (1.2) 
-00 
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where 
B= face value of debt; 
E= earnings before interest and taxes; 
R= business risk parameter of earnings probability distribution (e. g., the variance); 
g(E, R) = probability of earnings level E, given R. 
The TS-BC hypothesis predicts that a shift in the earnings probability distribution 
implies an increase in the probability of financial failure (relative to the level of leverage 
prior to the earnings distribution shift) and simultaneously raises the expected marginal 
default costs and lowers the expected marginal tax savings. Empirical tests conducted in 
Castanias (1983) support that firms choose shareholders' value maximising mixes of 
debt and equity on account of bankruptcy costs and the tax deductibility of interest 
payments. 
In the TS-BS framework, the risk of financial distress is a function of both operating and 
financing risk. Business risk captures all elements of uncertainty of the income stream 
of the firm resulting from other than financing transactions. Included in this category 
would be such considerations as the firm's competitive position, the determinants of 
demand for its products, and the structure of its costs. One implication of TS-BS theory 
is that all companies, whether they be geared or all-equity financed, face the probability 
of being forced into bankruptcy. This fact is just one component of the concept of 
business risk and is allowed for in the required expected return on equity capital. 
Financial risk is linked to the element of uncertainty arising from inclusion of fixed- 
commitment debt financing in the firm's capital structure. The act of gearing up by a 
company has the effect of positively adding to the probability of the company's 
bankruptcy, due to the fact that if the company is unable to meet its fixed debt interest 
payments, then the debt holders have the legal right to liquidate the company in order to 
repossess their capital and unpaid interest. Therefore it is reasonable to expect 
companies with higher g earing a nd t hus g reater financial r isk tor un ah igher r isk of 
financial distress. However, the risk of distress and default will vary with the risk 
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position of the debt issuer and the shape of the economy. Since the likelihood of debt 
default is a function of both operating and financing risk, one would expect companies 
with high operating risk to use less debt. 
1.3.2.3 The Agency View on Benefits and Costs on Debt 
Agency theory can explain capital structure without relying on taxes or costs of 
bankruptcy and draws attention to incentive alignment properties of debt finance. The 
agency view helps to support the case of debt finance, pointing out to the control and 
efficiency enhancing, positive effects of debt. Attempts to resolve information 
asymmetries and conflicts of interests between equity holders and managers can serve as 
explanations of observed in practice preferences for having in capital structure of the 
firm both debt and equity. Furthermore, agency theory assumes a conflict between 
managers (shareholders) and debt holders, which along with asymmetric information 
explains such contracting features as restrictive debt covenants that give rise to an 
agency cost of debt. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that an optimal level of debt 
finance can be obtained by trading off the agency cost of debt against the benefit of debt. 
Each of the two facets of the agency problem of debt is now considered in turn. 
First, it seems desirable to have two different financial instruments such as debt and 
equity because of non-tax, organisational, and incentive benefits of a debt contract. 
Assume that the equity holders are wealth-constrained but they can raise new funds 
from outside investors. One possibility is to raise new equity finance, which means that 
new investors will take controlling interest in the firm. Another possibility is to borrow 
money from suppliers of debt finance and promise to make certain payments. A simple 
debt contract implies that if the firm does not make the payments, control shifts to debt 
holders raising the prospects for liquidation and reallocation of assets. It is useful to 
recall at this juncture that default is an attribute of any debt contract such as a bond or a 
loan. As Davis (1995) points out, debt contracts are incomplete financing contracts 
which do not specify the behaviour of the borrower in every eventuality, therefore it is 
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uncertain whether or not a limited liability company will fulfill its promise to pay a debt. 
The outcome of corporate insolvency is simply the legal consequences of the event of 
default and inability of a company to pay its debts (Scott, 1981; Brown, 1996; Goode, 
1997). Hence, a debt contract granting debt holders a fixed periodic payment and 
contingent control rights is a natural way of implementing contingent control allocations 
5 
- debt holders cannot exercise control unless default has occurred . 
A clear advantage of debt financing over equity financing is that non-payment of debt 
triggers a shift in control. By giving creditors a legal right to demand restructuring, a 
debt contract provides a specific type of discipline and monitoring of the managers' 
behaviour that is not available to an all-equity firm. The model due to Agnion and 
Bolton (1992) demonstrates that in the environment of contractual incompleteness, 
when equity holders are wealth-constrained, it may be optimal to transfer control from 
this party to debt holders. In an independent but related study, Wruck (1990) claims 
that default associated with debt finance, serves as a catalyst for organisational change. 
Where operating performance and the firm's value are deteriorating as a result of poor 
management decisions and weak governance, an earlier default can preserve value by 
increasing the likelihood that the firm will reorganise quickly and efficiently. Note that 
viewed int his I ight, d efault isn ot s ynonymous w ith I iquidation, b ut it in ay r esult in 
either restructuring of claims or liquidation. However, this benefit of value preservation 
disappears when the primary cause of corporate defaults is exogenous shocks 
responsible for the removal of economically viable firms. 
The agency theory way of thinking suggests that the "automatic" incentive devise 
provided by a geared capital structure may actually prevent economic and thus financial 
distress. Debt indirectly restricts non-value-maximising behaviour by corporate 
managers. By promising lenders a fixed stream of payments, the debt contract 
effectively links managerial rewards closely to the performance of the firm. Jensen 
5 The key difference between the equity and debt securities is the design of the control rights. Equity differs form 
debt by its cash flow claims and control rights. Equity holders are granted the unconditional right to dismiss the 
managers. 
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(1986) argues that high leverage aligns managerial incentives and minimises the 
inefficient use of "free cash flows". Default removes assets from managers' hands and 
thereby terminates any perquisites, which they can derive from the control of the firm. 
Where creditors have the right to replace the managers, the threat of dismissal induces 
the managers to perform better. It follows that debt financing gives managers an 
incentive to maximise expected returns and therefore a more efficiently run firm may 
have a reduced probability of financial distress. The incentive concept of debt expressly 
implies that, at the extreme, one may expect to find the inverse relationship between 
levels of debt and the risk of financial distress. However, Jensen's argument will work 
best when most of the variation of cash flow is idiosyncratic to the firm. When most of 
the risk is common across firms and debt is costly to negotiate, Jensen's theory may lose 
its appeal. 
Second, the agency view explores further the disciplinary aspects of debt finance when 
it focuses on the conflict between debt providers and owners. The debt contract gives 
shareholders and managers the opportunity of wealth transfer from debt holders by 
investing sub-optimally in very risky projects. This aspect of agency theory supports the 
use of protective provisions in lending agreements with shareholders. Protective 
covenants are imposed by debt finance suppliers who are concerned with the riskiness 
of their position in situations where the management raise finance for a supposed 
investment in a low-risk project but, once the debt is issued, they use the funds to invest 
in a high-risk project (Simpson and Anderson, 1957). In these circumstances, debt 
holders might suffer because there is insufficient equity capital to carry the risk. Thus 
the expected rate of return for debt holders would not properly reflect the risk of their 
investment. In order to avoid this sort of situation, debt suppliers might impose 
covenants on loan agreements that constrain managers' freedom of action. Debt 
covenants may carry restrictions on subsequent financing, on dividend policy or may 
prohibit disposing of major fixed assets without the debt holders' agreement. All this 
implies an agency cost to the firm of using debt finance. A violation of a debt covenant 
represents technical default, which may not necessarily lead directly to a formal 
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insolvency (bankruptcy), but nonetheless signals the deteriorating financial performance 
of the firm and increasing chances that the company's cash flow will not be sufficient to 
meet these fixed debt interest payments. Because the management of a company hold 
"undiversified portfolios" as far as their labour is concerned, to them the cost of 
bankruptcy is very substantial - they lose their employment. Therefore, management are 
given an incentive to take actions that reduce gearing and the probability of bankruptcy 
so as to avoid the very substantial agency costs involved. 
A great deal of insight into the link between the financing mix, unanticipated 
redistribution of wealth from debt holders to shareholders, and the likelihood of default 
has been obtained by applying the Black-Scholes approach to option pricing in analysis 
of capital structure choices. The option theory story of the conflict between equity 
holders and debt holders seems to fit well with the agency cost ideas. Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) suggest that the equity in a geared firm, organised as 
aI imited I iability c ompany, c an bet hought ofasac all option. When equity holders 
issue debt that is equivalent to selling the assets of the firm, but not the control over the 
assets, to debt holders in return for proceeds from the debt issue and a call option. 
Assume for simplicity, that the firm issues zero coupon bonds secured by its assets, 
there are no transaction costs or taxes, there is a known non-stochastic, risk-free rate of 
interest, and there are homogeneous expectations about the stochastic process that 
describes the market value of the firm's assets. The value of the equity holders' position 
is equal to the discounted value of the bonds and a call option. If on the bonds' maturity 
date, the value of the firm exceeds the face value of the bonds, the shareholders will 
exercise their call option by paying off the debt and keeping the excess. But, if the 
market value of the firm is less then the face value of the bonds, the equity holders will 
default on the debt by deciding not to exercise their option. It should be realised 
however that option pricing theory assumes the possibility of unanticipated 
redistributions of wealth. However, debt holders can protect themselves from 
anticipated redistributions of wealth by charging an adequate rate of return or by writing 
debt covenants restricting the actions of shareholders. 
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This section has discussed seminal theories of the firm that contribute to understanding 
the causal processes underlying financial distress and financial failure of companies. 
The traditional, firm-as-production-function model of the firm relating survival to 
profitability shows that market exit of inefficient firms heightens the efficiency of asset 
allocation. However, the traditional technological model does not deal with the financial 
risk factor and largely ignores the genuine differences in relative risks of distress 
attributed to geared long-term capital structures. Differences in financial instruments 
and their role in the evolution of economic organisation have been accounted for in the 
models of the firm displayed in the studies from new institutional economics. In this 
field, several theories, combining arguments from corporate finance and economics, 
have been put forward to explain the relation between the observed in practice financing 
mix types and failure in the form of involuntary insolvency triggered by debt default. 
The logic of new institutional economics sheds light on the differences between 
economic and financial distress. The main import from the theories of transaction cost 
and agency relationships is that capital structure measures should be regarded as an 
important independent factor defining the likelihood of financial failure due to default 
on debt payment. However, the state of modem theory of the firm does not allow to 
devise a unified analytic framework for empirical analysis of the determinants of 
company failure in the form of involuntary insolvency. 
1.4 The Institutional Framework: A Legal Mechanism for Resolving Financial 
Distress 
In discussing the selection process triggered by financial distress, it is desirable to 
consider the institutional framework that shapes exit of firms via the bankruptcy route. 
Insolvency (or "bankruptcy", in the US context) is a public policy aimed at the 
promotion of general welfare, which could be served by the protection of creditors and 
efficient asset reallocation as well as by the rehabilitation and organisational survival of 
debtors. The usefulness of insolvency (bankruptcy) proceedings as a mechanism to 
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resolve financial distress of companies requires strong creditor rights and judicial 
efficiency. Creditors are more likely to undertake the costs of bankruptcy if they are able 
to effectively use courts in case of default. 
Bankruptcy law determines the allocation of power between the firm and its financiers. 
UK and US bankruptcy procedures are different. US law imposes significant restrictions 
on the contractual rights of lenders in the event of default, especially the liquidation 
rights of senior lenders (see, e. g, Franks and Torous (1994), Suarez and Sussman, 
1999; Franks and Sussman (2002)). In the US, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act 
includes a lengthy automatic stay, the exclusive right of the debtor to remain in control 
of the company, to submit a reorganisation plan, and to raise new supra priority 
financing. Within the US legal framework for bankruptcy, courts are accorded much 
discretion about the extent of the company's relief from its creditors. In contrast, the UK 
approach to insolvency has been characterized by the strict enforcement of creditors' 
contractual rights, including the litigation rights of secured creditors. In sum, UK 
insolvency law tends to concentrate power in the hands of the secured creditors, whereas 
US bankruptcy law favours the company and unsecured creditors. 
When a company fails to pay a debt on its due date, the lender is entitle to avail himself 
of all the rights and remedies given to him by the debt contract and insolvency laws, 
including the institutions of legal proceedings against the borrower. However, the 
company's inability to pay debts does not automatically give rise to legal consequences 
for the company unless a formal insolvency procedure is commenced. For instance, a 
petition to compulsorily wind up a company can be presented if it is unable to pay its 
debts, or an administrative receiver can be appointed. At this point, under the 1986 UK 
Insolvency Act, two primary tests of insolvency may be applied for the purpose of 
relevant statutory provisions (Goode, 1997). The first test is a short-term measure of 
insolvency that is the company's inability to pay its debts as they fall due (unless the 
debt is disputed), and is known as the cash flow, or going-concern, or commercial 
insolvency test. The company may be cash-flow insolvent and unable to pay its way in 
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the conduct of business, b ut y et s till h ave s ufficient n on-liquid a ssets, sot hat ont he 
long-term view it is solvent. The second alternative test is the balance sheet or assets 
test which employs a wider expression of the term debt and establishes whether the 
company's assets are insufficient to discharge its liabilities, 6 taking into account 
prospective and contingent liabilities. A cash-flow based definition of insolvency means 
that a firm is unable to meet current cash obligations, while the balance-sheet based 
definition indicate the firm's negative economic worth. It is possible that a firm may be 
insolvent on a balance-sheet basis but solvent on a cash-flow basis and in this case the 
firm's creditors have little power as their claims are paid to date (Wruck, 1990). Both 
tests require an analysis of the debtor-company's financial position and involve an 
element of projection, the cash flow test because the court looks to see whether the 
company's inability to pay its debts as they fall due is purely temporary, and the balance 
sheet test because it is required to take into account prospective and contingent 
liabilities. Proving either test to the satisfaction of the court is sufficient for the purpose 
to attract statutory insolvency proceedings against the company. 
In the UK, there are five distinct legal regimes for handling a failing company, namely: 
administrative receivership; administration; winding-up (liquidation); statutory 
compromises, compositions and arrangements with creditors; and reorganisations; 
(workoUts)' which are arranged contractually outside the framework of corporate 
insolvency law (Goode, 1997). Administrative receivership is a creditor-oriented 
procedure. There was an opinion that in the early 1990s, the large number of 
administrative receivership (Table Al. 1 of appendix 1) represented precipitate 
behaviour of secured lenders (banks), causing viable companies to fail. (Insolvency 
Service (2001): Insolvency -A Second Chance)). Though winding up is the fate of the 
most insolvent companies, it is not that every insolvency leads to liquidation. The 
6 There is a difference between the legal and the accounting concept of assets and liabilities. Both law and 
accountancy distinguish between capital transactions, in which an asset is acquired for a price, and revenue 
transactions, in which rent is paid for the use of another's assets, or some other revenue expenditure is incurred. But 
the law concentrates on the location of title, whereas accounting standards focus on economic substance (Goode, 
1997). 
7A workout is the restructuring of debt. Workouts usually involve lower direct costs than receiverships or 
adn-dnistration, because the time, spend in informal reorganisation, is generally much shorter (Chatteýee, Dhillon, 
and Ramirez, 1996). 
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introduction of company voluntary arrangements (within or outside the administration 
procedure) and the use of non-statutory bank-led workouts, facilitated by the London 
Approach, 8 aimed at increasing scope for business rescues. 9 
As mentioned above, the legal criteria for company failure are used in the world of 
business by practitioners. 10 For instance, credit management systems of banks and credit 
agencies in defining the default event apply criteria of importance, transparency, and 
lack of ambiguity. Commonly used as the nominated default event are clear events of 
financial distress (formal insolvency regimes as well as rating downgades) and payment 
defaults on obligations above a nominated threshold after the expiration of a specific 
period. Insolvency-based events are most easy to ascertain, because the presentation of 
bankruptcy petition or the winding up order is a matter of public record, and the event 
and the date it occurs is relatively easy to establish. For other quasi-insolvency events 
timing and occurrence issues are less clear cut (Brown and Chance, 1998). For 
instance, defaults to banks might be negotiable - it is sometimes up to the bank to decide 
when a borrower has problems. Unless forced, it might not be in the bank's interests to 
do so, because its shares would be hammered. Debt reschedulings and restructurings 
that frequently undertaken to avoid payment default or legal insolvency are affairs that 
can run for many years. Loans may be non-performing for several years without being 
called into default. The consequence of such definitional imprecision is that academic 
research into causes of corporate distress and failure commonly choose the state of legal 
insolvency as an operational proxy for the event of failure. 
8 London Approach restructurings used during the early 1990s' recession by a small number of very large companies, 
are orginised by banks and aim to maximise value for creditors by avoiding unnecessary collapse of potentially viable 
enterprises as a result of disagreements between creditors (Kent, 1994; Belcher, 1997). 
9 In the 1990s, most notably in the USA and France, a so-called "rescue culture" of rehabilitation of the enterprise 
has been identified. The proposed reforms of UK insolvency laws place great importance on both formal and 
informal rescue regimes to reverse actual or to avert imminent insolvency of the enterprise (Brown, 1996; Belcher, 
1997; Goode, 1997). As a result of rescue procedures attempting a "turnaround", the failing company may restore 
solvency and profitability and continue trading. In this sense company failure associated with temporary distress 
would not lead to liquidation. 
10 For instance, business failure, the term adopted by Dun & Bradstreet, a leading supplier of relevant statistics on 
businesses, applies to the following firms: (i) those that cease operations following assignment or bankruptcy; (ii) 
those that cease with loss to creditors after such actions as executions, foreclosure, or attachment; (iii) those that 
voluntary withdraw, leaving unpaid obligations; (iv) those that have been involved in court actions such as 
receivership, reorganisation, or arrangement; and (v) those that voluntary compromise with creditors. In 1990, the 
business failure total in the USA, reported by Dun & Bradstreet, was slightly less than the number of business 
bankruptcy filings (Altman, 1993). 
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In relation to the distinction between financial and legal dimensions of failure, Brown 
(1996) draws attention to the fact that even liquidation does not necessarily connote 
failure of the business (commercial enterprise) as opposed to its legal vehicle, the 
company. The business of the company may be saved by a sale, or the assets being 
hived down to a new subsidiary established for this purpose. 
1.5 Corporate Finance Theories of Corporate Bankruptcy 
As mentioned earlier, company failure research at the firm level does not rest on a 
unified, coherent analytical model linking together the factors underlying company 
failure. The major implications of models proposed in the area of theory of the firm for 
company failure research have been considered in section 1.3. The aim of the present 
section is to review the developments that have been used in the field of corporate 
finance to explain in a more formal way the process of financial failure. We begin with 
a brief description of the theoretical approach employed in Laitinen and Laitinen 
(1998), who are interested in the impact the cash management behaviour makes upon 
company liquidity during an early phase of financial distress. Then the discussion turns 
to the treatment of company default by Merton's model (Merton, 1974) and to 
theoretical predictors developed in Scott (1981) for the final stage of distress 
represented by liquidation of an individual company. Scott (198 1) derived his analytical 
models with the purpose to discover the logic underlying the forecasting success 
claimed by some commercial models of long-term (balance-sheet) solvency. 
1.5.1 Cash Management Behaviour of a Distressed Company 
The cash management approach uses a dynamic theoretical framework of reserve 
(inventory) cash management models to depict the behaviour of a financially distressed 
firm and to predict failure. Constituting financial failure events of legal insolvency, 
bond default, an overdrawn bank account, or non-payment of a preferred stock dividend 
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are originated in the failure to fulfill the cash balance requirements (Beaver, 1966). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the cash management model of a financially 
distressed firm will systematically differ from one of a "healthy" firm and that the 
difference may be useful in explaining failure. 
Laitinen and Laitinen (1998) advanced a dynamic model of the cash management 
behaviour and attempted to empirically test whether the parameter estimates of cash 
management models had additional explanatory and predictive power when these 
variables were utilised alongside conventional accounting-based determinants in 
modelling distress. Failure of short-term management of corporate cash balances refers 
in their model to an imbalance between cash inflows and outflows, which leads to 
illiquidity or the inability of the firm to pay its financial obligations as they come due. 
The Baumol-Tobin cash reserve (inventory) framework and its extensions (Bauniol, 
1952; Tobin, 1956)" was chosen as a model of demand for money. Assuming the 
firm's demand for money depends on the volume of transactions, the objective of the 
model, subject to cash balance requirements, is to minimise the costs of cash 
management. The transaction (liquid) assets consist of two types: cash and a secondary 
asset which is interest bearing. The cash management problem in this framework deals 
with the apportionment of the transaction assets between these two types. Each 
transaction between the asset types causes a lump sum (fixed) cost (a) and a variable 
cost (b) proportional to the volume of transaction (transaction costs), and an opportunity 
cost of holding cash because of foregone interest earnings (at the rate of interest i). The 
total volume of transactions to cash (S) is needed to finance the difference between 
(periodic and instantaneous) cash inflows and cash outflows (occurring at a constant 
rate) in a fixed period (t). At the beginning of the period, this amount is invested as a 
secondary asset, and will be transferred to cash in equal parts (A) during the period. This 
leads to the average cash balance of (A12) and to the opportunity cost of (i(A12)). The 
" The theoretical background of demand for money has been developed by macro economists like Fisher, Pigou, 
Marshall, Keynes and Friedman. Keynes (1936) classified the factors affecting the demand for money in three 
categories: transaction, precaution, and speculative motives. The transaction motive is caused by the lag between 
cash inflows and outflows, which leads to the need for cash as a buffer. The view of the firm as a reservoir of liquid 
assets, which serves as a buffer against variations in the flows, fori-ned the core of the approach adopted by Beaver 
(1966), in one of the early empirical studies of the determinants of failure. 
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number of transactions during the period (t) is (N=SIA). Thus the total cost of cash 
management is the sum of opportunity and transaction costs: 
C=i(A12)+a(SIA)+bS . 
The size of transferred optimal volume A minimising total costs is: 
A* = (2aSlif'. 
That leads to the following optimal long-term average cash balance: 
A* /2= (aS / 2i)'-' = (aN / if'. 
Expression (1.5) gives 0.5 for the elasticity of optimal cash balance with respect to the 
rate of fixed costs (e. ), to the volume of transactions (e, ), and to the number of 
transactions (e. ) as well as -0.5 for the elasticity with respect to the rate of interest 
(e, ). 
Assuming (a) is a constant, the simple static model of the actual cash balance of a firm 
in period (t) can be given in the logarithmic form by a multiplicative function of (S) and 
(i): 
InM(t) = InD+e, InS(t)+e, Ini(t)+u(t). (1.6) 
where (t) refers to the period, (D) is a scale constant and (u(t)) is a random variable. 
Within the Baumol-Tobin framework, the financial distress behaviour is based on the 
analysis of how the values of the parameters of specification (1.6) react to the peculiar 
cash management behaviour, when the firm is in financial distress. Distress means that 
the firm has a shortage of cash and, as a result, the maximum attainable cash balance 
(Mu(t)) is very close to the cash balance leading to the liquidity cri S'S (ML (0) 3, 
therefore, for a distressed firm, the difference (MU (t) - ML (0) . or the range, 
in which 
the cash balance can vary, is small. This means that generally only a small, if any, 
proportion of the cash is available with respect to the motive factors S(t) and i(t). Thus, 
expression (1.5) for a financially distressed firm would yield the lower absolute values 
of elasticities of cash balance (M(t)) with respect to the volume of transactions (e, ) and 
to the rate of interest (e), than the values for a similar "healthy" firm. 
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Further, in order to describe the distress behaviour, the dynamic cash management 
model introduces an adjustment process, according to which the actual cash balance 
tends to adjust towards the optimal balance. Total adjustment costs (C(t)), consisting of 
both the costs due to imbalance between the optimal and actual cash balance and the 
costs due to the adjustment towards the optimal cash balance, are approximated by 
squared functions as follows: 
C(t)=a(M(t))-M*(t))' +, 8(M(t)-M(t-1))', (1.7) 
where (a) is the rate of imbalance cost and (A) the rate of adjustment cost. 
This leads to a partial adjustment model given by: 
M(t) -M(t - 1) = Y(mo(t) -M(t - 1)). 
The adjustment is assumed to take place at a constant rate, periodically, and (y) 
measures the speed of adjustment: 
al(a + P) . 
If 8ý--O, then y-1 and the actual cash balance is immediately adjusted to the optimal 
balance because there are no adjustment costs. 
For a firm in financial distress, (M(t-1)) may be less than (M*(t)), and due to 
financial distress, the change may take place downwards so that (M(t)) is below 
(M(t-1)). Consequently, imbalance costs after the change, are greater than in the 
previous period (t-1) since (M . (t)-M(t)>M*(t-l)-M(t-l)). The behaviour ofa 
distressed firm may lead to the situation as if the rate of imbalance cost (a) is negative 
and the rate of adjustment cost (ff) positive. The negative values of (a) might be such 
that (I ct J> P) would result in a value of (y) greater than unity, and may exceed the 
rate for the similar "healthy" firm. It follows that, the larger the differences in estimates 
of the adjustment rate between a distressed firm and its counterpart, the shorter is the 
time for bankruptcy. 
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The cash management behaviour framework implies the importance of liquidity and 
cash management factors for explaining and modelling company failure. The upshot of 
the argument made by Laitinen and Laitinen is that the model demonstrates the direct 
link between environmental changes, captured in their model by the interest rate, and 
switches in the cash management behaviour 12 . 
1.5.2 The Merton Model of Company Default 
The work published by Merton in 1974 has extended the approach by Black and Scholes 
(1973) and Merton (1973). Merton infers the probability of default for a quoted 
company from the valuation of assets and liabilities of the company. The model states 
that a company is in default when the market value of the company's assets falls below 
the book value of its liabilities. The original variant of the model assumes that the event 
of default occurs only at the maturity of the debt, but in later versions this assumption 
has been relaxed. The event of default depends on the volatility of a company's assets, 
as measured by the standard deviation. Merton's approach posits that if there is a great 
variation in the change in the value of the firm's assets over time, the range of possible 
values may include a default point. However, if the value of the debt is fixed and the 
value of the firm's assets grows with time then that in itself will reduce the likelihood of 
default. The financial distress evolution is represented by the standardised distance to 
default, given by the difference between the expected value of the company's assets and 
the book value of debt at that point in time, divided by the standard deviation of the 
value of the assets. To derive the underlying value of a company's assets from the value 
and volatility of its equity and the book value of its liabilities Merton then applies option 
12A test of the Baumol-Tobin framework consistency and explanatory value for failure prediction of the parameters 
that e nter s tatic a nd d ynamic e quations f or t he c ash m anagement b ehaviour, h as b een p erformed in Laitinen and 
Laitinen (1998) with data on 82 Finnish distressed firms. E mpirical r esults from m ultivariate I ogit s howed t hat a 
model based on the cash management variables only, achieved poor classification accuracy on the estimation sample. 
When used in combination with traditional financial detem-driants, the cash management variables from the static 
model again did not provide information incremental over the benchmark financial variables. On the estimation 
sample, the dynamic model was clearly outperforming the static model in failure prediction as the estimates for the 
scale elasticity of cash in the d ynan-dc m odcl p rovided i nformation t hat h ad i ncremcntal v alue. T he c lassification 
error rates of the combined model for the year one before failure had slightly, by about 6 per cent, been reduced. 
Apparently, the theory did not agree well with the data examined. 
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pricing techniques (see Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973)). Assuming the 
probability of default follows a standard normal distribution, the probability of default 
of an individual quoted company can be easily evaluated. 
1.5.3 Scott on Theoretical Predictors of Company Liquidation 
A Single-period Model 
The single-period model of bankruptcy (Scott, 1981) is based on a firm that lasts for 
two periods. Its securities are traded in the current period and it will be liquidated next 
period. If (V, ) is a random variable representing the market, end-of-period value of a 
hypothetical firm and if (DI) denotes the amount owed to creditors, then the firm will 
go bankrupt, in the sense of having negative net worth or being long-term insolvent, if 
V<D 1 11 (1.10) 
Assuming that (V, ) has a two-parameter probability distribution with parameters (, u, ) 
and (a, ), we can standardise both sides of inequality (1.10) and obtain the following 
condition for bankruptcy: 
D, 
av av 
(1.11) 
Now, if F[. ] represents the cumulative distribution function for (V, - p, ) / cr, then the 
probability of failure equals F[(D, -p, )/cr, ]. 
Notably, this model favours as empirical predictors of liquidation both the market value 
of equity and the estimates of liabilities from financial accounts. As fortnula (I. 11) 
contains only stock variables, namely the next debt payment (principal and/or interest) 
and the expected market value of the firm (debt plus equity) at the next debt payment, 
and no flow variables, the model does not capture factors linked to illiquidity and hence 
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failes to explain the power of existing empirical predictors represented by flow 
accounting values and earnings variables. 
A Gambler Is Ruin Model 
The gambler's ruin models (e. g., Borch, 1967; Wilcox, 1976; Santomero and Vinso, 
1977) assume that the firm has a given amount of capital, (K), and that changes in (K) 
are random. Positive changes in (K) result from positive cash flows from the firm's 
operations. Losses require the firm to liquidate assets. Implicitly this model assumes the 
firm isc ompletely c ut o ff from s ecurity rn arkets a nd c an n ot r aise funds via debt or 
equity issues. When (K) becomes negative, the firm is declared bankrupt. 
Assume that accounting values can serve as surrogates for liquidation values. If (K) is 
the liquidation value of shareholders' investment, measured by the book value of equity, 
and (Z) ist he c hange in (K), r epresented byt he c hange inr etained e arnings, t hen in 
terms of standardised variables the firm goes bankrupt if 
Z-P, - (p, 
Both a stock variable and a flow variable appear in the gambler's ruin model. The stock 
variable represents the gambler's stake, and is measured by the liquidation value of the 
firm's physical assets. T he f low v ariable isr epresented byt he n ext p eriod c hange in 
retained earnings (net income minus dividends and equity repurchases). 
Dividing the terms of expression (1.12) by the value of total assets yields the following 
theoretical predictor: 
p, ITA+KITA 
a, ITA 
(1.13) 
Scott (1981) pointed out the correspondence between the variables in model (1.13) and 
some empirically derived determinants of failure represented in the risk evaluation 
model ZETA 013 described in Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977). Like 
13 In the analysis by Scott (1981), ZETA* was viewed as a benchmark empirical model of commercially proven 
predictive ability. Altman (2000) reports that, in the late 1990s, the ZETA" model based on the liner discriminant 
function was still being used by practitioners throughout the world. The ZETA* variables include: a size measure 
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ZETA'Iý, the gambler's ruin model contains stock variables, which reflect the financial 
position at a point in time, as well as flow variables that involve estimates of the firm's 
future cash flow distributions. For instance, the ratio of retained earnings over total 
assets in ZETAO is close to the ratio of shareholders' equity over total assets, (KITA), in 
(1.13). The ratio of earnings before interest and tax over total assets in ZETAO is similar 
to (p., / TA ). The standard error of the ratio of earnings before interest and tax over total 
assets is close to (a., / TA ). However, the ZETAO model includes the additional 
determinants which are absent from the gambler's ruin model (1.13). 
A Model with Perfect Access to External Capital 
The idea of this model is similar in spirit to the option pricing model by Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). The option pricing framework recognises equity as 
a call option which is written on the value of the geared firm. Limited liability implies 
that equity holders have the right, but not an obligation to pay off debt holders and take 
over the remaining assets of the firm. The firm is essentially owned by the holders of 
other liabilities until those liabilities are paid off in full by equity holders. Thus, equity 
is the same as a call option on the firm's assets with a strike price equal the book value 
of the firm's liabilities. Default or bankruptcy occurs when asset value falls below the 
values of the firm's liabilities. 14 The risk of a firm going bankrupt depends critically on 
the beginning market value of the firm's assets relative to its external debt as well as the 
volatilityof the market value of the firm's assets. 
In the model with perfect access to external capital a firm has a potentially infinite life 
and can meet losses by selling debt or equity in an efficient market without incurring 
given by the log of total tangible assets; profitability and earnings stability measures expressed by the level and 
standard deviation of the ratio of earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets; the current ratio measuring 
liquidity; the ratio for debt service expressed as the log of earnings before interest and tax divided by total interest 
payments; the ratio of cumulative profitability expressed by retained earnings over total assets; and the ratio of the 
market value of common stock over the market value of total capital (Altman, 1993). We discuss the ZETAO model in 
chapter 2. 
14 KMV Corporation, the market consultancy, presents empirical evidence from a sample of several hundred 
companies, which suggests that, in general, firms do not default when their asset value Teaches the book value of their 
total liabilities (see Crosbie, 1998). Many firms continue to trade and service at this point because the I ong-terni 
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flotation costs (Scott, 1976 and 1977). The model assumes that the secondary market 
for real assets is imperfect and the firm's initial level of assets is optimal. The firm can 
also sell assets but does not choose to do so. It remains solvent as long as shareholders' 
wealth, measured in terms of market value, remains positive. 
Fonnally, the firm fails if 
S+X<O, (1.14) 
where (X) represents the next period earnings (loss), and (S) the optimal value of equity 
in the next period (ignoring the loss). 
The determination of whether a given loss will bankrupt the firm is based on the 
following scenario. First, shareholders ignore the loss and determine the optimal asset 
and debt structure and a financial plan to achieve that structure. They then observe what 
the value of their equity would be, given the optimal plan and ignoring the loss. If this 
optimal value exceeds the loss, they avoid bankruptcy by first carrying out the plan and 
then selling just enough additional equity to pay off the loss. If the optimal value of their 
equity is less than the loss, the firm fails. Thus, this theory is dynamic in the sense that it 
assumes that management act optimally when faced with solvency-threatening losses. 
In terms of standardised variables, the bankruptcy condition is: 
X-P" <- (p, + 
ax ax 
(1.15) 
If a group of firms shares the same two-parameter probability distribution for earnings, 
F[-], then F[-(p., + S) /aj equals a firm's probability of failure. The higher the 
((p., +S) I aj, the lower the probability of failure. 
The transformation of (1.15) with scaling the terms by total assets and multiplying by 
minus one yields the following predictor: 
nature of some of their liabilities provides them with a breathing space. KMV Corporation finds that the asset value, 
at which the firm will default, lies generally between total liabilities and short-term liabilities (Crosbie, 1998). 
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p,, ITA+SITA (1.16) 
TA 
All of the variables in model (1.16) are likened to the ZETAO variables in Altman, 
Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) and affect the probability of bankruptcy in the same 
direction. For instance, the ratio of earnings before interest and tax over total assets in 
ZETA 0 is close to (p., I TA), whereas the standard error of earnings before interest and 
tax to total assets is similar to ( o-X / TA ). 
Unlike the single-period and gambler's ruin models, the perfect-access model bases the 
prediction of bankruptcy on both the internal earnings variables and the 
external stock market variable (S). The presence of a market valuation variable is an 
important practical advantage, because a low stock market value does not just predict 
bankruptcy it actually increases the probability of bankruptcy. The market value of a 
firm's stock determines the amount of external capital the firm can raise to avoid going 
bust (Beaver, 1968). Thus, the lower the market value, the lower the borrowing capacity 
and potential for survival. 
The gambler's ruin model and pcrfcct-access model have generally agreed with 
empirical predictors, for example, with commercial applications reported in Altman, 
Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) and Crosbie (1998). 
A Model with Imperfect Access to External Capital 
For the more realistic case of imperfect external markets, Scott (1981) derived a 
criterion that contains both a liquidation value of the firm's existing assets, as in the 
gambler's ruin model, and the present value of the firm's future cash flows, as in the 
perfect-access model. 
To change the perfect access model into a model with imperfect access, Scott allows 
that a firm must pay flotation costs, there are no personal taxes, and securities are 
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efficiently priced. Real assets can be bought and sold in perfect secondary markets. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that the firm has no debt but can issue equity. Investors are risk 
averse with homogeneous expectations; and future single-period interest rates are 
constant and certain. 
Suppose that there are three distinct points of time, denoted 0,1, and 2. The current 
period is period 0. A firm can exist until period 2, at which time it will be orderly 
liquidated. 
To write the expression for the probability that the firm will go bankrupt at period I 
Scott introduces the following variables. Shareholders' equity at period Q) is given by 
(Ki). (Xi [KI-I ]) is income of the firm when i=(O, 1), and the value the firm would have 
in an orderly liquidation when i=2. (X, ) is a random variable that can take any real 
value. Each realisation of this random variable is an increasing, concave function of 
(K, 
-, 
). Net investment at period (i), a decision variable, is denoted by (1, ); so 
(KI = KI-I +I, ). The market value of the firm's equity at period (i) is given by (Si [11 
(r) is the rate of interest, and (c) is flotation costs per unit of equity sold. 
Shareholders' wealth at period 2 will equal maxIX2[K, ], 0] because equity has limited 
liability. Since investors are risk neutral, the market value at period 1 is given by 
S, EOIX2[K,, +I, ]] 
I+r 
(1.17) 
where (E,, ) represents the partial Lebesque-Stieltjes expectations operator with a lower 
limit of integration equal to zero. 
Due to flotation costs, the optimal level of (I, ) and thus (S, ) will depend on the level of 
income (X2[KO ]). 
39 
CHAPTER I 
Let shareholders' wealth at period I be denoted by (SU), then 
Sl[fl]+X, [Ko]-Ii 
SW =-S, [XI [Ko ]] 
s, LI, I+ (I + OV, Wo I- Li) 
if X, [Ko 12: 11 
if ljý! XJKOIý->Ij, (1.18) 
if Ijý: Xj[KO>Ij-Sj[Lj11(1+c)- 
In (1.18) (1, ) is the optimal level of investment when income is sufficiently high and 
investment is funded from income, while (I, ) is the optimal level of investment in the 
case when income is low and the firm must use the externally-raised funds. 
According to (1.18) the bankruptcy takes place when shareholders' wealth reaches zero: 
[LI ] (1 + c)(X, [K, 1- LI): 5 0. (1.19) 
A financially distressed firm maximises its value by setting (I, = L, ) The difference 
(SI [LI ]- (I + c)L, ), which is the maximum of the present value of future earnings less 
current investment, can not be negative, because (S, [LI ] 2! 0) by limited liability, and 
(I = 0) is a feasible investment decision. Therefore, bankruptcy requires that (XI [KO 
be negative. If (SI LI, ]) is insufficiently large the firm goes bankrupt at period 1. 
Defining (K, = KO +I, ) and rewriting (1.19) in terms of standardised variables we 
obtain: 
X, [K,, I-p., 
< 
(Ko - KI) - S, [LI I /(I + c) (1.20) 
ax ax 
Then, given that the firm is faced with earnings losses, the term (K(, -K, ) can be 
interpreted as the amount of assets it is optimal for a distressed firm to sell, and the term 
(SjLj1(l+c)) represents the maximum amount of equity (after fiotation costs) a 
financially pressed firm making optimal decisions can sell. 
The bankruptcy criteria of the gambler's ruin and perfect-access models (1.12) and 
(1.15) are special cases of( 1.20), i. e. as( c -+ oo, SI[L, ]I(I+c) --+ 0), and the firm is 
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forced to meet all eamings losses with sales of assets. If (c -)- 0,1, -> I, ), the firm will 
rely more heavily on the equity market to cover losses and the imperfect access model 
approaches the perfect access model. If, in addition, the firm has already achieved its 
optimal capital stock, then at the optimum, (I, = 0). Under these conditions, (1.20) is 
identical to the perfect access criterion (1.15). 
Condition ( 1.20) i mplies t hat t he f inn's i ncome, i nitial I evels a nd changes in market 
values of shareholders' equity, and the rate of interest are factors that might be relevant 
for empirical examination of insolvency. 
1.6 The Influence of the Macroeconomic Context 
Company survivability is influenced by the enviromnental factors. The links between 
the changes in overall economic conditions and aggregate rates of corporate liquidations 
have been in the focus of a large number of studies based on economy-widc-lcvcl 
information. The examples of investigations answering the question about the rate of 
company liquidations include Bernanke (1981), Altman (1983), Wadhwani (1986), 
Turner, Coutts and Bowden (1992), Davis, (1995), Young (1995), Cuthbertson and 
Hudson (1996), Robson (1996), Assadian and Ford (1997), and Gray (1999). Work 
on aggregate liquidations has found that the important among the environmental factors 
are cyclical swings in economic activity, shifts in factor prices, credit availability, 
changes in real and nominal interest rates, and movements in exchange rates. Research 
results in the macro-level strand of the company failure literature have merits for 
potentially explaining regularities observed at the level of individual firm. 
Bankruptcy risk is a counter-cyclical variable (Bernanke, 1981; Altman, 1983). Sales 
and earnings of companies are directly related to overall business activity with most 
defaults o ccurring d uring ori mmediately a Rer r ecessions, w hich a re o flen coincident 
with periods of monetary and fiscal constraints. The link from recession to bankruptcy is 
influential in imperfect capital markets, which prevent companies from b cing able to 
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borrow as much as they would to cover cash flow shortages resulting from a fall in 
demand for their products and services. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates what happened to the UK corporate sector when the 1990-92 
recession set in. Company insolvencies rose steadily from 1980 to 1985, by which time 
the overall number had roughly doubled. Then they fell back sharply to the level of 1982 
between 1986 and 1988 and began to accelerate in 1990. The 1992 figure is roughly 
three times that of 1989. However it should be borne in mind that, in the UK, in the 
mid-1980s company formation was unusually rapid, and the failure rate could be 
expected to rise during the recession. 
At the time, failures were located primarily in the South-East outside London, Scotland 
and the South-West, indicating a higher failure rate among companies 
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Figure 1.1 Company insolvencies in 1979-95 (adopted from "Understanding the UK 
Economy", 1997). 
fonned in the late 1980s. A credit crunch existed throughout the 1990s recession, when 
the banks became unwilling to lend to the companies that got into trading difficulties. 
Not only the banks widened the gap between the interest, at which they could borrow, 
Company insolvencies annualised as a 
petcentage of active companies 
(left-hand scale) Ik 
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and the rate, at which they lent, but also they disposed of their collateral when payments 
secured by that collateral cease to be made, and shut down companies, which, in better 
times, they would have been willing to support ("Understanding the UK Economy", 
1997). 
In recessions, firms are severely affected by a collapse in demand, which creates 
financial distress by narrowing the margin between cash flows and debt service. 
Bernanke (1981) suggested a link between the economy-wide level of bankruptcy risk 
and the propagation of recessions. In the period of recession, the initial fall in national 
income may be propagated through the economy via a multiplier mechanism. Given 
costly bankruptcy, there would be a general attempt to ensure solvency. Even given the 
assumption, that, at the outset of recession, only a few were at zero liquidity or going 
bankrupt, the need to guard against the risks of low liquidity would be a factor in the 
economic behaviour of most agents. Consumers and firms would be careful to retain 
sufficient liquid assets to meet fixed expenses. Lenders would tighten credit by both 
charging the interest rate that includes a premium compensating for the increased risk of 
default, and setting loan sizes below what borrowers would like. That leads to a reduced 
demand for consumer and producer durables - which in turn generates further income 
reductions. One profound implication of this theory is that company failure is industry 
sector-specific. The largest impact on company survival is predicted to occur in sectors 
producing long-lived, illiquid goods. 
Altman (1983) empirically tested the impact of diminishing GDP activity on the US 
business failure rate for 1950-79 by including the percentage change in real GDP in the 
set of explanatory factors. Other macroeconomic factors affecting companies' financial 
position included credit and liquidity c onstraints asd efined byt he n ation's in onetary 
stock M2, investor expectations, and changes in business formation. The results indicate 
the negative effect of changes in real GDP on the rate of business failures but, somewhat 
counter-intuitively, did not support the link from the rises in interest rate to the 
propensity of firms to fail. 
43 
CHAPTER I 
In contrast, econometric studies by Wadhwani (1986), Young (1995), Davis (1995), 
Cuthbertson and Hudson (1996), where a careful look at the aggregate rate of 
company liquidations in the UK was taken, produced evidence suggestive of a strong 
link between the changes in the real and nominal interest rates and company failure 
incidences. 
Wadhwani (1986) presents theoretical considerations that declining profitability and 
interest rates are the key determinants of corporate insolvencies when debt is not 
indexed and capital markets are imperfect. Price inflation has a significant effect on the 
aggregate b ankruptcy r ate a nd d efault p remia, i ndependent of real interest rates. It is 
well known that high inflation is detrimental to companies as it rises nominal interest 
charges. Under these circumstances, firstly, the company would become reluctant to 
raise long-term capital even if there is a need for investment, and, secondly and more 
importantly, lenders might be reluctant to accommodate the firm with cash flow 
problems. If one assumes that the short-run cash flow factors determine failure than the 
nominal rather than real rate of interest might have an important role in explaining 
failure. Another possible link is that rising inflation may engender expectations of a 
subsequent tightening of macroeconomic policy, leading to a decline in business 
confidence. 
In Wadhwani (1986) the bankruptcy condition is specified for an individual, quoted firm 
and then tested with aggregated quarterly UK data for total liquidations covering 1965- 
81. First, Wadhwani looks at the perfectly competitive case and ignores inflation. The 
firm isap rice-taker a nd c hooses t he I evel of employment (L) to maximise expected 
profits net of expected bankruptcy costs, which depend on the probability of bankruptcy 
denoted p(. ). The firm has a borrowing constraint and the budget constraint. The firm 
has borrowed the amount (D) at the real, risk-free rate of interest (p). Should the firm 
fail to meet the current obligations, it can raise external finance up to (S = MV - D), 
where (MP) is the expected present value of the future earnings and (S) is the value of 
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shares. The only source of uncertainty is the output price (; o-), which is a random 
variable with the known distribution with the mean and variance (; 5, o-). Denoting 
money wage by (W) the bankruptcy condition is given by: 
; 5F(L)-WL-pD+S<O. (1.21) 
Second, Wadhwani augments the model by introducing the effects of inflation and 
allowing the firm to compete a'la Cournot-Nash. Given that the borrowing limits are 
determined by the expected present values of earnings, a firm with debt exceeding its 
borrowing limit, will have to survive on generated cash flows. But if debt is not indexed 
and at a variable rate, inflation erodes cash flows. This is because for any positive real 
interest rate, a given rise in inflation leads to the greater proportionate increase in the 
nominal interest rate (r) than the proportionate increase in the nominal value of its 
operating profits, thereby increasing the probability of bankruptcy. Wadhwani also 
points out that inflation reduces the firm's chances in obtaining new loan finance 
because inflation negatively affects interest cover, the ratio of profits to nominal interest 
payments, I imits for w hich in ight bes et inI oan covenants by using nominal interest 
rates. 
If there is a steady inflation of (, b ), and the real rate of interest is replaced by the 
nominal rate of interest, r=p +jb + pp, the firm goes bankrupt when: 
(1 + P)[; 5F(L) - WL - pD + (MV - D)] < 0. (1.22) 
Under Cournot-Nash competition, a firm chooses the output to maximise profits net of 
expected bankruptcy costs, taking other firms' output as given. Assuming that 
employment is affected by aggregate demand (AD), the general expression for the 
probability of bankruptcy under imperfect competition would be: 
p(-)Ipc =, u(W, p, D, MV,; 3, a, AD). (1.23) 
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Relation (1.23) implies that bankruptcy risk is linked to debt, the market value of equity, 
the real interest rate, factor and output prices, and aggregate demand. However, while 
his theoretical framework suggests the use of the real interest rate (p) and the rate of 
inflation (, b), in empirical modelling Wadhwani experiments with both the nominal 
interest rate (r) and the real interest rate (p). He reports that the use of the real interest 
rate was rejected by tests, but the nominal interest rate was a highly significant variable 
over the 1965-81 analysis period, implying that inflation raises bankruptcy rates. 
A similar theoretical base with the focus on the link between current profits, credit rates, 
inflation, and the likelihood of bankruptcy, was used by Simmons (1989) who explored 
the factors determining the bankruptcy rate amongst small unincorporated UK 
businesses. His findings, therefore, are not directly comparable with the aggregate 
results of Wadhwani (1986). Simmons found that demand variables and real wage costs 
were the significant key determinants of failure, but, in sharp contrast to the findings of 
Wadhwani, rises in interest rates reduced bankruptcy rates in retailing, road haulage and 
construction. 
General specification (1.23) has been used in the study of major OECD countries, 
reported in Davis (1995). For the context of the UK in 1969-90, Davis registered that 
inflation (whose influence was implicit in the positively signed coefficient for the 
nominal interest rate and the negatively signed coefficient for the real interest rate), the 
business cycle (recession), and factor prices were as important for explaining business 
failure rates as corporate gearing. Results on the influence of macroeconomic factors on 
UK business dissolutions in 1980-90, reported in Robson (1996), support the findings 
of Wadhwani although point to the especial importance for explaining business 
deregistrations of the changes rather than levels of the real interest rate. Since levels of 
the interest rate may be to some extent anticipated, then only an unanticipated 
component represents new information, which matters for explaining the process of 
company failure. 
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In the UK study for 1977-92, Young (1995) explicitly distinguishes between the 
expected and unexpected changes in nominal and real interest rates. Young 
demonstrates empirically that is was macroeconomic instability, associated with high 
inflation and sharp, unanticipated movements in real interest rates and demand, that led 
to a higher liquidation rate of the sample companies. Young has also discovered that the 
firm's response to changes in interest rates will depend on the composition of its debt 
contract. 15 Companies financed by variable-rate debt are adversely affected by the 
unexpected increase in real interest rates as that reduces the market value of their 
capital, but does not affect the value of variable-rate debt, causing the firm's net worth 
to fall. Firms financed at fixed nominal interest rates would be vulnerable to the 
unanticipated reduction in inflation. Results from Young's model suggest that a rise in 
nominal interest rates may either increase, decrease or have no effect on the rate of 
business failure, depending on whether it corresponds to a rise in real interest rates or 
inflation, is anticipated or unanticipated, and debt is at fixed rates or variable rates. 
Cuthbertson and Hudson (1996) in their empirical design followed Wadhwani's 
(1986) general specification for the probability of failure (see expression (1.23)) too, but 
they examined only compulsory liquidations among UK companies over the period 
1972-89. Their model specification controlled for the "age-structure" effect proxied by 
the number of company "births", and included a profit margin variable to capture the 
individual cost variables of Wadhwani (1986). In their model, it is an increase in income 
gearing, which increases insolvencies. Cuthbertson and Hudson (1996) explained this 
finding by creditors being myopic and relying in their assessment of the probability of 
15 Interest rates on loan finance may be either floating or fixed. A floating Tate means that the rate of return payable to 
lenders will rise and fall with market rates of interest, although it is possible for a floating rate loan to be issued, 
which sets a maximum rate of interest and/or a minimum rate of interest payable. The market value of the lender's 
investment in the business is likely to remain fairly stable over time. The converse will normally be true for fixed 
interest loan capital. The interest payments will remain unchanged with rises and falls in market rates of interest, but 
the value of the loan investment will fall when interest rates rise, and rise when interest rates fall. A company that has 
borrowed at a floating rate of interest, may find that interest rate rises will place real strains on cash flows and 
profitability. Conversely, a company that has a fixed rate of interest will find that when interest rates are falling it will 
not enjoy benefits of lower interest charges. To reduce or eliminate the risk, a company may enter into a hedging 
arrangement, such as forward rate agreements, interest rate guarantees (options), interest rate swaps. However, 
unanticipated movements in interest rates can present a significant issue for companies that have high levels of 
borrowing. 
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insolvency of a debtor on the debtor recent performance. However, this result also 
implies that, after a time, firms may be able adapt to high nominal interest rates by 
reducing borrowing and, in the long run, by cutting input costs. Increases in real unit 
labour costs and real input prices influenced profit margins and these changes in profit 
margins caused an increase in compulsory liquidations for the sample period. As for 
interest rates, they had a direct effect on gearing and indirectly affected the earning 
power via changes in real output and hence profit margins. 
The short-term view creditors tend to take as to distressed companies prospects is 
evident in the results form a macro-study of the effect of the Thatcher government on 
UK company liquidations by Turner, Coutts, and Bowden (1992). Their work 
covering 1951-89 empirically tested two alternative theoretical conditions for 
liquidation. The first condition is linked to value maximising theory. This theory implies 
that the probability of a company being placed into liquidation depends on the 
assessment by the company creditors/members of the company's liquidation value today 
relative to the discounted present value of the expected future net revenues and the 
expected future liquidation value. They consider a firm that has purchased capital 
equipment of the value (K) and expects to receive a stream of future net revenues on this 
capital given by (; r, (t = 1,..., T)), where (; r, ) is the net, expected revenue in period (t), 
and (7) is the liquidation time. If the firm decides to abandon production and to sell its 
capital instead, it can do so but at a discount rate equal to (46). The real interest rate (P) 
equals the nominal rate (r) minus the expected rate of inflation (A^ 
The firm will go into liquidation if the return from selling off its capital exceeds the 
present value of the stream of the expected net future revenues and the expected future 
liquidation value (LT): 
T LT 
K(I-8»j m (1.24) 
, -0 
T, -+PY + 
(1 + PY 
' 
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Inequality (1.24) specifies the condition for a firm's creditors to choose liquidation 
when capital markets are perfect, that is the firm has a free choice of the amount it can 
borrow at the going interest rate. Liquidation of the company is determined here by its 
long-term profitability prospects, rather than short-term fluctuations in cash flow due to 
micro and macro factors. Condition (1.24) fails to take account of capital structure, 
although it does take in a factor external to the firm, the interest rate. 
An alternative constraint suggested by Turner, Coutts, and Bowden for specifying firm's 
survival, i mplicitly i ntroduces d ebt a nd a ssumes t hat: ( i) t here are restrictions on the 
maximum amount (B) the firm can borrow at the current interest rate, and (ii) given a 
free choice, the firm will continue to trade. The constraint is the following: 
rK-B>; ro . (1.25) 
Inequality (1.25) seems relevant when it is expected that short-term factors have a much 
stronger impact upon company failure. Firstly, condition (1.25) implies that the current 
cash flow of the firm is insufficient to meet its fixed costs, which in this case are the 
interest payments on its capital. Secondly, its borrowing capacity is insufficient to make 
up any shortfall. The determinants of the borrowing capacity of the firm will depend on 
the banks' attitude towards risk and their willingness to extend short-term credit on the 
basis of the anticipated long-term profit potential. Condition (1.25) concurs with the 
explanation put forward by Wadhwani (1986), who asserts that the nominal rate of 
interest rather than the real rate of interest is the appropriate explanatory variable in the 
company failure process. 
By combining factors from conditions (1.24-1.25), Turner, Coutts, and Bowden 
introduce appropriate macroeconomic measures as independent variables to explain in 
an econometric specification, the aggregate failure rate. Their macroeconomic variables 
included the nominal rate of interest, the rate of price inflation, the rate of growth of 
money stock, reflecting credit market constraints, and the rate of company formation 
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that captures the age structure of companies. The empirical evidence appeared 
consistent with liquidation condition (1.25), giving importance to the cash flow 
interpretation of company liquidation and pointing to creditors' miopia. Econometric 
results also indicated sensitivity of company liquidations to the effects of the cycle, 
which were channeled via company profitability. 
Goudie and Meeks ( 199 1) attempted to assess ex post the response of the potential 
failure rates to movements in a key macroeconomic variable, the effective exchange 
rate. Their examination of the impact of variations in the exchange rate upon the 
potential failure rate among the top 100 UK companies in 1984-89 showed an 
asymmetric and irregular relationship. The results from a macro-micro model suggested 
that failure could be a penalty for producing exports (or importing material inputs) at a 
time of a soaring exchange rate, especially if the rise is combined with the relative price 
increase leading to a disastrous loss of competitiveness. 
Increased attention, in the recent financial economics literature, has been directed to a 
complementary analysis of micro and macro linkages such as a relation between the 
"healtW' of the corporate sector as a whole and a country's macroeconomy, especially in 
the light of the Asian Crisis of 1998. A recent study by Gray (1999) bridges the gap 
between the corporate finance concept of illiquidity and macroeconomic analysis of 
insolvency. Gray's framework is based on the notion of "economic value added", which 
is tied to the creation of shareholder wealth and economic growth. The author puts 
forward a model for corporate sector "vulnerability" defined as the sharp decline in 
equity below a threshold that triggers widespread default for a significant part of the 
corporate sector. 
Gray's model implies that vulnerability to default in the corporate sector is high if: (i) 
equity value is sensitive to changes in exchange rates, interest rates, and investment; (ii) 
the level of liquid assets held by corporations is low; (iii) corporations are highly 
leveraged with the low level of equity; (iv) there is a high level of short-tenn debt and 
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concentration of a few lenders in the corporate sector, which could stop financing or 
rolling-over short-term debt; and (v) there is the potential for investment to drop by a 
large amount and even to turn negative in a short period of time creating a short-term 
financing constraint. 
The empirical research by Takala and Viren (1996) that deals with the macroeconomic 
problem of bankruptcies in Finland over the period 1923-94, show that company 
failures are strongly related to the business cycle, indebtedness, real interest rates, and 
asset prices. Excessive indebtedness easily causes a wave of bankruptcies when an 
economy is hit by a recession with a fall in demand, output, and asset prices and with an 
increase in real interest rates. 
An attempt to theoretically link interest rates and bankruptcies has also been made in a 
recent, macro study of US firms. Assadian and Ford (1997) adopted a theoretical 
model that assumed a direct relation between negative profits and the probability of 
business failure. They re-specified the traditional profit maximisation model by 
changing, in line with agency and managerial theories, the decision variable of the firm, 
from the level of output to the rate of growth of output. The rationale for introducing an 
alternative decision variable is based on the managerial utility theory for modem 
corporations with separate ownership and control. The managerial utility theory implies 
that managers of such firms are typically concerned with the growth of the firm and not 
with the level of output at any given point in time. The size of the firm is represented by 
the p resent v alue oft he total money capital invested by the firm (I ). They consider 
perfectly competitive input and output markets, and the linear and homogeneous 
production function assuming that both total costs and total revenues increase more than 
proportionately with higher rates of growth of output. The profit growth function (H) 
depends on the firm's initial net revenue at time z ero (A), the f irm's c ost ofc apital, 
proxied by the interest rate (i), the rate of growth of output (g), and the present value of 
the firms expansion costs, (C): 
(1.26) 
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where it is assumed that i 
The first and the second order conditions for maximisation are written as: 
Ilg =A[(1+i)I(i-g)2]-Cg =O , (1.27) 
FI 
gg = 
2A[(l + i) l(i - g)31 - Cgg < 0. 
Supposing that the rate of growth (g) depends on the firm's size, expressed as the 
present value of capital invested (I), and on the initial net revenue (A ), and assuming 
further that the cost of capital impacts both total revenues and total costs, the general 
expression for profits becomes 
rI = rI ( A, i, I). 
(1.28) 
Assadian and Ford pointed out an apparent limitation of the chosen economic structure 
(1.28) as a basis for empirical research. Model (1.28) fails to define the direction of the 
impact the independent variables would have on profits, with the exception of the 
finding that the firm's cost of capital (i) would have a negative effect. Empirical results 
showed a bipolar relation. The expected positive link between the interest rate and 
insolvencies was documented for the firms with large liabilities (over $100,000), but a 
negative effect was present for the group of firms with smaller liabilities (under 
$100,000). With respect to the latter group, these results appear to have some similarity 
with those obtained in Simmons (1989). Much of the literature sampled above clearly 
implies that managerial ability to forecast and react adequately to changes in the 
business environment is crucial for company survival and calls for a joint examination 
of important, internal and external to the firm factors. We turn our attention now to what 
has been said in the literature about the role of managerial factors. 
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1.7 Incompetent Management Theory of Financial Failure 
The literature, explaining business failure by managerial inadequacies, seldom uses 
rigorous statistical methods and tend to rely on evidence from case studies and practical 
experiences of management consultants and insolvency experts involved in failing 
companies (e. g., Argenti, 1976; Slatter, 1984; Altman, 1993; Yhe SPI Survey, 1996). 
The Society of Practitioners of Insolvency (SPI) have been undertaking regular surveys 
of corporate insolvency in the UK since October 1991. Their reports have come to be 
acknowledged as the principal source of qualitative information on the state of British 
industry and of the reasons for and significance of company insolvency. The surveys 
have identified the following interdependent factors leading to insolvency: 
Loss of Market 
Management Failure 
- Fraud 
- Over-Optimism in Planning 
- Imprudent Accounting 
- Lack of Management Information 
- Erosion of Margin 
- Product Obsolescence / Technical Failure 
- Overgearing 
Bad Debt 
Finance 
- Loss of Long-term Finance 
- Lack of Working Capital / Cash Flow 
Knock-on 
- Knock-on from the Failure of an Another Group Company 
Other 
Excessive Overhead 
New Venture / Expansion / Acquisition 
The Fifth SPI Survey (1996) was based on 1,660 insolvency cases - 9.5 per cent of the 
total number of insolvencies during July 1994 and June 1995 - and dealt only with the 
particular insolvency regimes, such as administrations, company voluntary 
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arrangements, receiverships, compulsory liquidations, creditors' voluntary liquidations. 
The analysis suggested that most failures were not caused by external effects or 
economic conditions alone. The difference between similarly troubled firms that 
survived, and t hose t hat d id n ot, appeared to be the relative quality and prudence of 
management. 
The Fifth Survey stresses that weaknesses in management had a great influence, with 
around 22 per cent of the companies in the sample failing due to this reason. Finance 
factors were responsible for 21.5 per cent of insolvencies. The interesting result is that 
fraud depends on company size and less of threat to smaller companies, many of whom 
are managed by their owners. The proportion of failures due to fraud was only 1.5 per 
cent for small businesses (turnover less than f- 1 in), while among companies with higher 
turnover, fraud was listed as a primary factor in 7 per cent of insolvencies. In the 
opinion of many practitioners, loss of market, which caused 31.5 per cent of failures, 
and finance problems were themselves due usually to the failure of management to react 
to market conditions, rather then exceptional, external, and unforeseeable occurrence. 
Managerial theory of company failure was in the focus of the two well-known earlier 
studies by Argenti (1976) and Slatter (1984). The authors assert that one can trace 
virtually all the causes for failure back to "bad management", arguing that either poor 
decisions or inaction on the part of management is t he p rincipal d efault factor. E ven 
where the cause of distress is primary due to changes in environmental characteristics of 
the business, which are beyond directors' control, one could argue that management 
should forecast such events and plan accordingly. Often, quantitative managerial factors 
are not easy to operationalise for modelling which might have constrained their use as 
explanatory variables in company failure research. 
Argenti (1976) believes that features associated with company failure can be separated 
into three categories - inherent defects in the actual organisation and financial structure 
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of the company, management mistakes, and symptoms of deterioration. He describes 
(Argenti, 1976; p. 122; emphasis in original) 12 major inter-linked elements: 
If the management of a company is poor then two things will be neglected: the system of 
accounting information will be deficient and the company will not respond to change. 
(Some companies, even well managed ones, may be damaged because powerful 
constraints prevent the managers making the responses they wish to make. ) Poor 
managers will also make at least one of three mistakes: they will overtrade 16; or they will 
launch a big project that goes wrong; or they will allow the company's gearing to rise so 
that even normal business hazards become constant threats. These are the chief causes, 
neither fraud nor the bad lack deserves more than a passing mention. The following 
symptoms will appear: certainfinancial ratios will deteriorate but, as soon as they do, the 
managers will start creative accounting, which reduces the predictive value of these ratios 
and so lends greater importance to non-financial symptoms. Finally the company enters 
the characteristic period in its lastfew months. 
Slatter (1984), who studied a sample of forty UK public companies in turnaround 
situations, adopted and tested Argenti's argument. Slatter derived a list of principal 
factors similar to those of Argenti's, and concluded that lack of financial control in 
terms of cash flow forecasts, costing systems, budgeting, and incompetence of 
management personnel were clearly the major causes of failure for the firms in the 
sample. Notably, o vertrading did not appear to be a discriminating dimension. Thus, 
Slatter concluded that failure was most likely to occur when a firm, already weakened 
by poor management, inadequate financial control, and economic inefficiency, was 
affected by adverse changes in market demand due to cyclical fluctuations, and by 
problems resulting from big projects, of both a capital and revenue nature. 
In the turnaround literature, corporate failure is often attributed to poor managerial 
responses to performance decline. Jensen (1993) stresses the key role of information in 
16 Overtrading occurs where a company operates at the level of activity that cannot be supported by the amount of 
finance, which has been committed. Overtrading results in permanent liquidity problems, which might lead to failure 
unless the level of operations is cut back in line with available finance. 
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managing exit from the market efficiently. In making decisions about exit, firms often 
are faced with the lack of information regarding their own costs and the costs of their 
competitors. It is often unclear to managers that they are the high-cost firm and should 
reduce the firm's presence in the market and exit the industry. When managers exercise 
poor judgement, resisting the adjustment actions of shutting down, restructuring, or 
liquidating the firm because that creates uncertainty and interrupts management careers, 
and continue to invest in the losing operations, the firm may inevitably face financial 
difficulties and fail. 
Although somewhat short on rigorous statistical analysis, arguments expressed by 
Argenti, Jensen, and Slattcr have been influential in the use in models of company 
failure of non-financial indicators, either alone or in conjunction with financial ratios. 
For the UK, Peel, Peel and, Pope (1986), Keasey and Watson (1987) and Peel and 
Peel (1988) attempted to incorporate factors, reflecting managerial capabilities, 
however, their modelling results did not indicate strong explanatory power of 
managerial variables. But the key and valid point, made by the models based on 
managerial theories of failure, is that in trying to understand the process of failure it is 
important to allow for mispredictions or mistakes by firms' managers in forecasting 
their market environment and the macroeconomic conditions. 
1.8 Conclusions 
We have presented a selected survey of the important literature, from the UK and the 
US, concerned with the theoretical background of models of company distress and 
failure. We note that so far research in this area has not produced a complete 
representation of a unified analytical framework, which can be validated in empirical 
work and then used for predicting the phenomenon of company failure. All the more, 
financial, economic, and legal meanings of distress and failure differ. The industrial 
economics literature associates failure with company exit from the market, which results 
from negative economic profits. Another way to characterize failure in the strict 
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economic sense is to equate failure of a firm with inefficiency defined as the firm's 
revenues being less than its alternate revenues would be if its capital were invested in 
the best alternate use. Neoclassical theory of the firm and transaction and agency costs 
theories advanced in new institutional economics, provide a conceptual basis for 
understanding the causes of economic and financial distress for the case of a public 
corporation with diffused ownership. Concepts of capital structure, illiquidity and 
insolvency takes on added importance in the modem corporate finance literature. 
Company financial failure is broadly defined as inability to pay debts as they come due, 
which is caused by: (i) lack of cash flow or liquid assets and (ii) absence of new inflow 
of external financing, for instance, in the form of debt or equity, necessary to overcome 
illiquidity. The firm's failure is linked to indebtedness and triggered by debt default 
explained by insufficiency of liquid assets due to a fall in operating profits and inability 
to rollover the debt. Deteriorating profitability, being sensitive to both aggregate and 
idiosyncratic risks, might result from cyclical or competitive reasons; from rapid growth 
with subsequent overtrading; from over-expansion; from shifts in exchange rates 
causing a drop in competitiveness; and from excessive gearing which together with 
unanticipated changes in interest rates impinges upon the firm's ability to service 
borrowings. As the evolution of the market value of equity depends on the firm's profits 
net of interest payments to lenders, short-term illiquidity develops into long-term 
insolvency with entrepreneurial equity (net worth) falling below zero. When creditors 
have instituted legal proceedings against a company, which failed to meet its debt 
obligations, the company might eventually discontinue as a legal entity via the rout of 
formal insolvency. 
Theoretical frameworks for analysing the evolution of financial distress and determining 
conditions for liquidation, offered in Merton (1974), Scott (1981), Wadhwan! (1986), 
Turner, Coutts, and Bowden (1992), Laitinen and Laitinen (1998), and Gray 
(1999), motivate out choice of explanatory variables in empirical modelling. The 
conditions for company failure derived analytically, usually imply that the risk of debt 
default and subsequent insolvency can be explain by two groups of factors. The first 
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group represents firm-spccific attributes that correspond to the dimensions financial 
analysis traditionally uses in describing the firm's financial profile, with liquidity, the 
level of indebtedness or gearing, and changes in market valuation being of utmost 
importance. The second group is the contextual factors usually represented by the 
macroeconomic environment changes modifying firm's financial performance and 
altering distressed firms' access to external finance. The conceptual frameworks that 
establish that failure risk is determined both by firm-specific characteristics and by 
macroeconomic factors have a strong implication for empirical research. These models 
suggest that a possible way of enhancing the predictive and explanatory power of 
traditional models, relying on financial statement-based inputs alone, is to include 
controls for such macroeconomic influences as the phase of the cycle and unanticipated 
changes in nominal and real interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation. 
Finally, the literature refers to the incompetent management theory, linking corporate 
collapse in the form of insolvency to managerial mistakes and fraud. Clearly, this theory 
is not naturally expressible in pure economic or finance categories. A rigorous statistical 
test of this theory, being impossible from publicly available information, would require 
data from case studies or surveys, specially designed and carried out. 
The confrontation of economic and financial theories with the observable phenomenon 
of company financial distress and failure is the objective of empirical research. 
Therefore chapter 2 summarizes features of the core econometric studies of the financial 
failure question the firm-level, examining data on UK and US firms. Our exploration of 
the determinants of financial distress and failure of large quoted companies presented in 
chapters 3-5 adopts a traditionally accepted in the finance theoretical literature, clear but 
narrow meaning of the company failure outcome associated with the state of involuntary 
insolvency arising from debt default. 
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CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW OF UK AND US EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
MODELLING FAILURE AT THE LEVEL OF 
INDIVIDUAL COMPANY 
2.1 Introduction 
Company failure research from both the UK and the US, contains many dozens of 
observational retrospective studies that purport to show that the process of failure can be 
analysed at the level of individual firms. There a re p erhaps t wo rn aj or s trands int he 
literature. Benchmark studies forecast failure with accounting and market information 
and claim acceptable levels of predictive accuracy of developed statistical models at 
classifying failures and survivors over time horizons ranging from one to four years. 
Despite being usually reliant on relatively small data sets, this strand seems successful 
in establishing the link between failure caused by financial distress and observable from 
publicly available data changes in company performance and financial position. These 
studies report set of accounting-based predictors usually measuring profitability, 
gearing, liquidity and financial efficiency, but, taken as a whole, the findings from these 
investigations do not demonstrate consistency with respect to the predictive power of 
particular accounting measures. This is not entirely unexpected in the situation of small- 
scale statistical examinations where the choice between the models is made on empirical 
grounds, dependent on model fit, and that approach render inference sample-sensitive. It 
would seem implausible to locate a "correct" unique set of predictive constructs because 
accounting variables by their very nature tend to be imperfect measures of notions of 
profitability, indebtedness, liquidity and financial efficiency. More importantly, there is 
also likely to be some variation in accounting practices across the populations of studied 
firms, across industry sectors and over time. This inconsistency may also result from the 
modifying impact of macroeconomic conditions on the interrelations between failure 
risk and accounting and economic variables. A number of studies in this first strand, 
attempting to detect failure of quoted firm with market-based indicators, have produced 
predictive models based on the ideas from option theory. This approach quantifies the 
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chances of the adverse outcome commonly proxied by debt default or involuntary 
insolvency by looking at the changes in the level of indebtedness and at the evolution of 
market value of the firm's equity. Although a stereotype predictive model is usually set 
as the classification problem, implying a causal mechanism, much of the studies in the 
first strand concern short-term prediction and usually do not make direct claims of 
exploring and quantifying plausible causal relationships between financial failure and 
the underlying firm-specific and contextual factors. 
More recent studies, forming the second strand, have been conducted with substantially 
larger data sets and explicitly sought to develop explanatory models at the firm level by 
expanding the "dimensionality" of the statistical relationship and covering the influence 
of environmental factors. These examinations assess how the interactions between 
firm-specific, industry-level and economy-wide factors help to explain failure outcome 
in their data. For the purposes of the present thesis, we are reviewing below some 
exemplary studies representative of the two strands. 
Our purpose in this chapter is to identify from current research some baseline ideas 
concerning t he e mpirical d esign for ana nalysis ofc ompany failure att he firm I evel. 
Given the lack of the unifying theoretical framework, an appropriate choice of 
components of empirical design is of great significance for isolating the empirical 
determinants of company failure. We review design choices in relation to the sample 
selection, statistical techniques for modelling, and the link between the two in the light 
of the literature from the United Kingdom and the United States, which has pioneered 
17 the retrospective observational design in the area . Many papers were written by 
distinguished authors or groups of authors and have achieved a prominent place in the 
debate about corporate financial failure. Our purpose in reviewing the empirics from the 
" Both countries provide the financial environment ideal for building successful statistical models for 
monitoring company financial "hcaltlf' and have a long history of failure prediction research. This success 
of prediction models in these two countries may be attributed to: (i) relatively higher incidences of 
corporate insolvency which serves as a common exit route for distressed furns; (ii) corporate financial 
data are readily available; (iii) failure is easier to identify because of the existence of 
bankruptcy/insolvency laws and banking infrastructures; and (iv) the sophisticated regulation of 
companies to protect investors. 
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UK and the US, is not to challenge the validity of particular accounting predictors and 
classificatory performance of the extant models. Rather our aim is to appreciate a 
valuable contribution of the previous literature towards the empirical design of company 
failure analysis in terms of the interrelated components of data, candidate variable 
selection and statistical methodology. Yet we will surpmarise some difficulties with 
applying the empirical design typical of the literature, concerning predominantly with 
prediction, for our particular investigation of the determinants of company failure for 
the UK and Russia. Both the limitations and the valuable contributions of the current 
literature motivate the choice we make in the present thesis in relation to statistical 
settings for explanatory models of failure, data sampling, and variable selection so that 
the determinants of company failure may be rigorously examined. 
2.2 The Definition and Measurement of Company Failure Outcome, Data Needs 
and Sampling Schemes 
The traditional empirical methodology for conducting an investigation into company 
failure causes at the firm level is econometric analysis, and the tools used by researchers 
are statistical. The case study method, an alternative to econometric modelling, suffers 
serious drawbacks such as the lack of generalizability and selectivity because single 
cases are not usually selected at random and form samples that are too small to support 
generalizations about the company failure phenomenon. When one is interested in 
average tendencies manifesting themselves in a wide range of settings, econometric 
work seems more appropriate, and that is the course we pursue in the present thesis. 
Econometric modelling of the failure process involves important choices and 
judgements regarding the appropriate empirical design. A short summary of approaches 
towards empirical design adopted in the core papers dealing with the problem of 
modelling company failure at the firm level is provided in Table 2.1. The problem of 
modelling failure at the firm level involves the estimation of the association between 
hypothesised risk factors and the adverse outcome on the basis of a postulated causal 
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CHAPTER 2 
link between the two. The observational retrospective design plays an important role in 
inferring causation from association in company failure analysis. However, in contrast 
to the macro-level studies of company failure, where aggregate failure rates are 
observable - by recording, for instance, the rate of corporate liquidations - at the level of 
individual firms, we can only record whether or not the event of failure occurs and 
cannot observe the probability of failure. In a retrospective study at firm level, a sample 
of firms is chosen according to failure outcomes in the analysis period and the analysis 
then investigates what values of potential explanatory factors had previously existed in 
firms' history. Measurement of explanatory variables for the intended analysis, are 
usually taken at specified times prior to failure in accordance with the principle of 
temporal precedence with respect of the putative causes and the adverse outcome. 
Two major and interrelated elements of empirical design in observational studies are the 
data and the associated statistical methodology and these must be chosen in a way 
allowing for their interdependence. Econometric inference can be no better than the 
suitability, relevance, and completeness of the data on which this inference is based. 
Therefore relevance of derived empirically determinants of failure depends heavily on 
the quality of the underlying data. On the other hand, the choice of both the analysis 
method and the model structure has considerable impact on the form and content of the 
data to be used. A statistical analysis of observations on firms can be conducted on 
cross-section, time-series and panel data. While static cross-sectional studies aim to 
assess the variation in failure determinants across firms, time-series analysis allows 
evaluation of the association between the temporal variation in characteristics of failing 
firms over time. An inclusion of a panel element in empirical design is desirable. It 
generates extra data points, which allow for the incorporation of dynamic elements to an 
explanatory model and exploration of more complex relationships between the outcome 
of failure and firm-level and environmental variables. On the other hand, the 
specification of the type and structure of the data determines a range of appropriate 
candidate multivariate analysis techniques for developing the desired model. The 
formulation of prior postulates of the failure process, on the basis of stylised facts and 
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theory, is also important as it provides needed guidance on the choice of data structure 
and statistical framework. 
A data set for an econometric work on company failure is defined by the sampling unit, 
samplingframe, and sampling procedures. Individual independent companies are used 
as sampling units because information on failure outcomes and accounting variables is 
usually recorded at this level. The sampling frame specifies every unit of the population 
from which the sample is taken. The choice of the sampling frame affects sample size 
and the extent of the data, which in turn influences the subsequent statistical analysis. It 
appears from the literature that in order to obtain a representative and sufficient sample 
of data to conduct an econometric analysis, sampling frames pertain to fairly broad 
populations of companies. The bulk of prior research focuses on large quoted companies 
since these firms release into the public domain more detailed primary data about their 
performance and operating activity and are better covered by the data bases researchers 
have assess to. 
In creating the sample, a primary consideration should be given to the definition of the 
adverse outcome and its timing. Failure is modelled by using a categorical response 
variable and the researcher uses a certain rule in making his judgement on the observed 
outcome. The importance of careful definition of company failure in the process of 
setting the sampling frame caimot be over-stressed since an inadequate criterion may 
lead to observing the wrong phenomenon or taking measurements on the wrong unit of 
analysis. As discussed in chapter 1, failure has often been used as a rubric for very 
different degrees of financial distress and this definitional variation is apparent in 
empirical studies. Prior empirical studies identified the event of company failure by 
using such measures as negative operating profit over several consecutive years (e. g., 
Hill, Perry and Andes, 1996), debt default(s) (e. g., Beaver, 1966), or legal insolvency 
- involuntary bankruptcy initiated by creditors (e. g., Altman, 1968, Taffler, 1982). 
Negative operating profits have the virtue of concentrating attention on the phenomenon 
of economic distress since they are natural response measures to identify the causes of 
economic inefficiency. However, the use of a negative operating profit-based definition 
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is likely to result in small sample size as information on firms, showing persistent 
operating losses, may be difficult and expensive to collect. When the phenomenon of 
interest is financial failure, than negative operating profits is an inherently noisy 
measure because not all firms experiencing a period of negative operating income will 
necessarily default on debt and collapse into insolvency. The use of this measure also 
gives rise to the problem of defining the timing of failure as in this case the adverse 
outcome can be related to any period in the interval of negative operating profits. 
As far as the use of debt default is concerned, this event can be observed from publicly 
available records and unambiguously signals financial distress but the operational use of 
this measure also involves a judgement about the timing of failure. Over the analysis 
period, the firm may have a history of multiple defaults, probably of dissimilar 
importance in terms of involved amounts of missed principal and interest payments. 
Since information about "minor" defaults may be neglected, the use of debt default as a 
failure indicator raises the problem of selectivity with respect to the presence of the 
adverse outcome. Therefore the rules on identifying the appropriate timing amongst the 
observed default times should be stated. In contrast, the criterion of legal insolvency is 
less ambiguous and regarded in the literature as a strong indicator of severe distress and 
failure. This measure narrows down the meaning of company failure, focusing the 
analysis on the outcome characterised by serious consequences, including a possible 
discontinuation of the legal vehicle and disappearance of the business. 
Econometric rn odelling isc oncerried w ith u nbiased e stimates of failure determinants, 
and this aim dictates the choice of sampling procedures. Usually it is unfeasible to base 
the desired analysis on all elements of the population of firms defined by the sample 
frame and the required information is obtained from a representative sample. A certain 
degree of error is inherent in the process of sampling since s ome i riformation ont he 
population will never be obtained. The sampling error increases as the sample size 
decreases, while the adherence to the principle of random sampling process ensures that 
the systematic component of error is minimized. As mentioned above, at the level of 
individual firms we observe the outcome of failure and, in general, assume the existence 
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of sub-populations of failing and surviving firms. Most studies employ the assumption 
that important determinants can be identified by comparing attributes of the companies 
in whose history the adverse outcome is present with characteristics of the continuing 
firms and therefore use a dependent categorical variable for describing the failure 
outcome. In practice, a truly random sample of defined by the sample frame 
observational units each having an equal probability of being selected, is not usually 
appropriate due to paucity of failed company cases in the population. Under this 
circumstance, a more complex method of sampling - called state-based sampling - 
seems to assist the analysis of association between explanatory variables and the 
outcome of failure. In the context of the simplest dichotomous outcome, naturally 
proxied by a binomial response, modelling methods involve classification, comparing 
failing firms with a group of non-failed firms. A case-control design with independent 
sampling for groups of failed and continuing firms fulfills the sample structure 
requirements for an econometric analysis of failure at the firm level. State-based 
sampling involves identifying and including in the case group of a data set the firms, 
where failure has occurred, and selecting either randomly or through a certain matching 
procedure the control group of firms where the adverse outcome is absent. However, 
separate sampling of each category in the data set entails an important issue about the 
determination of group proportions. 
Equal-share s amples w ith firms int he c ase a nd c ontrol g roups in atched oni ndustry, 
size and the time of measurement of explanatory variables are common in the literature, 
although given the generally low yearly rates of corporate failures serious drawbacks of 
this approach become obvious immediately. Matching by the timing of records on 
explanatory variables seems appropriate since this procedure controls both for changes 
in the financial profile of the distressed firm over the period preceding failure and for 
temporal differences in the business and regulatory environments modifying failure risk. 
To facilitate isolation of firm-specific explanatory variables it appears necessary to 
synchronize their measurements in the case and control categories so as to alleviate the 
confounding effect of time-varying environmental factors. However, matching by 
industry and size appears less desirable in models explaining company failure. Firstly, 
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these con-founders can themselves be important explanatory variables and secondly 
matching procedures yield smaller samples, reducing the generalisability of inference on 
failure determinants and giving rise to substantive problems in applying the findings at a 
practical policy level. A related issue arising from equal-share sampling is the 
overrepresentation of the failed category compared to the proportions, which purely 
random sampling would give. When the estimation method does not involve a 
correction procedure, an implication of ignoring the expected population proportions are 
the biased estimates of model parameters (see, e. g., McFadden, 1984; Palepu, 1986). 
We return to the issue of disproportionate sampling in chapter 3 where disproportionate 
sampling is discussed in greater detail. In general, the use of an unbalanced sample 
presents an alternative and practical way of obtaining unbiased parameter estimates. In 
an unbalanced sample, the share of failed firms is set according to the hypothesized rate 
of failure in the population or on the basis of the prior probability of the adverse 
outcome. Relatively few studies have ignored matching and construct unbalanced 
samples approximating the population shares of failed and non-failed firms. 
Another advantage of unbalanced sampling is that it alleviates the problem of small 
sample s ize. S tudies, w hich favour e qual-share s ampling, s uffer from t he p roblem of 
insufficient sample size and that necessitates the use of a rigorous statistical 
methodology for obtaining reliable statistical inference. In company failure modelling, 
the sample size is affected not only by the selection process, but often depends on the 
need to set aside a number of observations to explore the aspect of model robustness 
with respect to the model predictive power at classifying the status of fresh observations 
on firms. It is important to emphasize that when the analysis question is that of 
explaining failure (as it is in the present thesis) we are concerned with isolating the 
predictors or determinants, which are stable across firms in the population of interest 
and over time. Researchers are usually sensitive to this issue and the general principle 
employed in the literature states that to give confidence in predictors, the model has to 
be validated on data points (observations), which have not been used for calibrating. 
Such procedures, termed in the literature holdout sample tests, entail the partitioning of 
the full set of available collected data into the estimation and holdout samples, 
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inevitably reducing the number of data points over which the model is estimated. The 
literature on company failure risk especially stresses the importance of validating the 
inter-temporal stability of the model on an ex ante holdout sample containing fresh 
observations on new firms, taken from the post-estimation time period. An early 
example of this approach to validation can be found in Taffler (1982). Other examples 
of ex ante holdout tests in the UK work include Taffler ( 1985) and Peel and Peel 
(1988). Although the importance of satisfying the principle of the "out-of-estimation- 
sample" validation is recognised in the literature, limited availability of fresh data often 
precludes "true" ex ante tests. A widely used but rather unsatisfactory substitute is an ex 
post holdout created by dividing the ftill data set, at times at random (e. g., Altman, 
Haldeman, Naranayan, 1977), into estimation and holdout subsets. In the UK 
literature, Keasey and McGuinness (1990) and Alici (1995) support their 
interpretations of powerful predictors by such ex post holdout tests. One can argue quite 
generally in favour of ex ante holdout, suggesting that conclusions obtained with ex post 
holdouts s hould bet reated c autiously b ecause t he r esulting o verlap b etween t he t ime 
periods of the initial and secondary data sets takes away confidence in inter-temporal 
stability of the model. However, both approaches to model validation using holdout 
samples can be criticized as wasteful of data. A method particularly appropriate for 
model choice and checking and, at the same time, allowing to preserve the size of the 
estimation sample in situations of data scarcity is based on the principle of predictive 
cross-validation and involves a re-samplying of calibration data points. The 
Lachenbruch jackknife test (Lachenbruch, 1967 18 ) has been particular popular with 
researchers (e. g., Taffler and Tisshaw, 1982; Altman, Haldeman, Naranayan, 1977, 
Taffler, 1992; Platt and Platt, 1990; Wilson Chong and Peel, 1995; Mossman, Bell 
and Turtle, 1998; Richardson, Kane and Lobingier, 1998). However, compared with 
an ex ante holdout method, weaker levels of evidence regarding model stability attach to 
the Lachenbruch "leaving-one-observation-ouf' procedure. Alternative and versatile 
computational solutions for approximating model parameters such as the bootstrap have 
'8 The approach of approximating the expected actual error rate for discriminant functions originally 
suggested in Lachenbruch (1967) is a form of jackknife method for small samples. The procedure 
involves on-ýitting one single observation at a time, reestimating the discriminant fimction and then 
classifying the data point left out with the obtained model. An almost unbiased estimate of the expected 
error rate is calculated from the number of classifications done for all data points. 
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not received much attention in the modelling methodology debate which having been 
taken place in failure studies. 
Below we discuss the examples of approaches to creating data sets for company failure 
modelling employed in the literature. We think that there is a distinction to be drawn 
between company failure models for predictive purposes and m odels, w hich g ive t he 
description of the underlying phenomenon. Since in the present study we wish to 
investigate the determinants of failure, our main purpose in reviewing empirical designs 
adopted by prior studies is to indicate varying strength and as well as shortcomings of 
these approaches for developing explanatory models of failure. 
A univariate analysis of association between changes in accounting ratios, describing 
company financial performance, and failure risk has been undertaken by Beaver (1966) 
for the US context, with a cross-sectional sample covering 1954-64. Beaver argues that 
financial statement ratios, devised by credit analysts to monitor the financial position 
and performance of firms, must signal financial distress and failure. Using the concept 
of dichotomous response taking on just two values, "failure" and "non-failure" and a 
"coarse" definition of failure, Beaver includes in the failed category those companies 
that unable to pay financial obligations as they become due. The selection criteria of 
legal insolvency, bond default, an overdrawn bank account or non-payment of a 
preferred stock dividend yield a sample representative of various stages in the process of 
failure. A formal analysis, set as the classification problem, reveals best predictors by 
assessing individual discriminating power of a number of financial ratios. Favouring 
equal-share sampling, Beaver constructs a data set comprising 158 firms that are 
matched by industry and asset size. As Beaver primarily focuses on the ability of 
changes in financial statement ratios to predict failure risk, his matching procedures 
appears justified by the need to control for the variation in risk caused by the contextual 
effects reflected in sectoral and size differences. In the context of a different analysis 
question, where the researcher is interested in isolating the potential determinants of 
failure, matching by variables that represent important risk factors seems as a less 
reasonable sampling treatment. Matching on "confounding" factors precludes any 
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quantification of the influence of the "con-founders", affecting the reliability of 
inference about the "regularly" reproduced relations between changes in financial ratios 
and failure risk. Another serious pitfall of the empirical design in Beaver (1966) is the 
choice of overlapping time periods for estimation and holdout samples, which weakens 
evidence on the predictive power of ratios. Combined with matching, the ex post 
holdout approach makes Beaver's conclusions peculiar to the particular small sample of 
firms. 
Our reading of the literature shows that most of the post-Beaver (1966) studies that 
developed multivariate empirical models of failure tend to employ narrower definitions 
of failure, using the state of legal insolvency (or bankruptcy in studies of US 
corporations) as a measure of the adverse outcome. However, matching by industry 
sector and company size has been a characteristic feature of sampling plans for 
predictive models. One example is the sampling scheme adopted for the well-known Z- 
score model in Altman (1968) who popularised the multivariate discriminant function 
for predicting the failure outcome. Altman (196 8) defines the failure event as a filing for 
bankruptcy and works with cross-sectional data on large US manufacturing corporations 
for 1946-65. An equal-share sample of 132 firms, matched by industry and asset size is 
used but cases in the non-failed category are stratified randomly, to obtain predictors 
representative of the generality of large corporations. Altman also constructs an ax post 
holdout for testing the model's classificatory power on a sample of new observations. 
An analogous with Altman's (1968) design is adopted in Altman, Haldeman and 
Narayanan (1977) for developing a commercial variant known as ZETAO credit risk 
model for predicting bankruptcies in retail and manufacturing. A multivariate 
discriminant function is derived from a pair-matched sample of 106 large industrial 
corporations, taken from 1960-75. The sample frame excludes corporations in banking, 
finance, real estate and railroads to avert the influence of possibly confounding factors 
related to differing accounting practices and bankruptcy environments. The 
classification accuracy of the model and implied relevance of risk factors are evaluated 
on a secondary sample of ex post holdout data pertaining to 1974-83. Given the small 
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size of the estimation sample, the study uses an alternative solution for model testing 
and carefully approximates expected error rates of classification with a" leaving-one- 
observation-out" re-sampling of estimation data points in line with the jackknife 
procedure devised by Lanchenbruch (1967). This aspect of methodology in Altman, 
Haldeman and Narayanan (1977) addresses the concerns of misinterpreting the apparent 
error rate relating to the calibration data as a measure of predictive ability of their 
model. 
Whereas most studies conducted in the Sixties and Seventies focus on the US context, 
in 1977 Taffler and Tisshaw publish results on the first predictive model of UK firm 
failure for the situation of 1969-76. It is worth nothing that the empirical design of their 
study adopts approaches implemented in the work of Altman and colleagues. In Taffler 
and Tisshaw (1977), the sample frame is restricted to large, listed on the London Stock 
Exchange companies. Failure is gauged with indicators of severe financial distress such 
as receivership, creditors' voluntary I iquidation, compulsory winding up by the court 
order, or bailing out by the government. A matched equal-share sample of 92 firms is 
created for estimating a discriminant function. Matching criteria include industry and 
size, but observations on failed and non-failed categories were not matched by the 
timing of accounts. One can question the appropriateness of non-matching the sample 
firms by the time of measurement of financial and economic variables. Non-matching 
by the time of measurement, in general, implies that the structure of association between 
explanatory factors and the adverse outcome remains stable over the time, giving a time- 
invariant model that assumes the "average" macroeconomic conditions. Since 
macroeconomic instability does alter failure risk and, more importantly, impacts upon 
different companies in different ways, non-matching by the timing of accounts seems a 
rather untenable approach. It is easy to imagine that, for instance, the extent to which 
changes in interest rates may alter the cost of capital to the firm depends on the firm's 
capital structure. It is also clear that ignoring the matching by the timing of accounts 
cannot ameliorate the sensitivity of the discriminant function to the observations used in 
estimation because the sampling procedure in Taffler and Tisshaw's study uses 
matching by industry and size. Thus, the potential gains of developing a more general 
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and stable over time model by ignoring matching on the timing of accounting records 
might well be negated by the effect of controlling for industry and size. An interesting 
feature of empirical design in the Taffler and Tisshaw paper is a follow-up study, 
demonstrating their adherence to the principle of evaluating the model predictive power 
and predictor relevance on the "out-of-estimation-sample" basis. A follow-up study has 
a great advantage for interpreting the power of models intended to be predictive, but this 
component of empirical design is rarely adopted in the literature, the only exception 
being a study by Johnsen and Melicher (1994). - In addition, Taffler and Tisshaw 
(1977) follow Altman and colleagues' cue and employ a usual simple solution of 
assessing expected error rates of classification by the Lachenbruch "leaving-one-out" 
method applied to estimation sample observations. 
The predictors of UK quoted industrial firm failure relevant for a later period 1968-73 
are examined in Taffler (1982), where matching by industry or size of the sample firms 
is abandoned so as to obtain a more general predictive model. More importantly, 
unbalanced sampling is used for creating a small estimation data set of 23 insolvent and 
45 continuing firms. The adequacy of the developed multivariate discriminant function 
- the UK Z-score - is tested both by the Lachenbruch procedure for estimation data 
points and by fitting the model to data points pertaining to the post analysis period of 
1974-76. 
Most of the UK post-Taffier (1982) literature displays empirical design similarities, 
following methodological ideas exemplified in the work by Taffler (1982) and Altman 
and colleagues (1977). Company failure is modelled with cross-section data as the 
classification problem with a binary/binomial indicator describing the dichotomous 
outcome. The methodology of discriminant analysis of state-based - and most often 
equal-share - data samples is used to find associations permitting classification of the 
population into groups of failing and continuing firms. The lack of secondary holdout 
data for conducting rigorous checks of models is a frequently arising situation, so it 
becomes convenient to use an alternative for results robustness checks and generate the 
estimates of expected error rates via the Lachenbruch computational procedure for the 
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primary calibration data. The best performing discriminatory variables help to predict 
failure risk, pointing to common patterns in performance and position of failing firms. 
A small unbalanced sample of 38 insolvent and 53 non-failed firms is used in a study of 
UK listed manufacturing and distribution companies in 1973-77, which was carried out 
at the Bank of England (Marais, 1979). Non-failed category was selected at random, 
and although observations are not matched by the time of measurement of accounting 
variables, stratification over the analysis period controls for short-term cyclical effects. 
Tle p erformance oft he B ank ofE ngland rn odel is evaluated on a out-of-estimation- 
sample basis, by using ex ante holdout data from 1978 to c lassi fy as mall s econdary 
sample of 10 failed and 19 non-failed firms. 
The Z-score model developed in 1980 by DATASTERAM (cited in Taffler (1974)) is 
based on the operational definition of failure and sampling procedures similar to those 
employed in Taffler (1982). A listed company represents the sampling unit in the 
DATASTREAM study to ensure that the constructed commercial model is applicable 
across a wide range of manufacturing, distribution, service and transport sectors. The 
classificatory power of the DATASTREAM discriminant function is assessed on a 
secondary sample of fresh observations. 
In setting the sample for a development of a discriminant model, Bett and Belhoul 
(1987) also use a legal definition of failure. They construct an unbalanced sample for the 
period 1974-79, not attempting any matching of firms from failed and healthy groups by 
size, industry or by the timing of accounting records. The model classificatory power is 
approximated by the Lacheribruch method as well as being supplemented by a further 
evaluation on an r-rpost holdout sample. 
Using data from 1960-74, Goudie (1987) and Goudie and Meeks (1991) have 
constructed a micro-macro model of corporate failure that incorporates a predictive 
discriminant function as a final tier. The unit of analysis in their study is a listed 
cOmPanY operating in manufacturing or distribution. The authors restrict the meaning of 
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failure to voluntary liquidation or receivership and favour the equal-share sampling 
plan, but, to obtain more general inference, they select cases into the non-failed category 
randomly. To assess the inter-temporal stability of model classificatory power and the 
predictor relevance, Goudie and Goudie and Meeks conduct both the ex post (within- 
the-estimation-sample-period) and the ex ante (out-of-estimation-sample-period) model 
testing. 
The studies, which have been discussed so far in this section, with the exception of 
Beaver's (1966) seminal paper, use multivariate discriminant analysis as ad cvise for 
modelling the association between the firm-level characteristics and the failure outcome. 
Another popular methodology applied in examination of the failure process is logit, a 
conditional probability model for discrete outcome. A conditional probability model 
generates the probabilities of failure occurring as a non-linear function of explanatory 
variables, but can also be used as a classification tool for forecasting. Logit analysis of 
data on US corporate failure is employed in, e. g., OhIson (1980), Zavgren (1985), Platt 
and Platt (1990), Johnsen and Melicher (1994), Richardson, Kane, and Lobingier 
(1998), Mossman, Bell, Swartz, and Turtle (1998). Logit results regarding the 
association between firm attributes and failure risk are abound in the UK company 
failure literature too, being reported in Peel, Peel, and Pope (1986), Keasey and 
Watson (1987), Peel and Peel (1988), Keasey and McGuinness (1990), Keasey, 
McGuinness, and Short (1990), Morris (1997). As with discriminant analysis, state- 
based samples are particularly suitable for examining failure risk determinants using a 
conditional probability model. 
OhIson (1980) questions the appropriateness of equal-share sampling design and 
investigates bankruptcy of US listed industrial corporations in 1970-76 using a large, 
state-based, unbalanced sample. Ohlson argues that a sufficiently large sample size 
represents an essential condition for valid statistical inference regarding failure risk 
causes. To prevent possible confounding of results by differing across sectors 
bankruptcy regulations, the sample fi-ame covers only firms operating in a similar 
bankruptcy environment. Sampled observations give three-year records on 105 failed 
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firms and 2,058 company-ycar records on control, non-failed cases, with the latter 
category being drawn randomly from the COMPUSTAT population of firms. Because 
all available at the time of the analysis cases have been used for calibration, no holdout 
tests are conducted, but the "in-sampid" stability of classificatory power of the model is 
evaluated with the apparent error rate computed across a wide range of cutoff 
probability values. The variant of empirical design adopted by OhIson (1980) illustrates 
the problem of finding an acceptable compromise between the two conflictive 
objectives of sampling plans. Namely, estimation sample size needs to be increased for 
reliable inference but reduced on the pragmatic grounds of preserving some 
observations for "out-of-sample' holdout tests. OhIson asserts that classificatory 
accuracy evaluated with a larger estimation sample - as compared to small sample sizes 
typical for UK and US academic research into failure predictive models in the 1970s 
and 1980s - should approximate well the ex ante predictive ability of his model. 
However, this contention is open to question as the apparent error rate produced by 
fitting the model to the calibration data points yields a generally optimistic estimate of 
the expected error rate in predicting future observations (see, e. g., Lachenbruch, 1977; 
Efron, 1986). In the absence of fresh secondary data, the two conflicting objectives can 
be reconciled by approximating the expected error rate with a jackknife-type resampling 
Procedure or with other more advanced techniques of numerical simulations. 
Following OhIson's paper, applications of logit to state-based samples became as 
Popular in the literature dealing with company failure prediction as analyses based on 
discriminant functions. Zavgren (1985) favours logit but she also modifies the 
experimental design centred on a single model predicting failure one- to two-years 
ahead. Zavgrcn employs a sample of repeated cross-section data on US firms with 
measurements of explanatory variables taken at several pre-specified time-horizons. The 
rationale for using a design based on repeated cross-sections is that it provides "time-to- 
failure" specific logit functions, useful for our understanding of the evolution of failure 
SYMPtoms over time. Zavgren's paper turns on the premise that as the firm approaches 
failure, defined as bankruptcy, the relative importance of failure factors changes. The 
problematic element of the sampling plan in Zavgren relates to the matching on industry 
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and size, which is employed for creating a comparison group of non-bankrupt firms. In 
Zavgren, this procedure reduces the estimation sample size to just 90 firms from 1972- 
78, while data on 16 failed firms from 1979-80 are set aside for holdout tests. As noted 
earlier, a serious limitation of matching is the increased sensitivity of obtained 
parameter estimates to the data points used for model development, that weakens the 
model predictive power and can render inferences on the key drivers of failure invalid. It 
seems fair to argue that unlike Ohlson's inference based on a larger sample, Zavgren's 
interpretation of failure symptoms, backed up by standard asymptotic tests on a 
relatively small, equal-share and matched sample, appears less convincing. 
The unit of analysis in a study by Platt and Platt (1990) is a US publicly traded 
company filing for bankruptcy in 1972-86. They employ an equal-share sample of 114 
firms in atched byi ndustry s ector, a sset s ize a nd the timing of financial records. The 
predictive power is validated by using jackknife tests and by fitting the model to fresh 
observations from 1986-87. Since the estimation and holdout time periods are not 
distinctly different, the test results in Platt and Platt (1990) are likely to suffer from a 
bias, overstating the model predictive power. 
Almost all studies envisage just two mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes in 
justifying the sufficiency for company failure analysis of the conventional dichotomy 
between failed and non-failed firms. Extensions of the design with a categorical 
dependent variable consider more complex structures and can be used in describing a 
multi-stage process of failure or for analysing more than one adverse outcome. In the 
background of the former problem is the proposition that some variables exist that can 
explain and predict the different and distinct stages of failure process. In other words, 
we think that one should be concerned here with regression models linking an assessed 
categorical response variable with a set of predictor or explanatory variable. An 
assessed categorical variable is generated by an assessor (or maybe by the researcher) 
who processes some amount of information before providing his judgement of the 
degree of financial distress and corresponding grades of the categorical variable. For 
instance, one can judge the severity of distress in firms by the 4-point scale: "none", 
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"mild", "moderate" or "severe". This approach to failure analysis effectively dictates the 
use of an assessed ordered categorical response as a dependent variable. 
However, it appears that in some studies (e. g., in Lau, 1987) the naturalness of a 
qualitative ordered response is ignored and the ordered categorical regression problem 
has been replaced by the problem of multinomial response. As a consequence these 
studies use multinomial response models which assume exclusive and exhaustive states 
in the outcome space. As one would expect, sampling approaches adopted in this 
context, involve state-based procedures for separate sampling of each outcome. The first 
paper on corporate failure modelling, which discretises the continuum of company 
financial health is a study of large quoted US firms in the 1970s by Lau (1987). Lau 
assumes the following five stages of the evolution of financial position of a quoted 
company: financial stability, an omission or reduction of dividend payments, technical 
default and default on loan payments, filing for bankruptcy, and liquidation. For 
isolating factors explaining each of the outcomes, Lau uses a large, state-based, 
unbalanced estimation sample of 400 companies, with the prevailing proportion of 
healthy firms. Ex ante holdout tests are performed on a taken from a later time period 
sample of comparable size and structure. An objection to the empirical design in Lau is 
that to describe the relationship it combines unsuitably the ordered outcome with an 
inappropriate for this situation logit model of the multinomial variety. The major 
difficulty with creating a sample for modelling the failure process as a categorical 
response relates to defining adequate indicators that measure unobservable stages of 
financial distress. Overlapping categories violate the underlying the multinomial and 
ordinal model methodology assumptions of the categories associated with the set of 
outcomes being mutually exclusive and exhaustive, which obviously leads to a rather 
poor identification of failure determinants. A range of proxies used in Lau seems 
unsuitable for defining non-overlapping categories, therefore one may have some 
reservations in relation to the validity of Uu's interpretations of stage-specific factors of 
financial distress. 
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An analysis of failure with a multinomial dependent variable is conducted in a recent 
paper by Johnsen and Afelicher (1994), who study US firms in 1970-83. Their 
empirical design suffers shortcomings similar to those that we have just identified in the 
paper by Lau (1987), although the number of states of the outcome space has been 
collapsed to three. in order to locate bankrupt, financially weak and non-bankrupt 
companies, the authors use the records of bankruptcy filings along with Standard & 
Poor's rankings of stock quality. A large state-based sample consists of 112 bankrupt 
firms, 293 non-bankrupt firms and 255 financially weak firms, but the observations 
comprising the two latter groups are drawn randomly, to facilitate generalizability of 
results. To prevent the confounding influence of contextual factors relating to industry 
differences, utilities and firms in financial and service sectors are not included in the 
sample, in line with the treatment applied in Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1977) 
and Ohlson (1980). The model fit, assessed on estimation data points, is additionally 
validated in a follow-up study whereby the predictive performance is monitored by 
tracking both financial position and changes in status of the sample firms over a five- 
year period after the year of the initial classification in the estimation sample. 
A recent paper from the US by Richardson, Kane and Lobingier (1998), is concerned 
with development of an explanatory model of failure. Their empirical design, centred on 
the dichotomy between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms, addresses the issue of 
appropriate sample proportions in explanatory models of failure, which employ the 
binary dependent variable. A large unbalanced sample of 2,218 listed firms resembling 
the population proportions of failed and non-failed firms, is used for calibrating a 
binomial logit model. No holdout data set is created for "out-of-sample" tests, but the 
relevance of failure risk factors is inferred from the assessment of the model predictive 
Power in the Lanchenbruch tests. 
In the late 1990s, studies from the US, exploring aspects of company failure, started to 
employ larger and unbalanced samples to address the pertinent problem of reflecting the 
Population proportions in the data sets used for model development. Since information 
on company status performance and financial position has become widely available 
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from established electronic data bases, it became possible to use correct, from the 
statistician point of view, random sampling procedures for constructing the comparison 
category of non-failed firms. Notwithstanding these improvements in data availability, 
there are examples of recent analyses favouring a problematic equal-share sample 
design, that is constrained further by matching on factors which can be considered as 
causes of failure. This problematic approach to sampling can be found in a comparative 
study of model sensitivity to alternative sets of financial-based model inputs, conducted 
by Alossman, Bell and Turtle (1998). Adhering to the empirical design typical of the 
early literature, they construct an equal-share sample of non-financial firms by matching 
them on size and industry, and obtain inference regarding the model classificatory 
power by using the jackknife procedure due to Lancheribruch. 
Peel, Peel and Pope (1986) in their investigation of UK listed companies work with 
binomial I ogit a nd as ample of78 firms, 34 of which failed in 1971-82. The failure 
outcome is defined as creditors' voluntary liquidation, receivership or winding up by the 
Court order, and no matching is used in creating the sample. From the perspective of 
model validation, an obvious flaw of Peel, Peel and Pope's approach relates to the 
limited usefulness of an ex post holdout, taken from the estimation time-period. This 
method of constructing the holdout sample introduces a bias in the estimates of model 
predictive accuracy and lessens the validity of results as to the stability of the effects of 
explanatory variables. The same criterion of failure and analogous sample structure 
shape the empirical design in the logit analysis of UK company failure in 1978-82 in 
Peel and Peel (1988). However, a holdout sample containing observations from a post- 
estimation time period 1983-85 seems more suitable for checking the sensitivity of 
evaluation results to the estimation sample data points. 
A narrower meaning of the failure outcome, whereby a company is considered as a 
failure if it is declared insolvent, is employed by Keasey and McGuinness (1990) and 
Keasey, McGuinness and Short (1990) who investigate UK industrial company failure 
in 1976-84. Relatively small repeated cross-sectional samples Oust 86 firms are studied 
in Keasey and McGuinness (1990) and 80 firms in Keasey, McGuinness and Short 
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(1990) arc created using matching on industrial sector, size, and the year of accounting 
records. While Keasey and McGuinness (1990) analyse the conventional dichotomy 
between failure and non-failurc with a set of year-prior-to-failurc specific binomial logit 
models, employing the design approach similar to Zavgren (1985), Keasey, 
McGuinness and Short (1990) create a multinomial response variable measuring 
respectively one "healthy" state and five "year-to-failure-specific" stages in the failure 
process. They then proceed in a manner similar to Lau (1987) applying multinomial 
logit approach for isolating important financial-ratio based predictors over the five time 
horizons, corresponding to failure occurring in one- to five-years time. Their 
methodological approach seems to suffer from the mentioned above flaw of neglecting 
the intrinsically categorical nature of successive stages in the failure process. These 
inappropriate assumptions made in their work may result in some problematic effects 
such as biased coefficients, inefficient estimates and spurious statistical inference on 
financial variable effects. For an ordered outcome variable a more appropriate option 
may be the use of the proportional odds model or other methods for ordered categorical 
responses (Agresti, 1996). Aside from that, an equal-share sampling plan, with tests 
relying on ex post holdouts, is most likely to produce biased logit inference regarding 
the important causes of failure in their sample. A questionable design employing 
overlapping estimation and holdout samples do not provide a good basis for assessing 
validity of the results as to the empirically isolated determinants. 
Morris (1997) tests the relationship between financial ratios and the failure outcome 
with an equal-share data set of UK listed companies, taken from 1973-83, by conducting 
binomial logit analysis and then by training neural networks. Morris defines failure as 
receivership or wound up order by the court. One part of his data set is used for model 
validation, which is conducted on an ex post holdout of failing firms pertaining to the 
estimation period and on an ex ante holdout of continuing firms from a later time 
period. 
There has also been some interest in modelling a broader concept of corporate failure, 
equating an adverse outcome with the event of discontinuation, when the firm loses its 
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status of a separate independent organisation. In this situation, exit through insolvency 
can be seen as an alternative to exit through acquisition because a financially distressed 
firm may well become an acquisition target. One example of modelling more complex 
exit structures is provided in Wilson, Chong and Peel (1995) who train a neural 
networks model for classifying three mutually exclusive outcomes of legal insolvency, 
distressed acquisition, and survival in UK quoted firms. The sampling frame defines a 
distressed acquired firm as a company, when the two conditions of separate outcomes 
are being satisfied: the firm was taken over and had reported either negative working 
capital, or negative pre-tax profit, or accounts' qualification. A state-based, cqual-share 
sample of 112 firms, with the non-failed category selected randomly, is constructed by 
Wilson, Chong and Peel for training a neural net. No holdout data points were set aside 
for further assessments, a nd e stimates ofc lassi ficatory a ccuracy oft he t rained n eural 
network are generated in standard jackknife tests. An earlier US paper by Pastena and 
Ruland (1986) also uses a broad dcfinition of company failure but is distinctive in that 
it assumes the dichotomy between merger and bankruptcy, working with a sample of 
distressed firms from 1970-83. Finns in early stages of financial distress were identified 
by a screening procedure based on the Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968). The legal 
meaning of bankruptcy is used for constructing their small data set of 110 firms, which 
has the prevailing share of merged companies. The absence of holdout tests represents a 
serious limitation of the empirical setting, casting doubt on the reliability of inference in 
Pastena and Ruland. 
AIN (1995) discusses the case of using neural networks classifiers for untangling the 
effects of changes in financial ratios on the risk of failure of UK firms. Failure is 
defined as a company being in receivership, liquidation or administration and modelled 
using the conventional dichotomous response. An equal-share, training sample of 92 
manufacturing firms falling into insolvency during 1987-92 is selected using matching 
by industry sector, size and the year of accounts. The predictive performance of the 
neural net is then evaluated with randomly drawn holdout observations on 590 firms, 
but the overlap in holdout and estimation time periods limits the reliability of tests of 
the importance of individual predictors. 
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In a time-series analysis of the relation between movements in returns on a firm' equity 
share and subsequent failure, carried out with a sample of UK companies, Diacogiannis 
0 996) defines failed firms as those that were liquidated, wound up by the court order or 
placed into receivership. The data set is made of failed firms alone because the approach 
adopted uncovers the behaviour of share returns of listed failing firms by contrasting 
these returns with returns on the market over the analysis period. A broad market index 
is used to establish the benchmark performance. The primary sample from 1975-83 and 
the secondary validation sample for a later time period 1986-93 are constructed, both 
containing Wed firms from the same industry category. In Diacogiannis (1996), 
matching by industry was necessary for minimising the distorting effects of scctoral 
trends on share return time-serics. 
A study by Lindsey and Campbell (1996) uses the time series estimates of stock 
returns variability obtained within the chaos systems framework as inputs for a 
classification model of failure amongst US firms in 1983-92. The purpose of their work 
is to establish the potential of chaos statistics of stock returns for improving 
performance of conventional univariate and multivariate failure prediction models. 
Failures are located using the bankruptcy criterion while a case-control equal-share 
sampling is used in creating the full data set of 158 firms matched by industry. The full 
data set is randomly divided to set aside one third of observations for ex post holdout 
tests. The samples are sub-divided further to allow a comparison of chaos measures over 
the two observational windows: 7-5 years prior and 3-1 years prior to bankruptcy. 
The choice of statistical method determines the sampling plan used in Hill, Perry and 
Andes (1996). The rationale for a longitudinal data set relates to the aim of conducting a 
more complex, event history analysis, which introduces a time dimension in the data 
and permits to explore the effects of b oth firm-specific a nd e conomy-wide factors in 
financial distress and bankruptcy of US industrial firms in 1977-87. Event history 
analysis uses so-called survival-time data, a variant of cross-sectional time-series data, 
which contain information on firm duration. The sample ftaine excludes financial 
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companies, transportation firms and utilities, to obtain a more homogeneous data set. 
Taking the cue from Lau (1987) and Johnsen and Melicher (1994), Hill, Perry and 
Andes (1996) model the failure process as evolving in three distinct stages: the stable 
state, state of financial distress and bankrupt state. Firms with cumulative negative 
earnings over any three consecutive years in the sample period are assigned the status of 
financially distressed, while involuntary bankruptcy indicates the bankrupt state. The 
resulting longitudinal data set contains 3 81 firms followed over II years, including 75 
bankrupt cases. A rotating panel design ensures that the panel is balanced: as failed 
firms drop out of the data set, they are being replaced by fresh cases. Although the 
models are intended to be explanatory only, the authors employ 'in-the-estimation- 
sample' classification tests for evaluating the overall fit of the model built. 
This section provided a discussion on data needs and sampling plans that are 
characteristic of the extant literature. All the studies reviewed above focus on an 
individual company as the unit of analysis. As data necessary for setting the samples are 
usually obtained from commercial data-bases that rarely include financial records on 
smaller firms. We have seen that most studies use data on large quoted companies in 
their examination of the company failure phenomenon. 
These past investigations usually utilise the retrospective case-control design for a 
micro-level analysis of failure within the classification framework and with state-based 
and often equal-share samples. Most micro level studies from the UK and the US, rely 
on cross-section data, the exceptions being multivariate time-series data analysis of 
share returns in Diacogiannis (1996), the use of time-series estimates in Lindsey and 
Campbell (1996) and a longitudinal study in Hill, Perry and Andes (1996). A binary 
indicator is a natural choice for modelling the dichotomy between "failure" and 
"survival", while legalistic criteria for identifying the failure outcome are considered as 
more practical because the event and timing of legal bankruptcy is easy to track with 
publicly available information. Favouring the notion of several distinct stages in the 
failure process, some studies attempted to modify financial distress analysis with 
classification models handling a multinomial response. The recurring flow in these 
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multinomial studies is that they ignore the ordinal nature of individual stages in the 
failure p rocess. A ssuming d istinct, m utually e xclusive a nd n on-overlapping grades in 
the scale measuring financial distress these studies introduce imperfect proxies for 
grades such as omissions of dividend payments, technical default, default on loan 
payments, rankings of stock quality by credit agencies and cumulative negative 
earnings. Our standpoint is that there is no merit to fit a multinomial regression to the 
response variable, which is putatively categorical. At the other end of the spectrum, 
financial failure by insolvency is modelled as one of the possible exit routes and 
compared with an alternative of losing independence through acquisition. 
An important issue of empirical design, which has a connection to sampling problems 
discussed above, concerns the choice of relevant causal variables for an explanatory 
model. In a retrospective observational study, firm-specific attributes, which measure 
explanatory variables, should be identifiable in the sample. The degree of consistency of 
records on the variables of interest affects sample sizes and determines the completeness 
of the data for the desired statistical analysis. The next section reviews approaches 
adopted in the prior literature towards selection of explanatory variables and potential 
predictors. 
2.3 The Choice of Candidate Variables Gauging the Factors of Company Failure 
The problem of variable selection in company failure studies arises from the 
coincidence of model uncertainty and parameters' heterogeneity. Such features as the 
definitional ambiguity of failure, absence of a clear conceptual structure and need for an 
integrated analysis of macroeconomic and firm-level factors place a burden on empirical 
research. Company financial distress depends on the firm's ability to meet payment 
obligations or renegotiate and restructure its debt, and this ability is determined by a 
multitude of potentially interacting internal and external factors. Econometric 
investigations of company failure are viewed as a search for empirical regularities, not 
as a set of exercises in structural estimations. Our reading of the literature suggests that 
the orientation of company failure research is exploratory and descriptive, rather than a 
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stringent test of structural relationships. The goal of a typical study is to identify internal 
and e xternal tot he firra characteristics, which are positively or negatively associated 
with failure and to explore their relative importance. 
Nonetheless, empirical models - even the models developed for predictive purposes only 
- have generated useful economic insights. The lack of a unifying analytical model does 
not appear to imply that the derived empirically failure predictors render their economic 
interpretation invalid. Previous studies of the failure phenomenon have explored a 
variety of predictors or explanatory variables including a number of firm-specific 
attributes that are based on accounting information, non-financial disclosures and 
market valuation as well as on indicators of the corporate business environment. 
2.3.1 Firm-specific Attributes 
Financial distress is a complex, high-dimensional phenomenon and plausible 
explanatory variables should ideally reflect the whole context of the failure process. 
Company failure is not a sole domain of finance. Although the empirical literature, 
offering stylised facts on the risks of failure, stresses the critical role of financial 
performance and position for the company's robustness to external shocks, the literature 
also recognises an important influence of economic efficiency, productivity, firm size 
and age, managerial competence and corporate governance. In the long term, the primal 
causal forces affecting the firm's performance and survival are its superior competitive 
ability and the growth potential, which result in profits, larger cash flow, and easier 
access to external finance. Abundantly supplied by the current literature accounting 
ratio-based predictive models are driven by intuitions that financial statement measures 
should reflect the impact of deep causal factors because ratios are widely used by credit 
analysts to judge credit risk of firms. That gives the rationale for the use of financial 
statement-based explanatory variables, which can be thought of as the observable 
indices of changes in the deeper latent variables that constitute the conditions for failure. 
The operational models of failure risk, initiated by Altman (1968) and Taffler (1982), 
show that failing companies can be identified with data from company accounts 
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capturing shifts along dimensions of profitability, gearing, liquidity, and financial 
efficiency. It follows therefore that the scholar may be able to say something about the 
conditions for failure by looking at the relationships that exist between accounting ratio- 
based observables and the adverse outcome. In other words, unobserved changes in 
primary factors will be recorded in observed consequences. 
2.3.1.1 The Rationale for and Use of Accounting Ratio-based Variables 
In financial analysis, an examination of company performance and financial position 
with data from financial statements involves a comparison of summary measures in ratio 
form. The prominence of financial ratio analysis for comparing performance is a 
response to the need to compress the large informational content of accounts, 
controlling at the same time for the effect of firm size. The rationale for the wide-spread 
use of ratios is to measure the non-size related variation in the accounting variable of 
interest either across companies or on the time-series basis. Although accounting 
practices in relation to specifications of individual items and the ways ratio components 
are calculated vary, numerous financial ratios proposed in the literature can be classified 
into broad categories of profitability, gearing, liquidity and financial efficiency'9, in 
accordance with the important dimensions of company performance and financial 
position. By construction, ratios within each category can considerably overlap in the 
information they provide, with the implication that a representative of each category set 
of ratios can convey much of the information contained in the accounts of a firm. The 
choice of particular sets of ratios for empirical work on company failure has been often 
justified by some evidence on their particular relevance reported in past studies, but at 
times this choice is simply predetermined by the coverage of account items in the data- 
bases used by researchers. 
Financial analysis holds that the embedded in a geared firm potential risk of debt 
default, which may carry the danger of bankruptcy and liquidation, results from 
unfavourable changes along the dimensions of short-term liquidity and long-term 
Note that in the literature, cfficiency ratios can also be tenned "turnover" or "activity" ratios. 
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solvency. Observable from company accounts measures of profitability and gearing 
encapsulate the conditions of long-tenn solvency, while liquidity and efficiency ratios 
facilitate assessment of short-term financial risk. 
Theoretical considerations link changes in profitability and the risk of liquidation. The 
liquidation event may occur when the market value of the firm's assets does not cover 
the book value of its liabilities (Merton, 1974; Scott, 1981). Profitability determines the 
changes in the asset value of the firm and therefore seems a natural determinant of 
failure. Accounting measures of the concept of profitability reflect the relationship 
between income and expense. The ability to control expense in relation to income 
enhances earning power essential for the firm's ultimate existence. The two most 
frequently used profitability ratios are returns on investment and profit margins. A 
generic ratio and the primary test of profitability is return on capital, which expresses 
the relationship between profits and the investment required to generate them. Several 
levels of profit and diverse measures of investment result in different forms of rates of 
return illustrating different aspects of investment and performance. In equilibrium, the 
after-tax return on investment is expected to be equal to the real interest rate on the risk- 
free asset plus a risk premium, which in turns depends on the business risk of the firm. 
An alternative way of expressing profitability is by calculating profit margins which 
state profit as return on turnover. In general, higher margins assist firm survival, 
however, many firms face a trade-off between profit margins and turnover. It may be 
possible toa chieve ah igher p rofit m argin by charging higher prices but the level of 
sales will fall. The level of proflt margins may be determined by industry sector and 
reflect the market power of the firm (Machin and Van Reenen, 1993). 
Financial risk in a firm is captured by gearing and liquidity ratios. Capital gearing 
measures the long-term default risk implied by the firm's financial structure. It captures 
the balance between the two sources of long-term finance - funds invested by ordinary 
share capital holders and those invested by lenders. The presence of debt in capital 
structure of the firm involves fixed obligations in the form of interest and principal 
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payments and therefore generates default risk. But a certain amount of gearing is 
attractive to shareholders as interest expenses on debt are tax deductible, and that should 
have the effect of raising the average return on equity. Capital gearing is concerned with 
the relation between the basic earning power, which can be measured by return on total 
0 assets or by return on equity' . 
Given that default risk is an attribute of debt, an analysis of underlying indebtedness is a 
crucial component in a joint examination of the extent to which the fin-n's long-term 
solvency can be affected by absolute levels and relative changes in gearing ratios. 
Capital gearing ratios relating debt to equity help to assess whether the firm can pay 
back the principal on the outstanding debt. However, various constructs of capital 
gearing ratios are inevitably arbitrary and the choice of the components entering the 
numerator and denominator of a ratio depends on how one defines liabilities and equity 
for the analysis. Some variants of the debt to equity ratio combine preference capital 
under the debt label, while other exclude short-term debt from calculations with the 
rationale that short-term debt is transitory and may not contribute to financial stress. The 
literature draws attention to a problem of measuring company assets, arising from the 
use of capital gearing ratios in financial position analysis (Foster, 1986). Capital gearing 
is a stock variable and where the debt to equity ratio uses book values it is likely to 
provide an inadequate picture of underlying indebtedness. While the balance sheet value 
of debt is approximate, the balance sheet value of equity is grossly inaccurate. There are 
variants of debt ratios that use market values instead of book values to reflect the fact 
that some finns have a significantly greater capacity to borrow than their book values of 
equity might indicate. The increases in debt levels may be matched by an increase in the 
market value of equity due to higher expectations of future profits or due to the presence 
of intangible assets, which are not capitalised in the balance sheet. Finally, it seems still 
appropriate to use market value-based debt ratios in examining the companies who do 
not have publicly traded debt since deviations of market values of equity from 
respective book values are likely to dominate in debt ratio calculations. 
" We discuss this relation in chapter 1. 
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Capital gearing captures only one part of the effect one would like to attribute to 
indebtedness. The second group of gearing measures, called income-gearing ratios and 
based on items from the profit and loss account, gauge the combined effects of 
indebtedness and profitability, allowing for the important influence of changes in 
interest rates on financial position of the firm (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999). Income 
gearing ratios that concern with the relation between pre-interest profit and post-interest 
profit for a given amount of interest indicate the firm's capacity to make interest 
payments from earnings. Unlike capital gearing, income gearing is a flow variable and 
avoids the problems arising from measurement of company assets. 
A joint analysis of changes in capital and income gearing ratios is of great importance as 
it helps to understand the extent of financial distress. A firm with low capital gearing 
but with a relatively high income gearing caused possibly by unfavourable changes in 
interest rates or temporary declines in profits, may be able to resolve debt sustainability 
problems by raising new external finance, thereby avoiding outright default. The 
situation of high income gearing being accompanied by high capital gearing makes the 
problem of temporary illiquidity more challenging. This situation can lead to a crisis of 
solvency because it might be impossible to rapidly evaluate the firm's long-term 
prospects and to implement a necessary restructuring of financial claims relatively 
cheaply. By reducing borrowing capacity, excessive gearing affects the firm's access to 
external finance and increases risk of failure. Stead (1995) emphasises that in covenants 
for their lending, bankers would normally consider a range of gearing indicators 
including equity or shareholders' funds value, the debt to equity ratio and interest cover 
(the reciprocal of income gearing). A violation of debt covenants results in technical 
default under the loan agreement, making the debt due immediately. If waivers from 
lenders are not obtained, the event of debt default might be followed by the firm's 
creditors initiating legal insolvency proceedings. 
Profitability and capital gearing are important factors affecting the viability of a 
company in the long run. However, as implied by the concept of income gearing, the 
firm's inability to meet its interest payments and other short-term financial 
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commitments can become an overriding issue since continually developing illiquidity is 
a terminal condition. Short-term liquidity risk arises primarily from the need to finance 
working capital, with poor liquidity leading to financial distress. Evidence from surveys 
conducted by the Society of Practitioners of Insolvency (1996) suggests that failing 
companies refer to the lack of working capital and non-paying debtors as the primary 
reasons for their financial distress. However, one can argue that, given equal capital 
gearing, short-term liquidity risk will be determined by the interaction of liquidity and 
profitability since the firm short of ready cash but generating good profits may be able to 
get the right backing and continue to trade. To avoid the potential shortfalls of liquidity 
the firm may keep more liquid assets on its balance sheet as a buffer. 
Accounting measures of liquidity are usually derived from the balance sheet. Current 
assets liquidity, as defined by the current ratio, gives a view of cash circulating in the 
working capital area of the company, measuring the relation between current assets and 
current liabilities. In a more conservative check of current assets, liquidity can be 
measured by the cash ratio that restricts liquid assets to only cash or cash and 
marketable securities. In addition to the on-balance sheet liquidity indicators, a related 
set of cash flow measures can be constructed with items from cash flow statements and 
funds of flow. The especial relevance of cash flow statement-based ratios for evaluating 
a company's liquidity position is emphasised in Beaver (1966). For analysing financial 
health, Beaver introduces the reservoir analogy, thinking of the firm as a reservoir of 
liquid assets supplied by cash inflows and drained by cash outflows. However, one 
potentially troubling feature of cash flow measures is that they reflect working capital 
movements, masking movements relevant to liquid assets. The serious problem of 
adequately measuring depreciation also arises in the operational use of cash flow 
measures. The literature observes the volatility of constructed cash flow ratios, which 
often precludes their use as explanatory variables in empirical models of failure 
(Altman, 1968; Taffler, 1982). 
A firm's working capital requirements and its liquidity position tend to vary with 
changes in management of working capital or financial efficiency. Efficiency (or 
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turnover) ratios are important for describing short-term liquidity risk because they are 
driven by sales activity and capture the effects of changes in inventories and debtors. 
The debtor turnover ratio can be particularly relevant as it can throw some light on the 
possibility of the domino effect should the company's clients experience liquidity 
problems. Overall, greater operational efficiency leads to a shorter financing period for 
the firm to fund working capital needs and reduces the likelihood of financial distress. 
Evidence from the industrial economics literature emphasises the need to control for 
size when examining the firm exit process. The empirical research in the field of market 
exit indicates clear links between age, size, subsequent growth and exit of firms. The 
learning process might induce the most efficient firms to expand and the least efficient 
firms to contract or exit. One benchmark model - the "passive learning" model due to 
Jovanovic (1982) - implies that new firms do not initially position themselves at a 
unique optimal size and learn about levels of their costs and efficiency over time. The 
inverse relationship between size and exit risk is supported in empirical work by 
Marcus (1967), Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988), Dunne and Hughes (1994), 
and Mata and Portugal (1994). In the extant finance literature, the preferred 
explanation of the size effect is that larger firms have greater market power, their 
earnings stability is expected to be greater, they therefore may be more successful in 
negotiating debt rollovers and financial restructurings, which provides them with an 
easier access to new external funds. The size effect also supports the view that within 
any given industry, small firms are more likely to be marginal suppliers and therefore 
could be highly sensitive to declines in industry demand and recessions. Special rescue 
actions by the government to resolve distress problems in larger firms seem more likely 
because large firm bankruptcies can be more costly to the economy in general as 
compared with failures of small firms. To the extent that size of a distressed company 
serves as an additional incentive for its creditors to co-operate in negotiating a corporate 
workout at the pre-insolvency stage this may partly explain higher incidences of 
insolvency amongst smaller firms. 
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Marcus (1967) reports the importance of size and age effects for variations in aggregate 
rates of firms' mortality. For US data from 1951-60, Marcus finds that the exit rate 
measured as a proportion of firms experiencing losses is explained by the effects of 
young age and small size, common to all industries. Markus argues that the higher 
probability of losses for small firms, given identical market risks, is linked to the fact 
that the cost of capital is higher for smaller firms, which in turn might imply lower 
profitability. In addition, Markus argues that the observed inverse relationship between 
failure and firm size is in line with the migration hypothesis, according to which 
profitable firms experience, on average, positive growth rates and subsequently migrate 
into larger size groups. 
The financial accelerator literature suggests that recessions, monetary tightening, and 
increased interest rates should have a differential effect on net worth and solvency of 
borrowers because the severity of the agency cost problem faced by firms depends on 
firm size. When the need for external funds is rising, credit flows away from harder-to- 
monitor, low-net-worth borrowers to high-net-worth borrowers. Large firms should have 
lower agency costs per unit of external finance because of their greater diversification, 
longer track r ecords, a nd b ecause ofe conomies ofs cale inc ollecting and p rocessing 
information about their situation. This gives rise to the agency problem in credit markets 
for smaller firms who experience reduced access to credit relative to other borrowers 
and therefore reduce their spending and production earlier and more sharply than other 
firms. Using firm-level data for US manufacturing companies, Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist (1994) present strong empirical evidence on the "small size effect" being 
explained by the flight to quality in recessions. 
The "small size effect" is observed in Dunne and Hughes (1994), who investigate the 
relationships between asset size, age, growth and death for the large sample of UK 
quoted and unquoted companies in 1975-85. Their analysis adopts a wide definition of 
exit including takeovers, voluntary and compulsory liquidations, receiverships, losses of 
quotation, c ompany r econstructions a nd r eorganisations. In their analysis, they find a 
non-linear, inverted U-shape relationship between exit and size, measured by net assets. 
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For companies with over El million in size in 1980, liquidation rates peak at 5.1 per 
cent in the f4m-Hni category and then fall to 1.3 per cent for the firms with net assets 
greater than L64m. The authors also observe the turbulence of small firms' growth, and 
the tendency for younger smaller firms to have a greater propensity to fail. 
Firm size can be defined in a number of ways - in terms of employment, product market 
share, turnover (or net sales), book value of total (or net) assets, and, for quoted 
companies, by market capitalisation. Company accounts generally provide adequate 
measures of these variables, although the information on product market shares 
available from accounts may be inconsistent and lacking detail. In predictive models of 
company failure, firm size has often been measured by turnover (e. g., OhIson, 1980; 
Wilson, Chong and Peel, 1995) or by assets (e. g., Altman, Haldeman and 
Narayanan, 1977; Marais, 1979; Peel, Peel and Pope, 1986). 
The heterogeneity of the failure process can also stem from differing ages of firms going 
into insolvency. Altman (1968) recognises the importance of age and uses an indirect 
proxy of cumulative profitability in his discriminant model, but such an approach seems 
simplistic. In much modelling of corporate failure at the firm level, essentially static 
cross-sectional empirical designs preclude incorporation of a time dimension. Despite 
the fact that the importance of the age factor has been registered by empirical work in 
the field of industrial economics (see, e. g., robust results in Dunne and Hughes 
(1994)), models of failure as an inter-temporal process, with firm duration entering as an 
independent explanatory variable, are virtually non-existent in a large body of UK 
empirical literature. 
In modelling failure, the choice of appropriate financial ratios to proxy the factors of 
interest can be justified by references to theory, especially when one is interested in 
providing further evidence on the explanatory role of indebtedness, cash flow, size, and 
age. However, the multitude of ratio specifications, ratio collinearity and concerns not to 
omit p ossibly i mportant v ariables o ften i nduce t he r esearcher toj ustify t he c hoice of 
accounting-based explanatory variables by evidence on their predictive power reported 
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by past studies. This modelling strategy has serious limitations. Empirical results can be 
ratio-construct-sensitive as well as sample-sensitive, inhibiting a comparison of the 
usefulness of particular predictors, while the underlying causes of failure may vary 
across firms, sectors, and over time, depending also on institutional arrangements for 
insolvency or bankruptcy. In the absence of a clear theoretical framework, an alternative 
way of revealing the important determinants is to rely on statistical selection procedures 
conducted with a wide range of ratio-based inputs, reflecting company performance and 
financial position. 
For a univariate analysis of US companies, Beaver (1966) uses thirty financial ratios 
which are selected on the basis of their popularity with financial analysts, perforinance 
in past studies and ability to reflect the cash flow position of the firm. Using an equal- 
share sample, Beaver compares mean values of ratios for failing and continuing firms as 
a profile analysis over a five-year period prior to failure, identifying general associations 
between changes in ratios and the adverse outcome. Based on results from dichotomous 
classification tests conducted on a univariate basis and for various prediction horizons, 
Beaver concludes that the ratio of cash flow to total debt discriminates b est b etween 
failing and continuing firms. Less powerful predictors included cash flow to total debt, 
net income to total assets, total liabilities to total assets, working capital to total assets, 
current ratio, and ND credit interval 21 . The most important dividend of Beaver's 
univariate study is evidence that financial ratios, or more generally, accounting data 
from which they are derived, have the information content that allows to predict failure 
for at least five years prior to the event. 
A standard example of a ratio-based multivariate discriminant model for failure 
prediction is the Altman Z-Score model for US manufacturing corporations (Altman, 
1968). An initial set of twenty two popular in the finance literature ratios was used in 
model development, but the ratio of cash flow to debt, the most important measure in 
Beaver (1966), was not possible to include in the model because of the lack of 
21 ND stands for Net defensive assets. ND credit interval = [(cash + marketable securities-current 
liabilities)/(operating expenses-depreciation-depletion-amortisation)]. 
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consistent depreciation data. The final specification of Z-Score function encompasses a 
comprehensive set of ratios, covering all main dimensions of financial analysis. 
Liquidity is represented by working capital to total assets; cumulative profitability and 
long-term solvency by retained earnings to total assets and by earnings before interest 
and taxes to total assets; gearing by market value of equity to book value of total 
liabilities and efficiency by sales to total assets. In offering the rationale for including 
cumulative profitability, Altman argues that this variable has an important additional 
function of being an indirect proxy for age. A relatively young firm had less time to 
build up its cumulative profits and therefore would show a lower ratio of retained 
earnings to total assets. Cumulative profitability measures, however, should be used 
with care as their usefulness as an indirect control for age can be restricted by 
manipulation via corporate quasi-reorganisations and declarations of stock dividends. 
A commercial application of the Altman Z-Score, the ZETAO credit risk model, 
developed to predict failure both in retail and manufacturing, is reported in Altman, 
Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977)22 . The range of explanatory factors has been 
expanded by adding measures of asset size, market capitalisation and earnings stability, 
and by using income gearing instead of capital gearing. The seven discriminating ratios 
included earnings before interest and taxes over total assets (overall profitability), the 
logarithm of total tangible assets (size), the current ratio (liquidity), earnings before 
interest and taxes over total interest payments (income gearing), retained earnings over 
total assets (cumulative profitability), market value of common stock over market value 
of total capital (market capitalisation) and the normalised measure of the standard error 
of estimate around a ten-year trend in the overall profitability variable (earnings 
stability). By allowing in the model specification for volatility in the firms' earnings, 
Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan take a more dynamic view on bankruptcy risk. 
Both models - the Z-Score and ZETAO - are still being used by practitioners throughout 
the world, illustrating that accounting ratios p erform reasonably well as indicators of 
22 The ZETA'10 model is a proprietary model for subscribers to ZETA Services, Inc. (Hoboken, NJ). 
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corporate financial health (Altman, 2000). The UK earlier work on company failure 
prediction generally followed the methodology of modelling failure risk as a function of 
financial ratios. The work by Altman and colleagues seemed to provide an important 
modelling principle, transferable into the context of a country with different accounting 
and bankruptcy environments, that both long-term solvency and short-term liquidity 
should be represented in an appropriate specification of a predictive model. It should be 
noted that differences in accounting standards and accounting measure definitions make 
it impractical if not impossible to exactly mimic ratios employed by prior studies for 
different contexts, and the extant literature uses a wide range of different and often not 
directly comparable measures. 
The first applications of the ratio-based classification model for screening financial 
health of UK listed industrial companies are reported in classical work by Taffler and 
Tisshaw (1977) and Taffler (1982). The choice of ratios employed by Taffler and 
Tisshaw (1977) is determined by the ratios' interpretability in terms of financial 
analysis dimensions, evidence on their effectiveness in prior empirical modelling and 
expert opinions given by financial analysts. Profitability is expressed as profit before tax 
to current liabilities, liquidity is given by current assets over total liabilities and by no- 
credit interva123, while the ratio of current liabilities to total assets reflects gearing. The 
ratios entering the predictive function in Taffler (1982) broadly fall into the categories 
of profitability, liquidity, gearing, and efficiency. The information on changes along 
these dimensions is provided by a five-variable set, containing the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to opening total assets, the ratio of total liabilities to net capital 
employed, the ratio of quick assets to total assets, the ratio of working capital to net 
worth and by stock inventory turnover. Taking the cue from Beaver (1966), who argues 
that models containing cash flow-based predictors should have better predictive power, 
Taffler experimented with ratios derived from the funds flow statement, but generated 
cash flow measures exhibited intertemporal instability, and did not enter the final 
specification of the predictive function. Taffler's paper establishes "stylised facts" 
23 The "no-credit intervar, is akin to the acid-test ratio, and defined as the period of time, for which the 
company can finance its continuing operations from its immediate assets if all other sources of short-term 
finance are removed. 
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regarding UK company failure as well as makes causal claims. The author observes the 
particular importance of profitability and gearing, noting the consistency of this 
observation with the view that short-term illiquidity and inadequate working capital 
management are less important in determining the viability of a firm than the magnitude 
of the firm's liabilities and its earning power. This result lends support to the hypothesis 
that long-term considerations will prevail when trade creditors, bankers and debenture 
holders decide on foreclosure of a defaulted debtor with temporary cash flow 
difficulties. Taffler's data also show that over the analysis period 1968-73, basically 
sound enterprises could usually borrow their way out of temporary difficulties or 
reschedule the debt payments. 
The appropriateness for multivariate modelling of favoured by Beaver cash flow 
measures is also investigated in the Bank of England study of listed UK industrials 
reported in Marais (1979). The Bank of England model includes flow of funds ratios 
alongside more conventional measures from the balance sheet and profit and loss 
account. It was found that the pre-specified ratio constructs adopted from Beaver (1966) 
and Taffler and Tisshaw (1977) performed on the Marais sample rather poorly, implying 
that the explanatory power of particular ratios can be sample-sensitive. Marais also 
investigates the usefulness of an alternative set of inputs, modelling the effects of 
profitability, size, liquidity, and cash flow. A cash flow measure was defined as the sum 
of pre-tax profit and depreciation. The final discriminant function relies on the 
following measures: the ratio of cash flow to current liabilities, the reciprocal of gross 
total assets, the ratio of current assets to gross total assets and the ratio of funds 
generated from operations and adjusted for the net increase in working capital to total 
debt. The model was inaccurate at classifying non-failed firms in an ex ante holdout, 
with error rates in the order of 50 per cent. The poor performance of the model might be 
partly attributable to the particular ratios but the small size of the estimation sample also 
likely to limit the robustness of predictors. 
It seems self-evident that a carefully selected set of accounting ratios is necessary for 
successful empirical analysis. Econometric models of company failure are predicated on 
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the identification of a candidate set of model inputs, say of dimension ý. In the absence 
of a clear theoretical guidance and resource constraints in modelling the total number of 
possible models is 2ý, and, at this juncture, the objective of the researcher is reduce the 
total number of possible specifications upon which to base the selection of the model 
with adequate fit. Much of models of failure for the US and UK firms have been shaped 
by a purely statistical search. In selecting the preferred set of explanatory variables for 
the final model, it is common to begin modelling with an initial variable set, containing 
a wide range of financial measures and representative of the underlying causes of failure 
suggested by theory. With large sample sizes and in the absence of multicollinearity, a 
stepwise method employing standard statistical procedures of backward elimination or 
forward selection yields as ubset oft he k ey p redictors. H owever, t he c ombination of 
small sample size with highly correlated ratios is a regular feature of data available for 
company failure research, and that limitation makes alternative approaches more 
attractive. One procedure that aids the variable selection is, to perform a preliminary 
univariate analysis of the relations between individual ratios of interest and the indicator 
describing failure risk, and then choose the model inputs based on their relative 
explanatory power. Another approach uses the methods of factor analysis or principal- 
component analysis for manipulating data prior to developing models. These methods 
serve as a means to reduce a large number of accounting measures (possible collinear) 
to a small number of largely uncorrelated salient characteristics, capable of describing 
company performance and condition. A typical example of applying exploratory factor 
analysis at the preliminary stage of examination of financial statement data is work by 
Chen and Shimerda (198 1). This paper reports that the diversity of factors represented 
in financial ratios can be attributed to differences along basic financial dimensions of 
profitability, gearing, efficiency, cash position, liquidity and working capital 
management. Given high multicollinearity of financial ratios, Chen and Shimerda 
recommend the inclusion into the variable set for statistical modelling of failure the 
minimum number of representative ratios. The development of DATASTREAM Z- 
score model (described in Taffler (1974)) illustrates the use of principal-component 
analysis for reducing the initial set of forty financial ratios to only four variables 
representative of profitability, liquidity, gearing and efficiency. It would be fair to argue 
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however, that in using the techniques of reformulating a set of observed financial and 
economic variables into a new, fewer in number, set of independent variables, one of the 
major difficulties the researcher encounters is the interpretative ambiguity of 
components (or factors) obtained. When the purpose of the model is to predict future 
observations, these methods of manipulating the data seems inappropriate as they 
convey little information to the model user. 
In deciding which ratios to include in a discriminant model, Goudie (1987) and Goudie 
and Meeks ( 199 1) rely on the notion that an appropriate set of ratios should reflect 
traditional dimensions of financial analysis, including the cash flow position of the firm. 
These two studies model the influence of profitability, liquidity, income gearing, 
changes in capital gearing and cash flow, with the cash flow ratio being measured by the 
sum of retentions and depreciation over net assets. The model based on these measures 
suggested that cash flow, income gearing and profitability play the dominant role in 
predicting failure for the sample firms. 
As discussed above, Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan made an attempt to augment a 
financial ratio-based discriminant function with a measure of earnings stability, to 
reflect t he I ong-term s olvency p rospects. T he h ypothesis a bout t he strong association 
between failure risk and variability in the key performance indicators was subsequently 
tested for t he USby Darnbolena an d Khou ry ( 1980) a nd for t he UKbyB etts and 
Belhoul (1987). In Betts and Belhoul (1987), an initial set of twenty-nine financial 
ratios was reduced via stepwise statistical selection to just six measures reflecting the 
degree of gearing and the levels and standard deviations for both profitability and 
liquidity. However Betts and Belhoul fail to provide any justification for thinking that 
standard deviations based on just three of time-series observations is an adequate 
measure of financial ratio volatility. It is easy to see how fragile is the authors' assertion 
that the adopted measures of ratio stability enhance their model performance. However, 
their analysis highlights the need for more dynamic approaches in studies of failure. 
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OhIson (1980) supports the use of standard accounting items in measuring factors of 
failure risk. The use of standard ratio constructs averts the potential difficulties of 
obtaining the data needed for creating measures replicating "handcrafted" ratio- 
constructs. In addition, for a predictive model to be useful in a decision-making context, 
it should be based on conventional, standard for the particular environment ratios. In a 
large-scale study of US listed company bankruptcies over the period 1970-76, OhIson 
uses a standard set of accounting items available from COMPUSTAT. The probability 
of failure is modelled as a function of asset size, gearing, changes and levels of net 
income, liquidity, cash flow, and balance sheet solvency. An interesting innovation of 
his study relates to the use of proxies for long-term solvency, which is measured both in 
terms of negative net income over the latest two-year period and in terms of balance 
sheet solvency. OhIson registers that changes in asset size, gearing, current liquidity and 
performance played the key r ole int he s ample f irms' b ankruptcies. Ind iscussing t he 
empirical results, OhIson makes an important methodological point regarding the 
inherent incomparability of statistical models of failure based on differing data sets and 
predictor-variables. Since data sources used for modelling are rarely standardised, it is 
difficult to ensure "like with like" comparisons of resultant models. OhIson notes that 
given differences in specification of individual accounting predictors, the researcher 
should shift the focus of the comparison of findings to the question about the relevance 
of the main drivers which these predictors represent, and to the overall conformity of 
empirical evidence. 
Practical considerations influence the choice of explanatory variables in Zavgren 
(1985), where the ratios, representing return on investment, leverage, short-term 
liquidity, cash position, and operational (financial) efficiency, reflect major financial 
dimensions. The logit analysis of data on US companies from 1972-78, suggests that at 
shorter risk horizons - one and two years before failure due to bankruptcy- higher levels 
of indebtedness and liquidity shortages signal failure. Lower levels of efficiency seem to 
indicate a failure event occurring in three-year time or four-year time, while changes in 
profitability - notably in a sharp contrast with Ohlson's results from a large-sample 
study - are not associated with failure risk. 
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The literature recommends raw values transformations to improve empirical properties 
of r atio-based c ovariates a nd tos trengthen p redictive p ower ofm odels. In particular, 
Platt and Platt (1990) address the methodological problem of inter-sectoral instability 
of accounting ratios in their analysis of US firms in the period from 1972 to 1986. As 
dimensions of company performance and financial position, Platt and Platt employ 
profitability, efficiency, leverage, liquidity and size. Platt and Platt introduce the use of 
industry-adjusted, centred values of accounting ratios in a logit model of failure. They 
record predictive accuracy improvements in ex ante holdout tests, the result, in their 
view, entirely attributable to the use of the transformed values. This finding is, of 
course, consistent with the general recommendation from statistical modelling that 
normality improving transformations or adjustments of continuous (or quasi- 
continuous) variables improve the overall fit of a resulting model. While the logarithmic 
and square root transformations can be used for the ratios defined in the positive area, 
standardised or centred ratio values can also be employed to improve statistical 
properties. Therefore when evaluating the results in Platt and Platt it seems impossible 
to separate out the improvements obtained due to the standard statistical procedure of 
centering and the effects of the centring ratio values on the industry-level averages. 
However, Altman (1993) argues that in the situation where a model is intended for 
prediction, transformation of values of new observations by applying sectoral averages 
may be not possible in a consistent way as many firms operate simultaneously in 
different industries or switch industries over time. More importantly, sectoral 
differences are not the sole factor affecting stability of accounting ratios and power of 
company failure prediction models. Changing economic conditions reflected in 
indicators measuring inflation, interest rates, credit availability, and the business cycle 
also impact on company financial performance and position. 
A substantial body of work examines inter-temporal and inter-industry stability of 
financial ratio constructs (see, e. g., Dambolena and Khoury, 1980; Mensah, 1984; and 
Sudarsanarn and Taffler, 1995). Empirical evidence from these studies suggests that 
ratios exhibit both non-proportionality and non-normality in the ratio component 
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relationship, which may render the distribution of the resulting ratio skewed and non- 
normal. The proportionality assumption that implicit in the transformation of accounting 
variables into the ratio form, is not maintained when data from company accounts 
represent different industry sectors and recorded for different phases of the business 
cycle. There is also evidence that the relationship between ratio components changes 
over time within a particular industry sector. This issue cannot be ignored in the context 
of company failure modelling because stereotype statistical methods often necessitate 
variable normality while data sets are heterogeneous due to unavoidable pooling of data 
across different years and industries to obtain sufficient sample sizes. One would expect 
that structure and accuracy of empirical models of company failure risk, estimated over 
untransformed accounting ratio values, differ across different business environments. 
However, current research seems to lend support to the following viable solution to this 
empirical issue. An appropriate, normality improving transformation of ratio values 
such as a simple standardisation of annuallised values using parameters of the respective 
annual distributions for the sample years, can improve the behaviour of financial ratios, 
strengthening model stability. 
In recent work, the choice of particular accounting ratios has been primarily justified by 
the availability of comprehensive arrays of readily available accounting items offered by 
large commercial databases. A major benefit of using standard ratio constructs, adjusted 
for changes in accounting treatments and practices, is convenient access to several years 
of observations on broad cross-sections of firms, which allows to create large samples 
needed for valid inference. But reliance on commercial databases in turn inevitably pre- 
determines the sample frame, restricting analyses to the population of large quoted 
actively traded firms. Illustrations of the use of 16 standard ratios supplied by 
DATASTREAM are two studies of UK non-financial large quoted firms in 1976-84 by 
Keasey and McGuinness (1990) and Keasey, McGuinness and S hort (1990). The 
purpose of these investigations was to examine the importance of profitability, 
efficiency, gearing and liquidity as indicators of financial health of large firms. Obtained 
logit estimates broadly imply that profitability and efficiency ratios are important 
explanatory variables in the short term, in the years immediately prior to failure. A more 
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recent example of the use of standard ratio constructs is the study by Morris (1997), 
where the EXTAT database is used as a source of accounting data for analysis of UK 
firm failure in 1973-83. Morris finds that profitability, gearing, liquidity and size are 
important in explaining the risk of failure. Accounting-based measures of profitability, 
risk, cash flow, liquidity, gearing and working capital held on MICROEXSTAT are 
employed for developing classifiers based on neural networks in AIM (1995). Over one 
hundred standard accounting ratios were included in the initial set, which was then 
reduced through stepwise elimination procedures to several smaller sets of best 
discriminating variables. Alici finds that classification accuracy in holdout tests tends to 
improve when a large number of ratios are used for training neural networks classifiers. 
This finding has a profound implication for company failure research that a desirable 
specification should be based on a wider range of explanatory variables because sparse 
models may fail to reflect high heterogeneity amongst companies and irregularities in 
financial ratios, associated with their stochastic nature. 
The widespread use of accounting ratios as input variables is particularly significant in 
company failure research but there is a problem of having too many possible ratios. 
Similar predictive power of reported in past studies models with specifications based on 
different combinations of ratios, seems to imply that no dominant or unique set of 
accounting variables with respect to corporate performance and financial position can be 
established (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3). Despite difficulties of selecting an appropriate set 
amongst a large number of candidate sets of ratios and relatively weak economic and 
finance theories, in terms of predictive power, resultant models seem to differ 
marginally. However, as direct comparisons of the levels of model accuracy seem 
inappropriate due to differing data samples, more formal assessments of differential 
influences of alternative sets of ratios on model predictive power have been conducted. 
In a recent p aper, M ossman, Bell, Swartz, and Turtle ( 1998) t est the sensitivity of 
logit model classificatory power to the variable set choice. Their investigation 
complements a well-known work published by Hamer in 1983, who finds no evidence 
that the predictive accuracy of discriminant and logit models varies when the 
dimensions of profitability, liquidity and leverage are being represented by alternative 
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Table 2.2 The Forewarning Ability of Failure Models Based on MDA 
US Studies UK Studies 
Years Prior AjtnIan24 Deakin 25 Taffler 26 Goudie Betts and 
to Failure BeIhOU127 
(1968) (1972) 
1 
(1982) (1987) (1987) 
Error Rate (percentage) 
Type I Type 1+11 Mispredictions Type I Type 11 Type 1+11 
of Firms 
at Risk 
1 6 22 4 n/a n/a 19.1 
2 28 6 39 0 1.0 47.1 
3 52 12 52 16.7 5.3 76.5 
4 71 23 65 25.0 5.2 76.5 
5 64 15 n/a 30.0 11.1 87.5 
" Altman (1968) classifies companies from the estimation sample, using one-period function. 
25 Deakin (1972) reports cross-validation results, using n-period functions. 
26 Taffler (1982) reports the results for the 23 failed c ornpanies in his estimation s ample, however, he 
applies the one-period model to the data from accounts for the years prior to the last set of financial 
statements. Entries denote percentages of failing firms, which were not identified as being at risk. Taffier 
stresses that this classification does not constitute a test of the model's predictive ability. It only states the 
error rate in identifying the firms subsequently going bankrupt. 
"' The validation sample results demonstrated by the linear discriminant ftinction containing stability 
measures and developed for one year prior to failure. 
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CHAPTER 2 
comprehensive sets of ratio constructs. Hamer therefore recommends that the researcher 
should consider a variable set that minimises the cost of data collection. M ossman, 
Bell, Swartz, and Turtle (1998) extended the investigation of model sensitivity to 
differing variable sets by adding stock market returns to a representative set of 
accounting ratio-based predictors. Four sets were constructed with the inputs used by 
Altman (1968) for representing financial analysis dimensions in Z-Score model, cash 
flow variables employed in Aziz, Emanuel, and Lawson (1988), and market valuation 
variables from the studies by Clark and Weinstein (1983) and Aharony, Jones, 
and Swary (1980). A comparison of results, derived from the four alternative sets, 
reiterates the conclusion that a comprehensive set of accounting ratios captures best the 
changes in company performance and position. Altman's set of ratios shows the best 
discriminatory power in the short term, while the set of cash flow measures does not 
provide gains in discriminatory power. The logit model based on independent variables 
derived from stock returns was the weakest in terms of classificatory power. However, 
this reduction in predictive power is not unexpected and should not be over-interpreted. 
The aggregation of time-series data on stock returns in order to use these measures 
within ac ross-sectional statistical framework, fails to capture the information on the 
variance between the distributions of stock returns for failed and non-failed firms over 
time. 
2.3.2.2 Market Valuation Variables as Inputs in Predictive Models 
For the purpose of generating the estimates of the likelihood of insolvency, the rationale 
for the use of market valuation measures arises out of the perceived limitations of 
financial statements recording the past and therefore backward looking. In contrast, the 
market value of an individual company synthesises views of many investors about the 
firm's ongoing business, future growth and earnings prospects, and risk. In an efficient 
market, the value of a firm is being constantly revised and thus incorporates the 
information the market judges to be relevant to financial distress, given that the 
market's reactions irrelevant to insolvency are random. Changes in performance and 
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financial position of a firm caused by the e ntry ofan ew c ompetitor w ith I ower-cost 
manufacturing plants or likely movements in interest and exchange rates should be 
factored into share prices of the firm. Data on share prices and market returns, are 
publicly available and represents an alternative type of information which can be used 
for inferring the probability of failure at the company level within appropriate statistical 
frameworks for time-series data analysis. An array of academic studies that have 
experimented with market valuation variables include Beaver (1966), Aharony, Jones, 
and Swary (1980), Theobald and Thomas (1982), Clark and Weinstein (1983), 
Diacogiannis (1996), Lindsay and Campbell (1996), and Morris (1997). Recent 
proprietary m odels of implied corporate default probability based on gearing, market 
prices of equity, and asset value volatility are discussed in Crosbie (1998). An 
important advantage of having market-based model inputs is that this type of variables 
facilitates modelling within a dynamic framework allowing for a "natural" incorporation 
into the model of time-varying variables capturing the important influence of the 
business environment. It should be noted that the object of the strand of literature just 
mentioned is prediction of the event of failure over different time horizons, not isolation 
of deep-seated causes of failure. Market valuation measures seem to be less useful as 
independent variables in explanatory models of failure. As discussed in chapter 1, 
company failure is a somewhat ambiguous concept and both definitions and 
measurements of failure differ across studies. It is self-evident that for a geared firm, the 
evolution of the market value of assets contains a lot of information on the firm 
solvency because the firm is insolvent when the asset value falls below the face value of 
debt. F rom t he p erspective ofe xplaining f ailure, o ne c an p erhaps w ish toc onsider a 
dramatic decline in the market value as a variable being predicted, ino ther w ords; a 
response variable or alternative proxy for the adverse outcome of failure. 
One example of time-series analysis of share price returns and the outcome of failure is 
the study of UK quoted companies for 1975-93 by Diacogiannis (1996). Cumulative 
average residuals are employed in a profile analysis of the behaviour of quarterly time 
series of returns on a failing company's shares. The residual was defined in the usual 
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fashion, as the difference between the realised return on security, and the return obtained 
from the estimated market equation, where a market proxy was represented by the 
FTSE-500 Share Index. 
The predictive worth of market valuation variables using a profile analysis has also been 
checked inM orris ( 1997). He analyses the behaviour of monthly returns over a 60- 
month interval prior to failure with the purpose to establish how long it is before 
insolvency that the market on average marks down the shares of financially distressed 
firms that went into receivership or liquidation in the period 1973-83. In contrast with 
the results in Diacogiannis, who observes the 50 per cent error rates when isolating 
failing firms in an ex ante holdout, Morris optimistically claims that return-based 
measures demonstrate strong predictive power for the sample companies. He concludes 
that, in relative terms, the market marks down share prices of failing firms two-three 
years prior to failure. 
Market-based model inputs alongside financial statement information are used in a 
related area of research on credit risk assessment. One of the best-known proprietary 
models of the percieved default risk, based on the option pricing framework due to 
Merton (1974) is CreditMonitoro by KMV (Crosbie, 1998). The CreditMonitoro 
approach is dynamic and uses market prices of equity and the book value of liabilities to 
derive the expected value and the standard deviation of the process that drives the value 
of the firm's assets. In this model, the standard deviation of the asset value represents 
business and industry risk. These estimates are then used to calculate the distance to 
default and evaluate, using an empirical distribution of incidents of default, a default 
probability. 
Overall, there is no doubt that market valuation measures contain information on the 
perceived risk of failure. But it is difficult to escape the conclusion, when reviewing this 
strand of the literature, that market-based indicators are useful in quantifying the 
likelihood of company default rather than in isolating the underlying causes of failure. 
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2.3.2.3 Non-financial Firm-specific Attributes 
Since the Argenti (1970) paper that put forward a proposition that the risk of failure is a 
function of management qualities and capabilities, there has been an interest in isolating 
empirically non-financial causes of financial distress. In Argenti's view, corporate 
failures are caused by weaknesses and defects in organisational. and governance 
structures, resulting in costly mistakes on the part of companies' management. Argenti 
argues that associated with modelling failure risk financial variables such as ratios from 
company accounts or market-based measures, cannot fully explain the phenomenon of 
failure since financial variables merely record symptoms of distress. Moreover, Argenti 
contends that financial measures give rather unreliable predictors since the failing 
company management would appear to be able to manipulate or "manage" important 
accounting information to hide the poor financial conditions from the firm's financiers. 
In the current literature, a common empirical strategy for investigating the information 
content of non-financial variables is to develop a conventional classification model that 
uses non-financial variables alongside conventional financial ratios, and then to test the 
predictive power of a hybrid model. The augmentation of a model with non-financial 
inputs seems particularly relevant in the context of small firm failure research, primarily 
due to the need to give attention to the important role the entrepreneur (owner-manager) 
plays in survival of a small firm. Experiments with various non-financial indicators in 
small firm failure models can be seen as an attempt to overcome limitations of the 
information content of small company accounts related to less detailed, as compared to 
large quoted firms, disclosure (Keasey and Watson, 1987). 
For UK large companies, an examination of non-financial variable predictive power has 
been conducted in Peel, Peel and Pope (1986) and in Peel and Peel (1988). In their 
work, a set of added variables included the submission lag in reporting accounts, the 
number of directors' resignations and appointments, and directors' shareholdings. The 
conclusion as to the incremental value of these additional non-financial predictors 
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reached in Peel, Peel and Pope (1986) and Peel and Peel (1988) is merely suggestive 
of the need for a further in-depth investigation of the role of managerial factors in the 
failure process. Following these two studies, Wilson, Chong and Peel (1995) also 
expand a set of accounting predictors by including a number of indicators controlling 
for managerial factors, namely, for directors' shareholdings, lag in submitting the annual 
accounts and qualified audit opinion. Keasey and Watson (1987) carried out aI ogit 
analysis of the explanatory role of non-financial factors with a sample of UK 146 small 
businesses. They tested the influence of five variables relating to management 
characteristics; these included average lag of accounts submission, number of directors, 
bank secured loans, and prior and current year audit qualifications. Keasey and Watson 
assert that classificatory performance of logit models has been improved by the addition 
of the non-financial variables to a set of accounting ratios and interpret this result as 
supportive of Argenty's views on the primary role in company failure of managerial 
inadequacies and mistakes. 
We note that studies of the extent the variables measuring management competence 
explain variations in failure risk are rare and o ffer f indings t hat n ot asc onclusive as 
evidence presented by the more traditional accounting-based investigations but they 
have an important implication for identifying further research avenues. More empirical 
work needs to be directed towards examining more explicitly the importance in the 
company failure process of ownership, corporate governance, management structure, top 
managers' competence and managerial practices. Here traditional observational studies 
with publicly available data may have to be supplemented by investigations going inside 
the conventionally defined boundaries of public disclosures, in the form of case studies 
or by using questionnaire survey data. 
2.3.2 Variables Representing External Factors 
An analysis based solely on financial historical statements and other firm-specific 
attributes gives an incomplete picture of the relations underlying the failure process. To 
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describe more accurately the phenomenon of failure, the literature examines the role of 
macroeconomic conditions for survival (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995). External 
shocks resulting from uncertainty regarding trading conditions, business and credit 
cycles and other macroeconomic influences affect the volatility of cash flows and 
clearly condition the risk of debt default. Current research suggests that a better 
approximation of complex interrelations between factors influencing the failure process 
can bea chieved byi ncorporating t he b usiness e nvironment variables into traditional, 
accounting ratio-based models of failure. 
In the UK, the first paper to incorporate a macroeconomic indicator into a firm-level 
cross-sectional model of failure prediction was work by Goudie and Meeks (1991) who 
register the critical role of currency risk in a predictive model of corporate failure. Their 
analysis links failure risk to the degree of transaction exposure suggesting that company 
failure can be a penalty for producing exports at a time of a soaring exchange rate, 
especially if the rise is combined with relative price increases leading to a disastrous 
loss of competitiveness. The inclusion of changes in inflation in a time series analysis of 
UK company insolvency improves the predictive ability of a market return-based model 
in Diacogiannis (1996), implying that inflation is a relevant explanatory factor. Results 
from the event history analysis conducted in Hill, Perry, and Andes (1996) indicate the 
importance of the business cycle and the interest rate in explaining distress and 
bankruptcy in a sample of US quoted companies from 1977-87. The relevance of the 
accounting-based factors, modelled in Hill, Perry, and Andes depends on the stage of 
financial distress. Variables reflecting liquidity, leverage, size, a proxy for qualified 
audit opinion, and the prime rate are statistically significant for the financially distressed 
firms, which are still at the pre-bankruptcy stage. For the group of bankrupts, significant 
variables include profitability, leverage, size, a proxy for qualified audit opinion, the 
business cycle, and the prime rate. 
The key role of the business cycle motivates a hybrid model, reported by Richardson, 
Kane, and Lobingier (1998), that includes conventional, accounting-based variables 
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and two indicators controlling, respectively, for failures occurring over recession 
periods and for accounts reporting operating results for recessionary periods. Although 
the separate time-specific fixed effects of the recession indicators have not been 
evaluated, logit inference indicates that the relative importance of firm-specific 
attributes changes considerably over the cycle. If a recession period was anticipated, the 
ratio of net income to total assets alongside the ratio of cash to total assets were 
significant predictors of failure. On the other hand, if data reflected operations during a 
recession period, significant predictors included the ratio of current assets to total assets, 
the current ratio, and the leverage ratio of long-term debt to total assets. If the operations 
supporting the data occurred during a non-recession period, the relevant predictors were 
the ratio of net income to total assets, the ratio of current assets to total assets, the 
current ratio, the ratio of cash to total assets, and the leverage ratio. 
Commercial applications of company failure models also imply the strong explanatory 
power of economy-wide factors. During the 1990s, a number of credit risk 
methodologies, integrating macroeconomic factors into models of default risk, have 
been proposed. F or i nstance, M cKinsey, aI eading c onsultancy firm, h as d eveloped a 
CreditPortfolioView, a discrete time, multi-period model (Crouhy, Galai, and Mark, 
2000). The model is used to simulate the joint conditional distribution of default and 
migration probabilities for various credit rating groups in different industries. The 
probabilities are conditional on macroeconomic factors, driving the credit cycle in the 
economy, which include the unemployment rate, the rate of growth in GDP, the level of 
long-term interest rates, foreign exchange rates, government expenditures and the 
aggregate savings rate. 
In sum, our overview in this section of various categories of plausible variables used as 
inputs in failure models seems to indicate that accounting-based explanatory variables 
are useful predictors of failure at the firm level, signalling changes in the underlying 
unobservable factors. Precise comparisons of explanatory power of ratio variants from 
different studies are vitiated by differences in sample frames, time periods, and 
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accounting practices. No "uniquely correct" set of accounting ratios has been 
established in the literature. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that investigations into 
sensitivity of models predictive power to alternative specifications of ratio-bascd 
explanatory variables usually conclude that an appropriate set of ratios for a predictive 
model should be representative of the main dimensions of financial analysis such as 
gearing, profitability, liquidity and financial efficiency. Being indirect proxies of 
distress, markct-valuation variables appear powerful predictors, though they present less 
attractive candidates for independent variables in an explanatory model of failure. 
Failure is a multifaceted phenomenon. In most cases there is much about the failure 
process for which financial ratio-based and markct-valuation variables do not account. 
One group of possible omitted influences interacting with financial ratios and intruding 
on past results may relate to the effects ofa gc, s ize, a nd m anagcrial c apabilitics a nd 
other non-financial characteristics of the firm. Although most of extant studies utilise 
only micro-lcvcl data, permitting detailed attention to attributes of individual firms, the 
literature o ffers e mpirical c vidcnce ont he i mportant r olc of environmental factors in 
explaining and predicting failure process. The effects on the failure process of 
macroeconomic factors and of firm age merit further enquiry and chapter 3 of the 
present thesis reports our empirical findings on the role of these factors. 
2.4 The Choice of Statistical Framework 
One of challenging problems in empirical work on determinants of company failure 
involves the choice of statistical setting in which to observe the processes that generate 
the data and to control for a whole variety of internal and external variables. The work 
on financial distress prediction started with univariate analysis of the individual 
accounting ratio potential to signal the event of failure (e. g., Beaver, 1966) and later 
adopted more powerful multivariate techniques, enabling one to model the ways 
different factors affect the viability of a company. Multivariate analyses of company 
failure data have been conducted with cross-section, time-serics and panel data. As 
discussed above, the choice of appropriate statistical methodology is linked to the 
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research question, choice of data, sampling schemes and explanatory variables. While 
most of past studies work with cross-section data and develop static models (see, e. g., 
the benchmark studies by Altman (1968) and Taffler (1982)), a dynamic approach based 
on a longitudinal data set has been employed in a US recent study by Hill, Perry and 
Andes (1996). Examples of profile analysis with time-series samples, testing the 
capability of market return variables to signal failure are reported in Diacogiannis 
(1996) and Morris (1997). Below we highlight the relative merits of the current 
statistical approaches for a causal multivariate analysis of the company failure 
determinants. 
In company failure research, statistical analyses usually distinguish between the 
response or dependent variable and explanatory or independent variables 34 . To simplify 
the problem, the researcher views the population of firrns as consisting of two distinct 
groups of failing and surviving units. The introduction of the dichotomy between failing 
and continuing companies allows one to employ two nominal categories for measuring 
the dependent variable such as "failure" and "non-failure". When it is assumed that the 
order of listing these two categories is irrelevant, the statistical analysis does not depend 
on this ordering. Such categorical variable is referred to as qualitative to distinguish it 
from numerical-valued or quantitative variables. Response variables having two 
categories are called binary or binomial response, while response variable having 
several non-ordered categories of outcome are termed multinomial responses. 
Explanatory variables, which can be also termed as covariates or predictors, represent 
putative causes or symptoms of failure and may be continuous or categorical. Company 
failure research uses standard statistical methods, which include basic ways of assessing 
the association between the response describing the event of failure and explanatory 
variables of interest. For the classification setting, these include multivariate 
discriminant analysis, neural networks classifiers and the conditional probability 
models, namely, logit and probit. The findings reported in the failure prediction 
34 This taxonomy implies a strict unidirectional causality and might not be completely adequate, 
particularly for the more complex cases of the reverse causality. 
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literature, testing applications of these statistical techniques for the purpose of 
classifying companies into various categories, suggest comparable predictive power. 
2.4.1 Cross-sectional Data Models 
2.4.1.1 Predictive Models based on Multivariate Discriminant Analysis 
For both the USA and the UK, most of earlier work on multivariate modelling of failure 
risk seeks a best predicting model and is usually based on multivariate discriminant 
analysis (MDA), whereby a discriminant function for the two categories of "failure" and 
"non-failure" is derived from a combination of discriminating predictors (see, e. g., 
Altman, 1968; Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan, 1977; Taffler and Tisshaw, 
1977; Taffler, 1982; Goudie, 1987; Goodie and Meeks, 1991, Marais, 1979; Bell and 
Belhoul, 1987). 
The problem of assigning a firm into one of two discrete, defined and mutually 
exclusive groups is a specific case of the multi-group classification problem but the 
essence of the method is contained in the two-group case. In particular, if y is a binary 
response variable and x is a vector of continuous explanatory covatiates describing 
attributes of firms, MDA as well as binomial logit are alternative means of 
characterizing the joint distribution of (y, x). Company failure studies have been 
primarily concerned with the discriminating power of accounting ratio-based variables, 
most of which can be classed as continuous or quasi-continuous. We observe the k- 
dimensional vector x and must assign the individual firm, whose characteristics are 
given by x, to one of the groups. We can construct an assignment rule by using samples 
from the two sub-populations. Discriminant analysis focuses on the distribution of the 
x covariates conditional on y. It is important to note that an analysis of company 
failure with linear multivariate discriminant functions involves the restrictive 
assumption of multivariate normality and homoscedasticity of the two sub-populations 
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with respect to covariates ". In derivation of the discriminant function, it is almost 
always assumed that the distribution of xIy is multivariate norinal with a common 
covariance matrix. For linear discrimination, the assignment rule is based on a linear 
function Ax, which is obtained from two samples of companies representing two 
groups, corresponding to, say, y=I (failure) and y=0 (non-failure). The coefficients 
A are chosen so that the variance of A'x between the groups is the maximum relative 
to its variance within the groups. The standard MDA classification rules have been 
derived from minimising loss functions of a form that takes into account the prevalence 
rates, which are called a priori probabilities of group memberships (7r, and ; rI), and 
costs of misclassification (C(g I h) )36 (Eisenbeis, 1977). 37 Then, the classification rule 
for the two-group case is: 
assign a new observation with a profile vector x,, to group I if 
1-- C(l I 2)ýr2 
2 
A'(X I+X2 In 
C(211)7c, 
(2.1) 
The rule is optimal if the data are multivariate normal, the covariance matrices of the 
two groups are equal, and the a priori probabilities, ; r, and ; r2 , are known. If the 
analysis ignores both the a priori probabilities and the misclassification costs, a cutoff 
point is given by 
I At (XI + X2) . 2 
" As discussed above, only appropriately transformed values of accounting variables give normal data. 
However, the use of untransformed ratios for estimating linear discrin-driant structures has not been 
uncommon. Various other discriminant analysis techniques deal with non-nornial data (Lachenbruch, 
1977), but it appears that no discriminant analysis results obtained with the methods handling non-normal 
covariates have been published. 
36 Despite the fact that statisticians have specified the optimal cutoff score, little attempt has been made to 
explicitly incorporate misclassification costs into the models of failure prediction. 
37 Qg I h) is the cost of misclassifying an observation as a member of group g given that it came from 
group h. 
120 
CHAPTER 2 
A numerical Z-score for a company can be calculated from the discriminant function. 
Using the cutoff, the discriminant function can then be used for sorting companies into 
those companies that are likely to fail and those that are likely to survive. Supposing that 
failure is denoted y=1, the firm with a score below the empirical cutoff is expected to 
fail, while the company with a score above the cutoff can be thought of as financially 
sound. The predictive power is measured in terms of performance of the discriminant 
ftinction on new (future) observations and that can be evaluated using the criterion of 
error (misclassification) rates. There are two possible classification errors: unexpected 
failures, i. e. companies classified as survivors that failed (Type I errors) and unexpected 
survivors, i. e. companies classified as failures that survive (Type H errors). Multivariate 
discriminant analysis is designed to find an optimal frontier, trading off one type of error 
against another. Estimates of the expected error rates, can be generated using a number 
of methods: by conducting holdout tests, whereby fresh observations, drawn from the 
same population, are classified, by resampling the observations used for calibrating the 
function, or by calculating the apparent error rates on the estimation sample. In applied 
contexts, one can adjust the cutoff point depending on what matters to the user of the 
classification tool. For instance, an investor avoiding investments in risky companies 
may set the cutoff at a low level, to reduce Type I errors. Apart from ranking companies 
according to their riskiness, the obtained discriminant scores can also be used to 
generate the probability of failure, assuming that estimated scores are non-nally 
distributed. 
From a statistical point of view, the problem with multivariate discriminant analysis for 
modelling failure relates to the often-violated assumptions of multivariate normality and 
homoscedasticity of the two sub-populations in terms of model covariates. Deviations 
from the normality assumption in studies, dealing with accounting and economic 
variables, are usually true. Many conventional accounting ratios have a lower bound of 
zero but possess no theoretical upper bound. For instance, the gearing ratio of total debt 
to shareholders' equity exhibits this property. Furthermore, coefficients of a 
discriminant function are not unique and therefore the relative importance or substantive 
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significance of discriminating variables can be only assessed up to the constant of 
proportionality. The tests used for the significance of individual predictors, such as the 
F test, may be unreliable as they depend on the same restrictive assumptions with the 
implication that the methodology is not well suited for isolating and quantifying the 
influence of specific variables (Eisenbeis, 1977). Notwithstanding these drawbacks, the 
commercial success of discriminant models for failure prediction is a strong argument 
for the use of this statistical setting when the research question concerns prediction. 
2.4.1.2 Logit Analysis and Explanatory Models 
Simple cross-sectional conditional probability models for discrete choice circumvent 
some of the problems with discriminant analysis. Various authors have considered 
conditional probability models as an appropriate statistical setting for modelling 
company failure. The examples of this approach include Ohlson (1980), Zavgren 
(1985), Peel, Peel and Pope (1986), Peel and Peel (1988), Keasey and McGuinness 
(1990), Platt and Platt (1990), Johnsen and Pedersen (1994), Morris (1997), 
Richardson, Kate and Lobingier ( 1998). 1t should be noted that researchers using 
discriminant analysis are interested in finding a relationship which permits classifying 
company populations into subgroups of failed and non-failed companies. Discriminant 
models are intended to be predictive, with the modelling purpose being to find certain 
distinct properties of the subgroups that will permit prediction. Since validity of a 
predictive model must also involve causality, in other words the direction of "effect" of 
plausible factors of failure (measured by firm-specific attributes) should be correctly 
specified, findings from discriminant analyses in respect of important predictors seem 
important for any new examination of company distress. Unlike discriminant analysis, 
binomial response models appear to have at least two applications in company failure 
studies. First, this methodology can be used as an alternative to MDA to develop a 
classification predictive model, and, second, and particularly relevant to the research 
question of the present thesis, this methodology overcomes the limitations of MDA and 
permits developing an explanatory model incorporating external environmental factors 
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alongside firm-level attributes. When the analysis question concerns testing the 
hypotheses about the significance of firm-specific attributes and some external factors 
that modify the influence of these attributes, as well as involves an evaluation of the 
magnitude of factors' influence, the choice of a conditional probability model seems 
more appropriate. 
In contrast to MDA, a conditional probability model involves the distribution of y 
conditional on x. The starting point for statistical analysis of a binary response variable 
y is often a linear regression model extended to binomial response by introducing an 
intermediate unobserved (latent) variable y* with: 
Y* = P'X + C, (2.2) 
and an indicator ffinction 
Y, = Z(Y, *) = 
i, if yl* > 0, (2.3) 
lo, 
if y, * :50, 
where x is a vector of explanatory variables, r is unobserved disturbance, and 
i=n indexes sample observations. 
If F(c I x) is the cumulative distribution function of the disturbances, then the model is 
characterised by the conditional distribution of y given x 
Prob(y 1) = Prob(z(y*) = 11 x) 
Prob(y* = P'x +c2: 0) (2.4) 
F(P'x 1 x), 
and also termed the response probability. 
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The most common binomial models, which assume c independent of x, are 
logit with 
F(P'x) =- 
ep, x 
PIZ I+e (2.5) 
A(P'x), 
and probit with 
F(P'x) 2; r)-l" exp(- 
Iz2 
)dZ 
2 (2.6) 
= 
Both models are derived from distribution functions with thin tails, though the logistic 
distribution is heavier in tails than the standard normal distribution. Therefore, for 
intermediate values of P'x the two distributions tend to give the similar probabilities. 
The logistic distribution tends to give larger probabilities to y=0 when Px is 
extremely s mall (and s maller p robabilities to y=I when P'x is very large) than the - 
normal distribution. 
In general, when the multinomial logit model is adopted to handle J+1 responses 
which proxy stages or states of failure (see, e. g., Lau, 1987; Keasey, McGuinness and 
Short, 1990), t he p robability t hat a ny oft hem iso bserved is given by the following 
formula: 
Prob (Y = 1) = , 6"xi /Z e6ý"' for I= 0,..., J. (2.7) 
jej 
The binomial logit, well established in company failure studies, is the special case for 
which J=1. 
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If we model the binary response yj which independently equals I or 0 with probabilities 
; r, or 1-; r,, then the maximum likelihood estimate of the parameter vector gives 
estimates R, by substitution in (2.7). The k, is considered as predicting whether an 
observation with the covariate vector x, will be a failed firm or a non-failed firm, by 
using the realised prediction rule 0: 
ei=l ifki>CO, lei 
=0 if ki: g Co, 
for some cutoff point C0 . 
38 
(2.8) 
As a general proposition, the question of the appropriate density is unresolved. In 
discussing the question of choice of alternative distributions, Greene (1997) points out 
that one should expect different predictions from two models if the sample contains: (i) 
very few responses (y, equals to 1) or very few non-responses (y, equals to 0), and (ii) 
very wide variation in an important independent variable, particularly if (i) is also true. 
OhIson (1980; p. 118) notes that in the absence of a positive theory of bankruptcy, there 
is no easy solution to the problem of selecting an appropriate class of probability 
functions: 
As a practical matter, all one can do is to choose on the basis of computational and 
interpretative simplicity. 
In discussing the choice of statistical setting, Efron (1975) shows that if the normality 
of xIy does obtain then MDA is considerably more efficient than logit. Nevertheless, if 
normality does not obtain, then the normal MDA estimator is inconsistent whereas the 
logit estimator maintains its consistency under a wide class of alternative joint 
distributions of (y, x). Logit requires less restrictive statistical assumptions, and 
provides explicit probabilistic predictions facilitating interpretation of empirical results 
in decision-making. Unlike discriminant analysis, logit permits the statistical 
"' We use the definitions and notations that are given in Efron (1986). 
125 
CHAPTER 2 
significance of each of the variables in the model to be evaluated independently. 
Further, the non-linear shape of a logit function is appealing. Unlike a linear model that 
changes the dependent variable by the same increment in response to equal changes in 
an explanatory variable, a logit model has a greater impact per unit change in an 
explanatory variable in the mid range of the logistic distribution. Near the tails of the 
distribution, there is a smaller incremental effect. Hence, the underlying logistic 
distribution implies that an extremely "healthy" (distressed) firm must experience a 
larger proportionate downturn (upturn) to significantly deteriorate (improve) its 
condition. For these v irtues, r ecent r esearch, e xamining b ankruptcy, f avoured I ogistic 
regression. 
A notable contribution to the investigation of the problem of the suitable statistical 
model for the context of corporate failure has been made by Lo (1986). Lo presented a 
specification test for the conditional normality of the attributes x and hence a test for 
appropriateness of applying normal discriminant analysis under the maintained 
hypothesis of logistic conditional response probabilities. He concluded that, for his 
sample, the null hypothesis of MDA and logit being equivalent, may not be rejected. 
Thus his findings help explain the fact that both MDA and logit have been accepted in 
commercial applications of company failure prediction. A more detailed discussion of 
inference with binomial logit with respect to failure modelling using both cross- 
sectional and panel data is presented in chapters 3 and 4. 
2.4.1.3 Neural Networks Classifiers 
An alternative classifier of companies into failing and surviving, that had a relatively 
rapid diffusion in failure modelling in the 1990s is a model based on neural networks 
(see, e. g., Alici, 1995; Tyree and Long, 1995; Wilson, Chong and Peel, 1995; 
Morris, 1997). A neural network is a collection of simple interconnected computational 
units called neurons, which are organised in layers and can be constructed 
hierarchically. The connections between neurons have weights attached to them. A 
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neuron can receive inputs from the preceding layer or from the external environment. 
Each connection between neurons has a weight, which models the influence of an input 
neuron on an output neuron. The output is computed by a non-linear transformation of 
inputs, for which a logit squashing function can be used. The number and p attem of 
interconnections of neurons in a network determine the classification task the network is 
capable of performing. The neurons in the output layer each form linear combinations of 
their inputs and apply a nonlinear transformation before sending the output signal. The 
network learns connection weights during a training process in which training data sets 
consisting of inputs and associated outputs are presented to the network. In the context 
of classification model of company failure, attribute data on a particular firm activate 
the input neurons, and this activity feeds through the layers of neurons to the outputs 
which represent the group membership of this firm. The output is then compared with 
the appropriate target values. Any errors in classiflcation are then used to alter the 
interconnection weights. The training set is processed repeatedly until a measure of 
network performance based on prediction errors for the whole training set reaches an 
acceptable level. An important attraction of neural networks is that that they can cope 
with the mass of ratio variables and the problem of ratio selection is thus avoided. 
However, there is no strong evidence that neural networks outperform the classification 
capabilities of multinomial discriminant analysis or conditional probability models. 
2.4.2 Longitudinal Data Models 
One problem with cross-sectional studies based on MDA, logit or probit, is that these 
models presuppose a steady state for the failure process. Statistically it means that the 
distribution at any given point in time is only informative if the underlying process 
remains stable over time. That assumption is often violated. Secondly, logit and probit 
do not give any estimate of the time to failure. This means that, the dynamic nature of 
the failure process has simply been unused in failure prediction. Empirical settings 
discussed so far deal with cross-sectional samples and can be criticised for the lack of 
dynamic approach. However, our overview of the literature identifies one dynamic study 
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from the US, reported recently inH ill, Perry and Andes ( 1996) who c onduct e vent 
history analysis of longitudinal data on corporate bankruptcy. By introducing a time 
dimension, this methodology permits more complex modelling of the failure process. 
Event history analysis uses the information on inter-temporal variation of explanatory 
variables, allowing the use of time-varying covariates, and controls for censored cases 
or companies surviving the analysis period. Under the event history framework, each 
firm is assigned a "spell" for every year while the progression of spells represents the 
history over time. A spell is defined by the dependent variable called the transition rate - 
the unobserved rate at which failure occurs - and the associated time-varying 
independent variables, measuring the firm's characteristics 39. The effects of the 
explanatory covariates on the transition rate are modelled with a log-linear link function. 
Similar to logit (and to probit), the estimated parameters from the model identify 
significant characteristics related to changes in a firm's status. 
As a final point in reviewing statistical settings used in company failure modelling, we 
should mention survival data models. These methods take account of time to failure or 
duration, use the time series information of the explanatory covariates and - in the 
simplest case of a single exit route - provide probability estimates of the binomial 
response variable defining the failure outcome. Complex models of survival data have 
recently been used in studies investigating industrial dynamics, including problems of 
survival, market exit, growth, corporate insolvency, acquisition, and takeover (see, e. g., 
Luoma and Laitinen, 1991; Mata and Portugal, 1994; Helwege, 1996; H enebry, 
1996; Lee and Urrutia, 1996; Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1998; Harhoff, 
Stahl, and Woywode, 1998; Laitinen and Kankaanpaa, 1999). Techniques for 
survival data inolve estimating the parameters of the function that defines the hazard 
rate - the number of failures per time period given the number of companies at risk. An 
39 The probability that a firm will occupy a particular state at time t+l, given that the fmn does not occupy 
the state at time t, is given by: Pik ('1,12)=prob[Y('2)=k I Y(tl)=j], where j, k=0,1,2, the alternative 
states. 
The transition rate is given by: rjk(t)= limlpjk(t, t+Aj)1At]. At-+O 
The transition rate depends on the characteristics of firm i, xj: r(t) = exp(P'x I) 
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alternative interpretation of the information in the hazard function is the survival 
function - the length of time until failure occurs. Thus, one way of viewing the 
application of this methodology to modelling the determinants of company failure is to 
estimate the impact of factors that caused a large number of failures in a given period. 
Another aspect is that the estimates of the hazard function reveal which factors led to 
shorter or longer life spans among the various companies. The hazard rate is a measure 
of the probability of failure, but unlike logit or probit, the estimation procedure focuses 
on the conditional probability of failure - conditional on not having failed in an earlier 
time period. The use of survival analysis avoids some of the problems associated with 
the classical cross-sectional design in failure modelling. In contrast to studies 
developing a series of logit models for different time-horizons (see, e. g., Zavgren, 
1985; Keasey and McGuinness, 1990), the hazard function takes into account previous 
years' data in making use of the current data, and particularly makes use of the fact that 
the firm did not fail in the earlier years. Survival analysis does not assume failed and 
non-failed firms as belonging to the different non-overlapping populations, but, being 
based on the rationale that at some stage all firms are at risk, treats non-failed firms as 
censored observations. However, one difficulty, which arises in application of survival 
analysis for modelling failure of large quoted company, is that of finding an appropriate 
proxy for the date of company birth (Morris, 1997). Our review of the existing 
company failure studies has identified two papers - by Luoma and Laitinen (1991) and 
by Laitinen and Kankaanpaa (1999) - which apply the hazard model in failure 
prediction but both use data on Finnish industrial firms. 
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the empirical literature that studies company failure 
modelling, from primarily the UK and the US. Since this thesis looks at the 
determinants of failure risk at the firm level, we have focused on the particular 
components of empirical design employed for firm-level research. 
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We have seen that, ostensibly at least, that much of the literature has opted for 
prediction as opposed to explanation and description. The micro-level empirical work 
conducted in academia and by practitioners, has been aiming for a powerful predictive 
model for large, quoted companies, that may be useful as a forecasting tool or screening 
device operating with publicly available accounting data. This area of research has 
provided important methodological principles for developing commercial applications 
of predictive models of company failure. The concentration of effort, in both UK and 
US studies, on identifying the best predicting accounting ratios, reliably signalling 
default and insolvency in the short run for the population of firms analysed, has resulted 
in neglecting another avenue of company failure research - the problem of developing 
an adequate explanatory model to inform policy choices. 
Early studies from the UK and the US are practically undistinguishable in that a typical 
statistical setting for modelling the conventional dichotomy between failing and 
continuing firms had been the multivariate classification problem. When the research 
question comes down to classification, the focus of analysis is shifted from the 
examination of the detailed causes underlying the high-dimensional process of distress 
and failure to the isolation of a small number of observable indicators most symptomatic 
of and closely associated with the insolvency outcome. These indicators are then used as 
components of a composite index of company vulnerability. The index provides a 
warning signal of impending failure by classifying future observations on firms into 
failing and surviving, on the basis of the latest available records on predictor-variables. 
By providing the high abstraction of the analysis, classification model methodologies 
made it possible to proceed with developing successful diagnostic tools without calling 
for a more detailed knowledge of the actual phenomenon and interrelations between 
failure "drivers". This may seem extraordinary, given the implications of corporate 
failures for financial stability and economic growth, but can partly be explained by the 
absence of a unifying analytical framework facilitating the motivation for explanatory 
model specifications. 
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In the absence of a clear analytical structure, the power of a model is often set by the 
sophistication of empirical design and depends upon decisions made by the researcher 
on the design components. The UK and US literature discusses various aspects of 
retrospective observational design in a firm-level econometric analysis, namely, sample 
frames, the definition of failure, data needs and sampling plans, justifications for 
selecting particular right hand-side variables, statistical settings for the discrete 
outcome, and the means of checking the modelling results robustness. 
In much of the published work from the UK and the US, a large quoted industrial 
company represents a unit of study, probably because data on this type of companies is 
available in assessable databases. Under the reason of obtaining more homogeneous 
samples, sample frames tend to concentrate on manufacturing firms while sectors that 
are subject to regulatory differences in terms of accounting practices and the insolvency 
arrangements environment, are often excluded. 
Any econometric study of company failure requires decisions on how to define the 
phenomenon of interest and how to proxy the associated dependent variable. Many of 
UK and US applied studies have employed purely legalistic definitions, equating failure 
of a financially distressed company with involuntary insolvency (bankruptcy for the US 
context). The primary dependent variable here as a limited dependent or discrete 
variable indicating whether there has been in the firm's history an event of failure 
associated with financial distress such as defaults on public debt, defaults on bank loans, 
and involuntary insolvency. Empirically, failure has almost always been gauged with a 
binomial (binary) indicator, reflecting the dichotomy between failing and continuing 
firms. Attempts to introduce finer distinctions within each of the "failing" categories 
have been made in a rather informal way since the naturalness of ordering of a multi- 
stage process of failure was entirely ignored by the employed statistical settings for 
nominal r esponses. V arious i ndicators w ere u sed tod efine t he i ritermediate s tages of 
distress at the pre-bankruptcy phase including technical and proper debt defaults, an 
omission of dividends, and negative operating profits. Designs based on a 
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polychotomous response presented scholars with purely practical difficulties in collating 
a representative sample of sufficient size, since it is not straightforward to locate 
companies in various, distinct, non-overlapping stages of financial distress. 
The specific feature of empirical design in company failure research, characteristic both 
of UK work and of US work, is the use of a state-based sample, which contains the case 
and control groups. In the two-category case, a state-base sample includes observations 
on failing firms, always selected non-randomly, since observations on failed companies 
can be available only on a limited basis, and observations on the control group of non- 
failed firms, which can be - and in some studies have been - drawn at random. We 
would like to point out that reliance on equal-share samples unrepresentative of the 
population proportions of the studied firms has been a shortcoming of cross-sectional 
design, which led to the problem of reduced sample sizes and therefore undermined 
inference. Another problematic treatment is the use of pair-matched sampling plans, 
involving matching of observations on firms from the two categories by some 
confounding factor, e. g. by industry sector or firm size. Such matching neglects the 
possibility that the "confounders" may be important for explaining failure. Pair-matched 
sampling plans results in smaller sample sizes and increase the sensitivity of inference 
to data points used in model development. The advantages of non-matching on industry 
and size, in terms of improvements in inference generalizability, have been appreciated 
by more recent empirical studies from the US, that are based on larger unbalanced 
samples resembling the true population proportions with the prevailing share of the 
46 survivors" at the end of the analysis period. Paucity of failed cases is the major reason 
for the widespread use of pooled, multi-time-period, cross-sectional samples. 
Considering the consequences of pooled-sample design for the reliability of inference, 
current research recommends to proceed with circumspection in the use of inter- 
temporally unstable accounting variables when modelling over pooled samples. 
Normality and stationarity improving transformations of data are recommended by both 
the UK and the US studies, as a means of improving stability of model structures. 
Another particular feature of sample design is the use of repeated cross-sections that is 
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almost always motivated by the aim to incorporate a time dimension in developing 
cross-sectional models of failure. Repeated cross-sectional design is thought of as being 
helpful for isolating the changes in the importance of individual, time-horizon-specific 
determinants. The use of pooled repeated cross-sections seems especially advantageous 
for developing explanatory models of failure, but may provide an inappropriate structure 
of relating predictors to the response, since inconsistent signals generated by time- 
specific models impair the models' usefulness for a decision-maker. The literature also 
points to the importance of matching the observations in the case and control groups by 
the years of economic and accounting variable records. Recent studies from the US 
argue that matching by timing of microeconomic information is important for 
controlling the changes in the firm attributes caused by the business cycle and 
environmental shocks. 
Techniques used for evaluating predictive power of models have impact on sampling 
plans and samples sizes. It appears that a common approach is to set aside a part of the 
available data and then evaluate the stability of an estimated model over these "new" 
holdout data points. In other words, the available data set is usually divided into 
estimation and holdout samples. Resultant small estimation sample sizes - often in the 
order of less than two hundred observations - have posed a serious problem for 
statistical modelling of company failure. One alternative to holdout tests, which allows 
to adopt a sampling plan preserving all available data points for estimation, and to 
which prior research from the UK and the US, has often turned to is jackknife validation 
methods. Jackknife procedures provide additional support to statistical inference 
obtained with small estimation samples. Given the limited number of observed failure 
cases, bootstrapping approaches and other numerical simulation methods would appear 
to be a suitable means for tackling the problem of small estimation samples size. 
However, results from applying appropriate - and economical in the use of data - 
techniques of statistical sampling for generating statistically valid pictures of the 
company failure process so far have not been reported in the UK and US academic 
literature. 
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Empirical design for analyzing company failure involves the selection of potential 
explanatory variables or predictors. This is a difficult task related to a more general 
problem of model uncertainty. Often researchers restrict the rationale for their choice by 
conclusions as to predictive success of particular measures, reported in past studies. 
However, the strategy of using pre-specified in this way indicators of failure may not be 
always appropriate for empirical work because studies based on data from differing 
countries, company populations and time periods, produce results that are sample 
sensitive and incomparable at this level of detail. The extant literature has explored the 
potential predictive power of a huge variety of candidate measures representing putative 
factors including combinations of firm-specific attributes and contextual variables. The 
empirics of company failure - consistent with theoretical predictions - seems to agree 
that the likelihood of financial distress and subsequent insolvency (or bankruptcy) is 
broadly associated with indebtedness, size, profitability, liquidity and financial 
efficiency. In UK and US studies, accounting-based measures in the form of financial 
statement ratios have been used as convenient proxies for these economic concepts. 
However, as one would expect, research evidence on the appropriateness of particular 
ratio constructs has been conflicting and no "unique", "correct", or "best predicting" set 
of a ccounting-based m easures h as b een i solated. F or e xplanatory m odel d evelopment 
that implies that a statistical reduction of a wide comprehensive set of ratios 
representative of the main dimensions of company performance and position seems an 
appropriate modelling strategy. In is conventional to argue that to counteract the effects 
of non-normality of financial ratios and to accelerate the estimation of models it is 
necessary to apply appropriate transformations of ratio values. 
Another interesting feature of the extant literature from the UK and the US is that past 
time-series studies of quoted companies attach particular predictive power to the levels 
and volatility of market value of equity, consistent with analytical models of debt 
default due to Merton (1974). Market valuation and failure risk are highly correlated. 
Furthermore, for a publicly traded company, the concept of financial failure can be 
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thought of in terms of rapidly declining value of its equity. It follows that the erosion in 
market value can itself serve as a measure of failure. If it is thought to be important to 
reveal the underlying deep-rooted causes, a model specification approximating different 
aspects of explanatory factors by the direct path from changes in the market value to the 
risk of failure may not be very helpful. Therefore, in modelling the determinants of 
corporate collapse, market valuation variables need be combined with other company 
performance attributes and indicators of e xogenous macroeconomic shocks. Amongst 
macroeconomic indicators, the business cycle, interest and exchange rates, and inflation 
were shown as robustly related to the probability of financial failure. The value of 
having macroeconomic indicators amongst the predictor variables is also demonstrated 
by the commercial success of proprietary models of credit risk. 
If financial failure is a result of management incompetence and mistakes, then the 
adequate set of explanatory variables should allow the measurement of this impact on 
company survival. Few studies from the UK attempt to augment accounting ratio-based 
models with management-related variables, utilizing accounts submission lags, number 
of directors and other non-financial measures. Inference regarding the incremental 
explanatory value of such non-financial indicators has been rather inconclusive and this 
aspect of company failure merits further investigation with questionnaire survey data. 
While studies from the industrial economics literature have documented the important 
role for survival of firm age, in line with theoretical models of learning, it appears that 
age has not been directly tested as an explanatory variable in traditional specifications 
used for firm-level models. 
In respect of statistical techniques for developing cross-sectional models intended for 
predicting failure or screening financial health of companies, multivariate discriminant 
analysis and binomial logit have been by far the most popular both in academic studies 
and in c ornmercial a pplications. C lassifiers b ased onn eural n etworks h ave a Iso b een 
used for formalizing the problem of classification. Although being based on different 
statistical assumptions, the three techniques appear to demonstrate comparable levels of 
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predictive accuracy at short-term horizons - one- or two- years ahead - with no material 
gains registered for neural networks classifiers. Our reading of the literature suggests 
that conditional probability models such as logit are adequate as a statistical setting for 
the explanatory type of models. From a purely statistical point of view, logit analysis has 
important advantages in that it averts the restrictive assumptions of multivariate 
discriminant analysis and, unlike neural networks classifiers, permits a sounder 
theoretical basis for a rigorous evaluation of the magnitude and significance of the 
effects of explanatory variables. 
In macro-level analyses of both time-series and longitudinal data, attention has been 
given to a formal representation of a time dimension in a model of failure. A more 
comprehensive assessment of factors underlying company propensity to fail calls for 
more complex modelling approaches able to simultaneously utilise cross-sectional and 
time series components of information that firm-specific explanatory covariates contain. 
As of the time of submitting the present thesis, in May 2000, our search of the literature 
has identified just one study of US company failure, which explores advantages of 
cross-sectional time series data in explaining failure (see Hill, Perry and Andes, 1996). 
However, it appears that no longitudinal studies of UK companies have been conducted 
so far. 
A group of studies concerned with developing prediction tools emphasizes the crucial 
role of adequate approaches for evaluating model predictive performance. The 
stereotype solutions suggested in the literature include tests over ex ante holdout 
samples, follow-up studies, and approximations based on jackknife resampling. Recent 
computationally intensive methods available for evaluating parameter estimates have 
not been popular. The Monte Carlo statistical philosophy and its particular elegant 
variant - the b ootstrap -s eern tobe able to provide a wide scope for making robust 
inference about model parameters and to uncover the real factors and their complicated 
interrelations affecting company failure risk. 
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The current empirical literature from the UK and the US, on predictive and explanatory 
models of failure offers an impressive array of general methodology advice but few 
stylized facts. In the following three chapters we endeavour to build on the existing 
research and provide an investigation of company failure determinants with new 
primary, cross-section and panel data for the UK and Russia. Our search of the literature 
identifies the lack of studies conducted with UK data pertaining to the period from the 
late 1980s to early 1990s, which contains the lowest point in the recent UK economic 
cycle. In a cross-sectional analysis, the objective will be to examine the causes of 
company failure by constructing more complete models of binomial response that are 
based on accounting ratios, control for firm's age, and condition failure risk on changes 
in the macroeconomic climate. We intend to extend this analysis of failure causes by 
utilising a panel data-set that introduces the time series component of covariate 
information, enabling us to formally allow for unobserved heterogeneity across firms, 
which is of great importance for generating more reliable and robust inference on 
estimates of model parameters. The panel analysis offers a holistic way of evaluating the 
interrelationships between the probable causes and failure outcome. 
We also intend to provide a contribution to the literature by conducting an examination 
of Russian company insolvency over a transitional period of the 1990s with accounting 
ratio-based explanatory variables. We motivate our study of Russia by the findings 
reported in the UK and US literature that broad measures of indebtedness, profitability, 
liquidity and efficiency determine corporate financial distress. That in turns implies that 
to the extent accounting ratios from Russian company accounts capture changes along 
these dimensions, one should be able to develop a conventional cross-sectional model, 
adding to our understanding of failure determinants. We take account of the problems 
associated with empirical design in past studies on company bankruptcy outcome, and, 
given the limited availability of data on Russian firms leading to the issue of small 
sample inference, support our conclusions by the bootstrap. As an additional means of 
verification of our findings on Russia we then contrast the Russian results with those 
137 
CHAPTER 2 
obtained from a UK study of similar size within an inter-country comparative 
frainework. 
138 
CHAPTER 3 
CHAPTER 3: A LOGIT ANALYSIS OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA 
FOR UK INDUSTRIAL COMPANY FAILURE IN 1989- 
93 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter offers empirical evidence based on cross-section data and the binomial 
logit estimator, relating to the determinants of UK industrial company failure in the 
form of insolvency, for the late 1980s and early 1990s. The conventional cross- 
sectional approach in this retrospective observational study identifies the key 
financial characteristics that reflect deterioration in company performance over 
several years prior to the event. Here the empirical design draws upon 
methodological principles developed in previous research yet an attempt is made to 
refine cross-section models, firstly, through introducing a control for company 
duration and, secondly, by accounting for changes in the macroeconomic climate that 
modify the corporate sector vulnerability. The risk of failure through insolvency can 
be decomposed into three components: financial risk associated with highly geared 
capital structure, business risk, inherent in the firm's operations, and aggregate 
economy risk. At the firm level, conventional quantitative analysis of failure risk 
involves a detailed examination of a firm's balance sheet, profit and loss account and 
cash flow statement, assuming that information on financial and business risks is 
reflected in financial accounts. However, an analysis of historical financial 
statements alone may present an incomplete picture of the relations underlying the 
failure process. Aggregate economy risk, arising from macroeconomic uncertainty, 
affects the volatility of cash flows and thus clearly conditions the risk of corporate 
failure. Given that the risk of default varies with changes in the economic 
environment and may be dramatically magnified in highly geared companies, it 
appears important to incorporate into a modelling framework the effects of 
macroeconomic factors so as to achieve a better approximation of complex 
interrelations underlying the failure process. Most defaults and bankruptcies occur 
during or immediately after recessions, so we focus our analysis on the recession 
period 1990-92, during which a considerable number of UK companies became 
insolvent (see Table Al. 1 in appendix 1). Covering this period, company-level data 
analysed here are taken from a reliable data-source, DATASTREAM. 
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Failure determinants are revealed by estimating and then assessing the predictive 
performance of four separate sets of binomial logit models. The prediction functions 
of the first group are based on the input variables that are purely financial. The 
second group yields both financial predictors and two macroeconomic variables, 
measuring unanticipated changes in the real exchange rate and nominal interest rate. 
Then in developing the third group of models we incorporate a proxy for time 
duration (or age) of the firm, and, lastly, the models of the fourth group make use of 
financial ratios, the two macroeconomic variables and the duration variable. 
A single set of models is a series of individual logit functions estimated with data 
specific to four risk-horizons, ranging from one to four years prior to failure. The 
obtained models yield the determinants explaining the propensity of a quoted 
industrial company to fail over the specified time horizons. Although in terms of 
individual ratio significance and overall predictive accuracy, the findings of this 
cross-sectional study are not directly comparable with the evidence from previous 
research due to differing data sets and model specifications, the results are intuitively 
appealing. We find a strong association between gearing, liquidity, profitability, and 
the probability of failure. The relevance of unexpected changes in exchange rates and 
interest rates to company failure in the early 1990s is evidenced by an improvement 
in predictive performance of models in holdout tests, when predictions are 
conditioned on changes in these two macroeconomic variables. The significance of 
coefficients for the duration term, judged in isolation, implies the importance of the 
age factor. We also find that when the duration term enters models based on financial 
and macroeconomic variables, the resulting specifications for risk horizons of one, 
two, and three years before failure demonstrate no improvement in out-of-sample 
predictive performance as compared with simpler models with no duration term. 
Conversely, when the forecasting performance of the model for the three-year 
horizon, which includes the two macroeconomic variables and firm age, is 
considered, it appears that the duration term contributes to correct predictions. 
Overall the addition of the duration term to models based on a wide set of financial 
ratios, has little impact on failure predictability, implying that a separate control for 
this factor is of limited importance for our data. 
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3.2 Empirical Design 
We follow a cross-section approach employed in studies by Zavgren (1985) and 
Keasey and McGuinness (1990) and estimate logit models specific to each of the 
four years before failure. Sets of n-period prediction models depict the failure 
process, described by significant predictors, and, in comparison with one-period 
prediction functions, permit a temporal aspect to appear in the explanation of 
company failure. Yet the approach has been criticised in the literature because 
predictive models based on such data structures may give contradictory results 
regarding the failure probabilities and this inconsistency impedes the practical value 
of such sets of models (see, e. g., Altman, 1970). Another shortcoming of previous 
cross-sectional research is that it often disregards changes in the macroeconomic 
environment when developing a series of time-horizon-specific functions (Goudie, 
1987). In an attempt to address the latter problem, this study explores macro-to- 
micro linkages by incorporating into models unanticipated changes in the nominal 
interest rate and real exchange rate. In the analysis of cross-sectional data we also 
control for corporate age, the factor being suggested as important in explaining 
company failure (e. g., Hudson, 1987; Altman, 1993; Dunne and Hughes, 1994). 
The unit of our retrospective observational study is a British large quoted industrial 
company. The sample design is driven by the objective of a cross-sectional study 
that aims at developing a series of models specific to each of the four years prior to 
failure. Therefore we create and estimation and holdout cross-sections repeated for 
four years prior to failure. The choice of the DATASTREAM database as a source of 
accounting data made it possible to compile an estimation cross-section of 421 
company-years based on 53 failed c ompanies a nd 3 16 n on-failed c ompanies. T his 
estimation sample is larger in size in comparison to data sets analysed in UK 
academic studies of large industrial firms (e. g., just 86 companies were used for 
estimation in Keasey and McGuinness (1990), whereas the models in Wilson, 
Chong, and Peel ( 1995) were derived with data on 112 quoted companies). We 
include in the sample industrial companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange, 
failing in the period 1989-93 and satisfying the constraint that for every observational 
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unit, the company accounts data were available for all four years preceding failure. 
At the same time, in constructing the estimation data set, we take account of the issue 
of disproportionate sampling (Palepu, 1986; Maddala, 1992; Greene, 1997). 
Specifically, to get as close as it was feasible with the continuous data, available on 
observational units, to the true population proportions, we designed for model 
estimation an unbalanced cross-sectional sample. In the sample, the failed group 
represents 12.6 per cent of the total observations and non-failed company-years were 
drawn at random. We note that in the constructed cross-section, the resultant 
proportion of failed firms is similar to a 9.1 per cent estimate of the prior probability 
of insolvency suggested by a stockbroker firm for one of Taffler's studies of quoted 
UK companies (see Taffler, 1982). 
We utilise the sturdy statistical methodology of binomial logit model to avoid 
problems associated with multivariate discriminant analysis. 40 Aside from providing 
probabilistic predictions, binomial logit permits one to test both the overall statistical 
significance of the model and the significance of individual predictors, which is 
crucial for isolating company failure determinants. To achieve more realistic 
evaluation of models' predictive power we perform ex-ante holdout tests as well as 
approximate analytically the downward bias in the apparent error rate by using the 
formulation due to Efron (1986). 
3.2.1 The Sample 
We take a large quoted industrial company as the unit of analysis. In binomial logit, 
the model posits that a company is in one of two observed states: in state 1 if it is 
failing and in state 2 otherwise; correspondingly, sample observations represent two 
groups - the failed firins and non-failed firms. The construction of estimation and 
validation samples requires: (i) a definition of failure and (ii) a specification of the 
population from which companies are drawn. In the present study, we have adopted 
the traditional failed/non-failed dichotomy based on a purely legalistic criterion. 41 
40 We discuss the assumptions of MDA and the issue of choice of the statistical methodology in chapter 2. 
41 Past studies from the UK and the US, which used the state of bankruptcy to measure the event of distress 
include, e. g., OhIson (1980), Taffler (1982), Keasey and McGuinness (1990), Richardson, Kane and Lobingier 
(1998). 
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We equate company failure with the event of entering a formal (involuntary) 
insolvency regime, such as administrative receivership, administration, and winding- 
up (liquidation). The population boundaries are set by the following criteria towards 
the sampling unit: (i) the period 1989-93, which is defined here in terms of the 
calendar year of the formal announcement of insolvency of a sample company; (ii) 
the equity of the company has to be listed; (iii) the company must be classified as an 
industrial on the DATASTREAM database; (iv) the company must have four years 
of financial data prior to bankruptcy, retrievable from the DATASTREAM database. 
The first criterion reflects the problem with the definition of recession as, for 
instance, the boundaries of 1990-92 designated in Yhe Economic Briefing, published 
by the HM Treasury, simply correspond to the period of falling output (The UK 
Recession 1990-92, The Economic Briefing 6 (February 1994)). Therefore, in order 
to play it "safe" and to account for a certain degree of judgement involved in 
deciding what constitutes a recession, we have included 1989, the year preceding the 
low point of the business cycle. The endpoint of 1993 is chosen because of a long (up 
to twenty months) lead-time between the fiscal year end in the last relevant records 
and the date of the formal announcement of insolvency for our sample firms. The 
second criterion excludes small or privately held companies thus allowing us to use 
the "live" list of firms, covered by DATASTREAM at the time of this analysis, as a 
source for constructing a sub-set of non-failed (solvent) firms. The third requirement 
removes from the sample financial services companies, transportation, and petroleum 
companies. Companies in these industries are structurally different and have different 
taxation regimes, accounting conventions, and insolvency environment. The sectoral 
composition of UK company cross-sections for the reporting years 1988-94 can be 
seen in Table 3.1. The fourth criterion, followed from the principle of temporal 
precedence, is necessary for constructing repeated pooled cross-sections. 
It is important to notice that due to a usually small number of insolvency cases in any 
single year, the observations forming a pooled cross-section are drawn from a 
number of consecutive calendar years, a design common in most failure studies. We 
started by constructing a single cross-section of failed firms with data corresponding 
to the years when the last sets of accounts were published. Then we extended this 
cross-section by including company-years of the non-failed group. In compiling 
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company-years for the non-failed group, we randomly pick data points from the 
reporting years identified by the last public records on the failed group. Finally, we 
collected records for the companies in the resultant pooled cross-section for each of 
the four years prior to the respective insolvency times of the failed firms. The 
sampling procedure yields a temporal sequence of pooled cross-sections, which 
enable us to estimate n-period models. One advantage of pooled cross-section data is 
that it permits a relatively large sample. Further, a temporal dimension is of great 
importance for isolating the influence of macroeconomic factors on failure risk. 
Annualised values of major financial items were collected for a four-year period 
prior to insolvency so as to allow for temporal precedence in revealing the 
determinants of failure occurring in one, two, three and four years. Thus, the sample 
companies are subject to availability of at least four consecutive years of complete 
accounting records. On the other hand, a pooled cross-section design may lead to the 
problem of temporal distortion whenever time-series data are analysed as cross- 
sections. We shall describe a way of standardizing the data to reduce the impact of 
non-stationarity in section 3.2.2.3. 
Names of quoted failed companies and their insolvency dates have been taken from 
the London Stock Exchange Official YearBooks for years 1988-97. The list of non- 
failed company names has come from the DATASTREAM files of UK equities. 
First, we complied a list of 53 quoted industrial companies entering insolvency in 
1989-93, all those companies have satisfied a requirement of having four consecutive 
years of complete accounting records available on the DATASTREAM database in 
1997.42 Insolvent company names and years of insolvency can be seen in Table A5.1 
in appendix 5. These companies had terminated financial reporting twelve to twenty 
months before the insolvent state was announced via a suspension/cancellation of the 
listing of shares or appointment of the official receiver. 43 When analysing company 
accounts data, it is important to ascertain the timing of company failure. Companies 
42 The initial list of companies, entering the state of insolvency in 1989-93, consisted of more than one hundred 
companies quoted at the London Stock Exchange, but only 53 firms satisfied the sample inclusion criteria. 43 Most insolvent UK companies end up in liquidation, but there is a slight possibility, that insolvent companies 
selected for the present study might have resumed financial reporting if they were successful in tuming-around 
their businesses. However, because the DATASTREAM database, considering such companies as "dead stocks", 
listed them no longer, we were not able to trace their fortunes after they had entered the insolvency state. 
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put into insolvency terminate financial reporting. Given a considerable lag between 
the issuance of the last accounts and the formal announcements, it seems appropriate 
to proxy the first year prior to failure by the calendar year of the last accounts. As a 
consequence, the time frame of the estimation samples spans four calendar years, 
namely, 1988-91. Accounting data for estimation sample firms were collected for 
this period. Out of 53 failed firms, 6 companies published their last accounts in 1988, 
18 in 1989,17 firms in 1990, and 12 in 1991. Consequently, the sub-set of failed 
firms in the estimation sample for one year prior to failure consists of 6 firms with 
accounts for 1988,18 firms with accounts for 1989,17 firms with accounts for 1990, 
and 12 firms with accounts for 1991. The sampling scheme for the failed group is 
state-based, because by including all companies that met criteria of data 
completeness and consistency, we aim at enriching informationally the estimation 
sample. As in the population, the number of insolvent companies is smaller than the 
number of solvent firms, a random selection scheme would have led to very few 
failed firms in the estimation sample and inefficient estimates. 44 Second, we 
constructed a random sub-sample of non-failed (control) firms to be used in 
estimation. A list of non-failed firms was generated using the following steps. A 
primary list of non-failed firms was tabulated from the DATASTREAM list of UK " 
live" quoted industrialS45 that consisted of 1,330 equities as of 13 February 1997. We 
took account of the methodological problem of state-based sampling for model 
estimation, which leads to biased and incorrect inferences in logit (see, e. g., Palepu, 
1986) and used all available, continuing in independent existence, non-failed 
companies with complete and consistent DATASTREAM records over the period 
1985-95. We did not match failed and non-failed companies on industry sector or 
size, but we viewed matching on timings of r ecords asi mportant a nd a ccordingly 
drew accounting data for non-failed cases from the period 1988-91. The end points 
of this interval were arrived at in the process of collating the failed company set. 
44 Manski and McFadden (198 1) show that an appropriate state-based sample provides more efficient estimates 
compared to a random sample of the same size. 45 The DATASTREAM code for this list of equities was "UKQI". 
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CHAPTER 3 
Thus, in the estimation cross-section for one year before failure, the non-failed group 
contains company-years (data points) pooled across 1988,1989,1990, and 1991. 
The four sets of company-years pertinent to each of the four-year period needed to 
be constructed to allow random selection of non-failed cases. To that end, we reduce 
the list of non-failed firms by excluding from the DATASTREAM list of UK "live" 
quoted i ndustrials: ( i) t hose f irms t hat h ad noa ccounts prior to 1995 and (ii) the 
firms with incomplete records over a seven year period prior to 1992. We have also 
checked information about the companies on the resulting list against various 
editions of the London Stock Exchange Official YearBook to ensure they had been 
"free" of involuntary insolvency up to 1995. Table 3.2 displays the number of 
company-years in four sets from which we draw at random data point for non-failed 
firms. 
Table 3.2 Number of Company-years in Sets of Non-Failed Firms Used for 
Random Selection of Non-Failed-Group Observations in the 
Estimation Cross-sections 
Year of the Last Set of Accounts 
1988 1989 1990 1991 
Non-failed Group: 
675 736 815 898 Number of Company-years 
The final sub-set of non-failed observations in the pooled estimation cross-section is 
made up of 368 company-years randomly drawn, without replacement, from the four 
sets. These 368 company-years are based on the records of 316 non-failed companies 
(their names can be seen in Table A5.3 of appendix 5). The temporal composition of 
company-years for the non-failed group, which are used in the cross-sectional 
estimation sample for year one prior to failure, is as follows. Of 368 non-failed 
cases, 98 company-years have accounts for 1988; 88c ompany-years for 1989; 88 
company-years for 1990; and 94 company-years have accounts for 1991. The non- 
failed company-years in the estimation cross-sectional samples for years two, three, 
and four before failure simply represent repeated observations for earlier years. 
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The sampling approach yields an unbalanced sample with a 12.6 per cent sampling 
frequency for failed companies in each of the four years before failure. It is 
impossible to access how accurately the sample mix approximates the proportions of 
failed and non-failed firms in the underlying population of large quoted industrials, 
as the necessary data have been hard to acquire. 47 However, under limited access to 
data sources, we attempt to attain a sample structure, which alleviates well-known 
methodological problems (Palepu, 1986; Maddala, 1992; Greene, 1997) arising 
from the use of state-based cross-sections in logit. 
Lastly, we constructed year-prior-to-failure-specific holdout samples that contain 
data on firms entering insolvency in 1992-95. Notice that in terms of timing of last 
published financial statements, the holdout observations span the period 1992-94. 
The pooled holdout was constructed using criteria and procedures similar to those 
employed in the estimation sample design. Of 10 failed firms, used in the holdout, 4 
firms reported their last accounts in 1992; 5 firms in 1993; and 1 in 1994. The 
corresponding observations on non-failed firms are distributed over the period 1992- 
94. Of the 86 holdout non-failed observations, 58 company-years were selected from 
1992; 14 company-years from 1993; and further 14 company-years from 1994. 
Names and respective years of insolvency for the holdout companies can be seen in 
Tables A5.2 and A5.4 in appendix 5. The holdout sample is also unbalanced, 
containing a 10.4 per cent share of failed firms and being representative of the 
quoted company population proportions for failed and non-failed categories. 
With regard to robustness of prediction model and validation of results, prior 
research recommends the use of post-estimation-sample holdouts, taken from a 
period distinctly different from the interval chosen for the estimation sample. 
Clearly, the holdout sample for 1992-94 is not distinctly different from our 
47 To our knowledge, comprehensive time series on the number of UK quoted companies suffering financial 
distress or being placed into formal insolvency regimes have not been reported systematically, and only rough 
and even arbitrary estimates have been used in previous research. Estimates of population proportions for failed 
and continuing firms vary. Letza (1994) refers to Dun & Bradstreet's estimate of the long run average failure rate 
of companies in England and Wales at 0.85 per cent. Taffler (1982) drew on subjective estimates of the 
investment analysts and used an odds ratio (based on the prior probabilities for a failed and non-failed firm) of 
1: 10. Focusing on the period of 1968-73, his study of UK company failure was concerned with industrial 
enterprises quoted on the London Stock Exchange, and failure was defined as formal insolvency. Dunne and 
Hughes (1994) exan-dne death rates over the period of 1980-85 in the sample of 2,149 UK firms that includes all 
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estimation sample, especially noting the fact that 62 firms came from 1992 because 
of data incompleteness. As a consequence, validation on such holdout data probably 
overstates predictive power of built models. This shortcoming arises from the 
insolvent company data "constraint" as the incidence of liquidation and receivership 
is counter-cyclical. At the time of constructing the data set for this study, in 1997-98, 
we included in our primary list all records on large quoted company failures in 1992- 
95, available from London Stock E xchange 0 fficial Y earBooks. H owever, wet ry 
and take account of data with these characteristics and address the problem of 
holdout reliability by supplementing validation of logit model with Efron's 
formulation (Efron, 1986) for approximating the bias in the apparent error rate. 
We should emphasise the limitations of our sample representative of the population 
of companies covered by the London Stock Exchange Official Yearbooks and 
monitored by DATASTREAM. First, the sample frame for a cross-sectional 
examination of this chapter, is predetermined by the population of large long- 
established companies, operating internationally. This represents a relatively small 
slice, towards the larger end of the scale, of the total population of incorporated 
businesses. In 1998, there were about 1.14 million UK companies registered at 
Companies House, but only 2,450 or so companies have their shares publicly traded 
on the London Stock Exchange (DTI: Modern Compýmy Law for a Competitive 
Economy (1998)). An immediate consequence of our choice of data source is limited 
generalisability of empirical results. Inference presented in the present chapter as 
well as in chapters 4 and 5 cannot be extended to the populations of private 
companies and small and medium-sized enterprises. Second, DATASTREAM 
retains and provides historical records on the firms that failed ("dead" firms) only 
the for a limited period of time after their failure, which caused difficulties in 
collecting time series data on most failed cases. Unavailability of longer time-series 
in turn restricted the number of repeated pooled cross-sections to just four. As a 
result the evolution of company failure is analysed in terms of four risk-horizons, 
namely, for one, two, three, and four years prior to the outcome. In future work, a 
more comprehensive examination, which can be based on a longitudinal survey data, 
quoted and large unquoted companies, and find that, on average, liquidations or receiverships accounted for 3.7 
per cent of sample firms. 
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should allow an examination of changes in financial attributes of firms and the 
macroeconomic environment on failure risk over longer risk-horizons. Third, 
accounting-based, firm-specific attributes stored on the DATASTREAM database do 
not cover other, likely to underlie the financial causes, dimensions such as corporate 
governance and managerial independence, practices and capabilities, important for 
understanding of the failure process of publicly traded large company. 
3.2.2 Independent Variables and Data Transformation 
As discussed in chapter 2, the existing empirical literature on financial failure at the 
firm level, which analyses cross-sections of companies, explains the risk of default 
by factors relevant to business prospects of a firm, its financing arrangements, and 
macroeconomic conditions. The most obvious source of publicly available 
information a bout t he b usiness' p erformance a nd financing is its financial reports 
that are traditionally used by credit analysts to judge whether or not the firm is a poor 
credit risk given the possible developments in the economy. For a quoted company, 
market prices for equity and debt, present an alternative source of information for 
modelling failure as the behaviour of market prices reflects the company's 
prospects. 48 
In the present chapter, we base models of failure on information, contained in 
financial a ccounts. Ind oing sowe follow the well-known UK studies by Taffler 
(1982,1995), Keasey and McGiunness (1990), and Wilson, Chong, and Peel 
(1995). We also try and explore the role of other factors, such as company age and 
macroeconomic conditions. For these variables, measures, based on financial 
statements and market valuation, might be rather unconvincing proxies. Here we 
augment standard, accounting ratio-based statistical models by adding to model 
inputs, measures of firm's age and unanticipated changes in the macroeconomic 
climate, which the literature links to corporate financial distress. The 
macroeconomic aspect is represented by two policy variables - the real exchange rate 
and the nominal interest rate. We now turn to a more detailed description of the three 
48 In general, the predictive ability of models utilising these two groups of explanatory variables is comparable. 
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categories of the explanatory variables used here for cross-sectional modelling of 
UK company failure: financial variables, firm's age, and macroeconomic variables. 
3.2.2.1 Accounting Ratios 
Information from annual audited and published accounts is seen in the literature as a 
critical input to empirical models of company failure. Ideally, financial statements 
reflect the company's performance, especially profitability, and changes in its 
financial position (Rees, 1995). The financial position is affected by the economic 
resources the company controls, by its financial structure, liquidity and solvency, and 
capacity to adapt to changes in the market environment, in which it operates. The 
significance of accounts' numbers comes from their comparison with other firms' 
performance. However, it is also important to notice that ratios based on accounts' 
items reflect the past and suffer from the limitations of accounting statement 
numbers. 49 
In reviewing the annual accounts to assess the overall "health" of a firm there are 
certain key things to measure. It is fairly conventional to group ratios in accordance 
with the major dimensions of the firm's performance, such as profitability, turnover, 
gearing (capital structure, or financial risk), and liquidity. One problem that arises 
from the use of ratios as model inputs, relates to the choice of ratio constructs. It 
should be emphasised that many different ratios are in common usage in the 
financial analysis literature and that for each ratio there may be more than one 
acceptable specification. Consequently, no dominant or unique ratio set with respect 
to corporate performance exists in the literature on failure modelling. Empirical 
results from a study by Hamer (1983) of comparative power of failure prediction 
49 Rees (1995) points out that the accounting reporting system might periodically experience failure. For 
instance, that happens when a substantial firm fails even though its latest accounts show an apparently healthy 
situation. He refers to examples of UK firms, namely, BCCI, British and Commonwealth, Coloroll, Maxwell 
Communications, Mirror Group Newspapers as the cases where accounting information gave no indication of 
impeding problems. In a way, this example of inability of accounts' ratios to indicate failure might not be that 
surprising given the fact that, when calculated at book values, ratios from accounts are likely to be backward 
looking. It is interesting to note here that Coloroll and Maxwell Communications are amongst the estimation 
sample companies we use in the cross-sectional analysis of the present chapter. The relatively simple financial 
ratio-based models of section 3.3.1 accurately predicted failure for Maxwell Communications, one and two years 
ahead, but were unsuccessful in forecasting the failure outcome for Coloroll. 
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models, 50 show that there is no significant difference in the reported classification 
error rates, which can be attributed to differences in the variable sets as long as the 
sets of ratios are comprehensive and represent the major dimensions used in 
financial analysis of company performance. Hence, in the present thesis, when 
modelling the determinants of failure of UK industrial firms, we employ the standard 
items of accounting and capital market information contained in the 
DATASTREAM database. Specifically, we use accounting ratios and capital 
market-based ratios as defined in "Company Accounts Definitions Manual, Issue 5" 
(1994) and "DATASTREAM Definitions Manual, Issue 2" (1995). For each firm in 
our sample we have initially collected data on 31 accounting ratios, readily available 
for UK industrials, which are grouped into six DATASTREAM categories of rates 
of return, profit margins, turnover ratios, gearing, liquidity, and tax position. To 
capture the influence of firm's size, solvency, and dividend policy, we then added to 
this set total net sales, the net tangible assets index, and the dividend payout ratio. In 
addition to these standard measures of the firm's profile, variants of the two ratios 
due to Altman (1968) were generated using company accounts' items provided by 
DATASTREAM: a ratio, measuring cumulative profitability, and a liquidity ratio of 
the net current assets to the total assets employed. 51 As discussed in chapter 2, the 
empirical literature suggests that a set of input variables for a debt default prediction 
model shall combine information from financial statement with market valuation 
information. For instance, independent variables based on market values of common 
equity are employed in Altman, (1968), Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan 
(1977), and Crosbie (1998). To take account of the market-synthesised view on the 
growth prospects and risk of an individual company we supplement the list of inputs, 
measured at book value, with the ratio of market capitalisation to net assets. 
However, not all of the 38 potential determinants have been used for general 
specifications in statistical modelling, as some covariates were perfectly collinear. 
50 In a paper about sensitivity of failure prediction models' accuracy to alternative variable sets and statistical 
techniques, Hamer (1983) maintains that four reasonably comprehensive sets of variables associated with failure 
models - those that were suggested by Altman (1968), Deakin (1972), Blum (1974), and OhIson (1980) - 
perform comparably on a pair-based sample of 88 firms. Ratios appeared in their sets can be broadly classified 
into six categories: profitability, liquidity, leverage (financial risk), turnover, variability, and size. These variable 
sets have also survived the test of time as strong predictors, and some w ere employed in recent studies, e. g. 
Johnsen and Melichcr (1994), Letza (1994), Mossman, Bell, Swartz, and Turtle (1998). 
51 In the UK studies by Keasey a nd M cGuinness ( 1990), K easey, M cGuinness, a nd S hort ( 1990), i ndividual 
predictors of failure are based on standard ratios from DATASTREAM. 
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Consequently, we now turn to a more specific description of the 25 ratio-based, 
candidate variables employed in model development. 
Profitability Ratios 
The concept of profitability in our analysis is measured by returns and profit 
margins. The return on shareholders' capital reflects the performance of 
shareholders' funds and is shared between the ordinary shareholders and preference 
shareholders. The computation of this ratio relates the after-tax profit to the total of 
share capital and reserves. However, this ratio does not reflect profitability of the 
firm as a whole. 
The return on capital employed takes account of the proportion of the firm, which is 
financed by fixed interest capital other than preference shares. Total interest charges 
and pre-tax profit (including associates) are included in the numerator, and total 
capital employed and borrowings repayable within one year are included in the 
denominator. This ratio tests whether the business is generating a worthwhile return 
on the capital used regardless of gearing and tax considerations. 
The return on netfixed assets details further the structure of the performance of the 
business for the equity-holders by looking at the performance of net of depreciation 
fixed assets in generating sufficient net profits, after the deduction of tax, minority 
interest and preference dividends, for the ordinary shareholders. The fixed assets 
exclude the assets leased out. One can see this ratio as a way of testing adequacy of 
the net profits for the ordinary shareholders. 
The cumulative profitability measure is expressed as a ratio of the revenue reserves 
for the parent company and its subsidiaries, to the total assets employed defined as 
the sum of all assets less total current liabilities. As pointed out in chapter 2, similar 
measure of profitability, namely, the ratio of retained earnings to total assets, was 
found to be the most important determinant of company failure in the ZETAIý study 
(Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan, 1977), where it was introduced for the first 
time to impute firm's age. 
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The relation between profits and sales is reflected in profit margins. One ratio that 
represents the core of earnings for shareholders -a crucial area for financial analysis 
- is the operating profit margin, which standardiscs operating profit by total net 
sales. 
Other key measure of profitability is the pre-tax profit margin, which standardises 
pre-tax p rofit byt otal n et sales. The objective of this ratio is to try to assess the 
repeatable profits of the business rather than one-off events. This is the case that the 
special items are figuratively sidelined as largely irrelevant to understanding of likely 
future performance. The numerator of this ratio excludes interest and non-recurring 
items or items of very irregular amount such as exceptional/extraordinary items, 
non-operating provisions, and exchange profit/losses. 
Finally, the overall profit margin shows how much income is earned for all 
shareholders from each pound of revenue. It is net of all expenses including tax, and 
adjusted for items that do not relate to normal trading activities of the firm. The net 
profit margin standardises after-tax profit before minority interests and preference 
dividends by total net sales. 
Turnover Ratios 
It is in the interest of the finn, all other things being equal, for it to maximise the 
output generated for a given level of investment. 
Thefaed assets turnover shows the efficiency of long-term capital investment, i. e. 
how effectively the firm manages its fixed assets. This ratio is calculated as total net 
sales divided by total fixed assets net of depreciation. However, some shortcomings 
of this construct of the turnover ratio are noted in White, Sondhi, and Fried (1998). 
This ratio does not give a measure of actual efficiency as the simple accumulation of 
depreciation expense leads to higher turnover because the carrying value of assets 
has been reduced. Also, the behaviour of this ratio is erratic as it is affected by 
characteristics of its constituents - sales growth is continuous, albeit at varying rates, 
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whereas increases in capacity to meet that sales growth are discrete, depending on 
the addition of new plants, and so forth. Compounding such issue is the fact that 
management often has discretion over the method, timing, and form of financial 
reporting of the acquisition of incremental capacity. 
The ratio of net current assets turnover relates total net sales to net current assets. It 
is conventional to decompose this overall measure of net current assets efficiency 
into several measures for investment in working capital, by constructing separate 
items for stocks, debtors, and creditors. The detailed analysis is based on the 
principle that stocks, debtors, and trade creditors are basically driven by sales 
activities. Credit sales create debtors and the need to order more stocks and to carry 
out more work, and the purchase of stocks creates more trade creditors. Failure to 
manage working capital investment efficiently is very common in business, since it 
requires continuous vigilance in management of stocks and/or debtors, in which 
capital is invested. As a result, firms frequently have to borrow. Slowdowns in 
turnover of stocks may indicate reduced demand for a firm's product or sales to 
customers whose ability to pay is less certain. A slowdown in debt collection may 
indicate liquidity problems among customers or may suggest lapsed credit control 
efficiency, while a slowdown in payment to creditors may reflect liquidity problem 
in the firm being analysed and possibly also a desire to window dress at the financial 
year end (Stead, 1995). An interpretation of declining turnover ratios usually 
requires a parallel analysis ofc ompany p rofitability a nd I iquidity. Weu tilise h ere 
three DATASTREAM ratios that relate total net sales and working capital items - 
the stock turnover, debtors turnover, and creditors turnover. 
Gearing Ratios 
Gearing ratios are concerned with the level of debt and its burden to the company. 
With regard to most ratios mentioned above there is a clear view that, all other 
things being equal, a firm's financial profile is "healthier" if the ratio moves in a 
particular direction. For instance, higher 'values of fixed assets turnover, profit 
margin, or return on capital are better than lower values. In contrast, the financial 
analysis literature gives no obvious good or bad interpretation of gearing (leverage or 
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capital structure 52) . Financial debt takes many forms - short-term such as overdrafts 
and commercial paper; medium-term such as hire purchase, leasing, term loans and 
53 bonds; and long-term such as capital bonds, debentures, and convertibles. The 
significance of debt is that it is repayable, bears interest or the equivalent, and may 
be secured and/or subject to covenants, thus affecting the firm's ability to obtain new 
external funds. The level of debt, which is safe for a firm to borrow, depends on 
various factors. They include the size of the firm, the particular nature of the debt 
(one example here is exchange losses), the cost of debt relative to operating profits 
or cash flows from operations, and the business climate. 54 As far as the mix of 
publicly-traded debt and equity securities or capital structure is concerned, the recent 
empirical research, summarised in Megginson (1997), suggests that capital 
structures have pronounced industry patterns. Certain industries such as 
transportation companies and those composed mainly of mature capital-intensive 
firms are characterised by high publicly traded debt-to-equity ratio, while other 
industries, for example, service firms, employ little or no long-term debt financing. 
Companies rich in collateralizeable assets, such as commercial real estate and 
transportation equipment, are able to tolerate far higher publicly traded debt-to- 
equity ratios than companies whose principal values are human capital of its 
employees or intangible assets. Furthermore, regardless of the industry in question, 
the most profitable companies may borrow the least (see Myers, 1993). 
In the present work, the gearing ratios used are the DATASTREAM specifications. 
Capital gearing is computed as the ratio of all long, medium, and short-term debt, 
including the preference capital, divided by total assets net of intangibles and future 
income tax benefits. It should be noted that capital gearing is measured here in terms 
of book value of equity plus book value of debt. 
52 It should be noted that in corporate finance the phrase "capital structure" is usually applied strictly to the 
relative n-dx of debt and equity securities in the long-term financial structure of a firm as contrasted with more 
Feneral measures of the firm's total indebtedness. 
Some sources would (see e. g. the definitions of gearing ratios used by PRIMARK DATASTREAM) include 
referred shares as debt as it behaves as if it were debt. I' In the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, British companies were particularly sensitive to the high level of 
debt, since interest rates have tended to be relatively high and volatile. On the other hand, the relative amount of 
debt carried by the UK companies tends to be lower than in America and most European countries (Stead, 
1995). 
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Income gearing is calculated as total interest charges divided by the sum of 
operating profit and total non-opcrating income. Interest charges arc calculated on 
loans, bonds and debentures, leasing finance and hire purchase including 
dividends/intcrest payments of redeemable preference shares described as 
participative loans. 
The borrowing ratio relates the sum of subordinated debt and total loan capital 
including borrowings repayable within one year to the sum of equity capital and 
reserves and deferred tax adjusted for intangibles. 
To help further with the analysis of the debt situation of the company we use the 
ratio of the gross cash flow over total liabilities, which includes shareholders' funds 
and calculated in regard to only tangible values. This concentrates attention on the 
adequacy of operational cash flows and the affordability of debt, as a low value of 
this ratio could signal the long-term solvency problem. The strength of this ratio is 
that it is responsive to changing circumstances in the business. 
Additional insight into debt levels can be gained by examining loan capital in 
relation to tangible shareholders' base expressed by the amount of equity and 
reserves net of intangibles. This ratio of loan capital to equity and reserves 
concentrates on over-one-year horizons for repayments by excluding loans with 
under-one-year maturity. A joint analysis of the borrowing ratio and the loan capital 
to equity and reserves ratio helps address the impact of the general profile of debt 
maturity, as distant horizons for repayment are generally more attractive than fast 
approaching repayment dates, which create potential liquidity problems. 
Liquidity Ratios 
The issues of profitability and financial indebtedness are important financial factors 
for a company. However, the question of liquidity can become an overriding issue 
when the organisation is in financial distress, since continually developing illiquidity 
is a terminal condition. Also, even in a profitable business, poor liquidity can expose 
the company to serious risks. A firm, which is short of ready cash but is generating 
good profits, with the right backing, will usually continue to trade. But one, which is 
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short of cash and unprofitable, will find difficulty in getting the backing it needs and 
may therefore fail, before profit-making capacity can be restored. 
The most common measures of liquidity are derived from information available in 
the balance sheet. Current assets liquidity gives a view of cash circulating in the 
working capital areas of the company, and can be measured on separate levels, from 
cash or its shortfall through to the whole of the current assets and current liabilities. 
The first liquidity measure, the quick assets ratio, contrasts quick assets with current 
liabilities. Quick assets are the current assets, which are currently in the process of 
producing cash or are already cash, cash equivalents, or short-term investments. 
Total stock and work in progress are excluded. 
The second measure, the familiar working capital ratio of total current assets over 
total current liabilities, gives a broader view of liquidity, assuming that all current 
assets may be used to pay off liabilities. An alternative specification measured by net 
current assets relative to total assets employed is also considered. A similar ratio 
was employed in Altman's Z-score model (Altman, 1968). This alternative construct 
helps to overcome the well-known problem with the quick and working capital 
ratios, as both may be distorted by window dressing - if the numerator and 
denominator in the ratio are not equal in size then any switching between them 
changes their proportionate relationship. Also, a firm experiencing consistent 
operating losses will find current assets relative to total assets employed shrinking. 
3.2.2.2 Other Financial Variables 
Controlling for firm's size is considered important in failure studies (see e. g., 
Foster, 1986; Marcus (1967); Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1994; Dunne 
and Hughes, 1994). 
The studies of company failure usually take the logarithm of total assets or logarithm 
of total sales as the means of determining " bigness". The main problem with the 
choice of assets as a basis for categorisation is that the balance sheet values of total 
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assets could be heavily influences by the limitations of accounting numbers. The 
assets of the firm pass through a market - and therefore are properly valued - only 
when the firm is actually sold. In this respect annual sales may provide a more 
reliable measurement. Therefore to control for firm's size in modelling UK company 
failure, we utilise the logarithm of total sales net of trade discounts. The logarithm 
of sales as a measure of size has been employed in prior empirical studies of failure 
by Pastena and Ruland (1986), Betts and Belhoul (1987), Wilson, Chong, and 
Peel (1995), Lindsay and Campbell (1996), Hill, Perry, and Andes (1996), 
Laitinen and Laitinen (1998) and Richardson, Kane, and Lobingier (1998). 
As discussed in chapter 1, due to inadequate liquid assets, a firm may suffer phases 
of relative illiquidity or inability to meet and pay its debt obligations promptly, yet 
still have sufficient non-liquid assets to discharge its liabilities. Such problems of 
temporary illiquidity can be sometimes resolved outside the framework of corporate 
insolvency I aw, for instance, the firm may use new overdraft facilities. However, 
when the company assets are insufficient to discharge its liabilities the company is 
insolvent or its net worth is negative. A very crude indicator of solvency can be 
provided by changes in the book value of tangible shareholders' funds or net tangible 
assets in the balance sheet. The net book worth is commonly used in the assessment 
of the prudential level of borrowing and may affect the company's ability of raising 
external finance despite the fact that book values are historically oriented and 
affected by changes in accounting conventions and thus may cause the unrealistic 
presentation of the company (Stead, 1995). To reflect this aspect of the firm's 
performance and financial stability we employ here the index of net tangible assets 
that uses the year of the first accounts as the base year. Net tangible assets are 
derived from the balance sheet and defined as equity capital and reserves less total 
intangibles. 
As discussed above, the finance literature, concerned with theoretical and empirical 
aspects of failure risk modelling, suggests that only the equity market value provides 
a good measure of the value of the ongoing business of the firm, because it changes 
as market participants revise the firm's future prospects, reassesing the firm's 
viability (see, e. g., Altman, 1968; Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan, 1977; 
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Scott, 1981; Crosbie, 1998; Gray, 1999). Therefore it seems essential to include in 
the vector of company descriptors, as a proxy for the firm's asset value, the ratio of 
the market value to book value of the ordinary shares, which is also called premium 
or discount to net tangible assets. This ratio allows one to appraise the degree of the 
difference between the future and market oriented valuation and historically oriented 
book value of the ordinary shareholders' capital. The literature emphasises that the 
perceived relative effectiveness of the management of assets might be a fundamental 
cause of differences between companies when compared on the basis of this measure 
(Stead, 1995). If problems of accounting measurement are disregarded for the 
moment, itis in ainly profitability as measured by the return on assets, which the 
managers can achieve, dictates the size of premium the investors are prepared to pay, 
relative to the reported assets value. However, the market value of shareholders' 
funds also depends on a number of factors that are outside the control of the 
company. Most importantly these external factors include interest rates and current 
supply and demand for shares. The inclusion of the ratio of market-to-book value in 
the vector of failure predictors can also be based on the argument that as the market 
valuation reflects the expected future cash flows and interest rates, it also captures 
the effects associated with macroeconomic factors. It should be noted, however, that 
in models described in this chapter we attempt to explicitly model the impact of 
some contextual factors on failure risk by adding into our financial ratio-based 
models measures of unanticipated movements in the interest rate and exchange rate. 
In modelling failure, we also include in the initial set of independent variables the 
tax ratio, which shows the relationship of published tax to published accounting pre- 
tax profit. However, it must be recognised, that the tax charge can vary depending on 
many factors unconnected with t he c urrent y ear p erformance. As election ofs uch 
factors, affecting the tax charge and hence the post-tax profits of firms is listed in 
Stead (1995). These include: (i) previous years' tax losses and/or investment 
allowances being utilised; (ii) sister companies' tax losses and/or investment 
allowances being utilised; (iii) the nature and extent of capital investment in the 
year; (iv) the nature and extent of capital investment in previous years; (v) dividend 
policy and the interaction of dividend payments with the extent of overseas earnings 
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(i. e. problems of unrelieved surplus advance corporation tax); (vi) the extent and rate 
of overseas taxes, and also the possibility of unrelieved double taxation. 
The payout ratio measures the proportion of earnings paid out as d ividcnds. This 
ratio is the reciprocal of dividend cover. All modem dividend theories assign an 
information revelation role to payout ratio changes (Megginson, 1996). On the one 
hand, a low payout ratio shows how much leeway was available for the last 
dividend, and the company commitment to investment and growth, suggesting that 
the company retains its earnings for investment into the business - rapidly growing 
firms hoard cash and might select a very low dividend. On the other hand, dividend 
decreases may imply declining earnings prospects. As British firms generally rely on 
capital market financing and compete for funds, they might pursue ambitious 
dividend policies even in a period of poor profits (Stead, 1995). Firms generally are 
unwilling to cut dividends; any significant decrease in dividends is likely to signal 
either financial distress or expected poor cash-flow performance in the future. 
Almost all firms maintain constant nominal dividend payments per share, even in the 
face of temporary net losses, therefore negative dividend cover might be taken as a 
sign that a company is in an especially difficult position. 
3.2.2.3 Transformation of Financial Data 
Methodological issues arising from empirical properties of accounting-based 
variables and, in particular, financial statement ratios have been indicated and 
discussed in the finance literature (e. g. Foster, 1986; Ezzamel, Brodie, and Mar- 
Molinero, 1987; Platt and Platt, 1990; Platt, Platt, and Pedersen, 1994; Rees, 
1995; Sudarsanam and Taffler, 1995). As discussed in chapter 2, empirical 
evidence shows: (i) that underlying the use of ratios the numerator-denominator 
relationship is inconsistent with the specific strict proportionality assumption 
between the numerator and denominator; 55 (ii) that distributions of financial ratios 
depart from normality; (iii) that there is a substantial variation between ratio 
components over time; and (iv) that instability of ratios over time along with the use 
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of research samples, which pool data points across different periods, violate the 
stationarity condition necessary to produce accurate forecasts. The conclusions from 
this strand of the literature suggest that accuracy and structure of multivariate 
financial ratio-based models can be improved by using transformed financial 
variables to remove non-stationarity. Here, to better approximate normality and to 
alleviate the temporal instability problem, we apply a normalisation procedure to 
observations in the estimation and holdout samples. Aside from that, standardised 
data are more appropriate for a non-linear method. 
For the estimation sample, the normalised value of the individual observation r,, on 
firm i pertaining to year t is calculated using the respective values for the sample 
mean F, and standard error se, obtained for the sample of observations taken from 
year t alone: 
Nonnalised Ratio = 
(r, F) 
se, 
(3.1) 
However, as there are fewer observations in the holdout sample, 96 as opposed to 
421 used in the estimation cross-section, we normalise holdout observation values 
with respect to the means and standard errors of three different, larger cross-sections 
created for 1992,1993, and 1994 - for the three years, corresponding with the time 
period oft he h oldout s ample. T hese c ross-sections, c ontaining 4 93,4 88, a nd 4 87 
observations, respectively, are used in a panel of UK quoted industrial firms, which 
we analyse in chapter 4. Tables A2.1-A2.6 of appendix 2 display covariate 
descriptive statistics calculated from the normalised values of 25 financial variables 
employed in cross-sectional model development, including, means for the failed 
company group and non-failed company group, related test statistics and p airwise 
correlations for each of the four years prior to failure. 
5' T'he strict proportionality between the numerator and denominator assumed both in comparison of ratios 
across firms at a point in time and in time-series analysis of ratios. However, for a particular ratio, the actual 
relation might imply a constant term or be non-linear. 
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3.2.2.4 Non-Financial Variables 
The Duration Variable 
The important explanatory role of company age, suggested by the model of market 
exit in a duopoly (Lambrecht, 1999), is consistent with stylised facts obtained from 
research into company failure determinants, which documented a negative 
relationship between age and failure risk. For instance, in the failure prediction 
model ZETA10 (Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan, 1977) corporate age was 
indirectly proxied by a cumulative profitability factor that had a large influence on 
failure risk. A number of studies, investigating the aggregate incidence of company 
insolvency and corporate growth and survival (Marcus, 1967; Hudson, 1987; 
Turner, Coutts, and Bowden, 1992; Altman, 1993; Dunne and Hughes, 1994), 
also have shown the importance of the age structure of companies. 56 
Hudson (1987) reports evidence on the age structure of UK company liquidations, 
obtained from the sample of 1,830 firms liquidated between 1978 and 1981. The age 
of the firm was proxied by the number of months between the company being 
incorporated and the liquidator or, in the case of a compulsory liquidation, the 
official receiver being appointed. Hudson finds that for the two categories of 
liquidations, involving insolvency, namely, winding up orders following petitions to 
the court by creditors and creditors' voluntary liquidations, newly incorporated 
companies prevail. In his sample, companies experienced difficulties in becoming 
established, which led to higher risk of becoming insolvent during their first nine 
years. Further, the firms that went into compulsory liquidations, stemming from 
winding upo rders, w ere y ounger t han t he companies being placed into creditors' 
voluntary liquidations. His analysis also revealed variation of this age structure of 
liquidations across regions and industries. Those industries that had seen greatest 
increases in unemployment, were characterised by a larger proportion of older firms 
amongst those being liquidated. The pattern changed with the cycle - as the recession 
deepened the proportion of old established fin-ns going into liquidation began to rise. 
56 Altman (1993,2000) refers to a failed US firm age statistics compiled by Dun & Bradstreet for the 1990s. The 
data give evidence that a young undercapitalised firm has a far greater propensity to fail than its old counterpart. 
In 1990, about 50 per cent of all failures were firms less than five years old, and nearly 10 per cent of firms 
failed in their first year. 
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It follows that age is a distinct factor that merits a separate analysis in company 
failure prediction research. Here the age of the firm is proxied by the length of time 
its records have been kept by the DATASTREAM database, and termed a duration 
variable. We recognise that the measure of duration, defined this way, can be only 
viewed as a very crude approximation of the age of a public limited company, but 
the reason this basis has been chosen is its practicality. Using the sources of public 
records we have had access to, itw as h ard to" exactly" e stablish t he a ge ine ach 
particular instance, mostly due to changes in the legal type of incorporation of the 
business. A value for the duration variable is calculated by subtracting the year from 
which DATASTREAM holds information about a company (the base date for equity 
records), from the accounts' year of the record used in the cross-section constructed 
for year one prior to failure. In the cross-section created with the data for one year 
prior to failure, the mean and median values of the duration variable equal 12.7 years 
and II years for the failed company group, and 19.5 years and 23 years for the non- 
failed company group. 
Further, we have scaled the duration variable by expressing it in relative terms. For 
both the estimation and holdout sets, the respective maximum values have been 
chosen as bases to obtain relative values. 
Macroeconomic Variables 
If the factors leading to insolvency were internal to all companies, the rise in failures 
in slump periods would be inexplicable. The actual occurrence and timing depends 
on changes in firm-specific characteristics due to economic events, which exacerbate 
financial constraints on firms. This suggests that characteristics of the 
macroeconomic environment might be helpful explanatory variables in firm-level 
models of failure. The current firm-level models reviewed in chapter 2 include 
variables representative of various aspects of the macroeconomic environment (see, 
e. g., Hill, Perry, and Andes (1996) and Richardson, Kane, and Lobingier 
(1998)). Theoretical considerations for company liquidation, link individual 
company vulnerability to default to changes in interest rates and exchange rates (see, 
e. g., Wadhwani, 1986; Scott, 1981; Turner, Coutts, and Bowden, 1992; Bartov 
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and Bodnar, 1994; Davis, 1995; Crosbie, 1998; Gray, 1999). For modelling 
company failure with cross-sectional data, we have chosen these two indicators as 
the prime candidates for potentially relevant macroeconomic determinants. 57 
The literature suggests that the principal channels, through which real and nominal 
interest rates impact listed company failure risk, are: (i) the market value of equity 
that has direct bearing on long-term solvency and determines the relative burden of 
debt, altering the firm's borrowing capacity and ability to restructure and reschedule 
outstanding short-term debt obligations; (ii) variations in risk premia and the cost of 
capital, which might also influence the company's ability to raise new funds; 58 and 
(iii) sales and profit levels as well as interest expenses on outstanding obligations, 
which all impact on cash flows and the short-term liquidity position of the company. 
For the firms involved in international activities, for instance, exporters, importers, 
or firms with foreign operations that have current or future cash flows denominated 
in foreign currency, the linkages could be more complex. The extend to which 
interest rates affect equity values of such firms will also depend on their shares of 
foreign and domestic components of outstanding debt, on export intensity and the 
proportion of operations abroad. Movements in the exchange rate result in direct 
changes in the relative prices of domestic and foreign goods, which influence both 
the current and future expected cash flows and revenues of firms with international 
operations. A rise in the real exchange rate is associated with a loss of international 
competitiveness in the traded sector, whereas a fall brings an improvement in 
competitiveness. Another dimension to how exchange rate movements affect the 
value of firms is given by the relation between the exchange rate and the domestic 
currency value of foreign currency-denominated fixed assets and liabilities. 
However, the impact of a change in the exchange rate on company performance, 
assets and liabilities is complicated by firms' "unobservable" activity to hedge 
57 We have also attempted to follow Platt, Platt, and Pedersen (1994) who attributed an improvement in 
predictive power of failure models based on logit for US petroleum companies to the explanatory role of 
inflation. However, in our study, a proxy for an unanticipated change in inflation, seems to be inconsistent with 
the initial set of model inputs that includes financial statement-based variables and two measures proxying 
changes in the non-dnal interest rate and real exchange rate. 58 The discussion in Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) suggests two effects on the costs of external funds, of the 
general rise in interest rates. Assuming that a large part of the firm's net worth is determined by the present value 
of future profits, there would be a direct effect, because the risk-free interest rate has risen, and an indirect effect, 
because net worth falls. The indirect effect reinforces the direct effect and is more important the higher is the 
initial level of debt relative to net worth. 
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foreign currency exposures. Therefore a complete market response to the impact of 
past changes in the exchange rate on the market value of a company is delayed until 
information regarding past performance, assets, and liabilities of the company, is 
released (Bartoy and Bodnar, 1994). 
A number of empirical studies for the UK (e. g., Wadhwani, 1986; Goudie, 1987; 
Goudie and Meeks, 1991; Young, 1995; Diacogiannis, 1996), and commercial 
models of default risk (see a description of the CreditPortfolioView approach from 
McKinsey in Crouhy, GaIai, and Mark (2000)), explicitly allow for the effects of 
interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation. Therefore, we follow the similar route in 
the cross-sectional analysis of UK company failure during the 1990s recession. 
Specifically, we seek to augment cross-sectional, financial ratio-based models of 
failure risk by introducing proxies for effects of changes in such important and 
observable prices in the economy as the nominal interest rate and the real exchange 
rate. The literature (see, e. g., Wadhwani, 1986) emphasises the influence of the 
nominal interest rate, which also encapsulates expected inflation rates, on the risk of 
failure. 
The particular relevance of changes in these indicators to survival of the sample 
companies follows from the fact that in the period post- 1986, the UK experienced an 
inflationary episode associated with excess aggregate demand that was pushed up by 
a number of factors. These factors included financial liberalisation, a relaxation of 
monetary policy, rising asset prices, tax cutting budgets in 1987 and 1988, growing 
consumer confidence, and buoyant world demand. The excess demand caused 
inflation to rise - the Retail Price Index increased from the annualised rate of 4.14 
per cent in 1987 to the annual rate of 9.46 per cent in 1990. The tightening of 
monetary policy in late 1988 taken in conjunction with the need to defend a higher 
exchange rate to keep the pound within the Exchange Rate Mechanism meant that 
the authorities felt unable to reduce interest rates below 10 per cent. In the spring of 
1990, despite persistent inflation, the real interest rate, as expressed by a three-month 
lending rate less inflation, was also high - for instance, the relevant estimate for the 
UK was 7.5 per cent and for the US - 3.0 per cent ("Understanding the UK 
Economy", 1997). 
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It appears, therefore, that by the end of 1989, the shocks from changes in the interest 
rates and exchange rate had been strong enough to influence default risk of highly 
geared companies by causing both short-term liquidity problems and a reduction of 
the market value of equity. As the recession of 1990-92 began and profits declined 
further, an increased number of companies suspended payments to creditors and 
subsequently entered insolvency procedures. 
The potential for allowing in a model estimated with cross-sectional data for the 
effects of changes in the two macroeconomic indicators comes from the structure of 
our repeated pooled cross-section sample. By pooling data points across several 
consecutive years, we provide a time dimension, allow for variation of financial 
covariates over time, and comply with an important for our analysis principle of 
temporal precedence because no cause can precede its effect. Different 
macroeconomic conditions are contained in data on accounting ratio-based and 
market valuation-based inputs. The resulting temporal dimension of our data permits 
us to explicitly model changes in economic conditions over the sample period. From 
a positive economic standpoint, the estimated relations might help to understand 
how these macroeconomic variables condition the probability of failure of a firm. It 
might be assumed that unfavourable changes in the nominal interest rate and real 
exchange rate had adverse effects on those companies that would consequently fail, 
thus a macroeconomic dummy variable is constructed that equals I for failed 
companies and 0 for non-failed firms. This dummy is then used in interactions with 
each macroeconomic variable. It follows that the predictions from the model will be 
conditional on the mistakes over macroeconomic forecasts made by the firm, the 
effect of which is measured from their impact on the failed firms. Hence, we are 
looking at the risk of failure conditional on a poor response to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions. 
In modelling the influence of the two macroeconomic variables we follow Young 
(1995) in assuming that only unanticipated changes (surprises) in interest rates and 
exchange rates will affect the firm's solvency, as in a perfect capital market prices 
fully and correctly reflect available information. According to Young, this is because 
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anticipated changes are reflected in initial business decisions in a way that 
unanticipated changes are not. Further, we assume the delayed effect of the 
macroeconomic variables upon the firm's performance and financial position. Due to 
the certain extent of inertia, it is the last year's mistakes and miss-predictions, which 
may be critical as a financial distress trigger. The failure process might well be 
driven by a sequence of such mistakes. Accordingly, in modelling, we utilize one- 
year lagged unanticipated changes in the annualised values of macroeconomic 
variables corresponding with the timings of financial records for the sample firms. 
Unanticipated changes in macroeconomic variables are directly unobservable, 
therefore they must be proxied. The simplest path to follow is to assume that the 
macroeconomic series of interest evolve as a random walk . 
59 To measure the 
underlying economic risks affecting failure, we make an assumption that a process 
for the y, series of observations of a macroeconomic variable is generated by a 
naive (drifiless) random walk: 
y, = y, -, + c,; c, - 
IID(O, Cr2); t= (3.2) 
where y, is a value of the variable at time t; and r, is a random disturbance, not 
predictable from the history of the process. 
Then the conditional mean and variance of the variable at date t, conditional on the 
initial value yo at date 0, is: 
E(y, I yo)=yo +0 (3.3) 
Var(y, I YO) = C2. (3.4) 
59 As for the non-drial interest rate process this assumption is a gross simplification. However, stylised facts 
concerning time series for the major exchange rates (under floating exchange rate regimes) are that exchange 
rates are hard to distinguish empirically from a simple random walk (Mussa, 1984; Taylor, 1995). Meese and 
Rogoff (1988) report that their regression forecasts of log real exchange rates are never significantly better than 
the driftless random walk. 
168 
CHAPTER 3 
That implies that the unanticipated change in the macroeconomic variable equals 
(y, - E(y, )), that is the entire change is unanticipated. From (3.2) - (3.4) it is 
apparent that one can approximate the "surprise" by the one-year lagged change in 
the macroeconomic variable. 
Accordingly, we construct the one-year lagged logarithmic change in the real 
exchange rate, which influences competitiveness in the traded goods sector, and the 
one-year lagged logarithmic change in the nominal interest rate, which directly 
impacts on the burden of debt and capacity to raise finance. If financial statement- 
based independent variables describing an individual firm in the cross-section 
pertain to year t, then the two macroeconomic variables are measured as follows: 
One - year Lagged Change in the Real Exchange Rate = [In RER(t - I)- In RER(t - 2)], (3.5) 
where the real effective exchange rate, RER(t), is given as an index, 60 
One -year Lagged Change in the Nominal Interest Rate= [In IR. (t -I)- In IR. (t- 2)], (3.6) 
where the nominal interest rate, IRn 9 is given by the 3-month sterling interbank rate 
measured as the annualised percentage rate. 61 
An additional advantage of specifying these macroeconomic measures in differences 
is that the resulting variates are also stationary, complementing the correction made 
for financial statement-based variables. 
It is important to observe that the expected value of the two macroeconomic 
variables is zero, implying on average zero response to either the interest rate change 
or the exchange rate change. One can argue that unanticipated rises both in the 
exchange rate and in the interest rate had the adverse impact on those companies that 
would consequently fail. Thus to capture the influence of changes in the business 
climate, a macroeconomic dummy variable is constructed that is equal to I for failed 
60 The index is the DATASTREAM item "UKOCREXC". 
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companies. This dummy is used in interactions with each macroeconomic variable. 
It follows that the predictions from the model will be conditional on the mistakes in 
macroeconomic forecasts, the effect of which is measured from their impact on 
failed firms. Hence, we are looking at the risk of failure conditional on a poor 
response to changes in macroeconomic conditions. 
As a final point, we should also comment on a potential methodological problem of 
measuring the impact of aggregate macro variables on micro units, when a strategy 
of merging aggregate data with cross-sectional data is employed (Moulton, 1990). 
Using an example of the linear model, Moulton cautions that ignoring the 
correlation of errors within groups, which used to merge aggregate with micro data, 
can result in spurious downward bias of the usual OLS standard errors, the resulting 
inflation of test statistics and incorrect inference. It is worth noting that in the present 
study, the logit specifications 62 that condition the probability of failure on changes in 
the two macroeconomic variables do not account for the within-group disturbance 
correlation. It is important to emphasise that in our empirical design no aggregate 
measure is being used as we combine with financial statement data on firms such 
economic indicators as the nominal interest rate and the real exchange rate. Aside 
from that, it was necessary to allow for the influence of macroeconomic factors as 
current empirical models, developed to explain company financial distress and 
failure, refute any "single cause" explanation. Moreover, the cost of omitting 
relevant explanatory variables is inconsistency. Nonetheless, we recognise that in 
further research it might be desirable to investigate further the implications and 
solutions of this potential problem when a range of macroeconomic variables used in 
logit models of failure is expanded by the addition of aggregate macro variables. 
3.2.3 The Statistical Model 
The Discrete Binary Dependent Variable 
The phenomenon of company failure we seek to examine is discrete, and in the case 
of a conventional, failed/non-failed dichotomy, the depended variable describing 
61 Young (1995) employed the same measure of the nominal interest rate. 62 These models are described below in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4. 
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outcomes is a binary response, which means that we equate the event of "failure" 
with I and the event of "non-failure" with 0. We view an outcome as a reflection of 
an underlying regression, which links the discrete dependent variable to a set of 
explanatory and control variables representing major dimensions of financial 
analysis, firm age, and macroeconomic variables. Changes in accounting variables 
and business conditions will result in various degrees of "financial health" of a firm, 
and this might, in principle, be measured on a continuous scale. But given the 
problems of defining distinct stages in the continuum of "financial health", which we 
have discussed in chapter 1, it seems more expedient and sufficient for the purpose 
at hand, to observe merely, whether the firm is broke or survives. Therefore, the 
discrete character of the dependent variable is somewhat imposed by the purpose of 
our analysis of company failure. In modelling, such an idea can implemented by 
using the latent variable specification described and chapter 2 and revisited below. 
The Binomial Logit Model 
We utilise in this study logit - the non-linear estimator common in studies of 
company failure prediction (e. g., Ohlson, 1980; Zavgren, 1985; Peel, Peel, and 
Pope, 1986; Keasey and McGuinness, 1990; Platt and Platt, 1990; Platt, Platt, 
and Pedersen, 1994; Richardson, Kane, and Lobingier, 1998). 
For logit we believe that a set of predictor-variables, gathered in a vector x, explains 
company failure. The latent hypothesis is captured by a linear combination oft he 
independent variables P'x. This linear combination is then transformed into a 
probability using the log-link. The use of the logit link here is to simply ensure that 
the mean is mapped from the real line to the unit interval required since the 
indicators are dichotomous. Thus the probability for a company to fail is given by 
the following expression: 
P", 
Prob(Y =I (Failure)) = I+e PIZ, 
(3.7) 
Here the yj independently equals I or 0 with probabilities ; r, or 1-; r,. The 
maximum likelihood estimate of the parameter vector 0 generates estimates of ; ý,. 
171 
CHAPTER 3 
By using the realised prediction rule 0 for some threshold point CO, the model 
predicts the failure outcome for an observation with the covariate vector x,: 
ei=1 if ki >CO, le 
,=0 
if ki: 5 Co. 
(3.8) 
The estimation of the logit model is based on the likelihood function. Each 
observation is treated as a single draw from a Bernoulli distribution (binomial with 
one draw). The model with response probability F(P'x) and independent 
observations leads to the joint probability or likelihood function: 
P'Xj 
(3.9) P'., ieF +e jeN + 
where Fd efines t he s ubset off ailed c ompanies in the sample, and N reflects the 
subset of sampled non-failed companies. Taking logs we obtain for the sample of n 
observations, where n=F+N, the log-likelihood function: 
R 
In L (y, In F(P'x, ) + (I - y) In(l - F(P'x, ))]. (3.10) 
The first order conditions for maximisation require: 
dL(. 1 P) "" , = PA = 09 dß 1-1 
e A'x' where y, -R',; Ri, = -- L-, and 
A is the maximum likelihood estimate of the 
1+ ep'xi 
parameters. 
If x, contains the intercept, the first-order conditions imply that the average of the 
predicted probabilities must equal the proportion of Is in the sample. 
172 
CHAPTER 3 
The coefficient in the logit model is the change in the log of the odds ratio associated 
with a unit change in the covariate. It is easy to see that 
ep'xi (3.12) 
+ ep,., 
and 
1-7ri PIX, 
(3.13) 
1+e 
so that the logarithm of the odds ratio is linear in x and in the parameters 
'-'r' rXI. (3.14) 
Any linear function of relevant covariates can thus be inserted in the logistic 
function; its argument may be treated exactly like a regression equation. It should as 
a rule include a dummy constant "I" with an intercept cc as its coefficient. Just as in 
a regression function covariate values can be appropriately transformed, for instance, 
by taking logarithms or centring, while qualitative factors can be represented by 
categorical variables. 
Since the cumulative distribution function F(. ) is non-decreasing, the logit model in 
equation (3.7) is consistent with the intuitive principle that failure becomes near 
certainty at the high levels of the log odds ratio (which shows how much the 
outcome I is " nearer" than the alternative outcome 0). The rate of change in the 
probability that outcome 1 results, given a change in the k-th covariate, is 
ýz, 
= 
dA(P'xi) 
A'(pfxi) 
d(P'xl) 
f(P'x, )ß, dxik dx dxik 
where f(P'xj) is the probability density function of a logistic random variable 
evaluated at the point (Px, ) and 6k is the k-th parameter in the vector P. 
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In interpreting logit results it is important to remember that the probability density 
function f(P'xi) is always positive, thus the sign of 6k indicates the direction of 
the relationship between the explanatory variables and the probability ; r,. If flk >0 
than an increase in xikincreases the probability that yj =I; and if 6k <0 than an 
increase in xik reduces the probability that y, = 1. The magnitude of the change in 
the probability, given a change in xjk , is determined by the magnitude of 6k and the 
magnitude of f(P'xj). 
Inference in the Logit Model 
Since maximum likelihood estimators of binomial logit model fit within the general 
large sample theory for non-linear models, statistical inference is conventional for 
large sample tests. 63 An important advantage of the chosen logit methodology is its 
suitability for implementing a traditional econometric approach for addressing the 
problem of evaluating particular specifications under the condition of model 
uncertainty posed by the absence of a unifying theoretical framework and parameter 
heterogeneity. Here we built a parsimonious model by testing down an initial general 
specification and eliminating covariates using a sequence of asymptotic t-tests and 
independent Likelihood Ratio tests. The resulting model should essentially contain a 
satisfactory proportion of information conveyed by the original general specification, 
while also being much more parsimonioUS64. 
For testing hypotheses about individual coefficients, usual Mests and Likelihood 
Ratio tests are used. 
When the sample size n is large the maximum likelihood estimator P for the logit 
model has a sampling distribution that is approximately normal: 
A 
P- N[P, cov(P)I. (3.16) 
Consequently, 
63 As a rule of thumb, sample sizes, which yield less than thirty responses per alternative, produce estimators, 
which can not be analysed reliably by asymptotic methods. Monte Carlo studies and sccond-order asymptotic 
approximations suggest that in many qualitative response models with sample sizes of a few hundred and more, 
first-order approximations are moderately accurate (McFadden, 1984). 
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N(0,1). (3.17) 
se(ftk) 
Given the null and alternative hypotheses 
Ho 
H, 
fik 
the t-statistic is t=.. 
se(, Bk ) 
(3.18) 
If the null is true, the t-statistic has a normal distribution (approximately) in large 
samples, and the critical values for the test may be taken from the standard normal 
distribution or the t, -K - distribution 
(K g ives t he n umber o, fe xplanatory v ariables 
including the intercept). 
Therefore, the appropriate standard errors for the model can be calculated by taking 
the square roots of the diagonal elements of the empirical analogue of the covariance 
matrix, cov(P), which can be obtained by evaluating the Hessian matrix of second- 
order derivatives at the maximum likelihood parameter estimates. 
General and joint hypotheses about the parameter values can be tested by using the 
Likelihood Ratio tests. The null and altemative hypotheses will be stated as 
HO: Rp=r 
H,: Rp#r. 
(3.19) 
The Likelihood Ratio test compares the value of the log-likelihood function, InL, 
evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimator (A), to the restricted maximum 
likelihood estimator (A*) that results when the log-likelihood function is maximiscd 
subject to the restrictions RP =r being true. 
64 For a discussion of model selection see, e. g., Davidson, Hendry, Srba, and Yeo (1978) and Hendry, 
Muellbauer, and Murphy (1990). 
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The Likelihood Ratio test statistic, 
LR, = 2[ln L(A) -In L(A *)] (3.20) 
has a ; r(j) distribution if the null hypothesis is true, where J is the number of 
independent restrictions being tested. If the data do not support the null hypothesis 
then the value of the test statistic becomes large, and the null is rejected if 
2 LRr ý: XV) 
A number of overall fit measures for the logit model have been suggested. To test 
specifications, that is to make a judgement about the goodness of fit of a model and 
to evaluate different models fitted to the same sample, even if they arc not ncstcd, 
the maximiscd values of log-likelihood functions at convergence, InLm, for the 
alternative models can be compared (Cramer, 1991; Greene, 1997), although it 
varies in proportion with the sample size n and increases with the number of fitted 
parameters K. 
A common test of the "overall" significance of a particular logit model, when we 
wish to test the null that all the slope coefficients are zero, is given by comparing the 
log-likelihood evaluated at the maximum and the corresponding baseline log- 
likelihood of the baseline model with a constant only. The corresponding Likelihood 
Ratio test statistic is: 
LRr = 2[ln L(ý) - In Lo ], (3.21) 
which has a Z' (K-, ) distribution. 
An analog to the coefficient of detennination R' in a conventional regression 
model, is the Likelihood Ratio Index (McFadden, 1974): 
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LRI =1- 
InL(ý) (3.22) 
InL 0 
The result of model estimation is a maintained probability model with accepted 
parameter estimates. But in practice the aim is to use these results in forecasts and 
policy formulation. The explanatory power of a model, fitted to the estimation data 
points, and hence the relevance of the obtained determinants of insolvency outcome 
is judged by the model's classification accuracy and ability to predict the response 
value for the observations that lie outside the estimation range and period. Notice 
that these predictions offer probability statements, not a single value of a point 
estimate, as with a linear regression. So it will be useful to think of a pseudo- R' for 
assessing the fit of a binomial logit model in terms of classificatory accuracy 
(Maddala, 1992). 
Thus we define classificatory accuracy as the proportion of the correct predictions of 
the realised prediction rule 0 (3.8), which attaches 0 or I to ý, on the basis of the 
probabilities of these values: 
count R' =# fy, = ýj) /n. (3.23) 
In general, a prediction rule of the form (3.8) will make two types of errors. It will 
incorrectly classify responses as non-responses (Type I error) and non-responses as 
responses (Type H error). Changing the cutoff probability value C. will always 
reduce the probability of one type of error w hile i ncreasing t he p robability oft he 
other. However, there is no correct answer as to what is the best cutoff value to 
choose, because the classification errors are usually asymmetric in the costs that 
result. Therefore, the appropriate cutoff value will depend on the decision context 
given by the criterion function upon which the prediction rule depends. The usual 
threshold value for CO in (3.8) is 0.5, and in this case we have the maximum 
probability rule "predict the most probable state". 65 If the sample is unbalanced, with 
65 This point has been illustrated by BarNiv (1990) in the study of the association between market- and cash- 
flow-based data and the ability to classify and predict insolvency in t he i nsurance i ndustry. B arNiv s elects a 
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many more non-responses than responses, than the obvious adjustment is to reduce 
the cutoff value Co. 
It is common to assess the classificatory power of a model, fitted to the estimation 
sample, by the apparent error rate: 
err=#Iyi #ýj)ln. (3.24) 
In other words we use the apparent error rate as an estimate of the true error rate of 
the model. However, because y was used for both constructing and assessing the 
prediction rule ý, -Err will usually be biased downwards: a new binary outcome 
might not be predicted as nearly as accurately by the old 4. 
The bias (or the optimism) is the difference between the true error rate and the 
apparent error rate, hence the purpose of estimating the bias is the constructing of 
estimates of the true error rate, better than the apparent error rate. The literature 
suggests several, frequently used solutions of the problem of assessing the ex ante 
predictive power of the realised prediction rule. These include: (i) the use of a 
holdout sample of new observations, which should be temporally distinct from the 
estimation sample; (ii) bootstrapping approaches for approximating the bias in the 
apparent error rate in logit; and (iii) Efron's formula for approximating the bias in 
the apparent error rate analytically (Efron, 1986). As far as the bootstrap is 
concerned, Jeong and Maddala (1993) note that, in parametric binary response 
models, bootstrapping may not be useful unless the sample size is small. Since for 
the cross-sectional study of the present chapter, we use a sample of 421 
observations, which may be viewed as a reasonably large sample, we do not employ 
cutoff value that rriinimises the expected costs of misclassifications in the estimation sample (ECM): 
ECM=plclnl IN, +p2c2n2lN2 where cj= tntisclassification costs for type i error, nj= the total number of 
type i misclassifications; Nj- sample size of the i-th group; pi -prior probability of the i-th group. 
OhIson (1980) discussed the issue and made no attempt of specifying a decision context by the priors 
and costs of misclassification. He merely presented Type I and Type 11 errors for different values of the cutoff 
probability within the range from 0 to 1. The cutoff value of 0.5 is used in Keasey and McGuinness (1990). 
Richardson, Kane and Lobingier (1998) reduce the cutoff value to 0.02, a choice reflecting a large 
differential between Type I error costs and Type Il error costs. 
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the bootstrap procedures. 66 However, we handle the problem by providing 
alternative, analytic estimates of the optimism in the apparent error rate (Efron, 
1986). The analytic estimate of the expected downward bias in the apparent error 
rate is added to the apparent error rate so as to obtain an improved estimate of 
prediction error, and to infer how well a model predicts the response value of a 
future observation. 
An analytic estimate of the bias for logit is obtained by calculating: 
ri)o 
rd, (3.25) 
di=) 
where O(z) = (2; r)-"' exp(- 
I 
Z2), 
2 
In(j- Pxj, 
ý0-) 
-A (3.26) 
R 
andd, =x', i-'x,, i=zij(l-irj)xjx'j- (3.27) 
J-1 
The matrix i-'is the usual estimate for the covariance matrix of The resulting 
estimate is a nearly unbiased estimator and has a small standard deviation. 
Th e Problem ofDisproportion ate Sampling 
One methodological problem, which often arises in applications of the binomial logit 
models, relates to non-random, disproportionate sampling (that is when two groups 
are sampled at different rates), which is employed in conjunction with estimators and 
inference procedures that assume random sampling (see, e. g., McFadden 1984; 
Palepu, 1986; Maddala, 1992; Greene, 1997; Cramer, 1999; Bayldon and 
66 The bootstrap computation of prediction error, which is adopted from Efron and Tibshirani (1993), and the 
relevant resampling plan from Adkins (1990) is employed in chapter 5 for models derived from small samples 
for the comparative study of company failure in the UK and Russia. The bootstrap procedures used in the present 
thesis are detailed in the annex to chapter 5. 
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Zariris, 1999). For instance, usually all available observations on firms failed during 
the chosen for analysis period are included in the sample, but only a small 
percentage of non-failed firms in a population is sampled. There is a valid 
econometric justification for preferring a state-based selection of failed cases over 
random sampling of this group, as a random sample would be likely to include very 
few failed firms leading to relatively imprecise parameter estimates (Palepu, 1986). 
On the other hand, the use of equal-share samples, with equal shares of failed and 
control groups, leads to biased estimates of the model parameters and to overstating 
the model's ability to predict failed firms. 
Consider a firm i in the population with a probability p of being a failure (become 
insolvent). Let p' be the probability that the firm i in the swnple is a failure. Using 
Bayesian formula for conditional probability, 
PI=px prob(i 
is sampled Ii is a failure) (3.28) 
[p x prob(i is sampled Ii is a failure) + (I - p)prob(i is sampled Ii is non - failure)] 
Under the case of random sampling, the probability of firm i being sampled is the 
swne whether it is a failure or non-failure: p' =p- 
When an equal-share sample is used, the sample likelihood yields an unbiased 
estimate of p'. But under equal-share sampling (p'-p)>O since usually the 
number of failed companies in the population is much smaller than the number of 
non-failed companies. In this case, the simple maximum likelihood procedure of 
maximising the sample likelihood function leads to the overstated true values of the 
probabilities of failure. Consequently, the observed error rate understate the model's 
true error rate in predicting failures and overstate the true error rate in predicting 
non-failures, although the net effect on the overall error rate is determined by the 
cutoff probability employed a nd t he p rior p robabilities oft he firms int he s ample 
(Palepu, 1986). 
To address the problem of determining an appropriate for ax ante classification 
cutoff, Palepu (1986) makes an assumption that the costs of Type I and Type II 
errors are equal and then uses the minimisation of error criterion. The errors are at 
180 
CHAPTER 3 
their minimum where the conditional marginal probability densities for two groups 
(failed firms and non-failed firms) are equal, that corresponds with the point where 
the plotted distributions of the estimated probabilities of failed and non-failed firms 
intersect. 
In discussing the problem of appropriate cutoff, Maddala (1992) points out that it is 
only the constant term that is affected by the unequal sampling rates, implying that 
for inference as to the effects of explanatory factors, the usual logit model can be 
used without any adjustment even with unequal sampling. If the estimated model is 
going to be used for prediction purposes, the constant term needs to be decreased by 
(In p, - 111 P2)2 where p, and P2 are the sampling rates of the two groups for which 
y=I and y=0, respectively. However, these sampling rates are difficult to 
estimate. Greene (1997) suggests a simpler treatment of adjusting the cutoff 
probability C. in (3.8) to take into account the bias introduced by the unbalanced 
sample. 
Cramer (1999) discussed the issue further and considers the unavoidable asymmetry 
in the estimated by maximum likelihood within-sample probabilities when a 
standard binary logit is fitted to a sample with the unequal shares of the two 
outcomes. For instance, if yi =1 refers to the outcome with the larger share, then 
inequality of sample proportions by itself leads to a high overall level of the 
estimated probabilities (unadjusted for disproportionate sampling) for the outcome, 
to high log-likelihoods, and to the good prediction of prevalent states. Assuming that 
the company failure outcome is normalised, it follows that in the company failure 
studies with representative samples where the share of non-failed group is relatively 
large, the inequality of sample proportions influences all the estimated probabilities 
downwards while higher sampling rates for the failure event influence the estimated 
probabilities for the failure state upwards. Cramer contends that to allow for unequal 
sample sizes in assessing the within-sample performance of the fitted model, the 
cutoff value reflecting the improvement of the obtained specification over the 
baseline model in predicting the outcome for the particular observation i, is a cutoff 
point which is set at the average of the estimated probability of the outcome y, =I 
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(failure state). The solution advocated by Cramer, receives finther support in 
Bayldon and Zafiris ( 1999), who e xamine the bias of disproportionate sampling 
and the consequences resulting from highly unequal sampling proportions in 
company failure modelling. Bayldon and Zafiris argue that the cutoff probability that 
is equal to the sampling frequency for the failure outcome, is the correct one to use 
in a ssessing t he fit oft he m odel, i rrespective ofp opulation s ize, s ample size and 
sampling rates. Obviously, this cutoff value is neutral with respect to relative 
misclassification costs, and may not be optimal for prediction in actual decisions. If 
the costs of misclassifying a failed company are higher than the costs of 
misclassifying a non-failed company, than the cutoff should be set lower than the 
average rate of failures in the sample. 
Given a large degree of subjectivity involved in making assumptions as to the prior 
probability of quoted industrial firni insolvency over a particular period and about 
relative misclassification costs, we follow OhIson (1980) and will assess the 
predictive performance of UK logit models at various cutoff probability values 
ranging from 0.1 to 0.875. 
3.3 Empirical Results 
Here the failure outcome is normalised and, therefore, the binary dependent variable 
takes a value of I if the firm is failed. We interpret the estimated models as 
describing the conditional expectation of the failure outcome y given the selected 
explanatory variables x. A model building approach utilised here is a backward 
elimination. To produce a parsimonious model, the modelling approach starts with a 
very general and fairly unrestricted specification, which is subsequently reduced in 
size by testing restrictions, imposed on individual variables. A sequence of 
independent Likelihood Ratio tests is used to eliminate covariates. A resultant model 
should essentially contain a satisfactory proportion of the information from the 
original general specification, while also being much more parsimonious. As follows 
from the overviews of chapters I and 2, there is little coherent theory of company 
failure upon which to base the choice of explanatory variables from a vast array of 
potentially uscftil candidatc-variables. The literature essentially suggests that the 
182 
CHAPTER 3 
relevant variables are those that measure firm-specific and external factors, which 
might affect the firm's performance and financial position and influence its 
propensity to default on debt. At this juncture, we take a usual route to proceed and 
include into an initial general specification a wide set of variables derived from 
observable financial reports, so as not to omit any important financial attribute. The 
spectrum of potential determinants has been complemented by a control for firm's 
age and by two macroeconomic variables that were seen important by past studies 
into aggregate incidence of liquidation and bankruptcy. 
Because performance measures deteriorate as a failing company approaches 
insolvency, models are estimated for four risk horizons, ranging one to four years, 
with p ooled c ross-sections d ata t aken from four s uccessive reporting years before 
failure. A single series of logit results consists of four functions, each being year- 
prior-to-failure specific. The results, however, are not attributable to any particular 
annual/calendar period, but, being representative of observations pertinent to 1988- 
91, give a broad picture of accounting indicators of failure for the whole four-year 
period. F our i ndividual s eries ofm odels e stimated h ere i nclude: (i) b asic in odels, 
employing financial variables alone; (ii) models employing financial statement- 
based inputs and two macroeconomic variables; (iii) models employing financial 
variables and a proxy for firm's age; and (iv) models employing financial variables, 
two macroeconomic variables, and a proxy for firm's age. Specifications, presented 
below in Tables 3.3,3.4,3.7,3.8,3.11,3.12,3.15, and 3.16, are risk-horizon specific 
parsimonious models based on a wide range of 25 financial variables, for which 
appendix 2 gives descriptive statistics. Values for pairwise correlations (see Tables 
A2.3-A2.6 of appendix 2) suggest that potential financial predictors are not highly 
correlated. The variables entering final parsimonious models have been selected on a 
stepwise basis by using asymptotic Mests and Likelihood Ratio tests as criteria for 
elimination. 
A description of logit estimation results is shown in two groups of tables. The first 
group reports the coefficient estimates and the goodness of fit measured by the log- 
likelihood at convergence, Likelihood Ratio test statistic, and Likelihood Ratio 
Index. Measures of the goodness of fit, which are given by within-the-estimation- 
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sample classificatory accuracy and the power to predict fresh, holdout observations, 
are displayed in the second group of tables. Alternative estimates of models' 
prediction error are provided by adjusting the overall apparent error rate generated 
on estimation samples for the downward bias approximated with Efron's 
formulation (as given by expressions 3.25-3.27). The choice of the relevant cutoff 
probability value influences to a great extent the classification results. Given that the 
differential in the relative costs of Type I error (when a failing firm is misclassified) 
and Type H error (when a non-failing firm is misclassifled) depends on the decision 
context, which is unknown, here we assume symmetrical costs and provide 
classificatory and predictive accuracy for a wide range of cutoff probability values. 
3.3.1 Models Utilising Financial Ratios 
We now turn to a description of a series of logit functions estimated with the data on 
financial ratios. A general specification for these models is solely based on the 25 
financial inputs, capturing various aspects of financial performance and position. 
The overall fit for the parsimonious models for each of the four years prior to failure 
(Tables 3.3 and 3.4) is acceptable as the ; r' statistics for the joint significance of 
model parameters exceed respective critical values at the 0.1% level. The one-year 
prior model shows the best fit in terms of the Likelihood Ratio Index (Table 3.3). As 
indicated above, the results for one year prior to failure (Table 3.3) correspond to the 
information contained in the last accounts a failing company releases. These results, 
therefore, record the state of severe (and thus, possibly, easily identifiable) financial 
distress and are usable for up to one-year predictions only. One-year results suggest 
that all obtained empirical determinants are significant at the level of 5% and better. 
A turnover measure, given by creditors turnover, capital gearing, the liquidity factor, 
represented by the working capital ratio, and the payout ratio have expected signs, 
suggesting that a company with relatively lower creditors turnover, higher gearing, 
lower liquidity, and a smaller proportion of earnings, paid out as dividends, is more 
likely to fail. The signs of profitability ratios indicate that nearer the point of entering 
an insolvency regime, failing firms in our sample have negative operating profits, 
which might be interpreted as a symptom of economic distress, do not generate 
184 
CHAPTER 3 
Table 3.3 Financial Ratio-Based Models: 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
One and Two Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period, 
53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years (n=421) 
Dimension 
Variable 
One Year Prior to 
Failure 
Coefficient 
(two-tailedp-value of 
asymptotic I-statistic) 
Two Years Prior to 
Failure 
Coefficient 
(two-tailedp-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Constant -3.249 (0.000) -2.517 (0.000) 
Size 
Log Total Sales -0.455 (0.022) 
Profitability 
Return on Shareholders' Capital 1.370 (0.006) 
Return on Capital employed -1.244 (0.001) Operating Profit Margin -0.813 (0.017) Pre-tax Profit Margin 
Net Profit Margin 
Cumulative Profitability 
Turnover 
Turnover/Net Current Assets 
Debtors Turnover 
Creditors Turnover -0.450 (0.048) Gearing 
Capital Gearing 0.667 (0.001) 
Income Gearing 
Borrowing Ratio 
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities -0.705 (0.000) Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves 
Liquidity 
Working Capital Ratio -1.789 (0.000) -1.124 (0.000) Quick Assets Ratio 
Working Capital / Assets Employed 
Other Financial Variables 
Payout Ratio -1.312 (0.020) -0.800 (0.056) Assets Index 
Tax Ratio 
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -103.55 -125.85 
z2 statistic of LR Test (p-value) 111.61 (0.000) 67.00 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.325 0.179 
n 421 
Percent Failed 12.6 
185 
CHAPTER 3 
Table 3.4 Financial Ratio-Based Models: 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
Tbree and Four Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period, 
53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years (n=421) 
Three Years Prior to Four Years Prior to 
Failure Failure 
Dimension Coefficient 
Coefficient 
(two-tailedp-value of (two-tailedp-value of 
Variable asymptotic t-statistic) asymptotic t-statistic) 
Constant -2.263 (0.000) -2.458 (0.000) 
Size 
Log Total Sales -0.804 (0.000) -1.020 (0.000) 
Profitability 
Return on Shareholders' Capital 
Return on Capital employed 
Operating Profit Margin 
Pre-tax Profit Margin 
Net Profit Margin 
Cumulative Profitability 
Turnover 
Turnover/Net Current Assets 0.225 (0.017) 
Debtors Turnover 
Creditors Turnover 
Gearing 
Capital Gearing 0.828 (0.000) 
Income Gearing 0.865 (0.023) 
Borrowing Ratio 0.937 (0.007) 
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities ý0.439 (0.005) 
Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves -1.312 (0.002) 
Liquidity 
Working Capital Ratio -0.701 (0.001) 
Quick Assets Ratio 
Working Capital / Assets Employed 
Other Financial Variables 
Payout Ratio 
Assets Index 0.368 (0.007) 
Tax Ratio -0.796 (0.050) 
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -134.65 -125.02 
, "'2 statistic of LR Test (p-value) 49.39 (0.000) 68.64 
(0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.122 0.185 
n 421 
Percent Failed 12.6 
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Table 3.5 Classification and Predictive Ability of Financial Ratio-Based Models, 
One and Two Years Prior to Failure: 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
1988-91 Estimation Period 
(53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years); 
1992-94 Holdout Period 
(10 Failed and 86 Non-failed Companies). 
Panel A: One Year Prior to Failure: Correct Classffication, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 . 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample 
Non-failed 73.6 79.1 92.7 97.8 99.2 99.5 
Failed 90.6 79.2 54.7 45.3 18.9 9.4 
Overall 75.8 79.1 87.9 91.2 89.1 88.1 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 1.9 2.4 3.9 5.2 6.2 6.5 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 26.1 23.3 16.0 14.0 17.1 18.4 
Holdout Sample 
Non-failed 73.3 77.9 90.7 96.5 96.5 96.5 
Failed 100.0 100.0 60.0 40.0 30.0 30.0 
Overall 76.1 80.2 87.5 90.6 89.6 89.6 
Panel B: Two Years Prior to Failure: Correct ClassifIcation, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample 
Non-failed 67.7 75.8 93.2 98.4 99.2 99.7 
Failed 86.8 77.4 45.3 18.9 7.5 3.8 
Overall 70.1 76 87.2 88.4 87.6 87.6 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 2.1 2.6 4.1 5.1 5.5 5.7 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 32.0 26.6 16.9 16.7 17.9 18.1 
Holdout Sample 
Non-failed 59.3 65.1 88.4 96.5 98.8 100 
Failed 80.0 70.0 50.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 
Overall 61.5 65.6 84.4 88.5 89.6 89.6 
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Table 3.6 Classification and Predictive Ability of Financial Ratio-Based Models, 
Three and Four Years Prior to Failure: 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
1988-91 Estimation Period 
(53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years); 
1992-94 Holdout Period 
(10 Failed and 86 Non-failed Companies). 
Panel A: Three Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample 
Non-failed 62.8 75.5 92.4 98.4 99.7 99.7 
Failed 83.0 73.6 34 9.4 3.8 3.8 
Overall 65.3 75.3 85 87.2 87.6 87.6 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 1.8 2.3 3.8 5 5.3 5.4 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 36.5 27.0 18.8 17.8 17.7 17.8 
Holdout Sample 
Non-failed 27.9 29.1 34.9 38.4 40.7 40.7 
Failed 50.0 40.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Overall 30.2 30.2 34.4 37.5 39.6 39.6 
Panel B: Four Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample 
Non-failed 67.9 75.3 90.2 98.6 100 100 
Failed 77.4 69.8 39.6 24.5 9.4 1.9 
Overall 69.1 74.6 83.8 89.3 88.6 87.6 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 2.1 2.6 4.2 5.6 6.3 6.5 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 33.0 28.0 20.4 16.3 17.7 18.9 
Holdout Sample 
Non-failed 60.5 65.1 83.7 94.2 95.3 95.3 
Failed 80.0 80.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Overall 62.5 66.7 80.2 84.4 85.4 85.4 
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sufficient return on capital used, but might show a positive return on shareholders' 
capital. This counterintuitive, positive relation between returns on shareholders' 
capital and failure risk could simply be due to the DATASTREAM specification of 
the ratio used. It is possible, that in the last reporting year, combinations of negative 
numbers for after-tax profits and negative values for shareholders' funds result in a 
positively signed ratio. 
Failure determinants for earlier years, are revealed by models for two, three, and four 
years prior to failure. All predictors in the models for two through to four years prior 
to failure, except the turnover ratio in the model for three years prior (Table 3.4), 
have signs that are logically acceptable. Reinforcing the styliscd fact that smaller 
firms exit first (see e. g. Dunne, Roberts, Samuelson, 1989), size measured byt he 
logarithm of net sales appears indicative of insolvency in years two through to four 
prior to failure. The coefficient of the size variable is significant at the 5% level and 
better and negatively related to failure. The model based on accounts for two years 
prior to failure (Table 3.3), gives a strong indication that failing firms generate 
insufficient cash flow from operations (the ratio of gross cash flow to total liabilities 
is significant at the 0.1% level) and have inadequate current assets (the working 
capital ratio is significant at the 0.1% level). Failing firms also seem to pay out as 
dividends a smaller proportion of their earnings if compared with non-failing firms, 
however, the payout ratio is significant only at the 10% level. The three-year prior 
model (Table 3.3) indicates that, over this risk-horizon, high gearing, measured by 
capital and income g earing, d istinguishes t he I ikely to fail firms from t he h ealthy 
ones. A positive relationship is also observed between current assets turnover and 
the probability of failure. This problematic sign might be consistent with the view 
that highly geared and fast growing companies fared least well during the 1990-92 
recession. The model derived from financial statements for four years prior to failure 
(Table 3.4) strongly suggests that failing companies seriously lack liquidity in the 
earlier years. When compared with a healthy company profile, failing firms appear to 
have comparatively less debt repayable in more than one year, but borrow more from 
short-term sources to compensate for insufficient current assets and low levels of 
their gross cash flow relative to total liabilities. This is implied by the positively 
signed borrowing ratio and the negatively signed ratio of loan capital to equity and 
189 
CHAPTER 3 
reserves, which jointly signal the failing company's reliance on borrowings with less 
that one year maturity. The failing companies' reliance on borrowings with less that 
one year maturity, is also consistent with the negative coefficients on the ratio of 
gross cash flow to total liabilities and on the working capital ratio. The four-year 
prior model suggests the importance of changes in the value of net tangible assets - 
the coefficient of the assets index is positive and indicates that failing firms are 
likely to demonstrate higher assets growth (in terms of book values), which probably 
increases their borrowing capacity, facilitating access to credit. In the four-year prior 
model, the tax ratio has a negative sign, indicating that for the case of failing firms, 
tax payments represent a lower proportion in pre-tax profits. As mentioned in section 
3.2.2.2, the tax charge is subject to factors unconnected with the current year 
performance. Therefore, to understand which factors brought about a negative 
relation between the tax ratio and the risk of failure, one will need more detailed 
information about tax payments, profits, investment, and dividend policy during the 
years preceding insolvency. However, the spectrum of financial attributes in our data 
set is insufficient to examine in greater detail the causes of the negative sign on the 
tax variable. 
As far as the classification and predictive ability of obtained accounting ratio-based 
models is concerned, the question of interest is of finding to what extent the results 
are coherent. Models, predicting within one and two years (Table 3.5), generate 
relatively robust, across a wide range of cutoff probability values, estimates of the 
overall error rate adjusted for the bias evaluated by Efron's formulation (expressions 
(3.25)-(3.27)). Prediction error estimates vary from 14 per cent to 26.1 per cent for 
year one prior (Panel A in Table 3.5), and lie between 16.7 per cent to 32 per cent for 
two years prior (Panel B in Table 3.5). Roughly similar accuracy is demonstrated in 
holdout tests, the exception being a 0.1 cutoff, at which the two-year prior model 
incorrectly identifies 38.5 per cent of observations as compared with the 23.9 per 
cent estimate of the overall error rate from one-year predictions. Noticeably, at cutoff 
values of 0.25 and greater, models for one and two years prior to failure perform 
better at predicting non-failures than failures, demonstrating high rates of Type I 
error. This finding can be explained by the sample design, which results in the non- 
failed group representing 87.4 per cent of estimation sample observations and 89.6 
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per cent of holdout sample observations. Therefore, the overall classification rate is 
influenced by the relatively low sample frequency. As Table 3.5 shows, applying a 
cutoff point of 0.875 generates high, within-sample overall classification rates of 
88.1 per cent for one year before failure and 87.6 percent for two years before 
failure, however, the success rate for the failure outcome drops to 9.4 per cent and 
3.8 per cent, respectively. On the estimation sample observations representing failing 
firms, the highest accuracy of 90.6 and 86.8 per cent is achieved at a conservative 
cutoff point of 0.1, for o ne- a nd t wo-year h orizons, r espectively; w hile t he c utoff 
value of 0.125 that closely corresponds with the estimation sample proportion of 
failed companies equal to 12.6 per cent, returns correct classification rates of 79.2 
per cent and 77.4 per cent. As discussed in section 3.2.3, the recent literature (see, 
e. g., Cramer, 1999) suggests that for assessing the within-sample performance of a 
model derived from an unbalanced sample, the cutoff probability taken from sample 
frequencies is the appropriate one to use. Holdout tests show that at 0.1 and 0.125 
cutoff values, the one-year prior model still retains the classificatory accuracy, 
demonstrated on the training sample, identifying all failed firms and correctly 
predicting 73.3 per cent and 77.9 per cent of solvent companies. Raising a cutoff 
value further to 0.25 results in a rapid decline of the correct classification rates for 
failed companies in both estimation and holdout samples: models for time-horizons 
of one and two years correctly predict 54.7 and 45.3 per cent of failing firms, 
respectively, w hile h oldout t ests c lassify c orrectly 60p er cent and 50 per cent of 
failing firms. 
Table 3.6 describes the classificatory and predictive ability of accounting ratio-based 
models for three and four years before failure. The performance of the four-year 
prior model, in terms of overall prediction error magnitudes and robustness on both 
estimation and holdout observations, is remarkably similar to that of the one-year 
model and two-year model, detailed in Table 3.5. However, when the threc-year 
model is considered, the overall correct classification rate from the holdout test 
achieves 30.2 per cent at the 0.1 cutoff and climbs only to 39.6 per cent at the 0.875 
cutoff, thus being in sharp contrast with the holdout results for other years and 
indicating an overfittcd model. In the model for three years prior to failure, the poor 
approximation of the holdout data corresponds to the lowest goodness of fit amongst 
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the four models - the respective values for the likelihood at c onvergence a nd t he 
Likelihood Ratio Index are -134.65 and 0.122 (Table 3.4). However, if accuracy is 
judged by the criterion of the adjusted apparent error rate, the three-year prior model 
is likely to forecast no worse than models for other risk-horizons - the estimates of 
prediction error lie between 17.7 and 36.5 per cent (Panel A in Table 3.6). 
It is not easy to compare predictive performance of models and the importance of 
obtained accounting-based predictors, with results from earlier UK work, as it 
appears that only one study, Alici (1995), reports evidence from 1987-92. Alici 
documents that a logit model and neural networks derived from an unbalanced 
sample of firms, which contains accounting data for one year prior to failure, 
misclassify, respectively, 34 per cent and 26 per cent of holdout observations. Thus 
the holdout approximation in Alici (1995) is roughly similar to accuracy levels 
observed in the present study for one, two, and four years prior to failure. 67 Alici's 
logit model indicates the importance of the profitability dimension (measured by 
profit before tax to total capital employed), the liquidity position (proxied by ratios 
of quick assets to current liabilities and working capital to total assets), and the 
degree of gearing (measured by the ratio of equity to total assets). Broadly defined, 
these dimensions are reflected in the model estimated here for one year prior to 
failure (see Table 3.3), although it is impossible to infer the usefulness and 
performance stability of individual ratio constructs as the determinants of failure. 
When compared to logit results in Keasey and McGuinness (1990), who also use 
the standard ratio constructs from DATASTREAM for their analysis of UK 
company failure for 1976-84, the models, presented here, seem to demonstrate more 
stable classification a ccuracy att he c ritical p robabilities t hat m inimise t he o verall 
error rate. For instance, at a cutoff of 0.5, the downward bias-adjusted estimates of 
the overall error rate, for years one through to four, are 14 per cent, 16.7 per cent, 
17.8 per cent, and 16.3 per cent, whereas unadjusted (and therefore downward 
biased) primary sample error rates reported in Keasey and McGuinness (1990) are 14 
per cent, 18.5 per cent, 23.5 per cent, and 30 per cent for years one to four before 
failure. As for the significance of individual variables, our results differ from a quite 
67 The basis for comparison and generalisations is also restricted by the lack of details on cutoff values used in 
Alici (1995). 
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incoherent pattern of importance of company performance dimensions in Keasey and 
McGuinness (1990), who also measure financial performance and position with 
DATASTREAM ratios. In sum, our models in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 paint the following 
picture. Gearing is a quite robust empirical determinant and important for all four 
years, size mearured by net sales has a reasonable degree of explanatory power for 
two through to four years prior to failure, liquidity is important for years one, three, 
and four prior, and profitability being insignificant over longer risk-horizons is 
important for year one prior to failure . 
6' Finally, our results do not appear to be in 
line with the evidence for the earlier period 1968-73, presented in Taffler (1982). 
Although we observe a similar noticeable independent role of gearing both over 
shorter and over longer risk-horizons, our modelling with the financial ratio data for 
the e arly I 990s d oes n ot s upport t he s trong I ink from low profitability to failure, 
reported in Taffler's work. In contrast to the studies documented a strong 
explanatory power of market valuation variables (e. g., Morris, 1997), the market to 
book ratio, a proxy for the future prospects of the firm, has not been selected as a key 
predictor by the econometric modelling procedures adopted in this chapter. 
3.3.2 Models Utilising Financial Ratios and Macroeconomic Variables 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 contain estimates for a series of four models that incorporate 
financial ratios alongside one-year lagged, unanticipated changes (or "surprises") in 
the real effective exchange rate and nominal interest rate. The starting specification 
being tested down to produce this series of models is richer than that used for the 
series of basic models of the previous section, based on financial ratios alone. The 
crude modelling assumption made here is that time series for both the nominal 
interest rate and the real exchange rate follow a random walk, implying that the 
entire change in a macroeconomic indicator is unanticipated. It is important to notice 
that we assume a lagged relation between the changes in a macroeconomic variable 
and their full economic impact on the firm's performance as rcflected in financial 
accounts and market valuation. The effect of changes in economic conditions on 
68 Profitability was not found to be a significant distinguishing characteristic in the US study documented in 
Zavgren (1985). 
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Table 3.7 Models Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables: 69 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
One and Two Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period , 
53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years (n=421) 
One Year Prior to Two Years Prior to 
Failure Failure 
Dimension Coefficient 
Coefficient 
(two-tailedp-value of (two-tailed p-value of 
Variable asymptotic t-statistic) asymptotic t-statistic) 
Constant -5.481 (0.000) -2.682 (0.000) 
Size 
Log Total Sales -0.540 (0.010) 
Profitability 
Return on Shareholders' Capital 3.895 (0.000) 
Return on Capital employed -3.778 (0.000) 
Operating Profit Margin 
Pre-tax Profit Margin 
Net Profit Margin 
Cumulative Profitability 
Turnover 
Turnover/Net Current Assets 
Debtors Turnover 
Creditors Turnover 
Gearing 
Capital Gearing 1.641 (0.000) 
Income Gearing 
Borrowing Ratio 0.548 (0.030) 
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities -0.727 (0.001) 
Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves 
Liquidity 
Working Capital Ratio -0.980 (0.002) 
Quick Assets Ratio 
Working Capital / Assets Employed -1.222 (0.018) 
Other Financial Variables 
Payout Ratio 
Assets Index 
Tax Ratio 
Non-financial Variables 
Change in Real Exchange Rate 190.452 (0.002) 35.066 (0.000) 
Change in Nominal Interest Rate 31.230 (0.000) 
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -25.90 -115.69 
,,, v2 statistic of LR Test 
(p-value) 266.90 (0.000) 87.31 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.831 0.246 
N 421 
Percent Failed 12.6 
6' Models include a macroeconomic dummy interacted with the two macroeconomic variables. 
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Table 3.8 Models Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables: 70 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
Three and Four Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period, 
53 Failed Companies and 3 68 Non-failed Company-years (n=42 1) 
Dimension 
Variable 
Three Years Prior to 
Failure 
Coefficient 
(two-tailedp-value of 
asymptotic t-statistic) 
Four Years Prior to 
Failure 
Coefficient 
(two-tailedp-value of 
asymptotic I-statistic) 
Constant -2.519 (0.000) -3.243 (0.000) 
Size 
Log Total Sales -0.651 (0.001) -0.621 (0.028) 
Profitability 
Return on Shareholders' Capital 
Return on Capital employed 
Operating Profit Margin 1.441 (0.045) 
Pre-tax Profit Margin -1.683 (0.034) 
Net Profit Margin 
Cumulative Profitability 
Turnover 
Turnover/Net Current Assets 
Debtors Turnover 
Creditors Turnover 
Gearing 
Capital Gearing 0.867 (0.000) 
Income Gearing 0.751 (0.043) 
Borrowing Ratio 1.126 (0.025) 
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities 
Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves -1.374 (0.021) 
Liquidity 
Working Capital Ratio -0.699 (0.036) 
Quick Assets Ratio 
Working Capital / Assets Employed 
Other Financial Variables 
Payout Ratio 
Assets Index 
Tax Ratio -1.478 (0.009) 
Non-financial Variables 
Change in Real Exchange Rate 32.773 (0.000) -122.365 (0.000) 
Change in Nominal Interest Rate -26.655 (0.000) 21.104 (0.000) 
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -118.31 -81.04 j statistic of LR Test (p-value) 82.08 (0.000) 156.63 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.228 0.472 
_ N 421 
Percent Failed 12.6 
70 Models include a macroeconomic dummy interacted with the two macroeconomic variables. 
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Table 3.9 Classification and Predictive Ability of Models 
Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables: 
One and Two Years Prior to Failure, 
Classifications and Predictions Conditioned on Interactive Effects 
between Macroeconomic Variables and Failure. 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of LJK Companies, 
1988-91 Estimation Period 
(53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years); 
1992-94 Holdout Period 
(10 Failed and 86 Non-failed Companies) 
Panel A: One Year Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample 
Non-failed 
Failed 
Overall 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 
Holdout Sample 
Non-failed 
Failed 
Overall 
97.6 98.6 99.2 99.5 99.5 100 
94.3 94.3 92.5 90.6 84.9 83 
97.1 98.1 98.3 98.3 97.6 97.9 
1.1 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.3 
4.0 3.1 3.1 3.4 4.5 4.4 
98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 
20.0 20.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
90.6 90.6 90.6 89.6 89.6 89.6 
Panel B: Two Years Prior to Failure: Correct ClassUication, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample 
Non-failed 
Failed 
Overall 
Overall Error Rate Dias Estimated 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 
Holdout Sample 
73.1 79.9 95.4 98.6 99.2 99.7 
75.5 73.6 56.6 39.6 17.0 9.4 
73.4 79.1 90.5 91.2 88.8 88.4 
2.1 2.5 3.7 4.7 5.3 5.6 
28.7 23.4 13.2 13.5 16.5 17.2 
Non-failed 29.1 38.4 68.6 93.0 97.7 98.8 
Failed 100.0 80.0 50.0 50.0 10.0 0.0 
Overall 36.5 42.7 66.7 88.5 88.5 88.5 
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Table 3.10 Classification and Predictive Ability of Models 
Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables: 
Three and Four Years Prior to Failure, 
Classifications and Predictions Conditioned on Interactive 
Effects between Macroeconomic Variables and Failure. 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
1988-91 Estimation Period; 
(53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years), 
1992-94 Holdout Period 
(10 Failed and 86 Non-failed Companies) 
Panel A: Three Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
_Cutoff 
Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample 
Non-failed 
Failed 
Overall 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 
Holdout Sample 
78.2 84.5 96.5 99.2 99.5 100.0 
84.9 79.2 56.6 41.5 18.9 5.7 
79.1 83.8 91.4 91.9 89.3 88.1 
2.1 2.6 3.7 4.7 5.4 5.8 
23.0 18.8 12.3 12.8 16.1 17.7 
Non-failed 38.4 38.4 39.5 43.0 43.0 45.3 
Failed 40.0 40.0 40.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Overall 38.5 38.5 39.6 41.7 41.7 43.8 
Panel B: Four Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classirication, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample 
Non-failed 87.8 92.7 96.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Failed 83.0 83.0 77.4 67.9 52.8 41.5 
Overall 87.2 91.4 93.8 96.0 94.1 92.6 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.4 5.0 5.4 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 15.2 11.2 9.7 8.4 10.9 12.8 
Holdout Sample 
Non-failed 80.2 80.2 81.4 81.4 83.7 83.7 
Failed 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 
Overall 78.1 78.1 79.2 79.2 81.3 81.3 
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failure risk is modelled by employing an interactive dummy variable, which equals 
unity for failing companies. This dummy variable is used in interactions with each of 
the two macroeconomic variables. This is an essential and novel feature of the 
specification capable to account for the influence the contextual factors when 
modelling failure at the firm level. Clearly, if in estimation the macroeconomic 
dummy w ere s et to unity for all observations, - then the resultant model could not 
discriminate and identify the macro effects as the mean value would be the same for 
failed firms as well as for non-failed firms. As discussed in section 3.2.2.4, one can 
argue that non-failed firms forecast the future environmental conditions more 
accurately, being able to better, faster and at I ow c osts r eact to" surprises" int he 
macroeconomy. Hence, in modelling, we assume that performance and survival of 
industrial firms are sensitive to one-year lagged unanticipated changes because of the 
failing firms' inability to adequately assess the impact of the changes and alter their 
activities in response to the new trading conditions. We judge the relevance of 
changes in the environment as measured by the two macroeconomic variables by 
examining both the significance of individual coefficient estimates and the accuracy 
of conditional predictions on primary and holdout observations. The predictive 
impact of the macroeconomic variables is identified in this way so that outside of 
sample it can be used to predict failure in all firms. In holdout tests, outside the 
estimation period, we assume that all firms are at risk of failure and set the 
macroeconomic dummy to unity for both failing and non-failed firms. 
Results presented in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 indicate that all four models for years one 
through to four before the event of failure show acceptable overall performance with 
the Likelihood Ratio ; r' statistics being significant at the 0.1% level. In terms of the 
log-likelihood at convergence and Likelihood Ratio Index, the two best models are 
the model for one year prior (the respective values are -25.9 and 0.831) and the 
model for four years prior (-81.04 and 0.472, respectively). The two external factors, 
approximating trading risks, appear significant explanatory variables of failure risk. 
For the firms in our sample, failure risk depends on the changes in competitiveness 
imposed by shifts in the exchange rate. The coefficient for the unanticipated change 
in the real exchange rate is significant at the 1% level and better, over all four years 
preceding failure, being positively signed in in odels for y ears o ne, t wo, a nd t hree 
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prior to failure, but being negative in the model for four years prior. Overall, this 
indicates that increases in the real exchange rate precipitated company failure during 
the 1990s recession. To help interpreting this positive influence it might be 
important to recall that the pattern for the real exchange rate was actually quite 
volatile from 1986 to the beginning of 1991 (see, e. g., 'Understanding the UK 
Economy", 1997). The real effective exchange rate showed a rising tendency from 
90.6 in 1986 to 97.3 in 1988, was falling to 96.6 in 1989 and rising again to 102.0 in 
1991.71 In general, if firms with direct international operations are considered, then 
exporters and firms with foreign operations that have current or future cash inflows 
denominated in foreign currency will benefit from depreciation, while importers of 
final products or inputs to production, as well as users of domestically available 
inputs, whose prices are determined in international markets, will benefit from 
appreciation. But, these are only direct consequences of the changes in the exchange 
rate on the revenue and cash flow position of companies, and their ability to meet 
debt obligations. The second indirect impact relies on the fact that exchange rate 
changes are likely to result in changes in other macroeconomic variables such as 
interest rates. Therefore, the unexpected exchange rate movements are also likely to 
have impact on firms that have no direct international activities. However, due to the 
limited range of company characteristics described by the data available for the 
present study, it is impossible to identify the sampled firms' linkages to international 
conditions and account for this factor in modelling. 
Nevertheless, this element of changes in the interest rate, induced by movements in 
the exchange rate, is controlled in our analysis, because the models presented in 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 capture the unanticipated changes in the nominal interest rate. 
Overall, the nominal interest rate effect is adverse and positive, exacerbating 
financial constraints and leading to a higher risk of failure. During the downturn in 
the late 1980s, the unanticipated rises in the nominal interest rate might have been 
especially harmful for firms dependent on the home market, while exporters were 
less affected by the domestic recession. This interpretation seems to be reconcilable 
with the evidence from a large-scale survey of UK leading firms reported in Geroski 
71 Annual avcrages; 1990--100.0. 
Source: PRIMARK DATASTREAM. 
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and Gregg (1996), that export oriented firms and foreign owned firms fared better 
during the 1990s recession. Therefore, one possible interpretation of the positive 
relation between the unanticipated rise in the real exchange rate and the probability 
of failure, detected in the sample, could be a loss of competitiveness in the domestic 
market due to the overvalued currency. The second possible explanation of the 
positive effect of the exchange rate "surprises" is via the link to the rises in domestic 
prices and short-term interest rates, which adversely affected highly geared, 
distressed firms predominantly dependent on the domestic market. 
Turning now to a more detailed description of the impact of interest rates, the 
models for years one, three, and four before failure yield as an important determinant 
the change in the nominal interest rate, which is significant at the 0.1% level (Tables 
3.7 and 3.8). We have discussed in chapters 1 and 2 the notion that high nominal 
interest rates translate into high failure rates. High interest rates raise costs of 
business borrowing, increase unit costs, signal inflation, and might induce recession. 
Moreover if long-term interest rates are high, then an increased cost of capital might 
entice firms into shifting their preferences towards riskier investment projects 
associated with higher rates of expected return required to afford debt finance. In 
other words, rises in nominal interest rates are unlikely to better the failure risk 
profile of industrial firms. Obviously, in analysing the effects of increases in nominal 
interest rates on the cost of capital, account should be taken of the contemporaneous 
rise in the rate of inflation. The positively signed coefficients for the variable 
representing unanticipated changes in the nominal interest rate in models for years 
one and four prior to failure are consistent with this contention. Unexpected 
increases may apply with particular force to the companies in our sample, which 
pertain to the early 1990s. A report by The Bank of England suggested that in the 
early 1990s, subdued equity issues and a fall in short-term interest rates following 
the stock market crash of October 1987, encouraged companies to issue long-term 
debt and increase short-term borrowing. The capital gearing of UK industrial and 
commercial companies rose significantly over the early 1990s being about three 
times higher than in 1980s (Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, August 1993). A 
sharp rise in interest rates from 1988 increased companies' debt service costs while 
the subsequent recession lowered companies' ability to service debt. 
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In the model for three years prior to failure (Table 3.8) the coefficient of the interest 
rate variate is "incorrectly" signed suggesting the negative relation between high 
nominal interest rates and the probability of failure. A similar "empirical anomaly" 
has been observed in the UK study by Simmons (1989) and in the US study by 
Assadian and Ford (1997). 
The inclusion of the two macroeconomic variables in model development alters the 
relative importance of major financial dimensions demonstrated by the basic models 
reported in section 3.3.1. Similarly to the results from the series of financial ratio- 
based models, the coefficient for the size variable is significant at the level of 5% 
and better, for years two, three, and four before failure, indicating the ultimate 
importance of the ability to generate revenues. An interesting result is that 
profitability measures are now important over both short and longer risk-horizons, 
with such measures as rates of return, the pre-tax profit margin, and the operating 
profit margin entering models for one year prior and for four years prior to failure. 
The model for one year prior to failure (Table 3.7) suggests, that the directions, in 
which profitability ratios (significant at the 0.1% level) influence the probability of 
insolvency, match the pattern revealed by the model based on financial ratios alone 
(see Table 3.3). The rate of return on shareholders' capital retains its positive sign 
and the rate of return on capital employed is again negatively signed. In the four-year 
prior model (Table 3.8), profitability measures, significant at the 5% level, imply 
that failing firms have lower pre-tax profit margins (exclusive of interest and non- 
recurring items) despite the fact that their operating profit margins are higher as 
compared with non-failing firms, suggesting the absence of economic distress. 
Therefore, it appears that failing firms in our sample exhibit profitability problems as 
early as four years before insolvency. Models with macroeconomic variables appear 
to reiterate the key role of the geared c apital s tructure ina 11 four y ears p receding 
failure, as gearing measures are all correctly signed and significant at the 5% level 
and better (Tables 3.7 and 3.8). Precipitating failure, relatively lower liquidity ratios 
are important in years one and four before failure (the respective coefficients are 
significant at the 5% level). As with the models based only on financial variables, 
lower tax ratios are associated with a higher probability of failure in four years time 
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(Table 3.8). Lastly, none of the models indicates that turnover helps explain the 
failure probability. 
Evaluation of the obtained failure determinants by way of assessing model 
perfonnance in terms of correct and incorrect predictions is described in Tables 3.9 
and 3.10. 
Predictions, generated by applying the one-year prior model to the estimation sample 
(Panel A in Table 3.9), indicate that conditioning on the effects of macroeconomic 
variables improves correct classification rates for failed and non-failed firms as 
compared to the financial ratio-based model for the one-year horizon (Panel A in 
Table 3.5). An improvement across different cutoff probability values is consistent 
with the decreased level of the overall prediction error, adjusted for the downward 
bias using Efron's formula, which is now 4.5 per cent and better (Panel A in Table 
3.9). However, the results of predicting holdout firms reveal the model's poor 
performance in detecting failed firms and hence a less stable relationship between 
the changes in incorporated macroeconomic variables and failure risk for the short 
risk-horizon. For instance, the Type I error r ate r eaches 90p er c ent, a Ithough t he 
overall error rate is low, ranging from 9.4 per cent to 10.4 per cent (Panel A in Table 
3.9). 
Predictive performance of the model for two years prior to failure (Panel B in Table 
3.9) is somewhat dissimilar from that of the one-year prior model. First, we should 
point out a deterioration in the holdout approximation at cutoff values of 0.1 and 
0.125, as compared to the financial ratio-based model performance (Panel B in Table 
3.5). When cutoff probability values of 0.1 and 0.125 are used, Type I error rates fall 
to zero and 20 per cent, respectively. But the overall accuracy declines to the levels 
of 36.5 and 42.7 per cent, being much worse than the correct prediction rate of 61.5 
per cent and better shown by the basic, financial ratio-bascd model constructed for 
this time-horizon (Panel B in Table 3.5). 
The importance for modelling failure risk over longer time-horizons of the 
macroeconomic f actors is suggested by the classificatory and predictive ability of 
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models built for pre-insolvency years three and four (Table 3.10). In comparison to 
the basic model, utilising financial ratios only (Panel A in Table 3.6), the three-year 
prior model, augmented with proxies for changes in macroeconomic conditions, 
demonstrates slightly improved accuracy in classifying observations on both the 
estimation sample and the holdout across all cutoff probability values. For instance, 
on the estimation sample, at the 0.1 cutoff, the Type I error rate is reduced from 17 
per cent to 15.1 per cent, whereas the overall error rate falls from 34.7 per cent to 
20.9 per cent. Despite the reduction in misclassification rates generated with holdout 
observations - at the 0.1 cutoff, the Type I error rate falls by 10 per cent while the 
overall error rate declines by 8.3 per cent as compared to the financial ratio-based 
model. The overall predictive power of the three-year prior logit function is again 
poor when judged by the overall error rates, reaching the levels of 56.2 per cent and 
higher (Panel A in Table 3.10). 
An examination of classificatory and predictive power of the four-ycar-pcriod logit 
function gives a picture of better performance. As compared to the results from the 
basic model based solely on financial variables (Panel B in Table 3.6), the four-year- 
period logit function classifies more accurately failed and non-failed firms in 
estimation and holdout samples. Notably, accuracy gains, evidencing the relevance 
of the two macroeconomic variables for the four-year risk-horizon, are present 
across a wide range of cutoff values and consistent with the alternative estimates of 
prediction error adjusted for the downward bias, of 15.2 per cent and better. This is 
also in line with the predictions generated with holdout observations, which produce 
the overall error rate of 21.9 per cent and better, with 40 per cent of failing firms 
being incorrectly classified. A possible interpretation of this improvement in 
predictive performance of the four-year-period logit function is that unanticipated 
rises int he n ominal i nterest r ate a nd u nanticipated f alls int he r eal e xchange r ate 
affected viability of companies in our sample with a delay. 
3.3.3 Models Utilising Financial Ratios and the Duration Term 
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 display the estimation results for a series of logit models when 
a duration variable is added to the general specification based on a wide array of 25 
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candidate measures based on financial statement items, to assess an impact of 
company age on failure risk. 
Judging by overall fit, parsimonious models are well determined, with covariates 
being jointly significant at the 0.1% level. The best fit is shown by a model for year 
one prior to failure, which, amongst the four models, has the highest log-likelihood 
at convergence of -92.11 and the Likelihood Ratio Index of 0.399. The backward 
selection results in all models containing the duration variable that is negatively 
signed and significant at the 0.1% level. On this criterion alone, the age factor helps 
explain insolvency risk, suggesting that younger firms are more prone to failure. 
This negative relationship between firm's age and failure risk for the examined here 
1988-91 cross-section concurs with the findings from the previous research into 
aggregate rates of company bankruptcy and firm's survival by Hudson (1987), 
Turner, C outts, a nd B owden (1992); Altman (1993), and Dunne a nd Hughes 
(1994). The relationship seems to be robust across all four years preceding 
insolvency. Furthermore, given the theoretical and empirical evidence on the inverse 
age-growth relationship (see, e. g., Jovanovic, 1982; Evans, 1987; Dunne and 
Hughes, 1994) the observed negative effect of age might, in part, be explained by 
firm's growth. That notion has been supported by the findings for the UK reported 
by Geroski and Gregg (1996) and Morris (1997) that fast growing, especially via 
acquisitions, firms coped worse with the 1990-92 recession. A negative impact of 
growth via acquisition on UK industrial firms have been registered by Dickerson, 
Gibson, and Tsakalotos (1997) in a study for 1948-77. Disadvantages of this type 
of growth are linked to a number of factors, which tend to delay or reduce the returns 
on the investment. First, there is a possibility that by purchasing existing plant the 
firm may not get exactly what it would prefer had it begun the investment from 
scratch. S econdly, t he a cquired f inn m ight n ot h ave b een w ithout i ts o wn s ets of 
problems, one of which is financial distress. Third, even if the acquired firm has no 
problems, there might be difficulties integrating it with the existing organisational 
structure of the acquirer. In addition to that, the use of debt to finance acquisition is 
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Table 3.11 Models Incorporating the Duration Term: 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of LJK Companies, 
One and Two Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period, 
53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years (n=421) 
One Year Prior to Two Years Prior to 
Failure Failure 
Dimension Coefficient Coefficient 
(two-tailedp-value of (two-tailedp-value of 
Variable asymptotic I-statistic) asymptotic t-statistic) 
Constant -1.805 (0.000) -0.871 (0.012) 
Size 
Log Total Sales 
Profitability 
Return on Shareholders' Capital 1.411 (0.006) 
Return on Capital employed -1.236 (0.002) 
Operating Profit Margin -0.939 (0.013) 
Pre-tax Profit Margin 
Net Profit Margin 
Cumulative Profitability 
Turnover 
Turnover/Net Current Assets 
Debtors Turnover 
Creditors Turnover -0.529 (0.041) 
Gearing 
Capital Gearing 0.683 (0.001) 
Income Gearing 
Borrowing Ratio 
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities -0.908 (0.000) 
Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves 
Liquidity 
Working Capital Ratio -1.071 (0.042) -1.014 (0.001) 
Quick Assets Ratio -1.234 (0.037) 
Working Capital / Assets Employed 
Other Financial Variables 
Payout Ratio -1.078 (0.062) 
Assets Index 
Tax Ratio 
Non-financial Variables 
Duration -2.813 (0.000) -2.602 (0.000) 
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -92.11 -121.62 
,, V2 statistic of LR Test (p-value) 134.48 (0.000) 75.47 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.399 0.207 
n 421 
Percent Failed 12.6 
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Table 3.12 Models Incorporating the Duration Term: 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
Three and Four Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period, 
53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years (n=421) 
Three Years Prior to Four Years Prior to 
Failure Failure 
Dimension Coefficient Coefficient 
(two-tailedp-value of (two-tailedp-value of 
Variable asymptotic t-statistic) asymptotic t-statistic) 
Constant -0.576 (0.104) -0.543 (0.197) 
Size 
Log Total Sales -0.418 (0.048) -0.678 (0.009) 
Profitability 
Return on Shareholders' Capital 
Return on Capital employed 
Operating Profit Margin 
Pre-tax Profit Margin -0.479 (0.020) 
Net Profit Margin 
Cumulative Profitability 0.391 (0.052) 
Turnover 
Turnover/Net Current Assets 
Debtors Turnover 
Creditors Turnover 
Gearing 
Capital Gearing 0.724 (0.001) 
Income Gearing 0.767 (0.047) 
Borrowing Ratio 0.407 (0.070) 1.723 (0.006) 
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities -0.724 (0.000) 
Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves -2.042 (0.002) 
Liquidity 
Working Capital Ratio -0.464 (0.027) 
Quick Assets Ratio -1.234 (0.037) 
Working Capital / Assets Employed 
Other Financial Variables 
Payout Ratio 
Assets Index 0.408 (0.008) 
Tax Ratio -1.129 (0.014) 
Non-financial Variables 
Duration -2.825 (0.000) -3.242 (0.000) 
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -123.06 -110.76 
X2 statistic of LR Test (p-value) 72.58 (0.000) 97.19 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.198 0.278 
n 421 
Percent Failed 12.6 
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Table 3.13 Classification and Predictive Ability of Models 
Incorporating the Duration Term, 
One and Two Years Prior to Failure: 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
1988-91 Estimation Period 
(53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years); 
1992-94 Holdout Period 
(10 Failed and 86 Non-failed Companies) 
Panel A: One Year Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample 
Non-failed 
Failed 
Overall 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 
79.6 82.6 91.8 97.0 99.2 99.7 
90.6 86.8 66.0 43.4 22.6 15.1 
81.0 83.1 88.6 90.3 89.5 89.1 
2.0 2.3 3.8 5.5 6.3 6.7 
21.0 19.2 15.2 15.2 16.8 17.6 
Holdout Sample 
Non-failed 70.9 72.1 84.9 94.2 95.3 95.3 
Failed 100 90.0 80.0 40.0 30.0 30.0 
Overall 74.0 74.0 84.4 88.5 88.5 88.5 
Panel B: Two Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample 
Non-failed 
Failed 
Overall 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 
69.6 77.2 90.8 98.4 99.2 99.2 
88.7 79.2 56.6 17.0 9.4 3.8 
72.0 77.4 86.5 88.1 87.9 87.2 
1.7 2.1 2.1 4.7 5.1 5.2 
29.7 24.7 15.6 16.6 17.2 18.0 
Holdout Sample 
Non-failed 52.3 59.3 81.4 96.5 98.8 100.0 
Failed 90.0 80.0 50.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 
Overall 56.3 61.5 78.1 88.5 89.6 90.6 
207 
CHAPTER 3 
Table 3.14 Classification and Predictive Ability of Models 
Incorporating the Duration Term, 
Tbree and Four Years Prior to Failure: 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
1988-91 Estimation Period 
(53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years); 
1992-94 Holdout Period 
(10 Failed and 86 Non-failed Companies) 
Panel A: Three Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
_Cutoff 
Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample 
Non-failed 
Failed 
Overall 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 
69.8 75.5 89.1 98.4 99.2 99.7 
81.1 69.8 52.8 17.0 3.8 3.8 
71.3 74.8 84.6 88.1 87.2 87.6 
2.1 2.5 4.1 5.9 6.5 6.7 
30.8 27.7 19.5 17.8 19.3 19.1 
Holdout Sample 
Non-failed 26.7 29.1 40.7 44.2 46.5 52.3 
Failed 80.0 80.0 60.0 40.0 30.0 30.0 
Overall 32.3 34.4 42.7 43.8 44.8 50.0 
Panel B: Four Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample 
Non-failed 
Failed 
Overall 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 
72.0 76.6 91.0 99.2 99.7 100.0 
79.2 75.5 50.9 26.4 18.9 9.4 
72.9 76.5 86.0 90.0 89.5 88.6 
2.1 2.6 4.3 6.1 6.8 7.0 
29.2 26.1 18.3 16.1 17.3 18.4 
Holdout Sample 
Non-failed 59.3 65.1 79.1 88.4 94.2 95.3 
Failed 100.0 40.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Overall 63.5 62.5 74.0 79.2 84.4 85.4 
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likely to increase gearing levels and financial risk. 72 We should note at this juncture 
that in future work, an investigation of the impact of past acquisitions on failure risk 
of the sample companies can provide an interesting extension to the cross-sectional 
analysis reported in this chapter. 
Once the age factor has been controlled for, it appears that size has negative effect 
on failure risk over longer time-horizons since it enters the models for three and four 
years before failure (Table 3.12). Profitability ratios (significant at the 10% and 
better) are of importance over short and longer risk-horizons, which is indicated by 
the models for years one, three, and four (Tables 3.11 and 3.12). In year one prior to 
failure, creditors turnover is important and inversely related to failure, but the 
efficiency related ratios are absent from models for two, three, and four years. The 
dimensions of gearing and liquidity are captured by all models and would appear to 
be important for all the four risk-horizons, with the respective coefficient estimates 
being significant at the 5% level and better. The payout ratio, reflecting a dividend 
decrease, is important in the year immediately preceding failure (Table 3.11), 
although its coefficient is significant at the 10% level. The lower tax ratio is 
associated with the higher risk of failure in the four-year prior model. It is of interest 
to notice that the model for year one prior to failure (Table 3.11) includes 
profitability, turnover, gearing, and payout ratios, whose coefficient magnitudes and 
signs, roughly match the parameters of the model based on regular financial ratios 
alone (Table 3.3). In addition, relatively lower liquidity of failing firms is 
highlighted by the working capital ratio and quick assets ratio, both significant (at 
the 5% level) and correctly signed (Table 3.11). The model for two years prior again 
shows insufficient cash flow and persistent liquidity problems of failing firms. The 
coefficients of the ratio of gross cash flow to total liabilities and the working capital 
ratio are highly significant (at the 0.1% level) and correctly signed. The results from 
the model, predicting failure in three years' time (Table 3.12), indicate that size, 
72 Davis (1995) and Gcroski and Grcgg (1996) point out to a period of intense takeover activity in 1983-90, as 
an important cause of heightened gearing in the UK corporate sector in the period prior to the 1990s recession. 
Takeovers can be financed by internal funds or by raising funds externally via issuing debt or equity. Debt 
finance might be particularly attractive because of the tax subsidy to debt due to deductibility of nominal interest 
payments. This motive for using debt finance can also be strengthened by expected inflation because inflation is 
likely to reduce the real cost of borrowing. However, it is hard to precisely ascertain from the literature how 
indebtedness of UK companies was quantitatively affected by takeover activity in the period prior to the 
recession of the early 1990s. 
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profitability, gearing, and liquidity are the important determinants of failure, when 
the age effect is controlled for. The set of estimates establishing predictive 
relationships by the model for four years prior to failure (Table 3.12), suggests that 
in the early years failing firms may well be profitable, which is implied by the 
positive coefficient of the cumulative profitability variable, significant at the 10% 
level. In comparison with the non-failed group, failing firms have higher gearing, 
lack liquidity, and exhibit faster assets growth measured by the index of net tangible 
assets. 
Classification and prediction results for specifications, which include the age variate, 
are presented in Tables 3.13 and 3.14. Noticeably, the accuracy pattern is 
qualitatively comparable with the predictive ability of the models displayed in 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6, which are based on a general specification employing only 
financial ratios. The addition of the duration term improves the fit. All models with 
the duration variable are slightly better at classifying non-failing firms on primary 
samples, demonstrating a Type H error rate not exceeding 30.4 per cent and the 
prediction error estimate of 30.8 per cent or better (Tables 3.13 and 3.14). This 
estimate of prediction error is roughly similar to an estimate of 36.5 per cent and 
better obtained for simpler financial ratio-based models (Tables 3.5 and 3.6). 
However, the holdout approximation does not appear to be clearly suggestive of an 
independent explanatory role of the introduced duration term. When a cutoff 
probability value is set at 0.1, then the models for time-horizons of one, two, and 
four years, discriminate between holdout failed and non-failed firms no better then 
the logit functions based on financial ratios alone. The model for three years prior to 
failure performs equally poorly, although at the 0.1 cutoff it reduces slightly the 
overall error rate from 69.8 per cent to 67.7 per cent (Panel A in Table 3.6 and Panel 
A in Table 3.14). Thus, the holdout results indicate that the inclusion of the duration 
term into a set of traditional financial determinants is likely to deliver no 
improvement in the out-of-estimation-sample performance of the time-period- 
specific models of company failure. It would appear that the provided by the 
duration proxy information has already been captured by a quite wide range of 
measures derived from financial reports. However, conceptually there is a clear 
advantage in having a model specification that contains both financial variables and 
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a duration term since it becomes possible to separately assess the independent effects 
of the firm's financial performance and age on the risk of failure. 
3.3.3 Models Utilising Financial Ratios, Macroeconomic Variables, 
and the Duration Term 
Tables 3.15 and 3.16 present estimates of the independent variable coefficients and 
accompanying statistics for each of the four, time-horizon-specific models of failure 
risk, incorporating financial ratios, macroeconomic variables, and a proxy for the age 
of the firm. The reported values for the log-likelihood at convergence, Likelihood 
Ratio statistics, and Likelihood Ratio Index indicate the acceptable fit and jointly 
significant covariates (at the 0.1% level) for all four models, however the models for 
years one and four prior to failure are slightly better performers on those criteria. The 
parsimonious models in Tables 3.15 and 3.16 are based on a rich general 
specification represented by the 26 firm-specific and 2 macroeconomic variables. As 
expected, these models show better values for the measures of fit than the three 
series of models based on fewer variables (discussed above and displayed in Tables 
3.3-3.4; 3.7-3.8; 3.11-3.12). When compared with the models from Tables 3.7 and 
3.8, where we also explicitly allow for the effects of macroeconomic indicators, a 
remarkable feature of the models with the control for age, is that the significance and 
direction of the macroeconomic variable effects do not practically change when the 
duration term enters the models. However, the key financial determinants differ. We 
shall just remark that this suggests no bias introduced by possible endogeneity. The 
results appear robust to adding the duration term into the general specification with 
the implication that the data from the early 1990s support the link between failure 
risk and unanticipated shifts in the real exchange rate and nominal interest rate. The 
unanticipated c hange int he r eal e xchange r ate iss ignificant ( at t he I% level and 
better) in all models and has the expected positive sign in the models for time- 
horizons of one, two, and three years. Similar to findings from the series of models, 
combining financial ratios with macroeconomic variables (Tables 3.7 and 3.8), 
unanticipated changes in the nominal interest rate are highly significant (at the 1% 
level) and thus important for explaining failure in one, three, and four years prior to 
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Table 3.15 Models Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables and the Duration Term: 73 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
One and Two Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period, 
53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years (n=421) 
One Year Prior to Two Years Prior to 
Failure Failure 
Coefficient Coefficient Dimension (two-tailedp-value of (two-tailedp-value of 
Variable asymptotic t-statistic) asymptotic t-statistic) 
Constant -3.302 (0.000) -1.062 (0.005) 
Size 
Log Total Sales 
Profitability 
Return on Shareholders' Capital 3.960 (0.000) 
Return on Capital employed 4.102 (0.000) 
Operating Profit Margin 
Pre-tax Profit Margin -0.889 (0.000) 
Net Profit Margin 
Cumulative Profitability 
Turnover 
Turnover/Net Current Assets 
Debtors Turnover 
Creditors Turnover 
Gearing 
Capital Gearing 2.211 (0.000) 
Income Gearing 
Borrowing Ratio 0.544 (0.012) 
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities 
Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves 
Liquidity 
Working Capital Ratio -0.741 (0.021) 
Quick Assets Ratio 
Working Capital / Assets Employed 
Other Financial Variables 
Payout Ratio 
Assets Index 
Tax Ratio -0.189 (0.051) 
Non-financial Variables 
Change in Real Exchange Rate 129.658 (0.003) 35.177 (0.000) 
Change in Nominal Interest Rate 28.885 (0.000) 
Duration -3.965 (0.014) -2.772 (0.000) 
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -24.81 -107.10 i statistic of LR Test (p-value) 269.08 (0.000) 104.50 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.838 0.302 
n 421 
Percent Failed 12.6 
73 Models include a macroeconomic dummy interacted with the two macroeconomic variables. 
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Table 3.16 Models Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables and the Duration Term: 74 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
Three and Four Years Prior to Failure; 1988-91 Estimation Period, 
53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years (n=421) 
Three Years Prior to Four Years Prior to 
Failure Failure 
Coefficient Coefficient 
Dimension (two-tailedp-value of (two-tailedp-value of 
Variable asymptotic t-statistic) asymptotic t-statistic) 
Constant -0.798 (0.032) -1.013 (0.033) 
Size 
Log Total Sales 
Profitability 
Return on Shareholders' Capital 
Return on Capital employed 
Operating Profit Margin 2.212 (0.001) 
Pre-tax Profit Margin -0.523 (0.016) -3.739 (0.000) 
Net Profit Margin 1.127 (0.006) 
Cumulative Profitability 
Turnover 
Turnover/Net Current Assets 
Debtors Turnover 
Creditors Turnover 
Gearing 
Capital Gearing 0.615 (0.004) 
Income Gearing 0.730 (0.051) 
Borrowing Ratio 1.547 (0.011) 0.942 (0.048) 
Gross Cash Flow/ Total Liabilities 
Loan Capital/Equity and Reserves -1.047 (0.013) -1.115 (0.051) 
Liquidity 
Working Capital Ratio 
Quick Assets Ratio 
Working Capital / Assets Employed 
Other Financial Variables 
Payout Ratio 
Assets Index 
Tax Ratio -1.819 (0.002) 
Non-financial Variables 
Change in Real Exchange Rate 35.084 (0.000) -122.708 (0.000) 
Change in Nominal Interest Rate -26.325 (0.000) 20.680 (0.000) 
Duration -2.955 (0.000) -3.654 (0.000) 
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -107.02 -73.24 
statistic of LR Test (p-value) 104.65 (0.000) 172.23 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.392 0.522 
n 421 
Per cent Failed 12.6 
74 Models include a macrocconon-dc dummy interacted with the two macroeconomic variables. 
213 
CHAPTER 3 
Table 3.17 Classification and Predictive Ability of Models 
Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables and the Duration Term, 
One and Two Years Prior to Failure: 
Classifications and Predictions Conditioned on Interactive 
Effects between Macroeconomic Variables and Failure. 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
1988-91 Estimation Period 
(53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years); 
1992-94 Holdout Period 
(10 Failed and 86 Non-failed Companies) 
Panel A: One Year Prior to Failure: Correct Classffication, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample: 
Correct Classification 
Non-failed 95.7 97.3 98.6 99.5 100.0 100.0 
Failed 94.3 94.3 94.3 90.6 86.8 84.9 
Overall 95.5 96.9 98.1 98.3 98.3 98.1 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.3 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 5.5 4.2 3.3 3.5 3.8 4.2 
Holdout Sample: 
Correct Classification 
Non-failed 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 
Failed 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 20.0 20.0 
Overall 91.7 91.7 91.7 91.7 90.6 90.6 
Panel B: Two Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample: 
Correct Classification 
Non-failed 76.9 80.4 93.8 98.1 99.5 99.7 
Failed 79.2 77.4 58.5 41.5 24.5 7.5 
Overall 77.2 80.0 89.3 91.0 90.0 88.1 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 1.9 2.2 3.4 4.6 5.4 5.7 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 24.7 22.2 14.1 13.6 15.4 17.6 
Holdout Sample: 
Correct Classification 
Non-failed 48.8 58.1 74.4 90.7 97.7 98.8 
Failed 80.0 80.0 80.0 50.0 10.0 10.0 
Overall 52.1 60.4 75.0 86.5 88.5 89.6 
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Table 3.18 Classification and Predictive Ability of Models 
Incorporating Macroeconomic Variables and the Duration Tenn: 
Tbree and Four Years Prior to Failure, 
Classifications and Predictions Conditioned on Interactive Effects 
between Macroeconomic Variables and Failure. 
Logit Results for the Cross-section of UK Companies, 
1988-91 Estimation Period 
(53 Failed Companies and 368 Non-failed Company-years); 
1992-94 Holdout Period 
(10 Failed and 86 Non-failed Companies) 
Panel A: Three Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classification, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample: 
Correct Classification 
Non-failed 76.6 82.1 94.3 99.2 99.7 100.0 
Failed 83.0 79.2 73.6 41.5 24.5 15.1 
Overall 77.4 81.7 91.7 91.9 90.3 89.3 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 2.1 2.4 3.7 5.2 6.0 6.4 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 24.7 20.7 12.0 13.3 15.7 17.1 
Holdout Sample: 
Correct Classification 
Non-failed 74.4 74.4 74.4 74.4 75.6 76.7 
Failed 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 40.0 
Overall 71.9 71.9 71.9 71.9 72.9 72.9 
Panel B: Four Years Prior to Failure: Correct Classifleation, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.1 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.875 
Estimation Sample: 
Correct Classification 
Non-failed 86.7 89.9 97.3 99.2 100.0 100.0 
Failed 83.0 83.0 79.2 73.6 56.6 43.4 
Overall 86.2 89.1 95.0 96.0 94.5 92.9 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated 2.0 2.3 3.2 4.0 4.8 5.3 
by Efron's Formula 
Estimate of Prediction Error 15.8 13.2 8.2 8.0 10.3 12.4 
Holdout Sample: 
Correct Classification 
Non-failed 80.2 80.2 81.4 81.4 81.4 87.2 
Failed 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 
Overall 78.1 78.1 79.2 79.2 79.2 84.4 
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failure. Models for one and four years prior to failure return an expected positive 
sign for the change in the nominal interest rate, yet the model for three years prior 
reiterates the negative relation between the interest rate "surprise" and the 
probability of failure. Similar to the reported above results of section 3.3.2, changes 
in the nominal interest rate do not enter the final model for two years prior to failure. 
Taken together, the findings suggest that unanticipated rises in the real exchange rate 
and nominal interest rate had a detrimental - especially over longer time-horizons - 
effect on the probability of failure of the sample firms. 
The relevance of the duration variable is again indicated by all four models, the 
respective coefficients are significant at the 5% level and better, and negatively 
signed, implying that younger firms more prone to failure. In contrast to more simple 
model specifications considered above (see Tables 3.3-3.4; 3.7-3.8; and 3.11-3.12), 
the size variable is absent from all four models, whereas profitability measures 
become particularly important for every of the four years (the estimates for 
profitability ratio coefficients are significant at the 5% level and better). This is an 
interesting finding as it shows that, at least for the analysis period, the fundamental 
of profit is important to company survival. Turnover appears to be an unimportant 
factor when firm's age and unanticipated changes in the two macroeconomic 
variables are taken into account. Gearing ratios are important determinants of failure 
over all four years, whilst liquidity distinguishes failing firms from non-failing firms 
only in the two-year prior model. Lastly, the negative tax ratio explains failure in two 
years time and in four years time. Overall, in this series of models, the pattern of 
coefficient signs is found to be highly congruous with a priori expectations although 
two exceptions should be pointed out. The first difficulty is concerned with the 
positive sign on the rate of return on shareholders' capital that appears in the model 
for one year prior to failure (Table 3.15). One way of explaining this "problematic" 
sign for the return on shareholders' capital, which has been already suggested in 
section 3.3.1, is to simply attribute the "counterintuitive" sign to possibly negative 
numbers of ratio constituents and small absolute values of divisors. The second 
problem arises in interpreting the directions of the relation between profitability 
measures and failure risk. In the four-year prior model (Table 3.16), the negatively 
signed pre-tax profit margin appears together with the positively signed net profit 
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margin. This combination would seem to accord with the evidence displayed by the 
models for two and four years prior to failure that failing firms have the tax ratio 
lower as compared to non-failed firms. Given the fact that in our sample tax charges 
may well be driven by factors unconnected with the current year performance it is 
likely that failing firms might be characterised by lower pre-tax profit margins but 
relatively higher net profit margins. 
Tables 3.17 and 3.18 report model validation results, describing the classificatory 
and predictive power of estimated logit functions. On primary (estimation) samples, 
as one would expect, financial ratio-based models conditioned on unanticipated 
changes in the exchange rate and interest rate, and controlling for firm's age, 
demonstrate a better fit then the fit of models based on general specifications 
containing fewer variables. As compared to the results from the "basic" model, 
utilising financial predictors alone (Panel A in Table 3.5), the one-year prior logit 
function identifies more accurately both failed and non-failed companies, 
demonstrating at cutoff values of 0.25 and greater, the misclassification rate of 15.1 
per cent and better for the failed firm category, a reduction by more than 40 per cent 
in Type I error rates (Panel A in Table 3.17). The overall accuracy is also higher, 
reaching 95.5 per cent at a conservative cutoff of 0.1; this estimate is consistent with 
the observed small magnitudes for the downward bias, which range from I to 2.3 per 
cent. However, the one-year prior to failure model with added macroeconomic 
characteristics (Table 3.9) performs on the estimation sample just as well, which 
once more indicates that the addition of the duration term gains no additional 
classificatory power. The two-year prior model, containing the two macroeconomic 
variables and duration term (Panel B in Table 3.17), slightly improves on the correct 
classification rates that are shown for failed firms in the estimation sample by the 
model incorporating the macroeconomic variables (Panel B in Table 3.9). For every 
cutoff probability value, except 0.875, Type I error rates have been reduced by 1.9 
per cent and more. However, the two-year prior model that includes the 
macroeconomic variables and duration term, still mispredicts more than 41.5 per 
cent of failing firms at cutoff probability values of 0.25 and greater (Panel B in Table 
3.17). 
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The three- and four-year horizon models with added macroeconomic variables and 
the duration term (Panels A and B in Table 3.18) show the primary sample 
classificatory accuracy similar to that generated by the three- and four-year functions 
with no duration control (Panels A and B in Table 3.10). The three-year prior model 
classifies failing firms slightly more accurate, for instance, at 0.25 and 0.75 cutoff 
values, Type I error rates have fallen by 17 per cent and by 5.6 per cent, respectively 
(Panel A in Table 3.18). The model also does not reduce the overall error rate on the 
estimation sample. Similar classificatory accuracy on the estimation sample, with 
Type I error rates being reduced by 1.8 per cent and more, is achieved by the four- 
year prior model (Panel B in Table 3.18). 
However, the usefulness of more complete models and the explanatory power of 
extra variables, are judged by the ability of a model to correctly classify new firms 
from the population that produced the estimation sample. It is this data analysis step 
that gives us the answer as to how well the series of augmented models captures the 
phenomenon of LJK company failure in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In our study, 
the holdout data, used to validate models, represent new firms for the post- 
estimation time period. Hence, in model validation, the focus is on the holdout 
results. Predictive accuracy, assessed by holdout tests, indicates that the models for 
the time-horizons of three and four years prior to failure appear to do better in 
capturing factors influencing company insolvency. The strongest results are 
produced by the three-year prior model (Panel A in Table 3.18). In classifying both 
categories of firms, this model outperforms a less comprehensive, with no duration 
term model across all cutoff probability values (Panel A Table 3.10). Type I error 
rates have declined to 60 per cent and better, meaning a reduction in the 
misclassification rate for failing firms by 10 per cent and more. It should be noted, 
that the model would permit 40 per cent (at the 0.875 cutoff value) or 50 per cent (at 
cutoff v alues r anging from 0.1 to0.75) of failing firms to be predicted correctly, 
demonstrating the accuracy levels that compare favourably with random selection. 
Note that our holdout cross-section contains 10 failed and 86 non-failed firms, 
therefore for a holdout failing firm the expected rate of predictive accuracy, based on 
chance, is 10.4 per cent. The model also classifies more accurately holdout non- 
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failed firms, bringing down Type H error rates to 25.6 per cent and better, a 
reduction by 30 per cent and more. 
However, the models for one, two, and four years prior to failure that are augmented 
with the two macroeconomic variables and duration term (Panels A and B in Table 
3.17; Panel B in Table 3.18), have produced less impressive improvements in the 
predictive power. For instance, the holdout performance of the four-year prior model 
(Panel B in Table 3.18) is fairly similar to the predictive accuracy of the model 
augmented with macroeconomic variables (Panel B in Table 3.10). Both models 
predict correctly 60 per cent of failed firms and more than 80.2 per cent of non-failed 
firms, demonstrating stable performance across all cutoff probability values. This is 
a striking result, as we observe a quite high overall accuracy of 78.1 per cent and 
better for four-year-period logit functions (Panels B in Tables 3.10 and 3.18). Both 
models appear to identify failed firms as far back as four years prior to failure, 
remarkably better than random selection. A comparison with the much weaker 
results, shown on holdout observations by the model based on financial ratios alone, 
which achieves at a conservative cutoff point of 0.1 the overall correct classification 
rate of 62.5 per cent (Panel B in Table 3.6), implies that the models, incorporating 
the macroeconomic variables, best capture factors determining failure risk. This 
finding suggests that unanticipated changes in the exchange rate and interest rate 
explain a great deal of the probability of company failure over the recession period 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, the similar predictive ability in holdout 
tests of the two models for the four-year horizon, which both condition the 
probability of failure on changes in the macroeconomy, seems to lend further support 
to our interpretation that the effect of firm's age, captured by the duration term, is 
unlikely to improve the classificatory accuracy. We recognise that this result seems 
to point to a rather weak information content of the used here proxy for age, which is 
measured by the period of time covered by the DATASTREAM records for a quoted 
firm, refiecting a limitation of our data source. In future work, the empirical 
modelling of the influence of firm's age can be sharpened by employing alternative 
measures based on the sources of public records of dates of incorporation and 
flotation. 
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The relative unimportance of the duration term is further confirmed by more 
complete models, constructed for one- and t wo-year h orizons (Panels A and Bin 
Table 3.17), which do not demonstrate on holdout observations the predictive power 
substantially superior to that of the simpler models with the two macroeconomic 
variables and no control for firm's age (Panels A and B in Table 3.9). For instance, 
although the one-year prior model is slightly better at detecting holdout failed firms, 
improving, across all cutoff probability values, the Type I error rate by at least 10 per 
cent, 70 per cent of failed finns are still mispredicted. 
Finally, as compared to the financial ratio-based model performance, the predictive, 
out-of-estimation-sample accuracy of the model for two years prior to failure, 
incorporating the unanticipated change in the exchange rate and the duration term, is 
somewhat weaker, with higher rates of Type H and overall errors when the 
conservative cutoff probability values of 0.1,0.125 and 0.25 are used (Panel B in 
Table 3.17 and Panel B in Table 3.5). However, the model detects better failing 
firms, reducing the Type I error rate by 10 per cent and more, at cutoff probability 
values ranging from 0.125 to 0.875. When compared with the model augmented with 
the unanticipated change in the exchange rate (Panel B in Table 3.9), a more 
complete, two-year prior model (Panel B in Table 3.17) again better predicts holdout 
non-failed firms, reducing, at the cutoff value of 0.1, the Type H error rate by 19.7. 
Note, that the Type I error rate has risen by 20 per cent at the 0.1 cutoff and we 
register no gain in the overall accuracy at the cutoff values greater than 0.25. It 
should be noted that unlike the models constructed for time-horizons of one, three, 
and four years, the unanticipated change in the nominal interest rate does not enter 
parsimonious specifications for two years prior to failure. 
Out-of-estimation-sample performance of the models allowing for macroeconomic 
effects and firm's age, also reveals a general "pattern" of variations in predictive 
accuracy demonstrated at risk-horizons changing from one year to four years before 
insolvency. The one-year prior model returns the overall error rate of 9.4 per cent or 
better, whereas the long-term accuracy of models for three and four years prior to 
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failure, is described by the overall error rate of 20.8 per cent and better. 75 In contrast, 
at the lower cutoff probability values of 0.1 and 0.125, the two-year prior model's 
performance on the holdout sample is characterised by a big drop in the overall 
accuracy with the error rate being in the vicinity of 40 per cent. The models, 
constructed from the financial statement data pertaining to two annual accounting 
periods prior to failure, seem to be the worst performers at approximating holdout 
observations. In general, one would expect, on an a priori basis, that as the forecast 
horizon increases, the relative predictive power of models would diminish. 
However, accuracy of models derived from our data seems to improve as the lead 
time increases from two years prior to failure to three and four years prior to failure. 
In the case of the risk-horizon of two years, the logit functions are overfitted, as 
regardless of what general specification is used for modelling, the error rates, 
generated in holdout tests, are markedly and persistently higher than for other 
forecast horizons. The likely explanation of the problem associated with getting the 
adequate ex ante predictive accuracy for the two-year-prior models might relate to 
some important omitted firm-specific variables that are not reflected in the general 
specifications used for model development. 
3.4 Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to re-examine the determinants of company failure 
in the form of insolvency by looking directly at the contribution of the 
environmental, macroeconomic factors and firm's age to the likelihood of failure 
measured at the firm-level in a sample of UK large quoted industrials taken from the 
early 1990s. The data used in the empirical models of this chapter came from 
DATASTREAM. T he c ontribution oft his s tudy ist hat m acroeconomic i ndicators 
were incorporated into cross-sectional models of failure risk. The motivation was to 
better understand how the changes in the economy modify the risk of insolvency 
modelled at the firm-level. We aimed to extend the company failure empirical 
literature to help inform forward-looking policies of banks and public bodies on 
preventing sharp rises in company failures. The employed in this chapter empirical 
75 Ilie three and four-year pfior accuracy, achieved in holdout tests by the constructed here logit models is 
similar to the ZETAO model's accuracy of 70 per cent for five years prior to bankruptcy (see Altman, 2000). 
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design based on repeated pooled cross-sections addressed the need of reflecting a 
temporal dimension, to allow in firm-level modelling for the effects of the important 
macroeconomic indicators. The essential feature of our approach towards the 
empirical design is that we assume a lagged relation between the changes in the 
contextual factors and failure risk. To examine the complex interplay between firm's 
age and failure risk, highlighted in work by Jovanovic (1982) and Dunne and 
Hughes (1994), we attempted augmentation of models with a duration term. We 
assessed effects of the shifts in the two macroeconomic indicators and the influence 
of age on the probability of insolvency by fitting time-to-failure specific logit models 
to pooled across several years cross-section data. Specifically, we obtained the 
determinants over the risk horizons ranging one to four years before insolvency. 
Availability of time-series observations on large, quoted at the London Stock 
Exchange, industrial companies, which were put into insolvency during the UK 
1990s recession, constrained the maximum length of risk-horizon for our modelling 
the determinants of failure. We assessed model adequacy and inferred the 
importance of the contextual, macroeconomic factors and the duration term from the 
significance of coefficient estimates and classificatory and predictive accuracy of the 
models. 
The main findings are as follows. 
For the analysis period, the effects of the macroeconomic factors are quite strong. 
Lagged yearly, unanticipated changes in the nominal interest rate and in the real 
effective exchange rate are significant variables in explaining failure. Aggregate 
economy risk arising from macroeconomic instability and uncertainty regarding 
trading conditions clearly conditions the risk of failure for the firms in our sample. 
Although the duration term enters significantly indicating that younger firms are 
prone to failure we register no qualitative improvements in out-of-estimation-sample 
performance when the models are augmented with age, which seems to imply that 
age has no independent explanatory role in financial distress of the sample 
companies. 
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The important finding is that models incorporating the macroeconomic indicators 
exhibited lower prediction errors assessed on an out-of-sample basis. The best 
predicting models, augmented with the two macroeconomic variables, demonstrated 
stability and the adequate fit on the out-of-sample data points. In holdout tests, the 
overall accuracy of 90.6 per cent and better was achieved over the one-year risk 
horizon, and of 71.9 per cent and better over the risk horizons of three and four 
years. The achieved accuracy compares favourably with a weaker approximation of 
the holdout observations by the basic models based on financial ratios alone. 
The empirical relation between increases in the probability of failure and 
unanticipated changes in the real exchange rate and nominal interest rate appeared 
stable over the four-year period before failure, indicating the importance of 
macroeconomic stability. Obtained empirical predictors suggested that during the 
1990s recession, unanticipated increases in the real exchange rate and rises in the 
nominal interest rate were associated with a higher propensity of UK quoted 
industrial company to fail. The results seemed to confirm the links to declining 
liquidity, to a loss in competitiveness for the firms relying on exports, to a possible 
decline in performance via reported equity values for the firms with assets 
denominated in foreign currency, and to the detriment of inflation for highly geared 
finns. 
Being remarkably robust to the model augmentation with macroeconomic indicators, 
the pattern of significance of financial statement-based determinants assessed for the 
four-year period prior to failure, provided evidence on the key roles of gearing, 
liquidity and profitability, corroborating earlier results on LJK company failure 
reported in Taffler (1982), Keasey and McGuinness (1990) and Alici (1995). At the 
firm-level, financial crisis preventing policies should be aimed at reforms 
forestalling problems of excessive gearing and insufficient liquidity in the corporate 
sector. 
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CHAPTER4: A PANEL ANALYSIS OF UK INDUSTRIAL COMPANY 
FAILURE 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we report an empirical investigation of the determinants of company 
failure for the last UK recession, based on a panel data on 539 large quoted 
industrial firms observed over the period 1988-93. The vast empirical literature has 
documented an association between measures of company performance and failure. 
Studies, employing cross-sectional data and independent variables derived from 
accounts, provided models useful for identification of problem-companies with 
financial profiles similar to the firms that due to severe financial distress were placed 
into a legal insolvency regime. Chapter 3 has reported results on the financial ratio- 
based determinants of UK company failure from a retrospective observational study 
based on the combination of binary logit with a temporal sequence of pooled 
repeated cross-sections, where we control in modelling for the influence of 
macroeconomic factors and firm's age. Covering the period of the 1990s recession, 
findings of the previous chapter appeared to be generally consistent with conclusions 
of earlier UK research. For instance, gearing was found to be of particular relevance 
and positively associated with failure at the risk-horizons, ranging from one to four 
years, whereas profitability and liquidity were negatively related to the probability of 
insolvency. The models presented in the previous chapter imply a strong, lagged 
relation between changes in macroeconomic variables and failure risk and therefore 
point to the importance of adopting more dynamic approaches to modelling company 
failure determinants. 
In the present chapter we attempt to enrich company failure research by departing 
from a standard, static cross-section design and analysing a panel data on UK quoted 
companies, taken from 1988-93. This extension to panel data is based on 
Chamberlain's (1980) conditional logit model with a binomial response. Our panel 
of LJK industrial firms permits to observe on several occasions the dichotomous 
(binary) response, which measures the adverse outcome of formal insolvency. We 
should emphasise a great advantage of panel study that relates to its potential of 
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providing larger numbers of observations, which is necessary for alleviating the 
cross-sectional problem of over-sampling the failed category with respect to the 
actual proportion of failed companies in the population. A panel study measures 
changes with greater precision than does a series of cross-sections of the same 
sample size. Another very useful property of observational design in the form of 
panel, which provides the rationale for our choice of this empirical methodology, is 
that the analysis of change in serial measurements over individual firms is 
fundamental in the examination of financial distress and in understanding its causal 
mechanism. Unlike pooled repeated cross-sections, examined in chapter 3, in the 
panel of UK quoted industrial firms, the data on failing firms are synchronised with 
the data on companies that survived the economic downturn of 1990-92. A panel 
study provides evidence on the temporal ordering of variables, an important factor in 
causal analysis. A cross-section study may show an association between the two 
variables of interest but it would not indicate which comes first, while panel data 
help to distinguish between the possible explanations of the association between 
failure risk and a plausible cause. Furthermore, the accumulation of information over 
both times and firms allows to take account in estimation for permanent effects that 
are not identifiable from cross-sectional analysis or from repeated cross-sections but 
nonetheless are likely to influence company performance and may be correlated with 
observable variables. 
In other words, a cross-sectional model of financial distress risk is limited to 
considering the impact of observed predictors on the outcome. A panel model 
successfully overcomes this limitation of the cross-section design, giving better 
scope to account for the role of more or less constant unobserved heterogeneity 
across firms, which may be difficult to capture with observable, firm-level variables. 
The promise of panel data lies in their ability to control and allow for additive 
individual effects. Many company characteristics might tend not to vary over time, 
especially over short periods. Individual company effects might reflect the firm's 
business risk, share of exports in sales, 76 organisation and ownership structure, 77 
76 Exports continucdtog row during the 1990-92recession(HMTrcasury, Economic Briefing, 6,1994) and 
export-oricntcd firms fared better during the economy downturn (Geroski and Gregg, 1996). 
77 Using data generated from a large-scale survey of how UK firms coped with the 1991 recession, Gcroski and 
Gregg (1996), identify an association in the data between organisation and ownership structure and vulnerability 
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corporate governance characteristics, technological and managerial qualities, "know- 
how" stock, industry-specific influences, 78 aspects of the business location, 
industrial union power, 79 as well as vulnerability to external shocks explained by a 
particular type of long-term debt finance that can be issued, for instance, either at 
fixed rate or at variable-rate. 80 The existence of firm-specific effects seems to be 
consistent with the view that selection effects of recessions are unevenly spread 
amongst firms (see e. g. Geroski and Gregg, 1996; Morris, 1997). It is important to 
realise that unobserved heterogeneity or differences between firms in their baseline 
levels of the outcome of failure may be interpreted as unobserved differences that 
impact on the outcome and reflect stable unmeasured characteristics of individual 
companies. Control for unobserved heterogeneity is then the basis for obtaining 
consistent estimates of the systematic part of the logit model, involving observable 
predictors. Not controlling for these unobservable incidental parameters, leads to 
bias in the resulting parameter estimates, which might be equivalent to omitted 
variable bias. In the context of model uncertainty in the form of a lack of unifying 
theoretical model and parameter heterogeneity, our panel data set may be more 
robust to incomplete model specifications. 
4.2 The Sample 
As with the cross-sectional study described in chapter 3, we define company failure 
as the event of entering a legal insolvency regime (administrative receivership, or 
administration, or winding-up, i. e. liquidation). That allows us to employ in model 
development a binary response describing the failure outcome, which takes the value 
I in the year the failing company published the last set of accounts. The data for the 
present panel study of company failure consist of company accounts' items and 
to the recession. Holding companies and firms with highly dispersed share ownership tended to be a little more 
vulnerable to recessionary pressures than functionally organised and divisionalised firms with a dominant owner 
(such as foreign owned firms). 
78 See Dickerson, Gibson, and Tsakalotos (1997). 
79 Machin and Van Reenen (1993) employ an explicit measure of industrial unionism in their panel study of UK 
firms , profitability. 
'0 Young (1995) discusses how the types of debt contract might have influenced aggregate company liquidations 
in the UK in the early 1990s, because a variable-rate debt is a good hedge against inflationary shocks whereas 
fixed-rate debt is a good hedge against real interest rate shocks. His empirical findings from the time-series study 
support two reasons for the rise in compulsory and creditors' voluntary liquidations over the early 1990s. The 
first reason has been an unexpected rise in real interest rates in the late 1980s, and the more important second 
factor has been that, over the period from the mid- I 970s to early 1990s, variable-rate debt was heavily used. 
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market valuation information for the six-year period 1988-93 and were extracted 
from the DATASTREAM database in 1997. 
Any empirical analysis involves choices made regarding the sample composition. It 
is worth pointing out at this juncture to a considerable overlap - especially with 
respect to the group of failed firms - between individual observational units in our 
panel and the companies contained in our pooled cross-sections, the composition of 
which is detailed in section 3.2 of chapter 3 and in appendix 5. Unfortunately, due to 
missing and incomplete records on the DATASTREAM files it was impossible to 
construct a cross-section sample totally identical in size and observed companies 
with the panel data set. The same problem of incomplete records resulted in the 
starting point of the panel being set in 1988, although, naturally, an earlier starting 
point would be desirable, providing more data for inference. Since a larger 
unbalanced panel sample with a prevailing share of non-failed firms can lead to 
more precise inference, it considered inappropriate to reduce the number of firms in 
the panel as such a reduction would have distorted the sample frequency. 
The data set is a moderately-sized unbalanced panel, constituting 539 individual 
quoted industrial companies, 56 of which are failed firms that went into involuntary 
insolvency over the analysis period and discontinued publishing financial records in 
1988-93. A short and wide panel created for the purpose of this study appears 
common of data employed in microeconomic research (see, e. g., Greene, 1997), 
where a relatively large number of individual units is being observed over the quite 
small number of periods. Our panel is unbalanced because in the present thesis we 
equate the date of failure with the fiscal year, in which, according to the 
DATASTREAM records, the failing company issues the last set of accounts. 
Therefore, this calendar year is considered as the firm's last year in the panel. In our 
sample, a failed company terminates reports twelve to twenty months before 
insolvency proceedings commence, while a choice of the particular sample period of 
1988-93, is a reflection of those lead times. The years of sample data were arrived at 
by identifying the dates of release of the last accounts for: (i) firms, where formal 
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insolvency was concurrent with the 1990-92 recession, and (ii) companies, where 
failures might have resulted from operations during the recession, even though the 
recessionary phase had actually ended before the date of insolvency. 
Transition of companies within the unbalanced panel can be seen in Table 4.1. Since 
failing companies exit the panel, the sub-panel of failed firms is unbalanced. In 
contrast to the failed company category, 483 non-failing firms are being followed 
over the whole six-year period of the panel, meaning that the resulting sub-panel of 
non-failed firms is complete and rectangular. Names of 56 quoted industrial 
companies that entered insolvency state in the early 1990s, have been identified by 
using various editions of the London Stock Exchange Official YearBook. Non-failed 
company names were taken from the DATASTREAM "live" list of quoted 
industrials" as of 13 February 1997. 
We intended to base a panel analysis upon a fixed effects estimator, inferences from 
which are with respect to permanent effects that are within the sample. Therefore it 
was essential to make the best use of the DATASTREAM data and include in the 
data set all quoted industrials with consistent available records for the period. 
Although it was not possible to attain a panel inclusive of all firms available on the 
DATASTREAM database list of "live" industrials, the sampling range had been 
significantly widened, as compared with the composition of pooled cross-sections, 
examined in chapter 3. We selected 483 non-failed firms with continuos records 
over the late 1980s and through to mid 1990s. Again, as in the cross-sectional study, 
the non-failed category is deliberately "oversampled" to resemble the actual 
incidence of insolvencics in the population. In the constructed panel, annual rates of 
failures vary from 1.01 to 3.34 per cent (Table 4.1), being close to the overall rate of 
1.2-3.0 per cent observed for the corporate sector in 1989-94 (Table ALI in 
appendix 1). It would appear that the sample proportions closely resemble the actual 
population proportions of failed and non-failed industrial companies. In similar vein 
to the cross-sectional study of chapter 3, we restrict the population boundaries by 
81 The DATASTREAM code for this equity list was "UKQI". 
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excluding petroleum, transportation, and financial services firms. The names 82 of 
firms in the panel are listed in Tables A5.5 and A5.6 of appendix 5 and their broad 
industrial classification can be seen in Table 4.2. More than 80 per cent of non-failed 
and failed firms come from manufacturing and services sectors. 
4.3 Independent Variables 
We use in the development of a panel data model, 24 financial statement-based and 
equity valuation items reported by DATASTREAM for UK quoted industrial firms. 
The rationale behind financial ratio-based empirical models of failure, and the 
definitions of accounting ratios have been outlined in chapters 2 and 3 (see 
especially sections 2.3.1.1 and 3.2.2). We did not introduce any extra variables in 
addition to the measures used in the cross-sectional study, and are simply proceeding 
here with the analysis of information contained in financial accounts by combining 
the different, panel type of data and a fixed effects logit estimator to explicitly model 
unobserved heterogeneity of the sample firms. As in chapter 3, the set of 38 standard 
measures of financial performance, based on DATASTREAM items, has 
substantially been reduced at the preparatory stage so as avoid multicollinearity. The 
list of financial variables for the general model specification totals 24 candidate 
variables, which proxy plausible determinants. Note that the initial set of candidate 
variables based on accounting ratios differs from that used in the cross-sectional 
analysis of chapter 3 because the ratio of net current assets to total assets employed 
has been excluded due to m ulticollinearity. S tandard financial r atios r epresent t he 
key dimensions of financial analysis, namely, profitability, turnover, gearing, and 
liquidity. We also proxy size by net sales; market valuation of the firm by the ratio of 
market value to book value (premium or discount to net tangible assets), and 
dividend policy by the payout ratio (a reciprocal of dividend cover). Further, to 
proxy the firm's net worth, we also included an index for the book value of ordinary 
shareholders' funds computed as the sum of share capital and reserves less 
intangibles. This so called "net tangible assets index" is defined as a percentage of 
the assets figure obtained from the first (in terms of DATASTREAM records) 
" As both the cross-sectional study of chapter 3 and the panel study of the present chapter examine failure of 
British industrial companies over the same period of time and using the same DATASTREAM lists, there is an 
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accounts; it is often used for solvency control, and therefore might be important in 
determining the risk of default. To the company, as a corporate identity, 
shareholders' funds are usually the only source of funds, other then liabilities, which 
it can use to finance assets. Changes in ordinary shareholders' funds also matter 
because a borrower's financial position is a key determinant of the cost of external 
finance. However, net worth at book values represents a rather crude estimate of the 
firm's value, because the assets shown in the balance sheet are usually recorded at 
historic cost (less depreciation) and may differ greatly from their current market 
values. Finally, the ratio between published tax and published pre-tax profit is used 
to p roxy t he t ax p osition oft he c ompany. T he comprehensive range allows us to 
implement a statistical procedure of backward elimination or reduction, based on 
conventional asymptotic tests, so as to identify the financial performance variables, 
explaining failure risk for our data set. Names and descriptive statistics of 
independent variables employed in modelling are displayed in Table AM of 
appendix 3. To handle the problem of non-stationarity in data, the original 
DATASTREAM values were normalised with respect to means and standard errors 
of relevant cross-sections for each calendar year of the panel, that is each 
observation is relative to the year mean and therefore centred on zero. 
4.4 A Fixed Effects Binomial Logit Model for Panel Data 
As in the cross-sectional case, the model with a binary dependent variable can be 
formulated in terms of an underlying latent variable. Typically, for a possibly 
unbalanced panel we would specify: 
Cl + P'Xi, +c (4.1) i 
where we observe y,, =I if yj*, > 0, and y,, =0 otherwise. 
In (4.1) we index all variables by an i for the individual cross-sectional unit 
(i=l,..., N) and a t for the time period (t=l,... , T). There are K explanatory 
inevitable significant overlap in terms of names of individual firms. 
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variables (financial determinants) in x,, . which are observed, not including a 
constant. This means that effects of a change in x are the same for all units and all 
periods, but the average level for individual i may be different from that for unit j. 
The a, captures the effects of those variables that are peculiar to the i- th individual 
member of the panel and that are assumed as being constant over time. Two basic 
approaches for modelling unobserved heterogeneity are a fixed effects treatment and 
a random effects treatment. The fixed effects approach takes a, to be a group 
specific constant term and c,, is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed over individuals and time with mean zero and variance o-.: 
(4.2) 
A random effects framework specifies that a, are different but that they can be 
treated as group specific disturbances, similar to c,,, except for each group there is 
but a single draw that enters the regression identically in each period. The essential 
assumption is that these drawings are independent of the explanatory variables in 
xi,. That leads to the random effects model where individual specific constant tenns 
are randomly distributed across cross-sectional units. The error term in this model 
thus consists of two mutually independent components, which are also independent 
of xj, . namely, a time-invariant component a, and a remainder component v,, that 
are uncorrelated over time. If we specify that ci, = a, + v,, . the random effects model 
can be written as 
2 ); 0,2). yit=p+ai+p'xi, +vi,, a, =IID(O, a, v,, = IID(O, v 
(4.3) 
The fixed effects approach is contrasted with the r andom c ffects o ne. W hether to 
treat the individual effects a, as fixed or random can make a difference to the 
estimates of the P parameters when T is small and N is large relative to T 
(Verbeek, 2000). A distinction is that under a fixed effects approach we condition 
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on the ai's, so that their distribution plays no role. This interpretation makes sense 
if the individuals in the sample are "one of a kind", such as large quoted companies 
of the present study, and cannot be viewed as a random draw from some underlying 
population (Greene, 1997). The fixed effects model is thus considered as applying 
only to cross-sectional units in the sample and, therefore, inferences are with respect 
to the effects that are in the sample. A random effects approach invokes a 
distribution for a,, and individual specific constant terms are viewed as randomly 
distributed across cross-sectional units. This is appropriate if we believe that 
sampled cross-sectional units are drawn from a large population. 83 Thus the random 
effects approach allows one to make inference with respect to the population 
characteristics. However, even if one is interested in the larger population of 
individual units, and a random effects framework seems appropriate, the fixed 
effects estimator may still be preferred. The reason for this is that it may be the case 
that a, and x,, are correlated, in which case the random effects approach, ignoring 
this correlation, leads to inconsistent estimators due to omitted variables. 
Two techniques have been commonly used for modelling unobserved heterogeneity 
on panel data with a binary dependent variable: a fixed effects logit model based on 
a conditional likelihood approach due to Chamberlain (1980) and a random effects 
probit model that is often referred to as Butler and Moffitt's (1982) 
"cquicorrelated" model. Given that both categories of firms in the panel, the failed 
firms and the non-failed firms, represent a rather large proportion of equities, 
followed by the DATASTREAM database, and were not sampled randomly, we 
would expect the fixed effects approach to have some intuitive appeal. More 
specifically, the 489 non-failed firms in the panel represent 36.8 per cent of equities 
that were on the "live" DATASTREAM list as of February 1997, while the 56 failed 
companies account for 50.9 per cent of those quoted companies, that according to 
the London Stock Exchange Official Year Book entered the insolvency state over the 
period 1988-93. The list of firms selected for the panel analysis was compiled by 
excluding transportation, petroleum, and financial services companies because of 
83 Appropriate scaling will help to alleviate such problem, as the differences associated with size, for example, 
are less pervasive when the data are standardised. However, the micro units in the sample may differ for other 
reasons, such as industry sector, export sensitivity, etc. 
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their specific taxation and accounting policies, and then through unavoidable 
filtering of companies due to the usual requirement of record completeness and 
continuity for the period of the analysis. The above might well have resulted in non- 
random selection of both the failed companies and the non-failed companies. 
Further, in the present study we expect that unobserved individual-firm-specific 
effects, such as, for instance, managerial quality, industry-specific influences, 
industrial union power, organisational structure, ownership and corporate 
governance structures, are likely to be correlated with observable characteristics of 
firm performance, captured by financial statement-based and equity market valuation 
measures. Therefore it would appear reasonable to assume that the fixed effects logit 
model would yield an appropriate specification for the present panel study. 
We specify a fixed effects logit model that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity as: 
Prob(Y =I (Failure)) + 
(4.4) 
If we treat a, in (4.4) as fixed unknown parameters, we essentially including N 
dummy variables in the model. Maximising the log-likelihood function with respect 
to P and a, results in a consistent estimator provided that the number of 
time periods T goes to infinity. For a short and wide panel, with fixed T and 
N --* oo, the estimators are inconsistent. The reason is that for fixed T, the number 
of parameters grows with the sample size N, which results in an "incidental 
parameters" problem arising in any fixed effects model. That is, any a, can be only 
estimated consistently if we have a growing number of observations for individual i, 
thus we have T tending to infinity. In general, the inconsistency of er, for fixed T 
will carry over to the estimator for P. 
Chamberlain (1980) suggested an approach to estimating a panel data model with a 
binary dependent variable, where N is large and T is small. He considers the set of T 
observations for unit i as a group, and then use the likelihood function conditional 
upon a set of statistics t, that are sufficient for a,. This means that conditional upon 
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t,, an individual's likelihood contribution no longer depends on ai but still depends 
upon p . 
84 In the fixed effects logit model, t, = jýj is a sufficient statistic for cc,, and 
consistent estimation is possible by conditional maximum likelihood. That is we 
TT 
discard alternative sets for which yi, =0 or yi, = T, because these cross- 
sectional units never change states and thus contribute zero to the likelihood 
function. The conditional distribution of y,,,..., y,,. is degenerate if tj =0 or t, = I. 
The conditional likelihood function is written as 
Nr 
Prob(Yi, y (4.5) Yll 9 Y12 = Yi2 2***P iT = Yir Yit), 
Maddala (1987) provides an illustration for the case of T=2, where we have to 
consider the sets yi, = 1. For the logit model given by (4-4) 
t 
Prob(0,1) =I .-ea, 
+, 6kl2 
-id Prob(1,0) _e 
ai+gkl I 
I+ e"+, 8ý11 I+ ea, +pki2 
91+ 
eal+, 6k,, I+e a, +, 
03r, 2 
Since (1,0) and (0, I) are mutually exclusive, 
Prob [(1,0) 1 (1,0) or (0,1)] 
Prob (1,0) 
Prob (1,0) + Prob (0,1) 
e 
Iß'(XII-Xi2)1 
+ elß'(xit-x'2)1 
' 
and 
Prob [(0,1) 1 (1,0) or (0,1)] =1 1+e lfl'(xi, -X, 2)) 
84 In the panel data model with a binary'dependent variable, the existence of a minimal sufficient statistic 
depends upon the functional form of F(. ) , that is, depends on distribution of cit . If a sufficient statistic 
tj exists, this means that there exists a statistic tj such that the probability mass function does not depend on aj , 
that is Pyil"-Yff J1j, aj, P)-f(yjj,..., yiT Iti, p). For a probit model no sufficient statistic for aj exists. 
Thus in applying the fixed effects models to discrete dependent variables based on panel data, the logit model 
and the log-linear model seem to be the only choices (Maddala, 1987). 
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The ai's have been eliminated and we have a standard logit model to estimate, in 
which changes in the x,, 's are used to explain changes in the binary dependent 
T 
variable. For general T, we have to consider the sets yi, = 1,2,..., (T - 1) . 
With homogeneity (a, = a), the model can be estimated as a binomial logit model. 
In order to test the null hypothesis of the homogeneity restriction a Hausman-type 
teSt85 based on the difference between Chamberlain's conditional maximum 
likelihood estimator (CMLE) and the usual logit maximum likelihood estimator 
(ML), ignoring the individual effects, is performed. 
Constructing the difference P CMLE PML 
A 
with the variance VW = V(PCMLE) - V(PML)I 
A 
m= (4.6) 
can be used as aXK 2 statistic under the null, where K is the dimensionality of P. 
Whether the null hypothesis of homogeneity is true or not, Chamberlain's 
conditional maximum likelihood estimator is consistent, but inefficient under the 
null, because it fails to use the homogeneity restriction. The usual maximum 
likelihood estimator is consistent and efficient only under the null of homogeneity 
and inconsistent under the alternative. 
4.5 Empirical Results 
Table 4.3 presents the results from the logit analysis for three parsimonious models 
derived from a more general specification that includes the 24 financial variables. 
Covariates were eliminated using a sequence of independent Likelihood Ratio tests. 
The failure outcome is denoted by I and the opposite state is assigned 0, therefore a 
85 Hausman (1978). 
237 
CHAPTER 4 
Table 4.3 Results from Fixed Effects Binomial Logit for the Unbalanced Panel of UK 
Quoted Companies, the Panel Period 1988-93 
Alternative Specifications of Fixed Effects Binary Logit 
For the Unbalanced Panel of UK Quoted Companies, for 1988-93, 
Failure Times are Defined as Years the Last Accounts Released, 
N=539, T=6, Sample Size 3,085 1(488x6)+(5x5)+(12x4)+(16x3)+(18x2)], 
56 Failed Companies 
Financial Dimension 
Accounting Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficient (two-tailed p-value of as totic I-statistic) 
Profitability 
Cumulative Profitability 0.314 (0.060) 0.302 (0.075) 
Operating Profit Margin 0.755 (0.155) 0.765 (0.147) 
Pre-tax Profit Margin -3.484 (0.028) -3.754 (0.018) -2.766 
(0.070) 
Net Profit Margin 2.858 (0.036) 3.107 (0.023) 2.666 (0.061) 
Turnover 
Turnover /Net Current Assets -0.747 (0.166) 
Debtors Turnover -3.914 (0.059) -3.697 (0.067) -2.902 (0.087) 
Liquidity 
Quick Assets Ratio -3.603 (0.011) -3.568 (0.009) -2.622 (0.016) 
Net Worth 
Assets Index -92.028 (0.002) -99.200 (0.001) -100.789 (0.001) 
Log Likelihood 
at Convergence -30.84 -32.28 -34.25 
statistic of LR TeSt86 65.71 62.83 58.91 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hausman Fixed Effects Test 
X2 statistic 53.58 33.37 13.01 
(P-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) 
n 3,085 
Per cent Failed 1.8 
86 Note that here the Likelihood Ratios are only a function of the slope parameters and not t he f ixed e ffects 
themselves, which are never estimated. 
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positive (negative) coefficient indicates that the factor, e xpressed byt he c ovariate 
positively (negatively) correlated with the outcome of company failure. As with 
cross-sectional models, the diagnostics indicate that the panel data models have good 
overall fit - the Likelihood Ratio test statistics are significant at the 0.1 per cent level 
for all three models. In all Models 1,2, and 3, based on the Hausman X2 statistics, 
the null hypothesis of homogeneity of intercepts is rejected at the 5% level and 
better. As discussed above, this implies that control for the firm-specific effects is 
necessary and that, therefore, the cross-sectional results may be biased. Regarding 
the importance of individual dimensions of company performance, the absence of 
gearing measures from all the three models is noteworthy. This contrasts sharply 
with the cross-sectional models of chapter 3, where the negative effect of gearing 
was evident in all models and for each of the four years before failure. With regard 
to other dimensions of company performance, profitability, turnover, liquidity, and 
changes in net worth (measured by the index of net tangible assets at book value) 
have a strong effect on the probability of failure for the firms in the panel. When the 
influence of ratios, expressing a profitability factor, is examined, at first glance, the 
estimate coefficients in Models 1,2, and 3 seem not all to have the correct sign. For 
instance, the coefficient for the cumulative profitability ratio and the coefficient of 
the operating profit margin (in Models I and 2) have contra-intuitive positive signs. 
The essential implication of positively signed coefficients for the cumulative 
profitability ratio, significant at the 10% level, is that failing companies are 
characterised by a greater ratio of revenue reserves relative to total assets employed. 
Aside from that, Models 1 and 2 link a greater likelihood of failure to higher 
operating profit margins, and judging by the sign of the coefficient on operating 
profit margin no economic distress is detected by these models, but this variable is 
insignificant. Positive coefficients for the net profit margin (significant at the 10% 
level and better in Models 1,2, and 3) appear to provide further support to a 
"teasing" positive relationship between profitability and the risk of failure. However, 
coefficients for the pre-tax profit margin (significant at the 10% level and better) are 
negative. 
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One possible explanation of the signs of these explanatory variables stems from the 
definitions of ratios adopted by DATASTREAM. For example, the operating profit 
margin is calculated before both interest expenses and losses on termination of 
operations. On the other hand, the pre-tax profit margin ignores pre-tax and after-tax 
profits of associated companies and undertakings, whereas the net (after-tax) profit 
margin takes account of amounts of associates' profits attributable to the parent 
company. Therefore, the fact that the pre-tax profit margin is negative, but the net 
profit margin is positive, might have to do with the equity method, used in financial 
reporting of companies, which have subsidiaries, and where financial results of 
subsidiaries are significant in their overall impact. Under the equity method, the 
parent company often shows in consolidated accounts proportional profits of its 
associates attributable to the group. Since profits are attributed it is possible that 
little or nothing has been received by the group, and its liquidity position has not 
been improved. In other words, higher profitability as measured by the net profit 
margin might have no bearing on the liquidity of the business. For further 
investigation of the "incorrectly" signed net profit margin, more detailed information 
of cash flow reports and relevant notes is needed, however, the range of financial 
characteristics covered by our data preclude our pursuing this aspect of analysis 
further. As far as the ambiguous sign for the measure of cumulative profitability is 
concerned, it might be explained by the possible impact that accounting policies 
might have on the accounting values of retained profits, because attributable revenue 
reserves of subsidiaries are included into revenue reserves of a parent company, in 
line with the equity accounting method. Moreover, the positive sign of the operating 
profit margin, considered together with the negatively signed coefficient for the pre- 
tax profit margin ratio, might be an indication that failed companies in the sample 
were productive and economically valuable as they would still be trading and 
generating revenues in the years preceding insolvency. At the same time, they are 
equally likely to suffer greater losses from terminating operations and incurring 
greater interest expenses as compared with the non-failing group. That tentative 
interpretation of the subtle interplay between the four profitability ratios, in our 
view, might reflect certain underlying factors such as shifts in the corporate sector 
indebtedness combined with high nominal interest rates before the 1990-92 
recession, such that the high gearing effect is captured by the incidental parameters. 
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Further, "conflicting" signs of profit margins and the cumulative profitability ratio 
are consistent with the fixed effects specification, as they would appear to accord 
with the fact that, in the failed category of our panel, many firms are organised as a 
group or a holding company, and this organisational feature might also have been 
captured by the firm-specific fixed effects. 
All three models suggest an appropriate negative relationship between turnover 
measures and failure risk. The ratio of turnover to net current assets is insignificant 
in Model 1, while the debtors turnover ratio is s ignificant att he 10% 1 evel ina 11 
three models, reflecting that before failure there is either a slowdown in trade, due to 
a fall in demand, or a decline in debtors quality resulting in bad debts, not recognised 
by provisions. The liquidity dimension is captured by the significant at the 5% level 
and better quick assets ratio that deals with the most liquid assets and is regarded as 
the best guide to short-term solvency. In all three models, the quick assets ratio 
suggests the expected negative influence of liquidity on the risk of failure. Lastly, all 
models yield the net tangible assets index as a key determinant of failure, significant 
at the 5% level and better. As shown in Table 4.3, a company is more likely to fail if 
its index of net tangible assets is declining. This result is intuitively logical as the 
borrower's net worth represents a buffer or a crude margin of long-term solvency 
between the assets and the liabilities, although, being based on book values and 
hence historically oriented, this measure depends upon accounting conventions. 
Moreover, the strong influence of the assets index should be treated with caution as 
financial reporting policies and practice, which affect book values, might have been 
inconsistent across the companies as well as over the years followed by the panel. It 
is interesting to note the contrast with the cross-sectional, financial ratio-based 
model for four years prior to failure (displayed in Table 3.4 in section 3.3.1), which 
has suggested a positive relation between the net tangible assets index and failure 
risk at the longer risk-horizons of three or four years. 
To provide an overall comparison between the cross-scction results of chapter 3 and 
the results from the fixed effects model, we summarise the key determinants of 
company failure in Table 4.4. Results displayed in Table 4.4 relate to the logit 
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functions constructed using common financial ratio-based inputs. The key predictors 
of failure detected with the cross-section data set are supplied by a series of four, 
year-prior-to-failure specific logit functions, where only financial ratio-based 
explanatory variables are used (these cross-sectional logit models can be seen in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 of chapter 3). Although both sets of modelling results are 
intended to explain the risk of failure for UK quoted companies in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, Table 4.4 points to the differences between the two sets of significant 
explanatory variables obtained from modelling with the cross-sectional and panel 
data. The preference should be given to the results produced by the panel estimator, 
as cross-section estimates of company failure determinants may suffer from the 
problem of omitted variable bias. First, the features of estimators and differing 
dimensions of the data could account for the discrepancies revealed by the 
comparison of pooled cross-section and panel estimates. Further, despite the same 
source of primary data used to construct the samples, there is an inevitable mismatch 
in terms of individual firms and calendar years as the panel includes more individual 
companies than pooled cross-sections used in estimation (539 as opposed to 369). 
The discrepancies might also arise from slightly differing initial sets of potential 
predictors adopted for general specifications. As discussed in chapter 3, in our cross- 
section analysis, a general, comprehensive specification for the series of four, year- 
prior-to-failure specific logit models includes the 25 financial variables, whereas the 
panel study utilises a reduced set of 24 financial variables, because the ratio of net 
current assets to assets employed is excluded due to collinearity. Under these 
limitations of comparability of the results, we offer in Table 4.4 a rather broad 
description of the three sets of the key explanatory variables and their respective 
coefficient signs: (i) those that are important at shorter risk-horizons, as suggested by 
cross-sectional, financial ratio-based logit models derived from the data for one and 
two years prior to failure (Column 2 in Table 4.4); (ii) those that are important at 
longer risk-horizons, as suggested by cross-sectional, financial ratio-based logit 
models estimated with the data for three and four years prior to failure (Column 3 in 
Table 4.4); and (iii) those that explain the event of failure in the panel, when the 
unobservable heterogeneity in individual characteristics of firms is controlled for 
(Column 4 in Table 4.4). 
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Based on evidence from both the cross-sectional analysis and the panel-data 
analysis, the turnover and liquidity dimensions seem to be strongly associated with 
failure at all risk-horizons (Table 4.4). It is remarkable that analyses of different data 
sets yield the negative signs of the coefficients for liquidity ratios, implying that 
insufficiency of liquid assets determines failure of firms in our samples. The sign 
pattern for coefficients on turnover ratios is more complicated. For instance, the 
cross-section model that gives a three-year early warning of failure, suggests that the 
ratio of turnover to current assets positively relates to failure, which may be 
interpreted as that, in earlier years, overtrading increases the risk of failure (Column 
3 of Table 4.4). However, the fixed effects logit models return a negative sign for the 
ratio of debtors turnover (Column 4 of Table 4.4), implying that a slowdown in the 
sales activity signals failure. That seems to be plausible and in conformity with the 
negative relation implied by the coefficient sign for the creditors turnover ratio in the 
model one year prior to failure (Column 2 of Table 4.4). As for other principal 
financial dimensions, the pattern of their importance in terms of significance and 
signs of explanatory variable coefficients is somewhat contradictory. For instance, 
the fixed effects logit models indicate that profitability factors are associated with 
failure, while the cross-section logit model that generates the probability of failure at 
the risk-horizon of one year, suggests that such association exists only in the later 
Years. In the same vein, the negative and highly significant coefficient for the net 
tangible assets index in models for panel data records a deterioration in solvency of 
failing firms, which is evidential of the independent explanatory role of a decline in 
the balance sheet value of ordinary shareholders' funds. In contrast, modelling the 
risk of failure with pooled cross-section data restricts the importance of changes in 
net worth to the longer risk-horizons of three and four years, yielding the positively 
signed coefficient for the net tangible assets index, which seems to link failure risk 
to faster growth in early years. 
In summary, the results, conditioned on the finn-specific effects, broadly confirm the 
relevance of failure determinants obtained in chapter 3 with the cross-sectional data 
pertinent to the same time period. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter presented empirical results on financial ratio-based determinants of 
company failure obtained with panel data on UK large quoted industrials for 1988- 
93. This panel study contributes towards the empirical literature on company failure 
by addressing the problem of unobserved heterogeneity across firms in empirical 
models of the determinants of failure. The panel data used here provided an 
extension to previous UK research that, to our knowledge, had been based on cross- 
section, pooled repeated cross-section, or time-series data. We employed an 
estimation technique that controlled for the unobservable permanent differences 
across companies, which were likely to affect the propensity to failure of an 
individual industrial firm. We found strong evidence of considerable heterogeneity 
across companies in the panel, which suggests that the panel data estimates are 
preferable to the cross-sectional estimates. In an unbalanced panel we follow 5 39 
companies of which 56 firms exit the panel due to severe financial distress problems 
resulted in formal insolvency. The structure of the panel constructed resembles the 
actual population proportions of the examined categories of failed and non-failed 
firms 
As for the individual determinants, our analysis provides the following findings. 
When the unobservable fixed individual effects are controlled for, our results with 
regard to important financial dimensions, suggest that narrowly defined liquidity, 
profitability, turnover, and changes in net worth (measured as the book value of net 
tangible assets) are the key determinants of failure for firms in our panel data set. 
Moreover, modelling with the panel data captures changes in both short-ten-n 
liquidity and long-term solvency. The documented importance of the liquidity 
dimension emphasises that the current cash flow considerations, rather than the 
economic value of the firm based on the future free cash flows, are more pertinent to 
the explanation of company failure in our panel. That result is consistent the findings 
reported in the time-series study of the aggregate rate of company insolvency by 
Turner, Coutts, and Bowden (1992), who argue that failure of the banks to extend 
to distressed companies short-term credit on the basis of the long-term potential is an 
important structural weakness of the British economy. The results also show that the 
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event of failure is associated with lower pre-tax profit margins. However, 
unexpectedly, the analysis also identifies a concurrent and of roughly equal 
magnitude, positive link between the net profit margin and insolvency risk, which, 
under the equity method used in financial reporting of groups, might be linked to 
that fact that profits of associates are attributable to the parent company. This 
observation appears to be in line with evidence from Geroski and Gregg (1996) that 
holding companies had fared less successfully in the 1990-92 recession. In contrast 
to previous cross-sectional studies and the cross-section results of chapter 3, we do 
not detect in our panel an association between gearing and the probability of 
insolvency, when models of failure are conditioned on the fixed effects. Lastly, 
being based on a fixed effects estimator, inference presented in the present chapter 
must be viewed as being applicable only to the companies in the study, not to the 
additional firms outside the sample. 
The panel analysis, presented in this chapter, is an exploratory study, providing basis 
for a more exhaustive empirical design of future work, where panel estimation and 
analysis of pooled cross-section data will have identical sample frames, based on the 
same analysis units (quoted companies) observed over a period longer than the 
covered here six-year period. Obviously, a cross-section of companies for this more 
exhaustive analysis will contain observations on failed and non-failed companies, 
coming from every year of the corresponding panel. This future work will also 
enable an interesting comparison of the determinants of failure over the risk- 
horizons longer than four years. 
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CHAPTER 5: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FAILURE 
DETERMINANTS FOR RUSSIAN AND UK 
COMPANIES 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, based on principles accepted in the UK empirical literature on failure 
modelling, we try and investigate the accounting-based determinants of company 
failure for Russian industrials, specific for the early transition years of the mid- 
1990s. Our purpose in this chapter is purely empirical: to clarify what was happening 
with distressed firms which were put into bankruptcy. We try to extract the key 
factors so as to deepen understanding of company failure and better inform 
judgements about the enterprise fortunes in the transitional economy, whether at the 
level of the agent or at the level of national policy on the Russian enterprise sector. 
In Russia, corporate bankruptcy is a relatively new phenomenon, as the legal 
provision for that mechanism of resolving financial distress and reallocation of 
resources of inefficient firms only became available since 1992. It follows that the 
statistical modelling of failure risk is constrained by the availability of data. To 
permit robust conclusions as to failure determinants, a research strategy, based on a 
comparative analysis, is adopted. We indirectly assess the model usefulness and 
information content of Russian data by imposing similar "experimental" restrictions 
on a parallel analysis of UK company failure. A small random sample of UK 
companies that entered a legal insolvency regime in the recession years of the early 
1990s is employed to construct a model of failure and test its ex ante predictive 
performance. In the UK case, we can compare the empirical determinants of failure 
with the findings of previous research as well as with the large sample results for 
1989-93, reported in chapters 3 and 4 of the present thesis. In comparison, empirical 
work into the nature of Russian company failure remains scarce. 87 Therefore, in this 
97 We are aware of the two papers which have reported empirical evidence on corporate failure for Russia. 
In the paper by Kasatkin (1995), the main interest is to develop an accounting-based model for a 
company in the petroleum sector. Kasatkin evaluates failure risk on the implicit assumption that the structure and 
covariates of the US Z-Score model due to Altman (1968), are applicable to the Russian case for the 1990s. No 
empirical investigation has been carried out to establish what particular financial attributes of an enterprise 
would convey information credibly about corporate failure risk in the economic and institutional cnvironmcnt 
different from the US conditions in the 1960s. The dicsriminant function (we discuss Altman's Z-Score in 
section 2.2.2.1) is replicated from the corporate accounts data taken for Russian petrochemicals, however, the 
model performance is not reported. 
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study, a numerical analysis based on bootstrap simulations, is implemented to 
validate the Russian model. Firstly, in model assessment we construct bootstrap 
confidence intervals for model parameters, using the resampling plan due to Adkins 
(1990). Secondly, aside from assessing by the bootstrap procedure the model's 
classificatory accuracy for a wide range of cutoff classification points, we also 
provide alternative, analytic approximations of the downward bias of the apparent 
error rate (Efron, 1986). 
In accord with the larger sample studies of UK firms, reported in chapters 3 and 4, 
the empirical design for modelling failure is based upon the much-favoured in the 
binary response literature, binomial logit methodology combined with traditional for 
company failure research at the firm level independent explanatory variables, 
measuring profitability, liquidity, gearing (indebtedness), turnover, and company 
size. Unlike larger sample studies of chapters 3 and 4, here we concentrate rather 
narrowly on those financial variables that are observable from the publicly available 
statutory balance sheet and income statement. As noted earlier in chapters I and 2, 
economic and financial theory of company failure does not provide a unified 
framework for selecting particular ratios, therefore, we address the predictor 
selection problem by starting with the widest possible range of ratios and then 
allowing good failure predictors to emerge from the analysis. We find that the 
dimensions of liquidity and gearing are not effective in explaining failure for 
Russian companies declared insolvent in 1996-97 and subsequently liquidated, 
whereas the measures of profitability, size, and turnover appear to be robust 
predictors. Companies of smaller size, lower profitability, and slower turnover are 
more likely to become bankrupt. The Russian results are remarkably consistent with 
recent developments in the transition economics literature. The obtained 
determinants agree with the logic of studies into soft budget constraints (Schaffer, 
1998) and into the all-pervasivc barter transactions in the Russian enterprise sector 
A study of Russian bankruptcy by Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2000) contributes 
to a separate strand of the literature, concerned with federalism in Russia and economics of bankruptcy 
procedures. In their analysis of inefficiency of the Russian bankruptcy law of 1998, an attempt is made to 
explain a ruling of the regional arbitrage court judge, as to whether to rehabilitate or liquidate an insolvent 
enterprise, by integrating a game theoretic approach and statistical model. The authors argue that the regional 
arbitrage courts, being captured by the political power, permit the regional governors in alliance with managers 
of I arge r cgional e nterprises toc mploy f inancial r ehabilitation asa vehicle for effective expropriation of the 
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(Commander and Mumssen, 1998). Moreover, our results, explaining company 
failure in the context of the first 1992 bankruptcy law, do not appear to contradict 
the assertions in Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2000), 
regarding inefficiency of bankruptcy institutions stipulated by the 1998 new 
insolvency law. More specifically Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya 
contend that discretion of judiciary in the regions, results in the opportunistic use of 
the external management procedure, assisting certain technically insolvent, albeit 
profitable, large companies to avoid federal tax payments and debt payments to 
creditors outside the region. As for the UK firms, our logit results indicate the 
importance of profitability, gearing, and liquidity in explaining the event of failure, 
as one would expect from relevant UK research. 
In the following section we introduce the basic background relevant to the specific, 
enterprise-level and macroeconomic conditions, in which a Russian industrial firm 
operates, and specify hypotheses on Russian company failure. The chapter goes on to 
outline the sample design and some methodological problems it entails, with the 
remainder containing the discussion of empirical results and some concluding 
remarks. Finally, the annex displays a description of the bootstrap used to produce 
inference in the comparative study. 
5.2 What Causes Russian Enterprise to Fail: Hypotheses 
The defining characteristic of industrial company performance in post-communist 
Russia appears to be dramatic growth of loss-making and illiquid enterprises. 
According to Goskomstat, in a single calendar year between 1995 and 1996, the 
share of enterprises, reporting net losses, rapidly increased from 26.4 to 43.5 per 
cent, constituting the majority of large and medium-sized firms in the economy. That 
was accompanied by large-order accumulation of enterprise arrears. In 1996, for 
companies in manufacturing and fuel and energy sectors, the total of accounts 
receivable reached 54 per cent of the total accounts payable, which was two times 
more when compared with 1995. The phenomena of negative net profits, inability to 
federal government and the outside investors. Using a trivariate logit they found that of debtor-cntcrpriscs, 
larger, in terms of employment, firms go into rehabilitation and smaller firms are liquidated. 
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meet debt obligations, arrears to trade creditors, non-payments of taxes and wages 
common to Russian enterprises in transition, has been widely described in the 
literature on post-communist economies under the generic term of "enterprise 
bankruptcy" or "financial distress". 
However, failure of Russian private industrial enterprise differs from company 
financial distress in market economies due to: (i) the different role of the state in 
economic activities and resource allocation and (ii) the existence in a market 
economy, of the functional financial system and institutional, regulatory, and legal 
arrangements necessary for sustaining financial discipline in the corporate sector and 
for providing a mechanism for managing financial distress. 
As discussed in chapter 1, the finance literature, broadly defines financial distress as 
the company's inability to pay debts as they come due, which is caused by the lack 
of I iquid assets and absence of new e xternal finance. Illiquidity leads to payment 
defaults. Financial distress is a situation where cash flow is insufficient to cover 
current obligations. These obligations can include unpaid debts to suppliers and 
employees, actual or potential damages form litigation, missed principal or interest 
payments under borrowing agreements. Bankruptcy refers to the court-supervised 
process for breaking and rewriting the contracts, while liquidation refers to the sale 
of the firm's assets and distribution of proceeds to claimants. We should again 
emphasise that there is bound to be some uncertainty as to the conditions under 
which creditors can initiate bankruptcy proceedings (see, e. g, Armour and Frisby 
2001). 
In market economies, the number of illiquid firms is constrained by the existence of 
institutions facilitating their timely exit or financial restructuring, and corporate 
bankruptcy (insolvency) provides one of a number of possible solutions for resolving 
financial distress. However, the literature in the area of economics of bankruptcy 
(e. g., White (1989 and 1994), Wruck (1990), Opler and Titman (1994)) argues 
that economic distress and financial distress do not necessarily go hand in hand. 
Poor economic performance is not tolerated for long and there should be a 
substantial asset reallocation from poorly performing, inefficient firms, but negative 
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consequences of the selection process of bankruptcy relate to a possibility that an 
economically viable enterprise can be put into insolvency as a result of debt default 
and discontinue as a legal entity. As discussed in chapter 1, such manifestation of 
distress as corporate bankruptcy results from a complex interaction of various firm- 
specific and external factors affecting the company's indebtedness, profitability, cash 
flows, market values of its assets, and hence its ability to meet or renegotiate debt 
obligations. The usefulness for modelling failure risk of data from company 
accounts, reflecting performance and financial position, is viewed as self-evident 
from the success of practical applications of accounting ratio-based empirical 
models in managing financing risk (see, e. g., Altman, 2000). 
In the analysis of Russian enterprise distress and illiquidity, it appears necessary to 
use the concept of soft budget constraints due to Kornai (1980), especially relevant 
in the context of a economy in transition from plan to market. The soft budget 
constraint is defined in the literature as a subsidy paid ex post, typically by the 
paternalistic state, to loss-making firms to guarantee their survival regardless of 
whether or not they are economically viable (Schaffer, 1998). The consequences of 
soft budget constraints are that: (i) debt is not associated with the disciplining of the 
management of poorly performing firms, and (ii) performance per se is not a 
condition for the injection of finance. In contrast, in a market economy, the private 
firm should face hard budget constraints, which means that if it made losses it would 
not normally be rescued by the state. 88 
Now we delineate why a representative manufacturing firm had become financially 
distressed as the old economic system was demolished, and ascertain from the 
literature why, in the 1990s, a large number of loss-makers persisted in the Russian 
industry, impeding the exit of economically non-viable enterprises. In what follows 
we describe some macroeconomic and institutional factors, shaping the degree of 
hardness of budget constraints, and then proceed to outline the survival routes the 
enterprise sector and the state have invented and employed to avoid mass exit. 
88 However, public firms may have relaxed budget constraints as they cannot go bankrupt (Bertero and Rondi, 
1997). 
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Change in Supply and Demand 
Economic and financial distress of Russian firms is not simply a by-product of the 
competitive process and natural selection as it is in mature market economies. In 
modem Western societies, institutions of markets and exchange provide a 
mechanism to co-ordinate activities of individual agents, who pursue their own 
interest. Out of the process of market exchange come the prices, wages and profits 
that serve to determine the allocation of the economy's resources and the distribution 
of income. Competition drives each and every agent to search for more profits and 
more production and, given infinite wants of consumers, economic growth and 
sustained improvement in human welfare are delivered. The market paradigm points 
the road towards affluence and a sustainable future. However, the proper functioning 
of markets requires clear profit-oriented incentives and financial discipline, which 
flow from defined property rights. Self-regulating market systems based on market 
exchange and competition are subordinated to law. Company law and bankruptcy 
law lie at the heart of the economy and fundamental to facilitating competitiveness, 
growth, and investment. Efficient, performing better producers are selected through 
competition, via interrelated processes of industry entry of new firms and exit of 
unviable firms, and, in the case of inability of the enterprise to meet debt obligations, 
by the disciplining mechanism of bankruptcy (or insolvency) 89. There is, however, a 
dilemma: during downturns or periods of macroeconomic instability, default by 
many companies on their debt can produce a domino effect, generating excessive 
bankruptcies, posing a risk to financial stability of the economy as a whole, and 
entailing social costs. One of the central and unanswered questions, posed by work 
of the students of bankruptcy economics, is the efficiency of the selection 
mechanism of bankruptcy. When the selection process is inefficient it might create a 
situation where creditors put economically viable firms into bankruptcy (and even 
46 automatically" liquidate efficient firms). Hence it is important to also look at the 
desirable properties of bankruptcy law that can guarantee efficient reallocation of 
resources. Understanding the causes of the process leading to bankruptcy is 
important for preventing severe financial distress in the enterprise sector and has 
implications for economic policy and bankruptcy reform. 
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Since 1992, radical reforms have brought about major changes. The liberalisation of 
prices, foreign trade, exchange rates and other transactions, the collapse of former 
regional and domestic trading arrangements represented a combination of transition- 
related, structural changes for enterprises. Macroeconomic shocks have resulted 
from the fall in the public and private demand for enterprises' output and from the 
disappearance of trade between the former Soviet Union countries, and markets of 
the former Soviet Bloc. Structural shocks derived from the shifts in the pattern of 
demand and profitability have followed from the reduction of the state orders9o and 
the opening of the domestic market to foreign competitors. Those factors led to 
changes in the structure of relative prices that have been moving towards the 
structure of international prices, and had imposed a double shock upon firms: firstly, 
in their production costs and, secondly, in the value of their product. The effect of 
the move from the planned economy to the market economy was a fundamental 
disequilibrium associated with the excess output, energy and material use, and 
overmanning in many firms. On the supply side, the prices on material inputs, such 
as energy and raw materials, have increased relatively to the prices ofI abour and 
manufactured goods. The disappearance of the economic area of the former Soviet 
Union, led to input dislocation for some companies making it impossible for the 
purchasers of intermediate inputs to complete their output and to sell their product. 
Removal of product-related, budgetary subsidies increased costs of inputs. On the 
demand side, the seller market vanished and the buyer market emerged. The power 
of foreign competition and consumers affected the prices of enterprises' output. This 
shock was differentiated across the Russian enterprise sector. Energy and raw 
materials producers saw an increase in demand, whereas heavy industrial goods 
producers, who used to supply specialised products and were dependent on the state 
orders, suffered a negative demand shock and revenue losses. Competitiveness of the 
enterprise sector was also affected by the significant depreciation of the rouble 
during the transition and a fall in the real exchange rate. 
89 At the extreme, recessions can be viewed as an integral part of the process by which economies grow and 
develop. An analysis by Saint-Paul (1993) supports an argument that recessions are associated with productivity- 
improving activities. 
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Bank Credit Squeeze and Collusive Trade Credit 
Initially, in the first phase of reforms, there were massive extensions of directed 
credit to state-owned and some privatised enterprises. That fuelled the sharp increase 
in inflation, 91 but from 1994-95, the tight monetary measures of stabilisation focused 
on containing the inflationary consequences, later the state subsidies had fallen, the 
supply of liquidity through directed credit was signiflcantly reduced, 92 and strict 
credit ceilings were imposed on the enterprise sector. There was very limited lending 
by banks to the private sector. 93 Banks had strongly shifted their portfolios to 
financing the government (towards GKOs - rouble short-term government debt). The 
nominal and real interest rates remained at more than 100 per cent per annum. with 
the high spreads, thus making banking credit prohibitively expensive for enterprises. 
The high nominal interest rate caused cash-flow problems because borrowers were 
forced into accelerated and premature amortisation of their debt, in real terms, 
whenever they were not able to add to their borrowings an amount equal to the 
reduction in the real value of the rouble due to inflation. With no access tob ank 
credit to finance working capital, an enterprise's output collapsed even if the 
enterprise was economically viable. Furthermore, the credit squeeze stopped any 
change in obsolete capital stock, necessary to make radical improvements in 
techniques of production to respond to price movements. Poorly developed banking 
and financial systems along with the unstable macroeconomic and regulatory 
environment, constrained the use of equity and debt instruments to finance 
investment. 
However, financial discipline via an initial credit squeeze is not easily established in 
an economy in transition. The excessively tight credit policy aimed at inducing firms 
to restructure can generate the potential for a collusive creation of financial arrears, 
arising from the temptation, even for profitable reformable firms, to resist by inertia 
90 State-orders are defined as orders from the government to the private companies, including orders from public 
sector enterprises. 
91 In 1994, inflation reached 200 per cent leading to high relative price variability and unprcdictability of the 
firm's revenues. When inflation is high, enterprise decisions predicated on the relative prices prevailing at the 
time of making decisions, may be well translated into the production processes that are no longer financially 
viable at the ex post relative price configuration. An uncertain revenue stream increases the possibility of default. 92 By the middle of 1998 directed credits have been phased out, and explicit subsidies to the enterprise sector 
diminished to no more than 2 per cent of GDP (Commander and Mumssen, 1998). 
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any retrenchment, necessary to overcome a shortage of liquidity (Khan and Clifton, 
1992; Perotti, 1999). Given an inflexible, highly monopolistic trading structure, 
inherited from central planning, and a significant proportion of unsalvageable value- 
subtractors, firms with no alternative markets to redirect the output from illiquid 
buyers, tend to extend unforceable trade credit to non-creditworthy clients. This in 
turn ensures the availability of trade credit to the better, reformable firms, which 
postpone the internal costs of restructuring because their behaviour is likely to be 
determined by insider ownership 94 and effective control over assets by managers, 
who are able to derive benefits from an opportunistic use of assets. Good firms 
become entangled with bad ones. Moreover, the enterprise sector expect that the ex 
post unconditional bail-outs will result from the political pressure caused by a 
massive chain of trade arrears and the confusion between the subsidy and credit 
channels, because the performance and prospects of individual enterprises are 
blurred by involuntary and strategic collusive trade credit. That lack of 
discrimination between firms in the bail-out process prevents unsalvageable 
enterprises from closures and introduces a perverse external influence on firms that 
are capable of restructuring, but prefer to take refuge in collusive illiquidity. In the 
Russian context, the potential for collusion could explain the explosive growth of 
trade arrears. Net arrears of the enterprise sector, the gap between overdue payables 
and receivables, rose from zero in 1994 to around 15 per cent of GDP in 1998 (IMF, 
1999). 
Tax and Payments Systems 
The fall in output and inflation had adversely affected the tax revenues that declined 
with high inflation as enterprises delayed the settlement of tax liabilities. Since taxes 
are generally not indexed to inflation, late payments were seen as a "sensible" way of 
reducing the real value of payments. In the 1990s, to protect tax revenues in the 
inflationary environment the government ceaselessly redesigned the tax code, 
introducing punitive and emergency taxes and penalties, hence the stock of the tax 
93 As Popov (1998) reports, by the end of 1996, total bank credit outstanding fell to about 10 per cent of GDP 
while total long-term credit shrank to less than I per cent. In contrast, in the UK, the relative size of domestic 
bank credit was 125.7 per cent of GDP in 1995. 94 Majority ownership by managers and employees has emerged as a result of Russia's mass privatisation 
programme, and as early as in 1994 these forms prevail in over 70 per cent of privatised firms (Earle, Estrin, and 
Leshchcnko, 1996). 
255 
CHAPTER 5 
arrears of an enterprise could grow to a level, at which it was impossible to pay tax 
debts out of the current revenues. 95 Unpredictability and high real tax rates have 
tended to be a specific feature of the Russian transition. The second institutional 
characteristic has been an integration of enterprise banking and tax collection, which 
resulted in effective state control over enterprise withdrawal of funds. Those tax 
related factors along with, as HendIey, Ickes, and Ryterman (1999) point out, a 
legal culture in which firms could question fairness and legitimacy of tax payments, 
reduced the usefulness of bank accounts for enterprise payments and receivables. 
Tax Arrears and Non-Monetary Transactions as a Route of Softening Budget 
Constraints 
Analytical and empirical research has emphasised that tax arrears and deferrals to the 
state 96 and quasi-fiscal institutions like utilities and railways, represent the main 
route a Russian firm takes to "soften" the cash constraint (Commander and 
Mumssen, 1998; Gaddy and Ickes, 1998; Grigoriev and Kuznetsov, 1998; 
Schaffer, 1998). The route is made possible by constant creation and injection of 
liquidity to the enterprise sector and byt he p ractice of the s tate, of accepting t ax 
payments in kind and issuing tax offset papers in return for purchases of goods for 
public procurement. These quasi-fiscal credits are then reallocated across the 
enterprise sector by using a complex system of non-monetary transactions and 
intermediaries, designed to avoid the banking system altogether, which encompasses 
barter trade, 97 promissory notes, in kind or late payments of wages, taxes, and utility 
bills. The underlying reasons for the growth of the net infusions of indirect subsidies 
into the enterprise sector have been associated in the literature with a substitution of 
indirect credit from the state and workers for direct subsidies and bank credit 
(Commander and Mumssen, 1998). A kind of financial transfer from the state to a 
continuing firm takes place where a flow of tax and utility arrears is not getting paid 
at all, or is being written off, or is being paid in kind at overvalued prices, which 
95 In 1995, there were some 200 identified taxes in Russia, with the corporate profit tax in the range of 25-42 per 
cent and pension tax of 42 per cent (OECD, 1998; EBRD. 1994; Shama and Merrell, 1997). 96 Schaffer (1998) reports growing stocks of tax arrears in Russia from 1.5 percent of GDP to 6.5 per cent during 
1995, and to 12.0 per cent of GDP in 1996. 97 H endley, Ickes, and Ryterman (1999) refer to the Russian Economic Barometer and World Bank-Russian 
Academy ofScience survey estimates that, between the first quarter of 1995 and 1997, barter increased as a share 
of industrial sales from under 20 per cent to 43 per cent, which indicates the thickness of barter market. 
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means that failing firms are being expost indirectly subsidised, hence the soft budget 
constraint. " 
The Soft Bankruptcy Constraint 
The nascent bankruptcy process generally did not provide an effective hard budget 
constraint on illiquid enterprises. Nevertheless, legal insolvency is possible and 
might constitute a final event of company exit (the discontinuation of the legal 
entity) - the number of distressed enterprises recognised insolvent by arbitrage courts 
on the national level, grew from 50 in 1993 to 1,035 in 1996, and to around 4,000 in 
1998. (Bulletin of the High Court of Arbitration of the RF, 1997; IMF, 1999). 99 
98 The growth in tax arrears over the period 1995-98 implies an implicit fiscal annual subsidy to the enterprise 
sector of 5 per cent of GDP (IMF, 1999). 
99 The first 1992 insolvency law provided creditors with three alternative structures for dealing with financially 
distressed enterprises: (i) reorganisation via external management or rehabilitation, (ii) liquidation, and (iii) 
amicable settlement. The main problem with the first 1992 law was that it required a somewhat high threshold 
for the declaration of bankruptcy, this is because the definition of bankruptcy combined the two, illiquidity and 
solidity, indicia of insolvency: non-payment of debt and debt in excess of assets, at book values. However, net 
worth of a privatised, but formerly owned by the state, enterprise is likely to differ greatly from the true market 
value assessments. That is because valuation of assets is likely to be subjective, especially for firms where 
balance sheet values were set at arbitrary levels at the time of privatisation and later several times readjusted for 
inflation. 
In March 1998, the first insolvency law was replaced by the 1998 Federal Law on Insolvency which is 
currently inf orce. The 1998 1 aw h as simplified initiation of bankruptcy by a creditor. A creditor with three 
months overdue claims amounting to 500 times the ongoing minimal monthly wage (e. g. less than US$5,000 in 
1999) can file for bankruptcy. Next, the debtor-enterprisc is placed by the arbitrage court in temporary 
management to prevent stripping of assets by incumbent managers, and to organise a creditors' meeting, where 
the creditors choose between liquidation or external management (rehabilitation). As the 1998 law was 
motivated by preventing inefficient liquidations, it allows creditors to make a decision on external management 
before the court conducts the hearing to determine whether the enterprise is indeed bankrupt, and in such cases 
the court will approve creditors' decision. However, the law also gives discretionary powers to judges, to impose 
external management in cases when the creditors' meeting proposes liquidation. It is important to notice, that the 
incumbent manager can be appointed as an external manager, and that, by creating a possibility of fraudulent 
bankruptcy, might impede restructuring of the distressed firm. 
An important non-judicial, administrative extension of reorganisation and restructuring of state-owned 
companies is organiscd under the umbrella of the Federal Service of Russia on Insolvency and Financial 
Rehabilitation (initially called the Federal Insolvency Administration), the state agency. In particular, the Federal 
Service is tasked with handling financial distress in enterprises with the state ownership of 25 per cent or more, 
by monitoring financial performance at the micro level, as well as with dccision-making on solvency and relative 
merits of reorganisation or liquidation. In accordance with the 1998 Insolvency Law, the Federal Service 
analyses solvency of large economically and socially important organisations (Tal, 1999). In practice, the 
Federal Service efforts have been partly related to tax collection, for instance, in 1996,936 court insolvency 
cases against non-paying enterprises was initiated by the Federal Service (OECD, 1998). 
Prima facie the fcderal agency have always rccognised the need of evaluation and ex ante 
classification of enterprises according to estimates of chances of their survival. Stemming from the importance 
that traditional financial analysis places on company liquidity in market-based economies, a set of liquidity 
criteria had been designed, and their lower bounds were recommended and widely used in extensive monitoring 
of the enterprise sector (Federal Insolvency Administration, 1994). Non-compliance with the liquidity criteria 
triggered intervention by the federal agency, following insolvency procedures. Other important aspects of 
viewing liquidity, such as profitability and cash flow patterns, were ignored. Such a simplified approach was 
limited by the very essence of liquidity ratios, which can be subject to "window dressing". Also, in a market. 
based economy, liquidity measures may decline in size as a result of increased efficiency, rather than a result of 
cash flow difficulties. In contrast, in the transition economy case, hypcr-inflation and the diminishing purchasing 
power ofm oney c reate i ncentives f or b usinesses to lower the level of cash holdings, and to resort to barter 
transactions. However, t he s ct ofI iquidity r atios h ad o utlasted t he 1992 o ld I aw a nd s till w as o pcrational in 
September 1999 ( see e. g. V ladin-tirov, 1999), one year after the 1998 Federal Law on Insolvency came into 
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However, the persistence of indirect subsidies, collusive arrears, and expectation of 
bail-outs resulted in creditor passivity (Mitchell, 1993; Hoshi, 1998; Hoshi, 
Mladek, and Sinclair, 1998), which accounted for the relatively small rate of court 
insolvency cases given the scale of enterprise negative net profits and illiquidity. 100 
Further, unlike in Western countries, where company directors are under legal 
obligations to declare insolvency and enter bankruptcy proceedings, 101 managers of 
Russian companies had little incentive to commence the process voluntarily, which 
implied informational asymmetries. This in turn restricted the ability of creditors to 
screen and monitor firms, setting a limit to future borrowing and increasing the costs 
of funds raised externally. In the circumstances, the most frequent use of insolvency 
proceedings was as a device by the fiscal authorities to collect tax (Mirsky, 1999; 
IMF, 19 9 9). 
The notion of the soft bankruptcy constraint receives further theoretical and 
empirical support in Lamb ert-Mogilian sky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2000), who 
address the issue of efficiency of rehabilitation in bankruptcy, in terms of managerial 
incentives to restructure and creditor protection. A game theoretic model of a 
regional arbitrage court which is either politically influenced by the regional 
governor or corrupt, shows how the present bankruptcy institutions in Russia tend to 
fail to protect creditor rights or induce restructuring, and external management is 
likely to be opportunistically used as a tool to avoid federal taxes and debt 
repayments to creditors outside the regions. This is an additional route of "soficning" 
budget constraints in technically insolvent, large enterprises. The authors maintain 
that their theoretical model is consistent with the empirical evidence they present on 
the economic and political factors that determine the likelihood of an enterprise 
being in an external management regime, liquidation, or escaping these two 
bankruptcy states. Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya utilise a trivariate 
cffect. Insufficiency of a single dimension of liquidity for solvency monitoring and a necessity of employing 
more sophisticated approaches based on probabilistic predictions, was recognised in the interview with the 
senior officials of the Federal Service of Russia on Insolvency and Financial Rehabilitation (Samonis, 
Vitryanski, and Postyshev, 1998). 
'()0 In market economics, creditors when faced with a default debtor react promptly and aggressively, any sign of 
fassivity reflects badly on the creditors and undermine their position via financial markets. 10 1 In the UK, to encourage more risk-averse behaviour by company directors the concept of wrongful trading is 
introduced in the 1986 Insolvency Act. A director who knows that a company is insolvent can be held liable for 
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logit to examine the effect of enterprise-specific characteristics on these three levels 
of enterprise financial distress. Their model inputs include cash flows given by the 
cost per unit of output, technical efficiency measured by labour productivity, 
restructuring efforts prior to insolvency, defined in terms of the logarithmic change 
in labour productivity, and size given by employment. The empirical micro-model 
also incorporates industry-wide aggregates for the firm-level variables and controls 
for a number of region-wide factors such as the extent the governor politically 
controls the regional economy and tension of her/his relations to the federal centre; 
federal tax arrears, cash tax collections; and the regional product per capita. Based 
on 17,475 data points for 1997-99, their model suggests that having greater costs per 
unit of output and lower technical efficiency increases the probability of external 
management or liquidation, whereas successful restructuring prior to insolvency 
staves o ff I iquidation. F urther, t he in odel i ndicates t he r elevance ofi ndustry-wide 
factors. For instance, being in an industry with relatively large costs per unit of 
output, reduces the probability of external management and increases the probability 
of liquidation, while prior efforts of restructuring undertaken in the sector reduce the 
risk of falling into either of those states. Finally, the strength of the governor in the 
regional economy, tension of her/his relation to the regional centre, federal tax 
arrears in the region, and the opacity of the tax collection system increase the 
probability of external management. Overall, the authors argue that these empirical 
findings imply the dependence ofjudiciary on regional authorities and, consequently, 
bankruptcy institution failure to harden budget constraints on large company 
managers. 
Hypotheses 
Soft f inance a nd n on-monetary i nstruments i mpact ont he p attem observed in the 
literature concerned with market-based economies, of how changes in traditional 
financial analysis ratios reflect the risk of company failure. Quasi-fiscal credits and a 
thick non-cash market blur the true position of company profitability and, 
consequently, short-term liquidity and long-term solvency. Firstly, it is likely, that 
the short-term liquidity characteristics that are centrally crucial for company survival 
the extra losses sustained by carrying on in business and can be disbarred from holding directorships in the 
future for a fixed period (Cuthbertson and Hudson, 1996). 
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in market economies will be unhelpful in distinguishing between failed and non- 
failed Russian companies. Illiquidity and soft finance are not incompatible with 
enterprise survival. The firm may be able to repeat the operating cycle and generate 
revenues on the continuous basis with the lower level of cash reserves. Reduced 
flows of cash and non-monetary transactions would limit the usefulness of the 
analysis of the enterprise cash position for determining failure. Although in financial 
statements debtors represent sales, they do not represent cash amounts due from 
customers. Similarly, creditors may not represent levels of future cash outflows. 
Therefore, both failed and non-failed enterprises are unlikely to have consistent 
differences between liquidity ratios. Hence, it is anticipated for the Russian case that: 
HP Yhe liquidity position will be irrelevant for the purpose of discriminating 
between thefailed and non-failed Russian enterprises. 
As far as financial gearing"' is concerned, in market economies, debt imposes 
conditions that can trigger default, because higher debt is expected to result in higher 
fixed financing costs and, therefore, increased financial risk for t he s ame I evel of 
variance with respect to a particular level of sales. The firm with higher debt will 
represent a poor bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, the theory of debt and 
managerial ownership points to the role of high leverage in imposing financial 
discipline on company managers and enchancing performance (see e. g. Aghion and 
Bolton, 1992; Jensen, 1986,1989 and 1991). However, in 1990s' Russia, long-term 
debt does not play a significant role in capital structure, and short-term debt seems 
not to discipline the management of poorly performing companies due to the 
existence of soft budget constraints. Therefore, there is unlikely to be a significant 
difference in levels of indebtedness, measured by debt ratios, between the failed and 
non-failed Russian firms. Our second hypothesis proposed for examining the 
Russian enterprise financial distress, is: 
H2: The gearing position will be irrelevant for the purpose of discriminating 
betweenjailed and non-failed Russian enterprises. 
1'2 We use here a more general meaning of financial gearing as a measure of a company's total indebtedness as 
contrasted with the "strict" definition of financial gearing as capital structure, which is applied to the relative 
mix of debt and equity securities in the permanent capital. 
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Third, general financial performance of a company may be assessed by its ability to 
generate income. The effect of erosion of earning power on an enterprise entails its 
inability to serve its debts. In order to continue trading the enterprise must be able to 
sell its goods and services at prices that exceed the costs of production, therefore 
profitability is expected to be a significant predictor of failure. Higher turnover 
(activity) of assets improves profitability and therefore should have a negative effect 
on the probability of failure. For a Russian firm, a negative relation between 
turnover and failure is expected to outweigh the opposite impact of overtrading, 
which might be caused by rapid expansion of trade. According to Geroski and 
Gregg (1996) this appears to have occured in the UK over the period of the early 
1990s. It is anticipated that: 
H3: A Russian enterprise will fail because of its relatively poor financial 
performance in terms of turnover andprofitability. 
In what follows we attempt to obtain a clearer, yet practical understanding of 
Russian company failure by investigating empirically the relationship between the 
risk of formal insolvency and the accounting variables. To control for the size of the 
Russian sample we contrast the results with a similar sized study of the LJK. 
5.3 The Sample Design and Methodology 
The Russian Company Sample 
Following previous UK research we proxy the event of corporate failure by the state 
of legal insolvency. A sampled, failed Russian company is an industrial enterprise, 
organised as a joint stock company, 103 which was declared insolvent in 1996 or 1997 
by courts of arbitration, and subsequently compulsory liquidated, i. e. failure equals 
discontinuation of the legal entity. Thus we focus on just two states of financial 
"health": failure, where the firm is determined as insolvent by the court, and non- 
failure otherwise. The definition of failure as legal insolvency allows us to be 
consistent in separating out the loss-making companies that despite being in payment 
103 During the 1992-94 corporatisation, the vast majority of state enterprises (22 thousands by the end of 1994 
(Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1995) were corporatised, i. e. rc-registcred as joint-stock companies with equity 
capital, a corporate charter and a board of directors. Transformed ex-socialist enterprises were removed from 
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arrears continued trading in 1996-97, and those enterprises that had eventually failed 
and exit the market over these two years. It should be noticed that our operational 
definition of Russian company failure is narrower than that we have employed in 
identifying failed cases for the UK study used as a control for Russian results. 104 A 
more strict notion of failure seems appropriate for Russia in the late 1990s, as many 
illiquid Russian debtor-enterprises have been provided with soft finance and bailed 
out by the state, or were considered as being "solvent" because of "satisfactory 
results" from "the balance sheet structure" test. 105 Moreover, occurrence and the 
dates of legal insolvency are easy to ascertain, because information about Russian 
enterprises, declared insolvent by courts, is systematic and publicly available, which 
is crucial for timing the failed firms' accounts for the years preceding failure. 
The overall sample contains 21 insolvent companies and 27 solvent firms. 106 
Insolvent companies were identified from the list of court insolvency cases 
published in 1996-97 in the periodical The Bulletin of the High Court ofArbitration. 
A list of sampled, failed companies can be seen in Table A5.9 of appendix 5. 
Selection criteria for including an insolvent firm in the sample were the following. 
Firstly, the firm should be organised as a joint-stock company as those firms were 
likely to be of medium or large size, and play an important role in the economy in 
tenns of output and employment. Second, the sectors were defined using the failed 
company list and their respective industry codes available from the State Committee 
on Statistics. For consistency in accounts and similar experience of the transition 
process only manufacturing, retail, and construction companies were included. The 
non-failed company names listed in Table A5.10 of appendix 5 were selected 
randomly from the relevant sectoral lists of joint-stock companies at the State 
Committee on Statistics. The breakdown of the Russian company sample by 
economic sector (Table 5.1) shows that manufacturing firms prevail with 
their dependence on the old branch ministries and become governed by commercial law common to both public 
and private organisations. 
'04 Throughout the present thesis, in modelling UK company failure with both cross-scctional and panel data, a 
widcr definition of failure as the event of entering insolvency proceedings is employed. 105 However, net worth at book value, when distorted by inflation and periodic revaluations, required by the 
government to adjust for the impact of inflation, is likely to be a poor indicator of long-term solvency. 106 'Me relatively small number of company insolvency cases in the mid-1990s, coupled with the absence of free 
of charge available company accounts, explains the small size of the Russian firm sample we obtained for this 
study. To alleviate the problem of model accuracy arising due to the small sample size, we support inference 
with the bootstrap. 
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Table 5.1 Sectoral Composition of the Russian Company Sample for 1995-96 
(Percentages in parentheses) 
Economic Groups 
General Consumer Telecom- 
Sample Industrials Goods Services munications Total 
Panel A: Sample Split into Estimation Sample (n=40,1995) and Holdout (n--8,1996) 
Estimation Sample 
Non-Failed 15 (75.0) 1 (5.0) 4 (20.0) 20 (100.0) 
Failed 17 (85.0) 2 (10.0) 1 (5.0) -- 20 (100.0) 
Holdout Sample 
Non-Failed 5 (71.4) 1 (14.3) 1 (14.3) -- 7 (100.0) 
Failed 1 (100.0) - - 1 (100.0) 
Panel B: Pooled Sample (n=48,1995-96) 
Estimation Sample 
Non-failed 20 (74.1) 2 (7.4) 1 (3.7) 4 (14.8) 27 (100.0) 
Failed 18 (85.7) 2 (9.5) 1 (4.8) -- 21 (100.0) 
Table 5.2 Sectoral Composition of the Estimation Sample of UK Companies 
for 1990-91 (Percentages in parentheses) 
FT-SE Economic Groups 
General Consumer 
Estimation Sample Industrials Goods Services Utilities Total 
Non-Failed 10 (50.0) 4 (20.0) 6 (30.0) 20 (100.0) 
Failed 9 (45.0) 2 (10.0) 9 (45.0) 20 (100.0) 
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approximately 75 per cent of non-failed companies and 85 per cent of failed firms. 
The selected Russian firms seem also to be representative of the population in terms 
of size measured by employment: the mean and median values are 1034 and 850 
employees for the failed group, and 2216 and 1579 for the non-failed group. 107 
The State Committee on Statistics was the source of statutory financial statements, 
from which the accounting measures were drawn. Since publicly available records 
began in 1995, the failed company data one year prior to legal insolvency, 108 are 
based on accounting measures calculated from end-of-year financial accounts for 
1995 and 1996. Similarly, non-failed companies were assigned from the same time- 
segment, a "year" to collect financial statement information. 
The available data points were initially split into an estimation sample and a holdout 
sample with the intention of validating the model using fresh observations. There are 
20 failed and 20 non-failed companies in the first estimation sample with data 
pertaining to 1995, and I insolvent and 7 solvent firms in the holdout, which uses 
accounting data for 1996 results. Additionally, in an attempt to take into account all 
available information, we utilise all 48 observations in model estimation. 
Th e UK Company Sample 
For the UK model, we equate company failure with the firm being placed on a 
formal insolvency regime: administrative receivership, or administration, or 
winding-up. We construct estimation and holdout samples of UK firms, by drawing 
observations randomly from the data set employed in chapter 3, a much larger cross- 
section. The names of failed companies were identified from various editions of the 
London Stock Exchange Official YearBook, and names for the non-failcd category 
were on the "live" list of quoted industrials in the DATASTREAM database as of 13 
February 1997. We aimed to achieve the closest possible correspondence with the 
Russian data set in t erms ofs ample s ize a nd p roportions of failed a nd n on-failed 
companies. We also took account of the time frame by selecting macroeconomic 
107 Boeva and Dolgopiatova (1994) defined a medium-sized industrial enterprise as a firm with 500-600 
employees for 1992 conditions. 
264 
CHAPTER 5 
conditions equivalent for the UK to the transitional depression state that has 
influenced enterprise failure in Russia. For comparison, we sample UK observations 
from the time period of a full-blown recession. However, as there exists no 
universally accepted definition of a recession, in deciding on the years to sample UK 
observations from, the annual unemployment rate (an aggregate business cycle 
variable) was used. Firstly, employment and unemployment typically respond with a 
lag to fluctuations in the level of economic activity. Second, according to PRIMARK 
DATASTREAM figures, the years 1991-93 saw a steady increase in unemployment. 
The unemployment rate was 8.0 per cent in 1991,9.7 per cent in 1992, and 10.3 per 
cent in 1993. Assuming a one-year lag, we determined the period 1990-91 to draw 
accounts for UK companies. Twenty failed companies chosen for the estimation 
sample, issued their last accounts in either 1990 or 1991, and similarly, accounts of 
twenty non-failed companies were obtained for the same years. Lists of UK cases in 
the estimation sample for the comparative study can be found in Tables A5.7 and 
A5.8 in appendix 5. 
Since holdout tests are employed for validating the UK model, we construct for the 
UK 25 random holdout samples each including I failed and 7 non-failed firms to 
resemble the structure of the Russian holdout. The holdouts pertaining to 1992-94, 
are random draws, without replacements, from the holdout observations employed in 
the cross-sectional study of chapter 3 (the company name lists, from which the 
observations have been drawn, can be seen in Tables A5.2 and A. 5.4 of appendix 5). 
As for the sectoral composition, the UK sample is somewhat similar to the Russian 
data set: 50 per cent of non-failed firms and 45 per cent of failed firms in the 
randomly selected training sample, came from manufacturing (see Table 5.2). 
Independent Variables 
As discussed in chapter 2, models of company failure constructed for Western 
economies typically link a set of independent accounting ratio-based variables and a 
discrete dependent variable describing different states of company financial health. 
Ratio-based prediction models have enjoyed the relative success, proving that public 
log Short history of financial records on individual companies, available in the public domain, precludes use of 
the analytical framework that chapter 3 employs, where completely different models are constructed for 
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accounts capture and quantify both the unique financial characteristics of the specific 
firm and macroeconomic pressures on the corporate sector, thus reflecting 
information sufficient for ex-ante identification of distressed firms (Altman, 1982). 
However, even a country with developed stock-markets, such as the UK, where the 
system of financial reporting seeks to serve the informational requirements of 
investors, financial statement ratios as failure determinants are bound to have certain 
limitations as they are computed by means of a set of accounting conventions based 
on judgements and opinion. The key e xamples oft he s ubjectivity w ould r elate to 
depreciation and stock valuation, accounting for convertible debt, classification of 
items under appropriate headings by nature and in terms of liquidity, historical cost 
accounting and accounting for inflation. Despite the trend towards standardisation, 
changes in accounting practice impact on values of accounting items and can cause 
inconsistency in data, affecting both the relevance of a particular measure to the 
conceptual variable of interest and the accuracy of failure risk prediction. An 
alternative route, taken to avoid those troublesome problems, is the use of equity 
market-based and non-financial indicators as model inputs. 109 Unfortunately, it is not 
feasible to implement this approach for the study of Russia, as equity market data do 
not exist for sampled companies, 110 therefore we take as a point of departure 
accounting ratio-based predictors. "' In doing so we follow UK research by Taffler 
and Tisshaw (1977), Marais (1979), Taffler (1982 and 1995) Goudie (1987), and 
Goudie and Meeks (1991), where classification models rely on pure public 
accounts information. 
It should be noted that the meaning of financial statements is conditional on the 
environment and that Russian accounting standards differ significantly from the 
Anglo-American tradition. At the time of compiling the data, statutory reports did 
rediction horizons of one, two, three, and four years prior to failure. 9 Several instances of studies, exploring non-financial indicators, are briefly reviewed in chapter 2. In 
modelling the event of failure with larger data sets of UK firms in chapters 3 and 4, to capture the influence of a 
wider range of factors, we add to the range of financial ratio-based covariates, a firm's duration term and 
macroeconon-dc variables. 110 In 1996 (this year is covered by our sample for the study of Russian enterprises) the Russian stock market 
was thin with only about 80 equities quoted (Rossiysky Credit Bank, 1996). Listed industrials were 
predominantly represented by revenue-rich, in comparison with the rest of the economy, exporters, or natural 
monopolists from petroleum, metal, telecommunications, energy, extractive sectors, and also by distillers, 
enjoying trade in the protected domestic market. 
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not seem to satisfy the informational needs of creditors and investors. Supplementary 
reports based on international GAAP and audited, were virtually non-existent. 
However, the statutory set comprising the balance sheet and income statement, 
provided us with a consistent albeit basic information set necessary to identify and 
calculate a range of principal accounting ratios. Such ratios have been widely applied 
in the Russian financial analysis literature to assess enterprise performance and 
solvency (e. g. Astakhov, 1996). 
As discussed in chapter 3, in terms of reported classification accuracy, a dominant 
ratio set does not appear to exist (Hamer, 1983). Also, there are no unique 
specifications of particular ratios or their components. The investigation of failure 
determinants is often exploratory due to the lack of substantive theories, and the 
researchers are trying to empirically identify useful discriminating ratios. In such 
situations it is common to start with a ratio set as comprehensive as feasible, 
representing the major financial dimensions. We have selected for the analysis of 
Russian company failure a set of 12 accounting ratios 112 along with the log of total 
assets, to control for enterprise size. This combination represents a relatively wide 
variety of covariates to capture dimensions of a firm's financial stance. The 
profitability dimension is given by the pre-tax profit margin, return on the long-term 
capital, and return on the net fixed assets. Turnover (or activity) indicators include 
stock turnover, shareholders' funds turnover, and the ratio of sales to total assets. 
Gearing, or an enterprise's total indebtedness, is proxied by three ratios. Firstly, 
capital gearing is obtained as a sum of the long-term debt and one year borrowings, 
divided by the value of the total assets net of intangibles. Second, we use a measure 
specific to the Russian practice of financial analysis, the cover for current assets out 
of shareholders' funds, (providing that fixed assets have been equity financed) . 
11 3 
Thirdly, the ratio of total liabilities divided by total assets is considered. There also 
is a separate ratio of total debtors divided by total assets, which is used in Russia for 
1" It should be noted that in chapter 3 and 4 we use the phrase "financial ratio-based" models because initial sets 
of ratios for specifications, estimated in these chapters, include constructs with componcrits based on equity 
market values. 
112 All Russian accounting ratios are unadjusted for inflation, as such adjustments require more dctailed 
information on items from balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. In 1996, the annual inflation rate had 
fallen to 21.8 per cent (Source: Russian Economic Trends, 23 September 1997). 113 For instance, this measure is utilised in Federal Insolvency Adininistration Materials (1994), and in Astakhov 
(1996). 
267 
Cl IAPTER 5 
the analysis of assets structure. Lastly, weu tilise t wo I iquidity r atios: t he r atio of 
quasi-cash assets defined as a sum of cash, short-term investments and debtors 
divided by the short-term liabilities, and the current ratio. 
Tables A4.1, A4.2, and A4.3 in appendix 4 present mean values and pairwise 
correlations of thirteen accounting-based explanatory variables for two estimation 
samples of Russian companies - for the sample of 40 enterprises and for the pooled 
sample of 48 enterprises. Univariate analysis of failed and non-failed groups (Table 
A4.1 of appendix 4) reveals that the significant differences between the categories of 
failed and non-failed enterprises arise from the following dimensions: size, 
profitability, and turnover. That provides support for the hypotheses about the 
irrelevance of liquidity and leverage in discriminating between failed and non-failed 
enterprises. Interestingly, the p attem ofs ignificance iss imilar for both estimation 
samples - for the sample of 40 companies and the sample of 48 companies. Pairwise 
correlation analysis for the Russian data (Tables A. 4.2 and A4.3 in appendix 4) 
suggest that the potential explanatory variables are not highly correlated with each 
other. Hence, no variable may be viewed as redundant and as a result there is little 
evidence that multicollinearity may be a problem. 
For the UK model, we utilised a standard set of accounting ratios available from the 
DATASTREAM database for quoted industrials. The set includes a size measure, 
which in the UK case is given by the logarithmic net sales, and 12 accounting ratios. 
Profitability is given by return on shareholders' equity, return on net fixed assets, 
and the pre-tax profit margin. Turnover is described by the ratio of net sales divided 
by fixed assets, stock turnover, debtors turnover, and creditors turnover. Gearing is 
measured by capital gearing and income gearing, and common ratios are employed 
for liquidity: the working capital (current) ratio, the quick assets ratio, and the ratio 
of stock and work in progress to current liabilities. We report the group means and 
correlations ofc ovariates s elected for the UK m odel in Tables A4.4 and A4.5 of 
appendix 4. For all financial dimensions, group means are significantly different for 
the failed and non-failed categories. It appears from the UK sample that, on average, 
relative to non-failed firms, solvent companies are typified by larger size, higher 
profitability, higher creditors turnover, lower gearing, and higher liquidity, thus 
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confirming the results from the previous UK studies (see Taffler, 1982 and 1995; 
Peel, Peel, and Pope, 1986). 
Methodological Problems Associated with Small Sample Estimation 
To model the dependence of the response variable, proxying the event of failure, and 
the covariate vector, containing accounting ratios, logit is employed - the non-linear 
estimator common in studies of company failure (e. g. OhIson, 1980; Zavgren, 
1985; Peel, Peel and Pope, 1986; Keasey and McGuinness, 1990). Since we 
discuss the general format of binomial logit in section 3.2.3 of chapter 3, it seems 
sufficient here just to reiterate some methodological problems that might arise from 
small size and equal-share sampling of the Russian data set and similarly designed 
data set of UK finns. 
A small and equal-share sample is likely to be a factor limiting the reliability of 
inference about model classificatory and predictive accuracy and as a result about the 
identified key determinants of financial distress. However, corporate failure studies 
often involve small sample sizes and independent variables that are skewed, 
collinear, and non-stationary, i. e. suffer from distributional problems of accounting 
ratios. ' 14 
First, the small size of the estimation sample results in a small number of 
observations from the response group per independent variable, that leads to the a 
model being overfitted and thus to less reliable parameter estimates and downward 
bias in the apparent error rate of classificatory accuracy. In the comparative study, 
we attempt to approach the evaluation of how well logit models estimated on small 
number of observations, capture the failure process, by employing three alternative 
solutions: an ex ante holdout sample test, bootstrap procedures, and Efron's 
formula' 15 for estimating the bias in the apparent error rates in logit (Efron, 1986). 
114 Altman and Narayanan (1997) refer to a number of carried out in developed and developing countries 
classification studies into company failure, which, apparently viewed small paired samples as adequate, despite 
barely having sufficient number of cases of failed companies and publicly available data on them. For instance, 
only 21 failed and 21 surviving companies are used in the Australian study (Castagna and Matolcsy, 1982); 18 
"sick" and 18 "healthy" companies formed a sample for the study of financial distress in India (13hatia, 1988); 
and the Malasian study (Bidin, 1988) relied on paired sample of 21 distressed and 21 financially sound 
companies. 
1" Efron's formulation for the bias in the apparent error rates in logit, is presented in section 3.2.3 of chapter 3. 
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Several Russian samples are constructed to this end. Initially, the insolvent and 
solvent groups were each split into an estimation sample of data pertaining to 1995 
financial reports, and a holdout sample taken from accounts for 1996. The narrow 
time frame for sampling leads to a holdout set that may not be sufficiently distinct in 
terms of time period from the primary sample, and as a result such holdout set risks 
overstating the forecasting power of the estimated model. The obvious alternative is 
to improve precision of the model by "sacrificing" the holdout data in order to 
increase the estimation sample size. In the second sample, all 48 data points are used 
to estimate the logit model. We account for the problem of small sample bias and 
size distortions in asymptotic tests by drawing inference from bootstrap 
distributions. Parameters and test statistics for logit are calculated by bootstrapping; 
the details of the bootstrap can be seen in the annex to the present chapter. 
Second, as discussed in section 3.2.3, under equal-share sampling, the maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure for a binary logit model does not yield an unbiased 
estimate of the population probability of failure. It understates the model true error 
rate in predicting failed firms and overstates the true error rate in predicting 
"healthy" companies. Given that in Russia, in 1996 and 1997, the number of legally 
insolvent industrial enterprises, going into compulsory liquidation, was much 
smaller than the number of non-failed firms, one can conclude that the two 
categories have been sampled at different rates. Solutions, suggested in studies based 
on binary logit, include: (i) a correction procedure for the constant term of the model 
using the prior probabilities of the two outcomes and the sample proportions 
(Palepu, 1986), and (ii) the adjustment of the cutoff probability point to take into 
account the bias introduced by the unbalanced sample (Eisenbeis, 1977; Taffler, 
1982; Maddala, 1992; Altman, 1993; Greene, 1993). Both methods require the 
estimates of prior probabilities for the populations of failed and non-failed firms. 
The obvious proxy for the prior probability of failure is the annual rate of enterprise 
insolvencies, however such data are not available for the Russian study, therefore the 
classificatory and predictive performance of logit models described below, is 
analysed by applying different cutoff probability values. 
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5.4 Empirical Results 
The logit results for one year prior to failure, for both countries, are reported in 
Tables 5.3,5.4, and 5.5. It is important to realise that the comparison with the UK 
model is used to validate the small sample results obtained for Russian companies. 
Failed c ompanies f orm t he r esponse c ategory a nd are assigned a 1, whereas non- 
failed companies were assigned a 0. That implies that a negative coefficient indicates 
that an increase in the ratio would reduce the probability of failure, and a positive 
coefficient suggests that a rise int he r atio i ncreases failure r isk. Inm odelling we 
start from 13 covariates and test down to the specific models. Variables were 
eliminated by using sequential Likelihood Ratio tests. 
The Russian model R-IL, estimated on 40 data points (Panel A of Table 5.3), 
produces a somewhat disappointing result. It indicates that the ratio measuring return 
on the net fixed assets is insignificant, and the further three covariatcs, such as the 
pre-tax profit margin, return on the long-term capital, and stock turnover ratio arc 
significant only at the 10% level, whereas the shareholders' funds turnover ratio is 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficients for significant variables have signs 
suggesting that failed firms are less profitable, have lower turnover and higher ratio 
of accounts receivable to total assets. The poor significance of the covariates might 
be attributed to the poor information content of the small Russian sample or to some 
collinearity amongst variables, though the overall performance is acceptable. 
However, standard inference, given the large sample criteria, may not be relied upon 
in this case. 
Results for the UK model UKL derived from 40 data points arc reported in Table 5.4. 
The turnover ratio of net sales over fixed assets has an ambiguous positive sign, 
which could point to ovcrtrading as a factor determining corporate failure for our 
data, although this variable is insignificant. The three covariatcs that arc significant 
at the 5% level show expected signs consistent with previous UK work, indicating 
that lower profitability, higher gearing, and lower liquidity are likely to be the 
important determinants of the probability of insolvency. The similar association 
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Table 5.3 Logit Results for Russian Data, 1995 Estimation Period, 
Equal-Share Sample (n=40), One Year Prior to Failure 
Panel A: Logit Model R-I L (n=40) 
Financial Dimension 
Accounting Variable 
Cocfficient (two-tailedp-value of 
asyrnptotic t-statistic) 
Constant 5.041 (0.041) 
Profitability 
Pre-tax Profit Margin -31.796 (0.056) 
Return on Long-tenn Capital 52.810 (0.092) 
Return on Net Fixed Assets -23.568 (0.240) 
Turnover 
Stock Turnover -1.105 (0.059) 
'Shareholders' Funds Turnover -3.327 (0.050) 
Assets Structure 
Debtors/Total Assets 131.969 (0.060) 
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -8.13 
1-2 statistic of the log-likelihood ratio (p-value) 39.20 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.707 
Panel B: Classification and Predictive Ability, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.125 0.25 0.5 
Estimation Sample 
Correct Classification 
Failed 95.0 95.0 95.0 
Non-failed 60.0 80.0 95.0 
Overall 77.5 87.5 95.0 
x2 test for differences in probabilities' 16 18.14" 27.69' 37.18' 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated by Efron's Formula 70.6 73.6 77.8 
Holdout Sample' 17 
Correct Classification 
Failed 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Non-failed 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Overall 12.5 12.5 12.5 
x2 test for differences in probabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 
' Significant at 0.001,2-tailed. 
116 This X2 statistic (Conover, 1971, pp. 141-154)) tests whether there is a significant difference between the 
classification accuracy of a model and the naive model in which all firms classified as failed. 117 The holdout sample includes accounting data on I failed and 7 non-failed Russian companies, for 1996. 
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Table 5.4 Logit Results for UK Data, 1990-91 Estimation Period, 
Equal-Share Sample (n=40), One Year Prior to Failure 
Panel A: Logit Model UKL (n=40) 
Bootstrap Confidence Intervals 
for a Coefficient, 5000 Replications 
Financial Dimension Coefficient 90% Confidence 95% Confidence 
, 4ccounting Pariahle"s (two-tailed p-value Interval Interval 
of asymptotic 
t-statistic) 
Constant -2.219 (0.247) (-99.512,12.608) (-283.665,60.942) 
Profitability 
Pre-tax Profit Margin -0.240 (0.022) (-11.590, -0.065) (-29.686, -0.061) 
Turnover 
Turnover / Fixed Assets 0.350 (0.131) (-0.286,14.076) (-0.041,38.107) 
Gearing 
Capital Gearing 0.083 (0.028) (0.008,3.477) (0.008,8.284) 
Liquidity 
Stock & Work in Progress/ 
Current Liabilities -7.473 (0.026) (-340.736, -1.065) (-842.846, -0.592) 
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -10.18 
X2 statistic of the log-likelihood ratio (p-value) 35.10 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.633 
Panel B: Classification and Predictive Ability, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.125 0.25 0.5 
Estimation Sample 
Correct Classification 
Failed 100.0 95.0 85.0 
Non-failed 70.0 70.0 85.0 
Overall 85.0 82.5 85.0 
Xý test for differences in probabilities 21.54 22.56' 32.81' 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated by Efron's Formula 2.9 5.2 9.8 
Bootstrap Estimates of the Expected Error Rate Bias, 300 Replications 
Failed 4.1 5.1 6.9 
Non-failed 4.6 5.4 6.9 
Overall 4.6 5.5 7.0 
Holdout Sample' 19 
Correct Classification 
Failed 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Non-failed 50.3 71.9 82.6 
Overall 56.5 75.5 84.8 
X2 test for differences in probabilities 3.82t 7.78 
b 7.78 b 
' Significant at 0.001,2-tailed. 
b Significant at 0.05,2-tailed. 
t Insignificant 
118 I'lie pre-tax profit margin and capital gearing are expressed in per ccnt. 119 Ile UK holdout results are the averages for 25 samples, which are randomly selected from the data set of 
chapter 3, specific to year one prior to the event of failure, and correspond to the period 1992-94. Ile mix of 
each random sample min*tics the proportions of the Russian holdout sample, i. e. each UK random holdout 
includes I failed and 7 non-failcd firms. 
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between changes along these three dimensions of financial analysis and the failure 
outcome is confirmed by the seven-variable model from the large cross-section of 
chapter 3 (see Table 3.3 of section 3.3.1). This seems to be a remarkable result, but it 
can simply be ascribed to the tremendous merits of random sampling employed in 
the UK model development in this chapter. The UK model, derived by applying a 
sturdy methodology of logit to a small-size but truly random sample, works because 
characteristics of all of the various types of firms in the population have a variability 
much closer to zero than to plus infinity, and hence the sampling units (firms) have a 
high degree of redundancy. 
Turning to the analysis of classificatory and predictive power, w hich isu sed asa 
performance measure, then we find that both Russian and UK models perform 
comparatively well at correctly classifying observations in the training sample. 
Using different cutoff values, 120 overall accuracy varies from 77.5 per cent to 95 per 
cent for the Russian model R-16 and ranges between 82.5 percent and 85 per cent 
for the UK model UKL (Panel B of Table 5.3 and Panel B of Table 5.4). 
However, on the holdout observations, taken from outside the training sample time 
frame, the model R- IL demonstrates no predictive ability. Obtained analytically by 
Efron's formula, estimates of the bias in the apparent error rate for the model R-11, 
are consistent with the holdout test, as the bias values range from 70.6 per cent to 
77.8 per cent indicating overfitting. The UK model UKL forecast performance, when 
assessed on 25 random holdouts, mimicking the mix of failed and non-failed cases in 
the Russian holdout set, contrasts sharply with the Russian results, as the LJK model 
appear to have some predictive power when, on average, it correctly classifies from 
56.5 per cent to 84.8 per cent of holdout firms. The analytical estimates of the 
overall error rate bias vary from 2.9 per cent to 9.8 per cent also pointing out the 
predictive ability of the UK model derived from the small random sample. To see 
the sensitivity of inference, we also provide bootstrap estimates of prediction error. 
Estimates of optimism in the apparent error rate for the UK model, based on 300 
120 Classification errors are assumed to be equally costly in this study, and accuracy is given for a range of cutoff 
probability values. Raising the cutoff value increase Type I errors of misclassifying of a failed firm, whereas 
reducing the cutoff value increases Type 11 errors of misclassifying a non-failed firm. 
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bootstrap samples, 121 can bee seen in Panel B of Table 5.2. The downward bias in 
the overall error rate equals 4.6 per cent, 5.5 per cent, and 7.0 per cent for cutoff 
probability values of 0.125,0.25, and 0.5, respectively, which is close to the range of 
values obtained from the Efron approximation. Then we can adjust the apparent 
error rate of the UK model by adding the estimated bias. Choosing the maximum 
values for optimism produced using the bootstrap and the Efron approximation, the 
improved estimates of the true overall error rate are 19.6 per cent, 23.0 per cent, and 
24.8 p er c ent c orresponding to0.125,0.25, a nd 0.5 cutoff values, respectively. 122 
This assessment of the UK model overall accuracy is consistent with the results 
obtained from the holdout test when 0.25 and 0.5 cutoff values are used for 
classification. However, at the 0.125 c utoff p robability, t he i nference d iffers from 
that based on the bootstrap and the analytical approximation, as the overall error rate 
of classifying holdout observations sharply rises to 43.5 per cent, indicating the poor 
predictive power. 
The evaluation of the stability of the UK model predictive performance, via 
comparison between holdout and bootstrap results suggest that similar approach may 
aid a more developed analysis of Russia, although feasibility of such assessment 
would obviously require adequate holdout data. In summary, on the basis of the 
results for the model validation using bootstrap procedures, holdout tests, and the 
analytical approximation of the apparent error rate bias, one can conclude, that the 
important financial dimensions for distinguishing between failed and non-failed UK 
companies, are likely to be: profitability as measured by the pre-tax profit margin, 
gearing proxied by the capital gearing ratio, and liquidity shown by the ratio of stock 
and work in progress over current liabilities. These results are remarkably similar to 
other work on the LTK both in the sense of forecasting performance and in terms of 
the isolated determinants of company failure (see e. g. Alici, 1995; Taffler, 1995). 
Furthermore, an interesting and important result is that a set of the discovered 
determinants conforms with the key dimensions of performance and financial 
12 1 Efron (1986) and Efron and Tibshirani (1993) state that 300 replications is an appropriate number of 
bootstrap replications to approximate prediction error for classification problems. 122 The seven-variable model for one year prior to failure that is presented in chapter 3 and based on a larger 
cross-scction of 421 company-ycars, demonstrates roughly the same predictive power judged by estimates of the 
overall prediction error. For the seven-variable model, the estimates of the true error rate vary from 14 per cent 
to 23.3 per cent, depending on the cutoff (see Panel A in Table 3.5 of chapter 3). 
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position, which are important for explaining failure risk in the firms included in a 
larger cross-section of chapter 3 (Table 3.3 in chapter 3). We note that the 
remarkable performance of the UK small sample points towards the success of the 
adopted here empirical design, highlighting benefits of recent techniques of iterative 
sampling methods in company failure modelling. 
As indicated above, we attempt to improve the information content of the training 
sample for the Russian logit model by using all available 48 data points in 
estimation. The resulting logit model R-21, can be seen in Table 5.5. The covariates 
defining the second Russian model R-2L, reveal the financial characteristics crucial 
for identifying failed enterprises. As expected, liquidity and gearing ratios are absent 
from the final specification thus supporting hypotheses HI and H2 that in terms of 
liquidity and gearing there exist no significant difference between Russian failed and 
non-failed industrial companies, for the analysis period. 123 The final set of three 
determinants includes the log of total assets (significant at the 5% level), the pre-tax 
profit margin (significant at the 1% level), and a ratio of shareholders' funds 
turnover (significant at the 10% level). The negative signs of the coefficients are 
consistent with the directions suggested by hypothesis H3, that failure is associated 
with lower profitability and slower turnover. The model also yields enterprise size, 
measured by the logarithmic total assets, as an additional failure predictor, implying 
that smaller firms have higher incidence of failure. Enterprise size might be 
important for a number of reasons. One is that larger firms provide employment and 
the social safety net and, therefore, they are likely to have more bargaining power in 
obtaining soft finance, because the cost to the society of large enterprise failures. 
Another reason is that larger enterprises might have easier access to short-term loans 
when approaching credit institutions, or stand a better chance in overcoming 
illiquidity problems by arranging debt for equity swaps. In addition to that, large 
firms might have more diversified operations and therefore have greater potential to 
succeed in the barter trade. However, we would not wish to overly stress the 
importance of the ratios found to be statistically significant as compared to the non- 
importance of the insignificant ratios as the latter may depend on the constructs of 
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ratios selected and definitions of ratio components. In addition, the results seem to 
show a pattern broadly consistent with conclusions offered in Lambert- 
Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2000), who find for Russia that such 
factors as firm's size and profitability of the industry 124 are inversely related to the 
probability of liquidation in bankruptcy. 
As no new holdout observations are available to test the second Russian model, we 
set bootstrap confidence intervals for the parameters, based on 5000 replicationS125 
and constructed using the modified percentile method (Davidson and MacKinnon, 
1993). For the purpose of comparison, we also estimated bootstrap confidence 
intervals for parameters of the UK model UKL. Looking at the bootstrap results for 
Russia (Panel A in Table 5.5) we can see that the 90% confidence interval for the 
pre-tax profit margin coefficient, emphasises the statistical significance of 
profitability in explaining c ompany failure, although, the 9 5% c onfidence i nterval 
indicates greater variation of the coefficient. Confidence intervals for the turnover 
ratio and the log of total assets say that their coefficients either closely approach or 
even include zero values thus indicating a much weaker relation between the 
covariates and the event of failure. 
An interesting finding is that confidence intervals for the UK model parameters 
(Panel A in Table 5.4) also show large variability of coefficients for all ratios and do 
not rule out zero values, thus suggesting that financial measures, proxied by the 
covariates, might have no association with the event of failure. That revelation 
contradicts the UK model's performance in holdout tests making generalisation of 
such results less conclusive. We also use the bootstrap to assess the second Russian 
model's predictive performance to supplement classification accuracy as measured 
by the apparent error rate obtained from the training sample. The correct 
classification rate for the final Russian model R-2L. obtained on the estimation 
123 It follows that the set of liquidity ratios, the Federal Service of Russia on insolvency and Financial 
Rehabilitation have heavily relied upon in monitoring the enterprise sector (Federal Insolvency Administration 
Materials, 1994), would appear to be insufficient in diagnosing the risk of failure of an individual firm. 124 B ut tot he extent that profitability can be captured by cash flows approximated in Lambcrt-Mogiliansky, 
Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2000) by costs per unit of output. 125 We use here 5000 bootstrap replications, which appears to be an adequate number for obtaining bootstrap 
confidence intervals (see e. g. Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). 
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Table 5.5 Logit Results for Russian Data, 1995-96 Estimation Period, 
21 Failed and 27 Non-failed Companies (n=48), One Year Prior to Failure 
Panel A: Logit Model R-2L (n=48) 
Bootstrap Confidence Intervals 
for a Coefficient, 5000 Replications 
Financial Dimension Coefficient (two-tailed 90% Confidence 95% Confidence 
Accounting Variable p-value of asymptotic Interval Interval 
t-statistic) 
Constant 3.116 (0.024) (0.737,8.804) (0.205,11.443) 
Size 
Log of Total Assets 126 -0.544 (0.049) (-1.452,0.086) (-2.097,0.044) Profitability 
Pre-tax Profit Margin -12.529 (0.007) (-28.991, -5.765) (-38.946, -4.877) Turnover 
Shareholders' Funds 
Turnover -0.680 (0.072) (-2.710, -0.087) (4.060, -0.069) 
Log-Likelihood at Convergence -14.39 
22 statistic of the log-likelihood ratio (p-value) 37.02 (0.000) 
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.563 
Panel B: Classification and Predictive Ability, Percentage 
Cutoff Value 0.125 0.25 0.5 
Estimation Sample 
Correct Classification 
Failed 95.2 85.7 85.7 
Non-failed 59.3 74.1 92.6 
Overall 75.0 79.2 89.6 
X2 test for differences in probabilities 23.76' 35.00' 49.72' 
Overall Error Rate Bias Estimated by Efron's Formula 3.7 6.1 9.6 
Bootstrap Estimates of the Expected Error Rate Bias, 300 Replications 
Failed 6.3 5.1 1.8 
Non-failed 4.0 3.2 0.7 
Overall 5.2 4.2 1.3 
a Significant at 0.001,2-tailed 
126 Total assets are measured in billions of roubles. 
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sample, varies from 75.0 per cent to 89.6 per cent (Panel B in Table 5.5), and might 
be unrealistically high as the same observations are used both for building and for 
assessing the model. 
The bootstrap estimates of the downward bias in the apparent error rate range from 
1.3 to 5.2 per cent, whereas Efron's approximation yields higher values from 3.7 to 
9.6 per cent. When we correct for the bias in the apparent error rate, the estimated 
true error rate for the Russian model R-21, forms an interval from 20.0 per cent to 
30.2 per cent depending on chosen cutoff probability points. The assessed accuracy 
is analogous to the UK model UKL, which yields the estimates of the true overall 
error rate from 19.6 per cent to 24.8 per cent. In summary, the R-21, model validation 
on the basis of error rates obtained via bootstrapping and analytical approximation, 
Supports the conclusion that profitability, turnover, and company size are likely to be 
the key indicators of failure risk, even given the small cross-section of Russian firms 
analysed. 
In summary the results seems to suggest that the underlying structure of enterprise 
financial crisis may be changing through time and different across countries, 
especially w hen o ne c ompares ad eveloped in arket economy vis-A-vis a transition 
country. Russian enterprise reforms, although extensive, were not coherent. We 
would inclined to think the Results onn Russia obtained in this chapter can be 
explained by the regime of transfers and subsidies characteristic of this transition 
country in the 1990s. Such traditional dimensions as liquidity and gearing will 
become relevant to financial distress and bankruptcy risk for Russian enterprises - as 
for UK firni they have been and are - once inter-enterprise arrears have been 
removed by market forces and the government have implemented programmes 
eliminating such cushions as bank credits on easy terms and arrears in payments due 
to government for taxes, custom duties, and social security. Bankruptcy as a 
mechanism of distress resolution will play a role in recourse reallocation when 
creditors become important agents of restructuring. Getting creditors to play this role 
in the Russian transition takes financial incentives, adequate information, and legal 
Powers in debt collection. 
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5.5 Conclusions 
We have constructed and compared the performance of failure prediction models for 
two countries: the UK and Russia. The resulting models implied the following 
determinants of failure: for the UK, measures of profitability, gearing, and liquidity; 
and for Russia, measures of enterprise size, profitability, and turnover. The 
classification and forecasting results are related to the year prior to failure. The 
strategy adopted in the comparative study allows for comparison of performance of 
Russian and UK models, in terms of their explanatory power and predictive ability. 
Firstly, we applied the principles accepted in the UK literature on failure modelling, 
to empirical research into Russian company financial distress. Account is taken of 
the specific micro and macroeconomic conditions relevant to the current position of 
Russian industrial enterprises. Secondly, given the small size and narrow time frame 
of the available Russian data set, we performed the UK study under similar 
conditions. A similar sized random sample of UK industrial companies is employed 
to permit correct comparison of the test statistics and diagnostics. Third, we 
conducted our empirical investigation of Russian enterprise failure using robust 
statistical techniques based on the well-known logit estimator supplemented by the 
bootstrap. Estimation and validation results from the Russian model were 
statistically significant and did not reject our hypotheses, that liquidity and financial 
indebtedness were unimportant in identifying failure for the specific environment 
associated with 1995-96, while profitability and turnover seemed to be important 
predictors. The model demonstrated acceptable classification accuracy and small 
apparent error rate biases. This is an interesting research outcome as it supports the 
potential use of models of Russian enterprise failure based on inýuts derived from 
financial statements, to back-up more judgmental analysis. The Russian model 
results also support the theory that a Russian industrial enterprise has soft budget 
constraints, and emphasises the clear differences with the determinants of UK 
company failure where liquidity and gearing along with profitability are important in 
identifying corporate financial distress. The UK results performed well when 
compared with relevant UK models based on larger data sets. 
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It should be noted, that although the approach to model validation employed here 
makes the most use of the data available, evaluation results, based on just two years 
of data, must be interpreted with care, since they reflect the macroeconomic 
conditions and policy environment prevalent at the time of the analysis. A fresh 
holdout for Russia with more years of out-of-sample observations will provide for a 
sterner evaluation of enterprise failure model forecast accuracy and of the relevance 
of failure determinants. Subject to the obvious limitation of the sample used, the 
results presented here suggest that low profitability is the key indicator of failure. 
Liquidity measures, which even in the UK can be manipulated, are not relevant and 
that is not surprising given soft budget constraints. Size in the context of the Russian 
case provides a shield against failure, large firms would seem less likely to be 
allowed to fail. Turnover, which has no designation for sign, is the least important 
variable to differentiate the UK from the Russian case. Clearly, traditional failure 
risk measures, based on UK and US data and variables, are not valid for the analysis 
or prediction of failure risk at this still early stage of transition of Russia to the 
market. 
The exploration of the experience of Russian enterprises vis-A-vis UK firms, 
undertaken in this chapter, makes a point that it is essential not to over-generalise 
because country differences can profoundly affect the relative importance of 
financial analysis dimensions. It seems that the current economic system of Russia 
makes the factors of indebtedness and liquidity irrelevant for enterprise survival. In 
the long run, on completion of stabilisation of what now looks as a relatively 
liberalised economy, through freeing Russia from macroeconomic instability and 
creating the essential institutions that foster competition, support far-reaching 
enterprise reforms, impose financial discipline and strengthen the tax system, the key 
factors of gearing and liquidity may do their work in explaining and evaluating 
bankruptcy risk of Russian private firms. 
Accurate failure prediction is of use to exporters, to investors, and owners of 
interests in Russia. Furthermore, the Russian government might employ this type of 
methodology to calculate how sensitive the Russian enterprise sector might be to 
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failure. Such analysis would appear preferable even on small samples to an analysis 
based on models from studies of the UK and the US. 
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Annex: The Bootstrap Approach Used in the Comparative Study 
This annex explains the bootstrap procedures of chapter 5 by demonstrating how 
they are used in evaluating the relevance of the determinants of failure, and overall 
predictive performance of classification models derived from small samples. 
Specifically, bootstrap procedures are employed to: (i) construct confidence intervals 
for binomial logit model parameters and (ii) assess the bias in the error rate, or the 
difference between the true and apparent error of the prediction rule based on a logit 
function. 
Widely used in the context of empirical work for model estimation, validation and 
hypotheses testing, bootstrap methodology 127 invented by Efron is an alternative to 
conventional asymptotic approximations, which, unless the sample size is very large, 
might not be sufficiently precise to allow to interpret model results with confidence. 
As Veall (1998, p. 419 and p. 423) puts in his survey: 
The bootstrap method may be regarded as a simulation s tudy t hat ist ailored tot he 
actual data being studied, with the results used either to fill in statistical gaps that do 
not yield easily to analytical methods (such as providing standard errors or confidence 
intervals when they are otherwise unavailable) or to adjust the original statistical 
estimates in an attempt to improve finite-sample accuracy. ... the boots trap does not 
create any additional information. it is simply a computational device to utilise 
information already in the original sample. 
The bootstrap uses the single available data set to implement a sort of Monte Carlo 
experiment in which the data themselves are used to approximate the distribution of 
the error terms or other statistics in the model. It is based on the idea that the 
available sample is a good representation of the underlying population and the 
random quantities of interest are drawn not from an assumed distribution, such as 
normal, but rather from the empirical distribution of their sample counterparts. 
127 For the class of discrete response data, the paper by Fairclough and Hunter (1998), on ex ante classification 
Of takeover targets using neural networks, uses a bootstrap pairs sampling algorithm, and a residual-bascd 
sampling algorithm to generate alternative standard errors and confidence intervals. Another recent example of 
applying the bootstrap tool for inference in a semi-parametric, discrete response model is in the study of UK 
mergers and acquisition activity by Hunter and Komis (2000). 
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Suppose a random sample x=(x,, x,,... 'x. ) from the unknown probability 
distribution F has been observed and we wish to estimate some statistic of interest 
0= t(F) on the basis of x. For that purpose one can calculate an estimate 0= s(x). 
One way to obtain whatever features of the distribution of 0 is to bootstrap the 
available set of data. Efron and Tibshirani (1993) use the following notion of a 
bootstrap sample. Let P be the empirical distribution function, putting probability 
I 
on each of the observed values xi. A bootstrap sample is defined to be a 
n 
resampled version of x or a random sample of size n drawn with replacements 
from x* (i) x; x. (i)). Co esponding to , 
(i)) 
,P -> 
(x, X, rr 
a bootstrap data set x* (i) is O(x* (i)), which represents a bootstrap replication of 0. 
B independent bootstrap samples yield B statistics O(x* (i)) and one can 
approximate the distribution of 0 by the bootstrap distribution. The bootstrap as just 
described is called the non-parametric bootstrap for it is based on P, the non- 
parametric estimate of the population F. 
The resampling scheme adopted here is a variant of the parametric bootstrap used in 
Adkins (1990) for g enerating b ootstrap s amples for ab inary r esponse inap robit 
model, based on normal distribution . 
128 Here we applied Adkin's variant to a 
binomial logit model, also a parametric binary response model. Jeong and Maddala 
(1993) stress that the benefits from bootstrap methods, in most cases of parametric 
binary response models, is only for small sample properties. In large samples, the 
parametric bootstrap does not outperform the maximum likelihood estimation, 
which gives asymptotically efficient estimators. 
Applying Adkins' scheme to logit, defined as: 
eß'xl 
- + eß'XI 
(5.1) 
129 The residual resampling standard bootstrap is not appropriate for the discrete dependent variable case since 
the residuals have an incomplete distribution (Jeong and Maddala, 1993). 
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where e, is IID and has a logistic distribution, y, takes values 0 and 1, 
one can resample the response variable y* and hence generate a bootstrap data set 
(y*, x) by fist generating a vector of uniform random numbers c* - [0, I], and then 
calculating 
yj* =I if 0 -: 5 vj* :! ý 
A(A' x, ), 
0 
(5.2) 
Y, =0 if A(A'xj)<cj*: 51. 
A bootstrap d ata s et (y*, x) ist hen u sed toc ompute b ootstrap r eplications oft he 
quantity of interest: ý* = s(y*, x). 
As mentioned above, in the comparative study, based on small samples, we are 
concerned with approximating confidence intervals of model parameters and 
estimating prediction errors of derived models of company failure. 
First, we discuss one possible bootstrap tool to fonn confidence intervals. It is worth 
to cmphasise the appropriateness of the construction of bootstrap confidence 
intervals based on the bootstrap distribution of a statistic, as compared to the 
approach of setting the cndpoints by using the bootstrap standard errors. According 
to Jeong and Maddala (1993) the latter procedure is not sufficient because even if 
the asymptotic and bootstrap standard errors agree, there can be large differences in 
the corresponding confidence intervals if the bootstrap distribution is sufficiently 
skewed, thus producing different confidence intervals. One usual solution to this 
problem is to set confidence intervals using bootstrap percentiles (Efron and 
Tibshirani, 1993). Let 6 be a cumulative distribution function of a model 
parameter A*. The lower limit and the upper limit of the I- 2a percentile interval 
are defined by the a and I-a percentiles of 6: 
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6-(1 
- a)] 
129. (5.3) 
Since by definition the 100-ath percentile of the bootstrap 
distribution, one can rewrite the percentile interval as 
V-1.10 I AV, p 
I-a (5.4) 
For some finite number of bootstrap replications B, let be the 100-ath 
percentileofthe A*(b) values, that is, the B-ctth value in the ordered list of the B 
*('-') be the 100 -(1 - a)th empirical percentile. replications of A% Similarly, let ftB 
The approximate I- 2a percentile interval is 
*02) 1 
10 ý 
A/o 
up 
ft 
09 
ftB 
(5.5) 
If the empirical distribution function of the parameter is asymmetric it is no longer 
optimal to omit the same number ofPb from each end of the empirical distribution 
function. One can follow Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) and Johnston and 
DiNardo (1997) in using the modified percentile approach, which tends to move the 
confidence interval away from the longer tail of the distribution, thus allowing to 
find the shortest interval that includes 100-(1-a) per cent of thep^b*. As given in 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) the modified percentile interval is constructed by 
minimising the quantity: 
I (A * (1+(I-a)B) + ft *(I+(I-a)B+I) 
)_ 
-I 
(ft 
*(I-I) + 
ft *(1) (5.6) 
22 
with respect to the positive integer I<a-B- 
"9 The value a is the significance level for the one-sided hypotheses that the true parameter is greater (less) 
than P. Also, hypothesis tests can be carried out by constructing a confidence interval and then checking 
whether the null value is in the interval. 
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We turn now to the description of the bootstrap procedure due to Efron and 
Tibshirani (1993) used here for estimation of prediction error. In classification 
problems, prediction error is commonly defined as the probability of an incorrect 
classification: PE = Prob(ý # y), where y is a future response and ý is its 
prediction from the model. PE is also called the misclassification rate. 
Let the data (y,, x, ),..., (y,,, x. ) be an IlD sample from the multidimensional 
distribution F, where y, indicates a class membership of the ith observation. We 
apply a prediction rule to the training sample and form the realised prediction rule 
ý, given by expression (3.13). 130 Let Q[y, ý(xo)] be the criterion that measures the 
error between an observed value yo and prediction ý(xo). The true error of the 
realised prediction rule 0 is defined as the expected error that 0 makes on a new 
observation (yo, xo) from F: 
err(P, F) mm EOF JQ[yo, e(xo)11. (5.7) 
A possible estimate of prediction error is the proportion of errors that the rcalised 
prediction rule 0 makes when applied to the original observations x, or the 
apparent error rate. 
The apparent error rate is quantified by 
P) = Eop JQ[yo, e(xo)]) Q[yi, e(XI)], (5.8) 
because Eop simply averages over the n observed cases of the data. The apparent 
error rate underestimates the prediction error. The difference between the true 
prediction error and the apparent error rate is defined in Efron and TibsIllrani 
(1993) as the optimism in the apparent error rate: 
130 In section 3.2.3 of chapter 3 we discuss the prediction rule for logit. 
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O(F, F) = err(F, F) - ýýn(F, F). (5.9) 
The expected optimism is 
co =E- Q(F, F), F-F (5.10) 
where the expectation is taken over F, which is obtained from the sample generated 
by F. To correct for the downward bias one can employ the bootstrap. A bootstrap 
replication of the downward bias is computed as 
Ct)b 
. 
The bootstrap approach in Efron and Tibshirani (1993) estimates the bias in the 
apparent error rate as an estimator of the prediction error. To approximate the final 
estimate of prediction error, the apparent error rate is corrected by adding the 
downward bias: 
1 pf iB 
-EQIYI, O(xi)l +-Ecobo n, B b-I 
(5.12) 
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARIZING REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS 
ABOUT POLICY ISSUES AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The substance of the present thesis is two studies, contained in chapters 3-5. The 
first study examines the determinants of industrial company failure in the UK for the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, and the second study is concerned with a comparative 
analysis of the industrial company failure determinants for Russia and the UK in the 
1990s. Both analyses explore the relationship between the characteristics of the 
company's financial profile and the outcome of failure, which is proxied here by the 
state of involuntary insolvency. The UK company failure analysis with firm-level 
data, allows also for the effects of the macroeconomic factors. 
Presented in chapters I and 2 overviews of the literature, concerned with economic 
and financial aspects of company distress and seeking to isolate the failure 
determinants, appeared to indicate the lack in most company-level empirical 
investigations of a unified analytical framework, which relates the risk of the adverse 
outcome to variables derived from company accounts. In past research based on 
company-level data, there appeared to be no agreement about which accounting- 
based measures can explain the failure outcome best and, therefore, previous studies 
employed variables reflecting main dimensions of financial analysis, such as 
profitability, liquidity, gearing and efficiency (turnover). The literature, which deals 
with the aggregate rate of insolvencies, points to the important independent 
explanatory role in company survival of the changes in macroeconomic conditions. 
Given in odel u ncertainty inr elation toa ccounting-based e xplanatory m easures, in 
the present thesis, we isolate empirically the firm-specific determinants of company 
failure using a conditional probability model. Such framework has often been 
employed in past firm-level research to discover the determinants of failure by 
examining the associations between failure risk and a wide range of indicators, based 
on publicly available information from financial accounts and market prices of 
equity and debt. This modelling approach, which depends on the assumption that 
company accounts and market valuation variables capture tendencies in both the 
firm's characteristics and in the market environment, has been accepted by 
academics and recognised by practitioners because of satisfactory predictive power 
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of e mpirical m odels. S pecifically, for b oth c ross-sectional a nd p ancl d ata, we use 
familiar binomial logit estimators allowing us to detect the key determinants of 
failure, interpret their relative importance, and validate the results by assessing out- 
of-sample predictive power of parsimonious models. Empirical design reflects 
developments in the UK and US literatures on involuntary insolvency (bankruptcy) 
prediction, on models for discrete dependent variables, and on the bootstrap, in 
particular, in work by Chamberlain (1980), OhIson (1980), Zavgren (1985), Efron 
(1986), Palepu (1986), Peel, Peel, and Pope (1986), Peel and Peel (1988), Adkins 
(1990), Keasey and McGuinness (1990), and Efron and Tibshirani (1993). In the 
UK study, we base empirical evidence on a relatively large, resembling the true 
population proportions of failing and non-failed firms, cross-section sample and a 
panel, covering the UK recession of the early1990. 
As one would expect, the results for Russia, provided in chapter 5, stand in contrast 
with the results for the UK, therefore, findings from the two studies appear to have 
some value taken individually. Firstly, this is because of obviously different 
economic, institutional, and regulatory settings in which an individual, private firm 
exits via the route of legal insolvency. Secondly, the limitation of a small Russian 
data set led us to opt for the comparative analysis format in order to interpret better 
broad tendencies as to the key determinants of Russian industrial enterprise failure, 
detected in the data. Sample size and time-period have a big effect on the choice of 
plausible explanatory factors, which can be modelled, and on the comparability of 
results from econometric analysis, across the two countries. 
Accordingly, for the Russian study, we modelled failure for the one-year risk- 
horizon and restricted the variety of possible model inputs to 13 measures 
observable from statutory accounts, while in a large-scale, cross-sectional analysis of 
UK firms, where failure was modelled over longer risk-horizons - up to four years 
before the event - 25 financial statements-based inputs were supplemented by firm's 
age and macroeconomic indicators. Moreover, it was important to explore how well 
a model, derived from a small sample of Russian firms, would detect the linkages 
between explanatory variables and the probability of failure. Thus, in the absence of 
fresh holdout observations, we felt that. the format of comparative study would 
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provide a complementary means for validating the results for Russia. We indirectly 
control for the Russian sample size, by applying a binomial logit model to a small, 
equal-share, selected at random data set of UK firms. It appeared that the UK model, 
derived from this small sample, did capture the essence of reality, as it yielded a set 
of correctly signed predictors and performed satisfactorily at classifying e-x ante new 
holdout firms, broadly conforming with the evidence from the UK studies based on 
larger data sets. The estimate of prediction error for this UK model, at a conservative 
cutoff probability value of 0.125 was 19.6 per cent. This performance supported the 
explanatory power of the pre-tax profit margin, the capital gearing ratio, and the ratio 
of stock and work in progress over current liabilities, which, in turn, implied that the 
dimensions of profitability, gearing, and liquidity discriminated between failing and 
non-failed UK firms at the one-year risk horizon. It follows that modelling the 
failure determinants with a modest in size, random sample might produce fairly 
interpretable results, thus lending further indirect support to the significant central 
factors of enterprise insolvency implicit in the model for Russia. 
An interesting and novel feature of our Russian work is the use of bootstrap 
procedures to infer the significance of model parameters and predictive ability. 
Setting the cutoff probability value at 0.125, the estimate of prediction error, 
generated by the Russian model, was 30.2 per cent, roughly analogous to accuracy 
rates reported in the UK study by Alici (1995), who examined corporate failures in 
the early 1990s. Based on bootstrap estimates, perhaps the most important result of 
our comparative work is that the Russian model implies no association between the 
risk of legal insolvency and changes in variables, reflecting the liquidity position and 
level of indebtedness. This finding supports the proposition that, atI cast o ver t he 
analysis period, Russian firms faced soft budget constraints and extensively relied on 
barter. Moreover, the results show fairly clearly that profitable and large Russian 
firms were more likely to survive the state of severe illiquidity and financial distress, 
which would appear to suggest that the actual implementation of Russian bankruptcy 
laws staved off imminent insolvency of large and potentially valuable enterprises. 
We should also add that, as yet, no similar work on modelling the Russian enterprise 
insolvency determinants with data from statutory financial statements has been 
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reported in the literature. Therefore, while it might not be difficult to believe that our 
results for Russia are true, they still should be treated circumspectly. Due to limited 
resources available for this Russian work, the time period, over which we traced the 
failure determinants for Russian firms, is rather short. Undoubtedly, a larger sample 
of enterprises observed over a longer period of time is necessary to see how robust 
our results are to the sample period. Larger data sets will permit to model the more 
subtle effects that changes in the firm's financial performance might have on the risk 
of failure over the transition from plan to market. Further, to provide a broader view 
to inform the policies of the government, domestic and foreign investors, and 
international agencies involved in economic reforms in Russia, it would seem 
important to move the research focus away from mere changes in enterprise 
performance towards investigating more directly the role in enterprise survival of 
such factors as characteristics of ownership, corporate governance, managerial 
flexibility, industry sector, regional location, and employment. 
In contrast, for the UK, to permit an exploration of the finer aspects of the failure 
process and to examine the influence of non-financial factors, we created a decent- 
sized cross-sectional sample and, in addition, constructed a panel data set, both 
covering company failures during the recession that occurred in the UK in 1990-92. 
Our UK work, which is reported in chapters 3 and 4, focuses on large quoted 
industrials and complements the empirical results provided by previous f inn-level 
studies of UK company failure. We have introduced the following two extensions to 
the UK past literature. First, inference from research into aggregate rates of company 
insolvency led us to examine, within a traditional for cross-sectional data studies 
framework, a more complete model of the determinants of company failure by 
adding to a set of accounting-based indicators the two variables, which capture 
aggregate economy risk. To allow macroeconomic influences to feed through 
company financial results within a year or so, we considered annual, unanticipated 
changes in macroeconomic variables, using one-year lagged interaction terms. 
Reported in chapter 3 cross-sectional models condition the risk of failure upon 
changes in the nominal interest rate and in the real exchange rate. Second, in chapter 
4, when modelling the failure determinants with panel data we allowed for 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms. 
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In the cross-sectional analysis of UK firms, presented in chapter 3, to permit a 
temporal aspect to appear in explanation of causes of failure, we constructed several 
series of time-to-failure-specific logit models and isolated the failure risk 
determinants for each of the four years prior to failure. We have started with a set of 
time-to-failure-specific cross-sectional models, based on 25 financial covariates, 
representing traditional dimensions of financial analysis. This general specification 
was then augmented by adding a control for firm's age and the terms, representing 
unanticipated s hifts int he n ominal i nterest r ate a nd int he r eal e xchange rate. To 
reveal the important determinants we estimated and then assessed the out-of-sample 
classificatory accuracy of the four sets of parsimonious models. These included: (i) 
basic models based on financial variables alone; (ii) models based on financial 
variables and one-year lagged unanticipated changes in the exchange rate and 
interest rate; (iii) models based on financial variables and a proxy for firm's age; and 
(iv) models based on financial variables, a proxy for firrn's age, and one-year lagged 
unanticipated changes in the exchange rate and interest rate. 
All estimated with the cross-sectional data logit models were found to be highly 
significant and being capable of producing predictions, which compared favourably 
with random selection for a wide range of cutoff probability values. We stress that 
this result can be taken as indicative of the relevance of the modelled determinants. 
Across all models, the estimate of the overall prediction error, obtained from Efron's 
approximation, was in the vicinity of 30 per cent. However, when models were 
confronted with the most severe test - out-of-sample classificatory ability - more 
complete models performed better on holdout samples. In particular, the predictive 
power of models, constructed for identifying failure in three-year time and four-year 
time in the future, appeared to be enhanced by incorporating macroeconomic 
variables. Remarkably, in holdout tests, the four-year-prior model that conditioned 
predictions on unanticipated changes in the two macroeconomic variables, 
approximated both failed and non-failed firms more accurately, than a simpler, 
financial ratio-based model. Specifically, it demonstrated stable rates of correct 
predictions across a wide range of cutoff probability values, improving on the 
overall accuracy by 15.6 per cent at a conservative cutoff classification point of 0.1. 
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This gain in accuracy over ex ante holdout tests, considered together with highly 
significant coefficients for the two macroeconomic variables, appears to suggest that 
for the years before and during the 1990s recession, shifis in the real exchange rate 
and rises in the nominal interest rate were associated with a higher propensity of a 
large industrial company to fail, thus indicating the links to a loss in competitiveness 
and the effect of high gearing. The finding that this "outperformance" was shown for 
the risk-horizons longer than two years, points to the importance of relationships 
between changes in the macroeconomic environment and the risk of bankruptcy, 
signalling the need to promote macroeconomic stability to contain default risk. Our 
results highlight that changes in macroeconomic conditions should be an important 
ingredient of any extension of empirical models of company failure determinants. 
To better capture factors influencing company failure, an attempt was also made to 
control for firm's age, the factor that, as was concluded by previous studies of the 
UK, inversely relates to the probability of failure. The models, based on financial 
ratios, two macroeconomic variables, and age, demonstrated stable rates of overall 
accuracy across the whole r ange ofc utoff v alues, a chieving t he i n-sample c orrect 
classification rate of 90.6 per cent and better for the one-year risk-horizon, and 71.9 
per cent and better for horizons of three and four years. However, prediction did not 
improved. We found that, with the exception of the three-year horizon, the out-of- 
sample classificatory ability of most of the models that contain both the two 
macroeconomic variables and the control for duration, was rather similar to that of 
the simpler models, the specifications allowing for the macroeconomic effects but 
without the duration term. These results did not seem to be indicative of the 
particular usefulness of a duration control in financial ratio-based models of 
company failure. It appeared that for our data set, the proxy for firm's duration did 
not contain new information not already captured by a wide range of covariates 
derived from financial statements. 
As far as the financial ratio-based determinants of failure are concerned, our overall 
results from the cross-sectional analysis show a strong positive association between 
gearing and the probability of failure; this effect of high gearing was robust to 
augmenting model specifications by non-financial variables. Coefficient estimates of 
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gearing ratios are significant in all specifications and over all years preceding failure. 
The strong influence of changes in the nominal interest rate, combined with the 
observed strong effect of gearing, seems to indicate that the companies that went 
bust over the period 1988-91 had severe problems in meeting their debt obligations. 
The capital gearing of UK industrial and commercial companies rose significantly 
over the early 1990s, being about three times higher than in the first Thatcher 
recession of 1980-81 (Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, August 1993). In the 
early 1990s, companies experienced a sharp decline in the growth of orders, subdued 
equity issues, and were affected by a fall in short-term interest rates following the 
stock market crash of October 1987. That encouraged companies to issue long-term 
debt and increase short-term borrowing with the unhealthy reliance on overdrafts and 
other short-term lending. A drawback to short-term finance is that a failure to 
rearrange the agreement can be devastating for the borrower. A sharp rise in interest 
rates from 1988 increased companies' debt service costs while the subsequent 
recession lowered companies' ability to service debt. 
If firm's age and unanticipated shifts in the two macroeconomic variables were 
uncontrolled for, then liquidity negatively related to the probability of failure for 
most of risk-horizons, whereas the profitability variables had a negative e ffect on 
failure risk at the shortest, one-year horizon. However, when model specifications 
were controlling for firm's age and predictions were conditioned on the changes in 
the macroeconomy, the liquidity dimension became unimportant, but profitability 
differences between failing and non-failed firms were evident both over the shorter 
horizons and over the longer horizons. The effect of turnover was implicit in models 
unconditioned on macroeconomic factors. The pattern of signs of coefficients on 
turnover measures was unstable over the risk-horizons analysed and appeared to 
suggest that, in the earlier years, fast growth and overtrading were associated with 
the risk of failure, whilst in the last year before failure lower turnover pointed to low 
efficiency and higher failure risk. It is also worth stressing that since our data cover 
only one recession, the UK results reported in this thesis are likely to be specific to 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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To examine more rigorously the impact of changes in corporate performance on the 
risk of failure, in chapter 4 we modelled the failure determinants for a panel of UK 
large quoted firms observed over the period 1988-93. We emphasise that the panel 
element of our study is of tremendous importance. The main advantage of modelling 
with panel data was that this empirical design allowed us to correct for 
unobservable, firm-specific, time-invariant factors, which were likely to be 
associated with failure risk. The corporate finance literature suggests the potential 
explanatory power of such factors as ownership characteristics, corporate 
governance, technological and managerial qualities, industry-specific influences, 
business location, market position and export intensity, however previous empirical 
studies failed to address the problem of allowing in modelling financial distress for 
the effects of these factors. Given the nature of our panel data, which contains only 
large quoted industrial firms, we adopte .da fixed effects approach and allowed for 
fixed unobserved parameters by using Chamberlain's conditional binomial logit 
model. 
We found a noticeable degree of unobserved heterogeneity across companies in the 
panel, which implies that the panel data estimates were preferable to the cross- 
sectional estimates. As one would expect, the results from the panel data yielded the 
set of key explanatory variables and corresponding, broader dimensions that 
somewhat disagreed with the pattern implied in our cross-sectional models. The 
major difference lies in the absence of gearing variables amongst the key 
determinants of failure, although this finding can be explained by the possibility that 
the gearing factor is captured by individual-specific, permanent effects. Further, our 
panel results showed that, after controlling for unobserved firm-specific factors, 
lower liquidity, measured by the quick assets ratio, and slower turnover, proxied by 
the ratio of debtors turnover, were linked to the higher risk of insolvency over the 
1990-92 recession. The fixed effects models also suggest that profitability played an 
important independent role, although the observed pattern of the cocfficient signs of 
profitability proxies is rather puzzling, as all models feature a positive coefficient on 
the n et p rofit m argin and a negative coefficient on the pre-tax profit margin. We 
attempted to offer a tentative interpretation that the positive sign of the coefficient on 
the net profit margin could reflect an accounting treatment of associates in 
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consolidated accounts of the company that has subsidiaries and where subsidiaries' 
profits impact significantly the overall performance of the group. Under the equity 
accounting method, a holding company or group might have showed a higher net 
profit margin but a lower pre-tax profit margin, simply because the consolidated 
profit and loss account of the group must report proportional profits of its associates 
attributable to the parent company by reason of its shareholding. It is worth noting 
that profits of associates, attributable to the group, do not indicate accessibility or 
cash flow, but rather a fair share allocation. However, more future research with 
additional and more detailed data will be needed to see what has caused the observed 
here mixed performance of profitability measures. 
In contrast to cross-sectional models, the panel data analysis clearly demonstrated 
that failing firms were not only illiquid but also insolvent since all models record a 
meaningful negative association between the probability of failure and changes in 
net worth, proxied by the index of net tangible assets. Overall, when we contrast the 
two types of evidence, obtained in this thesis with the cross-sectional and panel data, 
the bottom line seems to be that the major dimension discriminating between failed 
and non-failed firms in our samples was liquidity. This result was found to be very 
robust, supporting the evidence from the study by Turner, Coutts, and Bowden 
(1992) who contend that the current cash-flow considerations, rather than the future 
prospects of the firm, determined company failures over the 1990s recession. The 
potential for the robust predictive performance of the failure determinants points to 
the importance of creating a framework for encouraging lenders to employ on a 
greater scale empirical measures of credit risk of their borrowers so as to analyse and 
monitor the financial position of firms regularly and more closely. Early detection 
by the lender of the danger of distress of the borrower should result in more 
successful restructurings and preserve financial stability. 
We have tried to show that empirical modelling of the determinants of failure is 
useful for understanding the process of financial distress at the company-level and 
therefore may be of some assistance in informing responsible lending by banks and 
authorities' economic policies, aimed at maintaining stability. However, our study 
left for future work a number of other important questions. 
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We did not attempt to explain the role in the failure process of the structure of short- 
and medium-term debt finance and, in particular, the role of trade credit that due to 
cheapness and flexibility makes up an important part of the funding needs of UK 
companies. In future work, the link between company survival and the degree of 
reliance on a simplest and "free" short-term source of trade credit should be 
examined in greater detail and in combination with some kind of industry adjustment 
in the empirical analysis. 
Granting trade credit is, in effect, the granting of a loan. The credit provider usually 
relies on an assessment of credit risk provided by a credit reporting agency who 
make the their judgement or assessment as to the trade partner or borrower 
creditworthiness, based on information from company accounts and macroeconomic 
forecasts. Similar to insolvency announcements, credit rating downgrades represent 
clear events of distress and were used in past analyses of company failure to 
operationalise the concept of failure and derive the probability of default (see, e. g., 
Johnsen and Melicher (1994), Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2000)). But there is also 
an obvious way to extend the scope of analysis of UK company distress by seeking 
an explanation of how perceived assessments of creditworthiness in the form of 
credit quality spreads could modify the risk of corporate failure. This future work 
will require an extended version of the used in the present study data sets of UK 
fi rm s. 
This thesis has provided the first panel-data documentation of the effects that the 
accounting-based, company-level characteristics had on distress risk of LJK firms 
during the 1990s recession. Given a relatively short sample period, it was not 
possible toa How ino ur p anel in odel for t he b usiness c ycle i nfluence a nd f or t he 
factors underlying the banks' unwillingness to extend debt maturities of distressed 
firms, which lead to high liquidation rates in the early 1990s. The question, which 
merits further investigation, is how the relative importance for company survival of 
firm-specific, accounting ratio-based factors would change if an analysis, similar to 
that undertaken in the present thesis, were performed with the data representative of 
the first Thatcher recession of the early 1980s. The panel data methodology, which 
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reinforces information on trend, has good potential to provide an empirical answer to 
this question. This future work can assess the impacts both of recessionary climate 
and of changes in banks' behaviour, by allowing in modelling for external economic, 
credit and industry conditions, which will require additional, going back to the late 
1970s, macroeconomic and company accounts data. 
Lastly, the story that the models built in this study tell about the key role in failures 
of the sample companies, of insufficient liquidity and gearing, seems consistent with 
the fact that, over the analysis period, administrative receivership -a creditor- 
oriented regime in the 1986 UK Insolvency Act - represented the dominant 
proportion of UK total company insolvencies. The institutional framework for 
insolvency affects the determinants of financial failure and creditors' myopia, 
implied in our models, is the research result that has important implications for the 
debate about further policy reforms on insolvency in the UK. The procedure of 
administrative receivership seemed to provide the banks with an incentive to be lazy 
in planning for a possible slow-down in the economy, in monitoring financial health 
of firins and in pre-empting debt repayment problems. Therefore one of the central 
questions about financial distress of UK companies, is how creditor-oriented 
insolvency provisions affect the efficiency of financial distress resolution. It should 
be noted, however, that the ability of secured lenders to appoint a receiver is 
fundamental to the operation of the market system. As a contractual solution to the 
conflicts of interest, administrative receiverships have provided major benefits in 
terms of speed, flexibility, and control in enforcing performance of debt contracts. 
Over the recent decade, the procedure of administrative receivership has been 
subject to criticism because of its tendency to disregard the economic value and 
potential to restructure of the debtor-finn (see, e. g., Armour and Frisby (2001), 
Franks and Sussman (2002)). In case of default, an administrative receiver, 
appointed by the holder of the floating charge (the bank), has, without considering 
the interests of other stakeholders, in particular unsecured creditors, full discretion 
over whether to realise the firm's assets by selling the firm as a going concern or to 
liquidate it piece meal. Banks effectively take control of the debtor-finn and may be 
careless with respect to the indirect costs of bankruptcy. When the firm's economic 
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value exceeds its liquidation value, such concentration of control rights in the hands 
of one lender was seen as a shortcoming of the insolvency provisions available in the 
1990s. Collateralised and concentrated in the hands of one lender lending was 
viewed as a factor, which encouraged precipitate behaviour on the part of banks, 
causing companies to fail unnecessary in the early 1990s and imposing a barrier to 
enterprise, productivity, and innovation (Insolvency Service (2001): Insolvency -A 
Second Chance)). Furthermore, the available mechanisms, intended to promote a 
rescue culture by providing the economically efficient firm with temporary 
protection from creditors' actions such as administration and company voluntary 
arrangement procedures, have not functioned well since the holder of the floating 
charge (the bank) had the power to veto both procedures and appoint a receiver 
instead. The new Enterprise Act 2002 has tried to implement more debtor-oriented 
approaches by amending administrative receivership and thus promoting a corporate 
rescue culture. 
One way to guard against the threat of inefficient liquidations of companies and to 
inform a judgement about the overall efficiency of insolvency law as a financial 
distress resolution device, is to establish to what extent liquidations of economically 
efficient companies are influenced by the insolvency law orientation. The question 
can be investigated empirically, although the empirical design will need to address 
the p roblem. oft he a bsence ofac lear b enchmark ofe conomic e fficiency. C learer 
implications for the discussion and debate about the efficiency of LTK insolvency law 
can be generated in a large longitudinal study which will compare the determinants 
both of involuntary insolvency and of economic distress of the UK large quoted 
firms with the causes, underlying company failure, in countries with a more debtor- 
oriented bankruptcy code, such as the US. Given that existing evidence of the 
efficiency of the selection process, triggered by financial distress, is mixed and 
limited (White, 1989 and 1994; Kahl and School, 2001) it would be important to 
create a panel of firms containing a group of economically but not financially 
distressed firms alongside another group of the financially distressed firms. This 
important extension to the work, presented in this thesis, will also help to highlight 
the role of debt in the reallocation of assets. 
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APPENDIX 1: COMPANY INSOLVENCY IN ENGLAND AND WALES IN 1988-94 
Table Al. l. Company Insolvency in 1988-94, England and Wales 
(Source: Department of Trade and Industry, 1997) 
TYPE OF 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
_INSOLVENCY 
Company Insolvencies - England and Wales 
Total 9,427 10,546 15,051 21,827 24,425 20,708 16,728 
Compulsory 
Liquidations 3,667 4,020 5,977 8,368 9,734 8,244 6,597 
Creditors' 
Voluntary 
Liquidations 5,760 6,436 9,074 13,459 14,691 12,464 10,131 
Proceedings Related to Insolvency - England and Wales 
Receiverships 1,094 1,706 4,318 7,515 8,324 5,362 3,877 
Administrator 
Appointments 198 135 211 206 179 112 159 
Voluntary 
Arrangements 47 43 58 137 76 134 264 
Companies on Register, England and Wales, thousands 
864,4 1075,9 1115 1125,1 1117,9 1074,6 1058,6 
Overall Rate of Insolvencies and Proceedings Related to Insolvencies, 131 percentage 
1.2 1.2 1.8 2.6 3.0 2.4 2.0 
131 Insolvencies and proceedings realed to insolvencies relative to the number of companies on the Register. 
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APPENDIX 5 
APPENDIX 5: LISTS OF UK AND RUSSIAN COMPANIES 
Table A5.1 Company Names and Years of Entering Insolvency Regime, 
of UK Failed Quoted Industrials Used in the Estimation Sample 
for the Cross-sectional Analysis 
Allied Partnership Group 1992 Ketson 1990 
Arley Holdings 1990 Lawtex 1991 
Arnkliffe Holdings 1991 Lilley 1993 
Astra Holdings 1992 Lyon & Lyon 1990 
AT Trust 1990 Maxwell Comms. Corporation 1991 
ATP Communications Group 1992 Miller (Stanley) Holdings 1990 
Audit & General 1991 Oakwood Group 1990 
Bestwood 1990 Parkfield Group 1990 
C. H. Industrials 1991 Pavilion Leisure 1991 
Chelsea Man 1991 Pavion International 1989 
Chequers Group 1992 Peters (Michael) Group 1990 
Clearmark Group 1991 Polly Peck International 1990 
Colographic 1992 Reliant Group 1990 
Coloroll 1990 Rockwood Holdings 1990 
Conder Group 1992 Rush & Tomkins Group 1990 
Crown Communications Group 1993 Sale Tilney 1992 
Doctus 1991 Toothill (R. W. ) 1991 
Ferrari Holdings 1991 Trilion 1992 
Fobel International 1991 Turriff Corporation 1991 
Futura Holdings 1993 Video Store Group 1991 
Gaynor Group 1991 Ward Group 1992 
Goldberg (A. ) & Sons 1990 West Industries 1992 
Grovewood Securities 1991 Westerly 1991 
Halls Homes & Gardens 1992 Willaire Group 1992 
Hey & Croft Group 1992 Williams (John) Industries 1990 
Huges Food Group 1991 Yellowhammer 1990 
International Resort Holdings 1992 
Table A5.2 Company Names and Years of Entering Insolvency Regime 
of UK Failed Quoted Industrials Used in the Holdout Sample 
for the Cross-sectional Analysis 
Automagic Holdings 1995 Ferranti International 1993 
Beckenham Group 1994 Harland Simon Group 1992 
Bimec Industries 1994 McLaughlin & Harvey 1993 
Bullers 1995 Pentos 1995 
Dunkeld 1993 Scottish Heritable Trust 1994 
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Table A5.3 Company Names of UK Non-failed Quoted Industrials 
Used in the Estimation Sample for the Cross-sectional Analysis 
600 Group Bespak 
Abbott Mead Vickers Betterware 
Acatos & Hutcheson Bicc 
Adwest Group Billam 
Aegis Group Bilston & Battersea 
African Lakes Corporation Blue Circle Industries 
AIM Group Bogod Group 
Albion Boots 
Allied Leisure Brake Bros 
Allied Textile Companies Brarnmer 
Arnec Bridport-Gundry 
Arnersharn Brit. Building & Engineering Appliances 
Andrews Sykes Group British Bloodstock Agency 
Anglo United British Dredging 
API Group Brit. Polytheline Industries 
Arabis British Vita 
Arcolectric (Holdings) Brooke Industrial Holdings 
Arlen Brown (N. ) Group 
Ashtead Group Bristol United Press 
Associated British Foods BTP 
Associated British Ports BunzI 
Astec (BSR) Burton Group 
Atlas Converting Equipment BWI 
Avon Rubber Cable and Wireless Comms. 
Ayshire Metal Cadbury Schweppes 
Bailey (Ben) Cape 
Bailey (C. H. ) Capital Radio 
Banks (Sidney C. ) Carlton Communications 
Bardon Group Castle Mill International 
Barr & Wallace Arnold Trust Caverdale Group 
Barr (AG) Chamberlin & Hills 
Barratt Developments Charter 
Baynes (Charles) Chernring Group 
Beales Hunter Chloride Group 
Bearing Power International Christie's International 
Beauford Chrysalis Group 
Bellway City Centre Restaurants 
Bellwinch Clyde Blowers 
Bernrose Corp. CML Microsystems 
Benson Group Coats Viyella 
Bentalls Cook (William) 
Berisford Cookson Group 
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Table A5.3 - Continued 
Cooper (Frederick)) Grampian Television 
Corporate Services Group Granada Group 
Courts Green (E. ) & Partners Holdings 
Coutts Consulting Group Greenalls Group 
Cradley Group Holdings Gresham Computing 
Craig & Rose Gt. UnvI Stores 
Crest Nicholson Guinness 
Cropper (James) Halma 
Davis Servide Group Harripson Industries 
De La Rue Havelock Europa 
Densitron International Hawtal Whiting Holdings 
Dewhurst Hawtin 
Dixons Group Hay (Norman) 
Druck Holdings Heavitree Brewery 
Drummond Group Henlys Group 
Dyson (J&J) Heywood Williams 
Eadie Holdings Hicking Pentecost 
Eclipse Blinds Hickson International 
EIS Group Highland Distillers 
Eldridge, Pope & Co Home Counties Newspapers Holdings 
Electronic Data Processing Hollas Group 
Etarn Holt (Joseph) 
Feedback Hopkinsons Group 
Fife Indmar Homby 
FII Group How Group 
First Choice Holidays HTV Group 
Firth Holdings Hunting 
Fisher (James) and Sons HuntleighTechnology 
FKI lbstock 
Forminster IMI 
Fortnum & Mason Imperial Chen-dcal Industries 
Garton Engineering Intereurope Techn. Services 
GBE International Jacks (William) 
GEI International Jacobs Holdings 
Gieves Group Jarvis 
GKN Jerome Group 
Glaxo Wellcome Jeyes Group 
Glenchewton Johnson Matthey 
Glenmorangie Jones, Stroud (Holdings) 
Glynwed International Kalon Group 
Goodwin Kelsey Industries 
Grampian Hoildings Kingfisher 
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Table A5.3 - Continued 
Kode International 
Kwik Save Group 
Kwik-Fit Holdings 
Kynoch Group 
Ladbroke Group 
Lambert Howarth Group 
Lamont Holdings 
Laporte 
Laser-Scan Holdings 
Latham (James) 
Leigh Interests 
Lex Service 
Liberty 
Lilleshall 
Linton Park 
Lister & Co 
Locker (Thomas) 
Lopex 
Lovell (Y. J. ) Holdings 
Law & Bonar 
M-R Group 
Mallett 
Manders 
Maunders 
McCarthy & Stone (Holdings) 
McKechnie 
Menvier-Swain 
Menzies (John) 
Meristem 
Metal Bulletin 
Micro Focus Group 
Microgen Holdings 
Microvite 
Mitie Group 
ML Holdings 
MMT Computing 
Molins 
Morgan Grucible Company 
Morland 
Morrison (WM)Supermarkets 
Moss Bros Group 
Mowlem (John) & Company 
Nichols (J. N. ) (Vimto) 
Northern Foods 
Osprey Communications 
Oxford Instruments 
Page (Michael) Group 
Parity 
Parkland Group 
Pascoe's Group 
Paterson Zochonis 
Pegasus 
Pen. &Ornt Steam Navigator Company 
Perkins Foods 
Perry Group 
Persimmon 
Photo-Me International 
Pifco Holdings 
Pittards 
Plasmec 
Porter Chadburn 
Powerscreen 
Premier Farnell 
Psion 
Quadrant Group 
Radius 
Rank Group 
Real Time Control 
Record Holdings 
Reed Executive 
Reed International 
Reliance 
Renold 
Reurters Holdings 
Rexam 
Ricardo Group 
Richardsons Westgarth 
Ropner 
Rubicon Group 
Safeway 
Sainsbury (J) 
Saltire 
Salvesen (Chris. ) 
Scapa Group 
Scottish TV 
Serif 
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Table A5.3 - Continued 
Shani Group 
Sharpe & Fisher 
Shilon 
Signet Group 
Silenthight Holdings 
Sinclair WM Holdings 
Sketchley 
Slingsby (H. C. ) 
Srnith (WH) Group 
Sornic 
Soundtracs 
Sperati (C. A. ) (The Special Agency) 
Springwood 
Stakis 
Sterling Industries 
Stirling Group 
Storehouse 
Stylo 
Sutcliffe, Spkrrm 
Swan (John) 
Syltone 
Tate & Lyle 
Taylor Woodrow 
TDS Circuits 
Telemetrix 
Tesco 
Tex Holdings 
Thorpe (FW) 
Tibbett & Britten 
Tomkins 
Tomkinsons 
Transtec 
Trinity International Holdings 
Triplex Lloyd 
TT Group 
Tunstall Group 
Unigate 
Upton & Southern 
Usborne 
Verity Group 
Vibroplant 
Vickers 
Victoria Carpet 
Volex Group 
Waddington 
Walker (Thomas) 
Wardle Storeys 
Waterman Ptshp 
Watmoughs, Holdings 
Watts, Blake, Beame & Company 
Weir Group 
Wembley Group 
Whessoe 
Wickes 
Widney 
Williams Holdings 
Wilson (Connolly) 
WPP Group 
Wyko 
Yorkshire Group 
Young (H) Holdings 
Yule Catto 
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Table A5.4 Company Names of UK Non-failed Quoted Industrials 
Used in the Holdout Sample for the Cross-sectional Analysis 
Abbot Group INN Business 
ABI Leisure Group Intercare 
Airspring Furniture Isotron 
Alliance Unichem, Leeds Group 
Alphameri Lonrho 
Argos Lookers 
Argo Wiggins Appleton Macro 4 
Am-dtage Brothers Marley 
Associated British Engineering Marshalls 
Austin Reed Group McLeod Russel 
Black (Peter) Medeva 
Blick Mirror Group 
Boosey & Hawkes Mitie Group 
Bostrorn P&P 
BPB Paramount 
Breedon Pex 
Brunel Holdings Phoenix Timber 
BTR Pifco Holdings 
Capital Industries Prowting 
Church & Co. QS Holdings 
Claremont Garments Quiligott 
Clarke (T) Radamec 
Cobham RMC Group 
Cordiant Rotork 
Daily Mail RTZ Corp. 
Derby Group Rugby Group 
Delphi Group Savoy Hotels 
Domino Printing Scottish & Newcastle 
Eidos Sears 
Flare Group Senior Engr. 
Formal Group Seton Healthcare Group 
Forward Technology Industries Sidlaw Group 
Gaskell SIG 
Gibbs & Dandy Smith (David S. ) 
Gibbs Mew Southnews 
Gleeson (MJ) Group Spirax-Sarco 
Haden Maclellan Thorntons 
Haggas (John) TSL 
Hartstone Ugland International Holdings 
Hi-Tec Sports Ulster T. V 
Highbury House Communications Wace Group 
Hodder Headline Walker Group 
Howden Group World of Leather 
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Table A5.5 Company Names and Years of Entering Insolvency Regime 
of UK Failed Quoted Industrials Used in the Panel Analysis 
Allied Partnership Group 1992 Halls Homes & Gardens 1992 
Arley Holdings 1990 Harland Simon Group 1992 
Arnkliffe Holdings 1991 Hey & Croft Group 1992 
Astra, Holdings 1992 International Resort Holdings 1993 
AT Trust 1990 Ketson 1991 
ATP Communications Group 1992 Lawtex 1993 
Audit & General 1991 Lilley 1990 
Beckenham 1994 Maxwell Comms. Corporation 1991 
Bimec Industries 1994 McLaughlin & Harvey 1995 
Bullers 1995 Parkfield Group 1990 
C. H. Industrials 1991 Pavilion Leisure 1990 
Chelsea Man 1991 Pentos 1990 
Chequers Group 1992 Peters (Michael) Group 1990 
Clearmark Group 1991 Polly Peck International 1992 
Colographic 1992 Reliant Group 1994 
Coloroll 1990 Rush & Tomkins Group 1991 
Conder Group 1992 Sale Tilney 1992 
Crown Communications Group 1993 Scottish Heritable Trust 1991 
Doctus 1991 Toothill (R. W. ) 1991 
Dunkeld Group 1993 Trilion 1992 
EIT Group 1993 Turriff Corporation 1992 
Ferranti International 1993 Video Store Group 1991 
Ferrari Holdings 1991 Ward Group 1992 
Fobel International 1991 West Industries 1990 
Futura Holdings 1993 Westerly 1990 
Gaynor Group 1991 Willaire Group 1992 
Goldberg (A. ) & Sons 1990 Williams (John) Industries 1990 
Grovewood Securities 1991 Yellowharnmer 1990 
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Table A5.6 Company Names of UK Non-failed Quoted Industrials 
Used in the Panel Study 
600 Group Barratt Developments 
Abbot Group Bass 
Acal B. A. T. Industries 
Acorn Computer Baynes (Charles) 
Aegis Group BBA Group 
AIM Group Beales Hunter 
Airflow Streamlines Beattie (James) 
Albert Fisher Beauford 
Albion Bellway 
Alexanders Holdings Benuose Corp. 
Alexandra Workware Bensons Crisps 
Alexon Group Bentalls 
Allied Colloids Berisford 
Allied Textile Companies Bespak 
Alvis Bett Bros. 
Amber Industrial Holdings Beverley Group 
Amec Bibby (J) 
Amersharn International Bicc 
Amstrad Billarn 
Andrews Sykes Group Birkdale Group 
API Group Black (A&C) 
APV Black (Peter) 
Arabis Black Arrow Group 
Arcolectric (Holdings) Blagden Industries 
Arlen Blockleys 
Armitage Brothers Blue Circle Industries 
Armour Trust BOC Group 
Asda Group Booker 
Ash & Lacy Boosey & Hawkes 
Associated British Foods Boot (Henry) 
Associated British Ports Booth Industrials Group 
Astec (BSR) Boots 
Austin Reed Group Braime (Tf & JH) 
Avon Rubber Brammer 
Ayshire Metal Brake Bros 
Baggeridge Brick Brasway 
Baird (William) Brent International 
Bandt Bridon 
Banks (Sidney C. ) British Aerospace 
Bardon Group Brit. Building & Engineering Appliances 
Barr (A G) British Mohair Holdings 
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Table A5.6 - Continued 
British Polytheline Industries Cookson Group 
British Vita Cooper (Frederick)) 
Brooke Industrial Holdings Cordiant 
Brown (N. ) Group Corporate Services Group 
Brunel Holdings Costain Group 
Bryant Group Countryside Propeties. 
BS Group Courtaulds 
BSS Group Courts 
Bristol United Press Cowie Group 
BTP Cradley Group Holdings 
BTR Craig & Rose 
Budgens Crest Nicholson 
Bullough Croda International 
Bulmer (HP) Cropper (James) 
Bunzl CRT Group 
Bumdene Investments Cussins Property Group 
Barton Group Dalgety 
Burtonwood Breweries Davenport Knit. 
Cable and Wireless Comms. Davis Servide Group 
Cadbury Schweppes Dawson International 
Caffyns Deanes Holdings 
Canning (W) De La Rue 
Carclo Engineering Group Delta 
Castings Denmans Elect. 
Castle Mill International Dewhirst Group 
Caverdale Group Dickie (James) 
Channel Holdings Dinkie Heel 
Chamberlin & Hills Diploma 
Charter Dixons Group 
Chernring Group Dolphin Pack. 
Chloride Group Dowding & Mills 
Christie's International Druck Holdings 
Chrysalis Group Dyson (J&J) 
Church & Co. EBC Group 
City Centre Restaurants Eclipse Blinds 
Clarke (T) EIS Group 
Clyde Blowers Elbief 
CML Microsystems Eldridge, Pope & Co 
Coats Viyella Electrocomp. 
Cobham Elliott (B) 
Cohen Ellis & Everard 
Concentric Emap 
Cook (William) EMI Group 
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Table A5.6 - Continued 
ERA Group Grampian Hoildings 
ERF Holdings Grampian Television 
European Colour Granada Group 
Eurotherm Grand Metropolitan Hotels 
Expamet International Graseby 
Feedback Greenalls Group 
Fenner Greene King 
Ferguson International Greggs 
Ferraris Group Great Universal Stores 
Ferrum Holdings Guinness 
Fife Indmar Hall Engineering 
FII Group Halstead (James) 
Fine Arts Developments Hampson Industries 
Finlay (James) Hanson 
First Call Group Hardys & Hansons 
First Leisure Harris (Philip) 
Firth Holdings Harrisons & Cros. 
Fitch Hawtal Whiting Holdings 
FKI Hay (Norman) 
Flare Group Hazelwood Foods 
Forminster Henlys Group 
Fortnum & Mason Hepworth 
Forward Technology Industries Hewden-Stuart 
Foster (John) Heywood Williams 
French Hicking Pentecost 
French Connection Hickson International 
Friendly Hotels Highland Distillers 
Fuller Smith Hill & Smith 
Galliford Home Counties Newspapers Holdings 
Garton Engineering Hollas Group 
Gaskell Holt (Joseph) 
GBE International Hopkinsons Group 
General Electric Company Howard Holdings 
Gent (SR) Howden Group 
Gibbs & Dandy HTV Group 
Gibbs Mew Hunting 
Gieves Group lbstock 
GKN Iceland Group 
Glaxo Wellcome IMI 
Gleeson (MJ) Imperial Chemical Industries 
Glynwed International Inchcape 
Goodwin Instem 
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Table A5.6 - Continued 
Intelek Lyles (S. ) 
Intereurope Techn. Services MY Holdings 
Jacks (William) M-R Group 
Jacobs Holdings Macfarlane Group 
Jerome (S) & Sons Manders 
Johnson Cleaners Mansfield Brewery 
Johnson Matthey Marley 
Johnston Group Marshalls 
Jones & Shipman Marston Thompson 
Jones, Stroud (Holdings) Martin International 
Jourdan (Thomas) Matthew Clark 
Kalamazoo Computing Matthews (Bernard) 
Kalon Group Maunders (John) 
Kelsey Industries (keep) Mayflower Corp. 
Kingfisher McAlpine (Alfred) 
Kwik Save Group McCarthy & Stone (Holdings) 
Kwik-Fit Holdings McKechnie 
Kynoch Group McLeod Russel 
Ladbroke Group Meggitt 
Laing (John) Mentmore Abbey 
Laird Group Menzies (John) 
Lambert Howarth Group Merrydown 
Lamont Holdings Metalrax Group 
Laporte Meyer International 
Laser-Scan Holdings Microgen Holdings 
Latham (James) ML Holdings 
Leeds Group MMT Computing 
Leigh Interests Molins 
Lex Service Morgan Sindall 
Liberty Morland 
Lilleshall Mosaic Investments 
Linton Park Moss Bros Group 
Lionheart Mowlem (John) & Company 
Lister & Co Neepsend 
Loades Newman Tonks 
Locker (Thomas) Nichols (J. N. ) (Virnto) 
Logica Norcros 
London International Group Northern Foods 
Lookers North Midland Construction 
Lovell (Y. J. ) Holdings Ocean Group 
Lowe (Robert H. ) OMI International 
LPA Industries Owen & Robinson 
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Table A5.6 - Continued 
Oxford Instruments Ropner 
Parkland Group Ross Group 
Pascoe's Group Rotork 
Paterson Zochonis Rubicon Group 
Pearson Rugby Group 
Peek Safeway 
Pegasus Sainsbury (J) 
Pen. &Ornt Steam Navigator Company Saltire 
Perkins Foods Savoy Hotel 
Phoenix Timber Scapa Group 
Photo-Me International Scottish & Newcastle 
Pifco Holdings Scottish TV 
Pilkington Seet 
Plasmec Senior Engr. 
Plysu Sharpe & Fisher 
Pochin's Sheffield United 
Portsmouth and Sunderland Newspapers Shilon 
Powerscreen Sidlaw Group 
Premier Famell Siebe 
Premier Health Group Signet Group 
Quadrant Group Silenthight Holdings 
Queens Moat Houses Simon Engr. 
Quicks Group Sinclair WM Holdings 
Racal Electronic Sirdar 
Radiant Metal Sketchley 
Raine Slingsby (HC) 
Rank Group Smith & Nephew 
Ransom (William) Smith (David S. ) 
Ransomes Smith (WH) Group 
Readicut International Smith Industries 
Redland Spirax-Sarco 
Reed International Spring Ram Corporation 
Regal Hotel Group Stakis 
Relyon Group Sterling Industries 
Renishaw Stat-Plus Group 
Renold Staveley Industries 
Reurters Holdings Sterling Industries 
Rexam Stirling Group 
Ricardo Group Stoddard Sekers 
Richardsons Westgarth Stylo 
RMC Group Sunleigh 
Rolfe & Nolan Sutcliffe Speakman 
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Table A5.6 - Continued 
Swan (John) Waddington 
Swan Hill Group Wagon Ind. Holdings 
Syltone Walker (Thomas) 
T&S Stores Walker Greenbank 
Tarmac Wassall 
Tate & Lyle Watmoughs Holdings 
Taylor Woodrow Watson & Philip 
TDS Circuits Weir Group 
Telernetrix Wellman 
Tex Holdings Wembley Group 
Thorpe (FW) WF Electrical 
TI Group Whessoe 
Time Products Whitbread 
Tomkins Whitecroft 
Tomkinsons Widney 
Toye Wiggins Group 
Transport Dev Williams Holdings 
Transtec Wilson (Connolly) 
Trinity International Holdings Wimpey (George) 
TT Group Wolseley 
Tudor Wolstenholme Rink. 
TumPyke Wolv. & Dudley 
Ugland International Holdings Wood (Arthur) 
Unigate Worthington 
Upton & Southern WPP Group 
United News & Media WT Foods 
Verity Group Young & Co's Brewery 
Vickers Yorklyde 
Victoria Carpet Yorks. Group 
Vitex Group Young (H) Holdings 
Volex Group Yule Catto, 
Wage Gruop 
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Table A5.7 Company Names and Years of Entering Insolvency Regime 
of UK Failed Quo ted Industrials Used in the Estimation Sample 
for the Comparative Study 
Allied Partnership Group 1992 International Resort Holdings 1992 
Astra Holdings 1992 Lilley 1993 
ATP Communications Group 1992 Sale Tilney 1992 
Chelsea Man 1991 Toothill (R. W. ) 1991 
Chequers Group 1992 Trilion 1992 
Doctus 1991 Video Store Group 1991 
Gaynor Group 1991 Ward Group 1992 
Grovewood Securities 1991 West Industries 1992 
Halls Homes & Gardens 1992 Willaire Group 1992 
Hey & Croft Group 1992 Williams (John) Industries 1990 
Table A5.8 Company Names of UK Non-failed Quoted Industrials 
Used in the Estimation Sample for the Comparative Study 
Bailey (C. H. ) Jones, Stroud (Holdings) 
Benson Group Kwik Save Group 
Cadbury Schweppes McCarthy & Stone (Holdings) 
FII Group Meristem 
Fortnum & Mason MMT Computing 
Granada Group Persimmon 
Greenalls Group Quadrant Group 
Henlys Group Smith (WH) Group 
Holt (Joseph) Tate & Lyle 
Johnson Matthey Transtec 
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Table A5.9 Names, Years of Insolvency, and Accounts Years 
of Failed Russian Industrial Companies 
(All Companies are Organised as Joint Stock Companies) 
Failed Company Name Insolvency Financial 
Year Year 
Astrakhanzhilstroy 1996 1995 
Belgorodskii Mashinostroitelnii Zavod Progres 1996 1995 
Egor'yevskii Derevobrabativayushchii Kombinat 1996 1995 
Elektroinstrument 1997 1996 
Elkon 1996 1995 
Gorokhoveztkii Sudostroitelnii Zavod 1996 1995 
Karpinskaya Khlopkopryaditnaya Fabrika 1996 1995 
Kasimovskii Stroitelnii Kombinat 1996 1995 
Keramik 1996 1995 
Kostromaenergostroy 1996 1995 
Mozhginskii Zavod Dubil'nikh Ekstraktov 1996 1995 
Orlovskii Zavod Upravl'ayushchikh Vychislitelnich Mashin 1996 1995 
Pishchekombinat Kyrovsky 1996 1995 
Tekhnomash 1996 1995 
Torgovii Dom 1996 1995 
Tulaelektroprivod 1996 1995 
Valamazskii Stekolnii Zavod 1996 1995 
Vereshchagenskii Trikotazh 1996 1995 
Viborgskii Priborostroiteh-iii Zavod 1996 1995 
Viborgskii Tselulozno-Bumazhnii Kombinat 1996 1995 
Yeletskii Zavod Elta 1996 1995 
339 
APPENDIX 5 
Table A5.10 Names and Accounts Years of Non-failed Russian Industrial Companies 
(All Companies are Organised as Joint Stock Companies) 
Non-failed Company Name 
Beskudnikovskii Kombinat Stroitelnich Materialov 
Cherkizovskii Myasopererabativauyshchii Zavod 
Electrosv'yaz 
Irbitskii Stekolnii Zavod 
Ivanovskii Zavod Tyazhelogo Stankostroyeniya 
Kalugastroyservis 
Karacharovsky Mekhanicheskii Zavod 
Kostromskoii Sudomechanicheskii Zavod 
Krasnii Treugohiik 
Krasnodarelektrostroykonstruktsi'ya 
Mashinostrioitelnii Zavod 
Moskovskii Chugunoliteynii Zavod Stankolit 
Moskovskii Pishchevoy Kombinat 
Ornskii Elektromekhanicheskii Zavod 
Peterburgskaya Telefonnaya Set 
PO Khimprodukt 
Promtractor-CHLZ 
Serpuchovskaya Bumazhnaya Fabrika 
Sevemaya Zarya 
Sukremlskii Chugunoliteynii Zavod 
Trekhgomaya Manufactura 
Trikotazh, town of Irkutsk 
Tumentelekom 
Uralskii Shchinii Zavod 
Uralsvyazinforin 
Yargorgrazhdanstroy 
Yuzhnouralskii Farforovii Zavod 
Financial 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1995 
1995 
1996 
1996 
1996 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1996 
1995 
1995 
1996 
1996 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
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